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Viewing cable 07DILI70, REINADO'S LAST STAND: REBEL LEADER SURROUNDED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07DILI70 2007-02-27 13:28 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Dili
VZCZCXRO8907
PP RUEHLMC RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0070/01 0581328
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 271328Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3305
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0822
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0782
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0889
RUCNMCM/MCC COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0719
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0640
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0601
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2648
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000070 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/27/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MAAR KPKO UN AU TT
SUBJECT: REINADO'S LAST STAND: REBEL LEADER SURROUNDED 
 
REF: 2006 DILI 597 
 
DILI 00000070  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Stanley Harsha, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy 
Dili, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
 
 
 
1. (C) Summary:  As of 9 p.m. local time February 27, a large 
contingent of the mainly Australian International Security 
Forces (ISF) in a western East Timor town had cordoned off 
escape routes for dissident F-FDTL Major Alfredo Reinado and his 
group, who on February 25 seized 15-25 assault rifles from three 
Border Patrol Unit (BPU) posts. Barracaded in with Reindado were 
petitioner spokesman Lt. Gustao Salsinha and opposition 
politician Leandro Isaak. Reinado's February 25 actions have 
produced an immediate and unified consensus by both national and 
international authorities, including President Xanana Gusmao, 
that he has crossed a line and that the International Security 
Forces (ISF) should affect his surrender or capture as soon as 
possible.  An unknown number of "petitioners," the group of 
soldiers fired from the military in March 2006 after they 
complained of discrimination, are also in the area. ISF forces 
reportedly are tightening the cordon in hope that Reinado will 
surrender, but failing that are determined to arrest him, 
according to the Australian ambassador to East Timor.  However, 
the Australian Embassy is also apparently seeking written 
authorization from the President and Prime Minister before 
taking decisive action with the objective of persuading Reinado 
to surrender in light of public proof that the ISF has official 
authority to act forcefully. Regardless of the outcome of the 
current standoff, there will be several questions and risk 
factors to consider. His popular support in the West could 
produce a backlash in response to action against him, especially 
in the context of perceptions of double standards in holding key 
actors in the recent crisis accountable. In addition, he has 
become increasingly close to the military "petitioners" group 
and it is not clear how they will respond to current 
developments. End summary. 
 
2. (C) On Sunday February 25, dissident F-FDTL (East Timor's 
defense force) Major Alfredo Reinado and eight or nine of his 
men descended upon the BPU outposts of Tonobibi, Mota Masin, and 
Salele Suai in three vehicles, and acquired between 15 to 25 
HK-33 assault rifles and some ammunition.  Based on various 
sources, it appears that between 13 to 16 rifles were acquired 
in Tonobibi, three in Mota Masin, and five more from Salele 
Suai.  All reporting from those areas indicates that these 
acquisitions were not the result of attacks, but rather that 
there was at least some collaboration between Reinado's group 
and the BPU, and that mutual coordination may have actually 
preceded Reinado's arrival at two of the locations.  According 
to one report, the commander at Tonobibi did challenge Reinado 
initially, but capitulated after succumbing to rhetoric about 
how "we are all Westerners and must work together." 
Additionally, sources told us that BPU officers Marciano Andrade 
and Acacio de Araujo from Mota Masin, and Joao Martinho from 
Tonobibi joined Reinado following the handover of weapons. 
However there are conflicting reports as to whether or not this 
actually occurred as other sources report that the three simply 
accompanied him to facilitate the movement of the weapons and 
then returned to post. 
 
3. (C) Reinado's actions have produced an immediate and unified 
consensus by both national and international authorities that he 
has crossed a line, that all dialogue options are now off the 
table, and that (ISF) should achieve his surrender or capture as 
soon as possible.  Perhaps most damning for Reinado, President 
Xanana Gusmao who has been sympathetic to his stance, went on 
television the night of February 26 to proclaim that what 
Reinado had done was "stupid", and that he had given the ISF 
authorization to launch an operation against him.  Prime 
Minister Jose Ramos-Horta contacted President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono on the day of the weapons seizure and requested that 
the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) be used to secure Jakarta's 
side of the border.  Ramos-Horta's presidential campaign manager 
today relayed to Emboff that they had been intending to reach 
out to Reinado to ask for his support of the Ramos-Horta 
candidacy but that this was now out of the question.  Special 
 
DILI 00000070  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Atul Khare, in a 
meeting with Charge d'Affaires, stated unequivocally that 
negotiations were now off the table.  Khare added that he was 
previously intent on pursuing a course of action that would give 
Reinado every possible chance to surrender himself peacefully 
and that, in fact, Reinado had recently indicated that was ready 
to surrender. 
 
4. (C) Former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri in a meeting today 
with CDA remarked that Reinado should have been captured 
immediately following his prison break last year, instead of 
being given time to organize and build support.  (Alkatiri and 
his ruling Fretilin party have repeatedly alleged that Reinado 
was part of a larger conspiracy involving opposition parties to 
unseat him and undermine Fretilin's governance.)  However, he 
expressed satisfaction with the current leadership consensus to 
take military action to capture Reinado, identifying the ISF as 
the appropriate force to do so. 
 
5. (C) Following a great deal of collective speculation as to 
Reinado's whereabouts, we received accurate reporting that he 
would be holding a press conference in Same at 10 a.m. February 
27.  About two hours after the press conference was scheduled to 
begin, we began receiving eyewitness reports of an ISF cordon of 
Same, where no one - journalists included - were being allowed 
to leave or enter the town, that Reinado was trapped inside, and 
that his whereabouts had been confirmed.  One member of his 
group was reportedly captured with weapons this afternoon.  At 
the close of the day as night fell, it appeared that no further 
action would be taken overnight except to ensure that Reinado is 
unable to escape.  It is not known whether he is armed at this 
time, how many of his men are with him, or what his intentions 
are.  An unknown number of the "petitioners" group is also in 
Same.  In a conversation this afternoon with Embassy staff, the 
petitioners' spokesperson Lt. Gastao Salsinha confirmed that he 
is currently with Reinado.  Deputy SRSG Finn Reske-Nielson 
confirmed at 8 p.m. February 27 that ISF was tightening the 
noose around Reinado and had spotted 10-15 unarmed petitioners 
walking around town intoxicated, but that decisive action would 
likely not happen until the next day. 
 
6. (C) Late this afternoon the Australian Ambassador relayed to 
us that the ISF is seeking to obtain a letter signed by both 
Gusmao and Ramos-Horta to give them unambiguous authorization to 
"take specific action" against Reinado, and that the two men 
were to meet late today for this purpose.  With this 
authorization, it is expected that the ISF will initiate 
operations that should culminate in either Reinado's capture, or 
perhaps his death, should he choose not to surrender.  Earlier 
today, in speaking with media sources Reinado stated that he 
would not surrender and that he would in fact fight to the 
death.  In a possible indication of increasing desperation, 
Reinado attempted to reach the CDA by conveying his current 
number and a request for a call via opposition Member of 
Parliament Quiteria da Costa.  No call was made to Reinado and 
the information was passed to SRSG Khare and the Australian 
Ambassador.  The Ambassador said this information was useful in 
determining how desperate Reinado was in grasping for straws. 
 
7. (C) With the current leadership consensus on the need for 
action, it is possible that the risk of a pro-Reinado backlash 
may be somewhat mitigated but it is by no means eliminated. 
Although there are reports that some Catholic Church leaders in 
the western districts have dropped their support, he has built 
up widespread sympathy and varying degrees of support throughout 
the western districts (see Reftel).  Underscoring this support 
is the fact that there has been no evident movement by Timorese 
authorities to begin formal legal proceedings against a number 
of prominent individuals, with the exception of former Interior 
Minister Rogerio Lobato, who were recommended for prosecution by 
the United Nation's Commission of Inquiry (COI) for their roles 
in the events of April and May 2006.  Besides Reinado, other 
individuals named in the COI's report include ex-Defense 
Minister Roque Rodrigues, Defense Force Chief Brigadier General 
Taur Matan Ruak, and several others.  Nearly all of them are 
still holding the same position they occupied during the period 
last year when several possible human rights violations 
occurred.  The recent archiving of the criminal case against 
 
DILI 00000070  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
ex-Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, along with these other factors, 
probably contributed to Reinado and his supporters an even 
greater sense of injustice in light of the possible fate which 
may soon await him. 
 
8. (C) Additionally, there appears to have been almost nothing 
achieved by the Commission of Notables appointed by the GOET to 
look into the circumstances surrounding the military 
"petitioner" episode, the trigger for the period of crisis which 
began last April.  The petitioners also have much sympathy 
throughout the West and, unlike Reinado, are regarded as having 
conducted themselves maturely and non-violently throughout the 
crisis (although some individuals or small sub groups have been 
accused of involvement in violent incidents).  The fact that the 
petitioners appear to have now thrown in their lot with Reinado 
may also have a significant influence on the response to action 
against Reinado.  Reinado's closeness to the military 
petitioners is also a key to his overall tactical capability, 
and perhaps more significantly, his ability to project himself 
as a threat.  While there are still many unanswered questions 
with regards to the actual number of arms the petitioners 
possess, this ambiguity plays to one of Reinado's strengths of 
being able to project a threat while not actually having 
requisite capability. 
HARSHA