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DE RUEHSM #0008/01 0040840
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 040840Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1539
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 000008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/NB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV SOCI PHUM SW
SUBJECT: ANTI-IMMIGRATION SWEDEN DEMOCRATS ON THE RISE 
 
¶1.  (U)  SUMMARY:  The nationalistic Sweden Democrats gained 2.9% of 
the national vote in September, capitalizing on anti-immigration 
sentiment.  The party and its views on restricting immigration are 
treated with suspicion by the mainstream parties and media.  The 
Sweden Democrats claim that they are only proposing policies similar 
to existing laws in Denmark.  The party's relative electoral success 
will give it a more visible role in questioning Swedish immigration 
policy.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (U)  In September, the Sweden Democrats had their best election 
result ever, receiving 2.9% of the national vote, doubling their 
result compared to the national election in 2002.  They have 
increased their support more than eightfold since 1998.  Today, the 
party holds 280 elected posts in 140 municipalities, up from 49 
mandates in 29 municipalities in 2002.  The party's growth in power 
has happened despite a weak party organization, poor economic 
resources, and the lack of a strong charismatic leader.  This 
increase also happened despite the party largely being shunned by 
the mainstream media and excluded from the political debate. 
 
The Reasons behind the Sweden Democrats' Rise 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U)  Critics claim that the party is xenophobic.  At the same 
time many politicians and opinion makers explain the success of the 
Sweden Democrats as a phenomenon of people voting in protest against 
the establishment.  Although a significant number of working class 
voters in southern Sweden abandoned traditional Social Democrat 
loyalties to vote for the Sweden Democrats, it is an 
oversimplification to characterize this merely as a protest against 
the establishment.  The Sweden Democrats enjoy genuine support for 
their policy line on immigration and integration.  According to a 
Gallup poll published in October, 49% of Swedes agreed that 
"Immigrants should adapt to Swedish society, and not the other way 
around," 31% supported the idea that "Sweden has received far too 
many immigrants in a too short a period of time," 12% agreed that 
"Foreign citizens who cannot support themselves financially should 
return to their home countries," and 40% adhered to the view that 
"The burden of proof in cases concerning refugee status and 
residence permits should be tightened." 
 
¶4.  (U)  A significant proportion of the electorate supports a more 
restrictive line on immigration; yet none of the seven parties in 
parliament advocate this view.  With 12.8% of the population born 
abroad, Sweden is one of the EU states with the highest proportion 
of "immigrants."  The rising strength of the Sweden Democrats 
indicates that Sweden is following a wider European trend of 
increased support for nationalistic parties opposed to immigration. 
 
¶5.  (U)  On the municipal level, it appears that factors such as 
immigration, crime, and the degree of welfare dependence correlate 
with support for the Sweden Democrats.  The municipality of 
Landskrona is a perfect example, where the Sweden Democrats 
registered their strongest election performance nationwide by 
gaining 22.3% of the total vote and becoming the third largest 
party.  Landskrona has a large proportion of immigrants, with almost 
a quarter of the population born abroad, a reported crime rate 60% 
higher than the national average, and welfare payments more than 
double the national average, according to the leading daily Dagens 
Nyheter.  Prime Minister Reinfeldt's visit to Landskrona on December 
11 is also indicative of the seriousness with which the Government 
views the challenge from the Sweden Democrats. 
 
¶6.  (U)  In a broader study of all municipalities the newsmagazine 
Fokus compared municipalities where the Sweden Democrats have 
received a mandate to those in which they had not.  Crime rate 
levels were on average 19% higher, welfare dependence 27% higher, 
and the net numbers of refugees per 1000 inhabitants was three times 
higher in municipalities where the Sweden Democrats were elected to 
city council posts. 
 
Strong Reactions against Policies Opposing Immigration 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶7.  (U)  Politics in Sweden are in general less confrontational than 
in many other European states.  A consensual approach where parties 
on opposite sides unite around a common policy is not unusual.  The 
political debate is consequently not as broad and confrontational as 
in other countries.  The consensual approach is also reflected in 
the public debate.  On immigration there appears to be a tacit 
agreement that none of the established parties will overtly try to 
capitalize on sentiment opposed to further immigration.  Sweden's 
strongly embedded egalitarian values also appear to have set 
definite limits to the media debate, making a tough line on 
immigration policy a controversial, and almost suspect view.  This 
is in contrast to Sweden's neighbors Norway and Denmark, which have 
established parliamentary parties advocating restrictions on 
immigration. 
 
 
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Strong Reactions against the Sweden Democrats 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (U)  Opposition to the Sweden Democrats as a political movement 
has manifested itself in various forms.  The Sweden Democrats were 
largely frozen out of the political debate and given minimal media 
coverage before the election.  Following the strong showing of the 
party in the September election, many opinion makers have voiced the 
view that this was a mistake.  However, the united opposition to the 
Sweden Democrats across the political spectrum remains intact. 
According to Dagens Nyheter, the Sweden Democrats hold the potential 
balance of power in 41 municipalities.  In 30 of these, alliances 
between mainstream center-left and center-right parties have arisen 
to keep the Sweden Democrats out.  And in none of the 41 
municipalities has any party formally formed an alliance with the 
Sweden Democrats. 
 
¶9.  (U)  Left wing extremists have long targeted the Sweden 
Democrats.  As a result, party meetings are usually not announced 
publicly to avoid trouble, and members of the party have been 
physically assaulted.  The party leadership also claims that its 
email has been intercepted.  Just before the election, some 
candidates for the party were without their knowledge reregistered 
with the national tax authority as living at new addresses, 
apparently in an attempt to prevent them from being elected.  In 
October the Sweden Democrats held a meeting for newly elected local 
government representatives.  Even though the meeting's location was 
changed to avoid conflict, left-wing demonstrators attacked it, 
destroying two cars, breaking windows, and injuring the Party 
Secretary.  Later in November one member of the Sweden Democrats 
 
SIPDIS 
stepped down from his elected position in Skurup municipality, 
stating the threats against the party as the reason for the 
resignation. 
 
¶10.  (U)  Members of the party also report that association with the 
party is widely viewed as a disadvantage in professional life.  A 
recent high profile example was an incident in October when the 
Swedish Ambassador in Tel Aviv asked an intern to immediately leave 
the embassy after it came to his knowledge that he was an active 
member of the Sweden Democrats.  Ambassador Rydberg told Dagens 
Nyheter that the intern should have openly declared his political 
engagement and that "...an active engagement in a party which all 
Swedish parliamentary parties view as undemocratic and xenophobic is 
not compatible with working for a Swedish mission abroad." 
 
¶11.  (U)  In February, the Government shut down websites run by the 
Sweden Democrats, following the eruption of public anger in the 
Muslim world against a Danish newspaper's publication of cartoons 
depicting the Prophet Mohammed.  In January, the Sweden Democrats' 
party paper SD-Kurriren had announced a cartoon competition.  In 
early February, the Sweden Democrats' Youth League and SD-Kuriren 
published some of these drawings on their websites.  On February 8, 
a government representative from the Foreign Ministry and members of 
the Security Police contacted the internet service provider 
Levonline warning them that the Sweden's Democrats website may pose 
a threat to national security.  The next day Levonline made the 
domains belonging to the Sweden Democrats inaccessible.  On February 
9, the Lebanese TV channel al-Manar reported that Sweden was 
heckling the Prophet.  Afterwards the Government came under sharp 
criticism for its handling of the situation, which eventually 
contributed to the resignation of then Foreign Minister Laila 
Freivalds. 
 
What Do the Sweden Democrats Really Want? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  There is little public sympathy for the Sweden 
Democrats, and the party is still associated with its xenophobic 
views of the late eighties and early nineties (and with some of the 
party's former leaders from that era).  Some of the party's action 
program is strongly nationalistic.  Today's Sweden Democrat party 
has evolved and seen a change in leadership.  The Sweden Democrats 
still reject multiculturalism and advocate assimilation, but 
distance themselves from racism.  In October, party leader Jimmie 
Akesson told Poloff the Sweden Democrats are not against immigration 
per se, but rather want it well regulated, and significantly 
reduced.  Akesson says the Sweden Democrats view Denmark as a model 
for the application of restrictive policies that successfully 
reduced a large immigrant influx. 
 
¶13.  (U)  Akesson commented on the new Swedish Government's policy 
declaration (October 2006) on his blog.  He was most opposed to the 
proposed labor migration legislation, but also expressed 
reservations about increased integration with the EU.  He complained 
that there was no mention in the entire speech of the growing threat 
of Islam.  The Sweden Democrat's policy on topics other than 
immigration is not very developed.  Foreign policy positions include 
adherence to non-alignment (cooperation with NATO is OK, but 
membership is out of the question), and skepticism of an overly 
 
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powerful EU.  On domestic policy, the party has profiled itself on 
tougher crime policy and strong provisions for the elderly.  It is 
also clearly conservative on values. 
 
¶14.  (U)  Many suspect the Sweden Democrats have a hidden agenda. 
Until Mikael Jansson, formerly of the Center Party, assumed 
leadership of the party in 1995, the Sweden Democrats had a 
significant extremist following.  Jansson initiated a shift towards 
becoming a more "normal" party, and the current leader Akesson has 
continued in this tradition.  However, over the past years the NGO 
Expo has continued to identify individuals active in the Sweden 
Democrats who have also had connections to extremist organizations. 
The Sweden Democrats have expelled some of these people, and a 
significant group of more extreme Sweden Democrats left the party in 
2001 to form the National Democrats.  In an effort to increase its 
support the Sweden Democrat party is working to come across as a 
normal and non-extremist party. 
 
The Future of the Party 
----------------------- 
 
¶15.  (U)  The fact that no party is collaborating with the Sweden 
Democrats means that the party will be able to continue to play an 
"outsider" role, allowing it to attract those discontented by what 
they see as "the establishment parties."  The strategy of ignoring 
the Sweden Democrats appears to have failed, and many mainstream 
columnists have advocated a more confrontational approach. 
 
¶16.  (U)  The Sweden Democrats' party organization is weak.  There 
are only approximately 2,500 registered members of the party.  With 
its 2006 electoral success, the party is now entitled to 41 million 
SEK (approx. 6 million USD) in state aid over the next years until 
the 2010 election.  This represents an enormous increase for the 
party, which plans to channel one quarter of the funds to strengthen 
the national organization. 
 
¶17.  (SBU)  Comment:  The fundamental reason behind the Sweden 
Democrats' growing success is popular discontent among a small but 
growing minority of the population with immigration policies 
accepted by all Swedish mainstream political parties.  Support for 
the Sweden Democrats has the potential to increase as long as 
immigration and integration continue to be viewed as problems that, 
in the eyes of some of the electorate, remain unaddressed by the 
mainstream parties.  Until the next election (2010), mainstream 
parties are unlikely to make debate with the Sweden Democrats a 
front-burner issue.  However, with several political commentators 
having predicted that the Sweden Democrats could in 2010 pass the 4% 
threshold required for parliamentary representation, the Sweden 
Democrats will play an increasingly visible role in questioning 
Sweden's immigration policies.  End Comment. 
 
KOLLIST