VZCZCXRO8167
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #0368/01 0361335
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051335Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5924
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 3610
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000368 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR HARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016 
TAGS: PGOV MOPS MCAPARR MARR PHUM AF
SUBJECT: PRT LASHKAR GAH: MUSA QALA ELDERS DEFY THE TALIBAN 
AND ARE NOW AT A CROSSROAD 
 
REF: REF: KABUL 236 
 
Classified By: DCM RNORLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (SBU/NF) SUMMARY:  The death of a local Taliban 
commander,s brother in an air strike in Helmand province was 
the catalyst for a series of events that shattered the 
relative quiet of Musa Qala district, culminating in the 
Taliban,s seizure of the district center on February 1.  In 
retaliation for the air strike, Mullah Abdul Ghafar, whose 
brother had been killed, and Taliban forces occupied the 
district center and detained three Afghan National Auxiliary 
Police (ANAP).  District elders and shura members opposed 
this action en masse, forcing the Taliban to release the ANAP 
and withdraw.  In the ensuing negotiations, the Taliban 
demanded that the elders remove the Afghan national flag, 
then flying over the administration building.  The elders 
again refused, with local mullahs giving the refusal the 
force of a fatwah, or &Islamic obligation.8  The two sides 
agreed to meet on February 5 to negotiate further, but on 
February 1 the Taliban attacked the district center, beat and 
disarmed ANAP, damaged or destroyed the administration 
building, finally succeeded in removing the Afghan flag and 
confined shura members to their homes.  Afghan officials 
publicly threatened action, with the support of ISAF, to 
retake the town.  Governor Wafa has strongly advocated a 
robust response to the Taliban's actions.  He released a 
statement denouncing the Taliban and urging support for the 
elders (as did ISAF).  On the afternoon of February 4 word 
spread that an ISAF air strike in Musa Qala had killed Ghafar 
and unknown others. 
 
¶2.  (SBU/NF) Summary Continued: The controversial agreement 
reached last fall with Musa Qala district elders was in 
tatters before the February 1 attack; it is now inoperative. 
What will emerge from the wreckage of the agreement, and of 
the district center, will have impact across Helmand.  Musa 
Qala residents had been willing to live with hovering Taliban 
presence as the price of six months of relative calm.  With 
that peace shattered by the violence brought on the town by 
the Taliban, attitudes and loyalties appear up for grabs, 
though reporting indicates locals are unhappy with the 
insurgents' actions.  Swift reinstatement of the ousted 
elders and offers of assistance could draw what was an 
anti-government enclave towards the GOA,s sphere.  An 
important step would be acceptance of Wafa,s &protocols.8 
Musa Qala remaining under Taliban control would undermine the 
centerpiece of Wafa,s tribal outreach in Helmand. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
Taliban Retaliates for Deadly Air Strike 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU/NF) According to Afghan sources, an ISAF air strike 
last week in Helmand province,s Musa Qala district (outside 
the 5 km zone around the district center) killed the brother 
of a local Taliban commander, Mullah Abdul Ghafar (or 
Ghafoor).  In retaliation, Ghafar and Taliban supporters 
attacked the Musa Qala district center, disarming the guards 
(possibly members of the Afghan National Auxiliary Police 
(ANAP)) and forcing the shura to leave the district compound. 
 After Ghafar displaced the elders, a separate group of 
Taliban (the "local" or "moderate" Taliban who apparently 
supported the shura) interceded.  Lengthy negotiations 
between the two Taliban groups followed.  There were also 
reports of a large group of elders confronting Ghafar and 
demanding the release of the three men and the withdrawal of 
Ghafar and his men from the district center.  Ghafar and his 
men complied, withdrawing, releasing the three, and returning 
their uniforms and weapons.  (Note: The two versions of the 
confrontation with Ghafar may be one and the same.  Given the 
looseness of the term &Taliban8 among Afghans, and the fact 
that locals have acknowledged that &local Taliban8 are 
members of the shura, the accounts are substantially similar. 
 End Note) 
 
 
KABUL 00000368  002 OF 003 
 
 
Taliban Commander Demands Removal of Afghan Flag 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4.  (SBU/NF) On January 31, a member of the Musa Qala shura 
told PRTOff that, while Ghafar had left the district center, 
the situation had not returned to normal.  Negotiations 
continued with Ghafar demanding that the shura remove the 
flag of Afghanistan from the atop the district center.  He 
insisted it was not the flag of an Islamic state.  This 
angered shura members, who told Ghafar that it had been the 
country,s flag before Ghafar was born and refused his 
demand.  The shura member told PRTOff at that point that the 
shura expected to prevail as "all the people" in the center 
supported the shura,s existing agreement with the Government 
of Afghanistan (GOA), and that Ghafar had no support. 
 
Shura Rejects Taliban Demands, Again 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU/NF) The same shura member reported to PRTOff that on 
February 1 a large group of elders, mullahs and shura members 
(estimated as 2000) gathered in the district center. They met 
to address a demand to remove the Afghan flag, this time by 
Mullah Manan (Taliban district chief of Sangin).  (Note: It 
is not clear but appears likely that Mullah Manan was simply 
echoing Ghafar's demand.  End Note)  The assembled group 
agreed to reject the demand, concluding that words of the 
mullahs, shura and elders had the force of an "Islamic 
obligation" (fatwa) that must be obeyed.  The shura member 
stressed the importance of such an obligation, especially 
undertaken by so many.  He described the group as being 
angry, having concluded that the Taliban are the "slaves of 
Pakistan." (Note: A separate source provided an additional 
motivation for the shura members insisting that the flag 
remain flying.  He said the villagers believed it was a 
symbol that would protect the district center from bombings 
and raids by NATO.  End Note)  The group,s decision was 
conveyed to unspecified Taliban members, who responded that 
they would depart to discuss the matter with their "top 
commanders in Pakistan," and they would a meeting with the 
elders on February 5. 
 
Taliban Takes over District Center 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU/NF) On February 1 the Taliban attacked the DC, beat 
and disarmed ANAP, damaged or destroyed the DC administration 
building and surrounding wall, removed the Afghan flag and 
confined shura members to their homes.  A shura member 
claimed that locals were refusing to cooperate with the 
Taliban, e.g., refusing to provide food and shelter.  He 
added that fear of NATO air strikes fed the ill-will towards 
the Taliban, whose recent actions have put an end to six 
months of relative quiet.  There have been reports of locals 
fleeing the district center. 
 
¶7.  (SBU/NF) Afghan government officials publicly threatened 
action, in concert with ISAF, to retake the town.  Governor 
Wafa has strongly advocated a robust response to the 
Taliban's actions.  He released a statement denouncing the 
Taliban and urging support for the elders (as did ISAF).  On 
the afternoon of February 4 reports indicated that an ISAF 
air strike in Musa Qala killed Ghafar and unknown others. 
 
Frayed Relations with Taliban are Broken 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU/NF) According to various sources, relations between 
the shura and &active Taliban8 in the area had been 
deteriorating even before the air strike.  Before the 
occupation of the district center, and probably before the 
air strike, members of the shura approached Ghafar in order 
to convince him leave the insurgency and abandon a checkpoint 
that he and his militias used to search people and extract 
money from them.  Governor Wafa had made it clear that, 
pursuant to the existing agreement with the GOA, hr expected 
 
KABUL 00000368  003 OF 003 
 
 
the shura to turn over tax revenues.  This apparently led to 
the shura deciding that closing the Taliban checkpoint would 
leave more money in the pockets of locals for the shura to 
tax.  Ghafar reportedly apparently scoffed at the shura's 
request and insulted the elders, calling them useless. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU/NF) COMMENT:  The controversial agreement with Musa 
Qala district elders, reached last fall, was, at best, in 
suspension while the elders negotiated with the Taliban.  The 
seizure of the district center by the Taliban destroyed the 
agreement and upset the existing fragile balance between the 
local shura and the Taliban.  The shura is at a crossroad, 
and what happens next will have an impact far beyond the 
small district.  Governor Wafa,s call for a robust response 
on the part of the GOA and the international community, 
including public expressions of support and material 
assistance, does not mean he expects the elders to embrace 
the GOA.  He understands the elders are constantly weighing 
their options, comparing the costs and benefits of different 
alliances.  The Taliban has been damaged physically by recent 
ISAF and GOA operations in Helmand and politically by its own 
operations against Musa Qala.  Wafa understands an opening 
exists for convincing the shura that the GOA ) with ISAF 
standing behind it ) is both a credible threat and a 
potential partner.  Relatively swift reinstatement of the 
ousted elders, coupled with assurances of assistance, could 
draw a heretofore largely anti-government enclave towards the 
GOA,s sphere.  A critical first step on the part of the 
shura would be acceptance of Wafa,s pro-GOA conditions 
("protocols8) which he says have received a positive 
response from other districts, elders (REFTEL).  END COMMENT. 
NEUMANN