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OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0153/01 0120759
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 120759Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9768
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZJ/HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL  PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1962
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 4231
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH PRIORITY 0648
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 9526
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 2006
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 2981
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 0545
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3005

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 000153 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2017 
TAGS: PGOV KAWC KCRMJA KJUS KLIG PGOV PHUM PREL AS ID
CB, JA 
SUBJECT: JAPAN'S VIEWS ON WAR CRIME ISSUES 
 
 
TOKYO 00000153  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Joe Donovan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
. 
 
 ¶1.  (C)  Summary:  During a series of meetings on December 
21-22, 2006, Senior Advisor to the Office of War Crime Issues 
Milbert Shin met with academics, Japan Institute of 
International Affairs (JIIA) think tank scholars, and 
government officials to discuss progress in the establishment 
of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT) (also referred to as the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)), 
potential United States Government assistance to the KRT, 
nation-building in East Timor, and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).  Building 
democratic institutions, establishing rule of law, and 
maintaining stability need to be accomplished before Cambodia 
and East Timor can begin the process of accounting for past 
human rights violations, said Former United Nations Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General and Hosei University 
Professor Sukehiro Hasegawa, former Ambassador of Japan to 
East Timor Ambassador Hideki Asahi, and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs officials.  Turning to the ICTY, completion of all 
cases by the end of 2010 is a major priority for Japan, 
explained MOFA UN Policy Division Director Shigeki Takizaki. 
If the ICTY fails to complete its mission by the end of 2010, 
funding for further proceedings should be on a voluntary 
basis by concerned countries.  Japan is willing to discuss 
closer to the 2010 deadline specific procedures and 
mechanisms for any unexpected contingencies and to address 
residual jurisdiction after the ICTY has completed 
adjudicating cases, added Takizaki. 
 
Nation Building Before Tribunals 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) MOFA Director of the Second Southeast Asia Division, 
Akio Isomata, emphasized the need to build democratic 
institutions before East Timor begins to think about 
accounting for past human rights violations.  Japan is 
closely following investigations conducted by the recent UN 
Commissions of Inquiry, and Isomata acknowledged that such 
investigations are important to resolve underlying problems 
in essential government institutions; however, he cautioned 
against the international community being overly assertive. 
The UN Commission of Inquiry Report on the April-June 2006 
violence had intentionally not identified individuals 
responsible for serious human rights violations in order to 
help speed national reconciliation, Isomata asserted. 
Indonesia will object if East Timor considers legal 
proceedings, he said. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Accountability for crimes against humanity is very 
important.  However, in the near term, Japan is placing more 
emphasis on helping build democratic institutions and 
establishing the rule of law in East Timor's "fragile" 
environment, Isomata explained.  Japan has extended 
approximately USD 200 million in assistance to East Timor 
since 1999 and will dispatch  two civilian police officers to 
serve as advisors to the UN on the ground, Isomata stated. 
He was unclear, however, on whether the two advisors would 
have executive police powers.  Isomata agreed with S/A Shin's 
suggestion that training should focus on the importance of 
command and control, including measures for proper weapons 
registration and tracking.  S/A Shin praised the importance 
of Japan's contributions, and agreed that any future inquiry 
into past crimes must be conducted in an integrated fashion, 
addressing all aspects of the criminal justice system 
including a functional police force, the prosecution and 
defense bar and the judiciary. 
 
 
Hope for Khmer Rouge Tribunal 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) The United States should use the United Nations to 
promote a war crimes tribunal in Cambodia and work to avoid 
the appearance that any single country, such as the United 
States or Australia, is demanding the trial, emphasized 
former UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General and 
Hosei University Professor Sukehiro Hasegawa.  Japan's 
historical past and lack of human resources and experiences 
limits its ability to influence Cambodian leaders to move 
 
TOKYO 00000153  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
forward on accounting for crimes against humanity, Hasegawa 
said.  Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) 
Director-General Seki Tomoda said ASEAN should be the most 
important actor in pressuring Cambodia to hold a war crimes 
tribunal.  He added that he was not optimistic ASEAN could 
influence Cambodia given ASEAN's policy of not interfering in 
other countries' domestic affairs. 
 
¶5.  (C) MOFA Principle Deputy Director of the First Southeast 
Asia Division, Atsushi Kuwabara, and Deputy Director, Masaki 
Kawaguchi, downplayed the impact of political interference 
and stressed the overall positive gains made by the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). 
Kuwabara recognized that there have been attempts to 
influence the process, but did not believe they have risen to 
a level that would render the proceedings a sham.  He said 
the involvement of international judges and the UN in the 
hybrid tribunal will make it possible to hold trials at an 
internationally acceptable level.  Hasegawa believes that 
Cambodian judges should be included but the majority should 
be international judges to ensure the court can withstand 
local government pressure. 
 
¶6.  (C) Japan has sent strong messages urging Cambodian 
authorities (including Minister Sok An) to refrain from 
interfering with the work of the tribunal, Kuwabara noted. 
Citing the importance of the ECCC to the development of 
international standards for the Cambodian legal system, 
Kuwabara and Kawaguchi expressed hope that the United States 
will take a more active role.  S/A Shin agreed that the 
tribunal can serve the dual purposes of bringing former Khmer 
Rouge leaders to justice and instilling the confidence of 
ordinary Cambodians in their legal system, but only if the 
judges know they can do their jobs without political 
interference or the fear of political interference. 
 
¶7.  (C) Kuwabara shared S/A Shin's concerns that the Second 
Plenary had failed to agree on internal rules to govern the 
KRT in the November plenary, but faulted the complexities of 
trying to adopt more than 110 articles in just four or five 
days.  He was encouraged by the overall good cooperation 
between international judges, Cambodian judges, and the UN, 
and pointed to disagreements even within the two groups of 
judges to refute claims that the Cambodian side was trying to 
slow the process.  Kawaguchi cited recent problems with 
training to demonstrate the broader point that both the 
Cambodian side and the international side needed to make 
changes in the way they do business.  While it was not good 
for the Cambodian Bar Association (CBA) to have opposed 
training by the International Bar Association, he said, much 
of the blame should rest on the international side for not 
informing the CBA in an appropriate manner.  S/A Shin assured 
Kuwabara that international members of the KRT are now aware 
that they need to do more to smooth out problems.  The 
resolution of internal problems would make the role of 
political influence more readily discernible, if the tribunal 
is nevertheless still unable to move forward, he added.  S/A 
Shin told Kuwabara that the need to get past the internal 
rules has kept international friends of the court from 
addressing other issues important to the successful conduct 
of cases, such as technical issues related to investigations, 
case strategy, document databases, trial software and 
staffing. 
 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  S/A Shin met with UN Policy Division Director 
Shigeki Takizaki and Akihito Teruuchi at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs December 22 to discuss the future of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY).  Shin told Takizaki that in addition to wanting the 
court to have completed all trials by 2008 and appeals by 
2010, the United States is seeking an exchange of views on 
considering procedures and funding for residual jurisdiction 
matters that remain after 2010, such as post-appeal review 
proceedings.  There is a general feeling among staff of the 
ICTY that some residual jurisdiction will remain after the 
tribunal is completed, said Shin.  Also, if the dissolution 
of the court does not include a structure to handle 
 
TOKYO 00000153  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
carry-over cases, some indictees like Radovan Karadzic and 
Ratko Mladic might escape justice due to lengthy delays in 
bringing them to trial, which would in effect permit such 
fugitives to "win the battle of time," Shin warned Takizaki. 
 
 
¶9.  (C)  Careful consideration of procedures after the ICTY 
has concluded adjudicating cases is essential to preserving 
the legacy of the Tribunal, Shin said to Takizaki. Shin 
raised several possibilities for post-2010 proceedings to 
Takizaki, including that the ICTY could remain as an 
appellate chamber only, or judges could participate without 
being in residence.  Prosecution and defence counsel could 
return to their jurisdictions, only appearing in court to 
address post-appeal matters as they arise, further reducing 
costs.  Teruuchi suggested that the ICTY could pass 
jurisdiction on to select local courts that were deemed to 
meet international standards. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Completion of all cases by 2010 is Japan's major 
priority for the ICTY, stated Takizaki.  The government of 
Japan had never considered the matter of residual 
jurisdiction before Shin mentioned it, explained Takizaki, 
thanking Shin for bringing the issue to Japan's attention. 
With no pre-existing policy on this issue, the Japanese 
government welcomes consultation with the United States. 
However, it is far too early to begin serious deliberations 
on post-completion structures, and involved parties should 
focus their efforts on driving the ICTY to completion, 
Takizaki stated.  The current position of the Japanese 
government is that if the ICTY fails to complete its mission 
by 2010, funding for any additional proceedings should be on 
a voluntary basis by concerned countries.  However, Japan 
will be open to discussing the trials of late-arriving 
fugitives and the matter of residual jurisdiction closer to 
the 2010 deadline, but not any sooner, added Takizaki. 
DONOVAN