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Viewing cable 07SHANGHAI25, SHANGHAI STOCK MARKET: UP, UP, AND AWAY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SHANGHAI25 2007-01-11 10:24 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Shanghai
VZCZCXRO5343
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHGH #0025/01 0111024
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111024Z JAN 07
FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5426
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0734
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0385
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0367
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0482
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 0390
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 0329
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 5767
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SHANGHAI 000025 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
SAN FRANCISCO FRB FOR CURRAN/GLICK/LUNG; NEW YORK FRB FOR 
CLARK/CRYSTAL/MOSELEY 
CEA FOR BLOCK 
USDOC FOR ITA DAS LEVINE AND OCEA/MCQUEEN 
TREASURY FOR OASIA - DOHNER/CUSHMAN 
NSC FOR KURT TONG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN EINV CH
SUBJECT: SHANGHAI STOCK MARKET: UP, UP, AND AWAY 
 
REF: A. 06 SHANGHAI 2149 
 
     B. 06 SHANGHAI 5625 
     C. 05 SHANGHAI 3800 
 
This cable is Sensitive But Unclassified.  For official use 
only, not for dissemination outside USG channels. 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Investor confidence in the Chinese economy, 
the near-conclusion of the China's non-tradable reforms and 
large amounts of capital sitting relatively idly in savings 
accounts combined to push the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) into 
record territory during 2006.  The SSE closed 130 percent higher 
on its last trading day of 2006 than it had opened on January 1, 
2006.  According to analysts and Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) 
officials, these gains are sustainable and shares listed on the 
SSE are realistically priced.  Individual investors continue to 
"play" the stock market, gambling on quick gains while NYSE and 
NASDAQ continue to pursue the SSE looking toward the day when 
it, possibly, demutualizes.  End summary. 
 
------------------- 
Market Fundamentals 
------------------- 
 
2. (U) The Shanghai Stock Exchange's (SSE) benchmark Shanghai 
Composite Index closed at 2,675 on the last trading day of 2006, 
up more than 130 percent in one year.  Five years of market 
stagnation ended midyear when the share reform process and other 
regulatory changes eliminated market vulnerabilities (refs A and 
B).  Regained investor confidence, bullish sentiment on China's 
economic future, and trillions of dollars worth of individual 
savings sitting in banks earning relatively low interest 
combined to fuel the SSE's dramatic surge.  The sixteen year-old 
SSE's previous high of 2,245, set in June 2001 was not eclipsed 
until December 14, 2006.  The 130 percent gain in 2006 was even 
more remarkable given that the Shanghai Composite index closed 
below 1,000, an eight-year low, midway through 2006. 
 
3. (SBU) According to SSE Head of International Affairs Li 
Chian, as of January 9, 2007, there were 844 companies listed on 
the SSE with a total market capitalization of 7.14 trillion RMB 
(915 billion USD).  In December 2006, the market had an average 
daily volume of 31 billion RMB (4 billion USD) per day, and set 
a record of 86 billion RMB (11 billion USD) turnover on January 
4, 2007.  (Note:  For comparison, in October 2005, per ref C, 
SSE total market capitalization was 2.4 trillion RMB with an 
average trading volume of 38 billion RMB per day.  End note.) 
 
4. (SBU) Li told Econoff that following the conclusion of the 
reform process (during which time initial public offerings 
(IPOs) were not permitted) last summer, there were 13 IPOs in 
2006, including the record-setting Industrial & Commercial Bank 
of China (ICBC), which raised 19 billion USD on October 20, 
2006.   She added that the SSE expected to continue the IPO 
process in 2007, concentrating on "larger companies," such as 
ICBC and the China Life Insurance Company.  China Life listed on 
January 9, 2007 and its shares doubled in value from 19.9 RMB 
per share to 38.9 RMB (4.99 USD/share). 
 
------------------------------- 
Market Growth: Liquidity Driven 
------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Z-Ben Advisors Principal Peter Alexander told Econoff 
on December 15, that the groundwork for the market's gains had 
been set during the previous 18 months of incremental reforms by 
China's regulators.  These reforms, particularly the 
non-tradable share reforms, re-established investor confidence 
that had been depressed by "deep-seated structural deficiencies" 
such as the enormous percentage of shares that were held 
passively by state and other public-sector bodies.  (Note: other 
Consulate contacts have also pointed to widely-rumored cases of 
insider trading and stock manipulation as factors lowering 
investor confidence.  End note.)  Earlier attempts by the state 
to convert these shares in 1999 and 2001 had started the 
long-term slide in the SSE's value. 
 
6. (SBU) Alexander told Pol/Econ Chief and Econoff on December 
 
SHANGHAI 00000025  002 OF 004 
 
 
13 that when it became clear that the reform process was 
working, investors flocked back to the markets.  According to 
Alexander, the SSE's rapid rise in the second half of 2006 was 
"liquidity-driven" and he compared its rise to a similar 
increase in the SSE's value from 1997-98.   (Note: UBS 
Investment Research Chief Economist for Asia Jonathan Anderson 
reported, on January 2, 2007, that China's stock market gains 
were being fueled by the more than 4.3 trillion USD worth of 
cash and bank deposits owned by individuals in China.  The 
Shanghai branch of the People's Bank of China made the same 
conclusion in a January 10, 2006 statement, noting that long 
term savings grew at a slower rate than previous years because: 
"The rebounding capital market triggered the need for more 
liquidity and boosted the growth of demand deposits."  End 
note.) 
 
7. (SBU) Alexander argued that many individuals with "money 
sitting idly in banks" looked at market gains compared to the 
low interest rate they were earning and then purchased stocks. 
This transfer of money from banks to the stock market drove the 
market up, encouraging more people to invest.  Lombarda China 
Fund Management Chief Investment Officer Ian Midgley, also at 
the December 13 meeting, concurred with Alexander's analysis, 
adding that he believed that within the past six months, the 
China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) had "resolved the 
market's major structural issues," and averred that recent gains 
in market value were sustainable.  Midgley pointed to the 
greater breadth and strength of the market, in contrast to the 
past when listed firms had consisted primarily of sleepy and 
poorly-run state owned enterprises.  The companies that were 
listing, now, were the better banks and insurance companies, and 
soon would include oil companies.  (Note: The SSE closed at 2808 
on January 10, setting a new record high.  End note) 
 
8. (U) According to news reports, by the beginning of 2007, 
there were only 40 companies listed on the SSE and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange that had not completed the non-tradable share 
reform process.  These reports indicated that these companies 
were in rougher financial shape compared to those that had 
successfully converted their non-tradable shares and speculated 
that some of these 40 companies would be de-listed in the 
upcoming year.  News reports also indicated that companies that 
have not finished the conversion process were not allowed to 
raise funds or conduct any other operations that require CSRC 
approval.  Furthermore, these companies would be sanctioned by 
having the normal 10 percent per day trading band for their 
stocks narrowed to five percent. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Investors Gambling on High Returns 
---------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Goldman Sachs (China) Chief Representative Xiong Xiong 
told Econoff on December 11, 2006, that the fundamentals of the 
companies listed on the SSE had made a "quantum leap" in 2006. 
He said that the years-long reform process and depressed stock 
prices meant that the price to earnings (P/E) ratio of stocks 
listed on the SSE had declined from the "unrealistic" 50-60 
range to only 10-11 times the value of the stocks.  He noted 
that during the reform process, the value of the SSE index had 
halved, but that the earnings of the companies listed had 
doubled.  This was, he said, a "very healthy development for the 
market."  Midgley, on December 13, pointed out that P/E ratios 
at the SSE were now comparable to, and in some cases even lower 
than H shares listed on the Hong Kong exchange.  This had not 
been the case during the last China bull market when P/E ratios 
averaged in the 60s. 
 
10. (SBU) Despite these improved market fundamentals, Xiong 
said, most investors failed to do basic research and bought 
stocks based on word of mouth.  He said that for most private 
individuals, stock purchasing was more "gambling" than 
investing.  He supported his statement by telling how the last 
time he went to get a haircut, his barber had asked him what he 
know about stock "600823."  Xiong asked him the name of the 
stock, the barber did not know.  Xiong then asked him what the 
company did, and the barber had no idea, but that he had heard 
 
SHANGHAI 00000025  003 OF 004 
 
 
from a friend it was a good deal and he was planning on buying 
it.  Xiong said that his barber, like most investors, simply 
acted on the basis of rumors as to which stocks were "hot" 
without doing any due diligence.  According to Xiong, 80 percent 
of stocks traded in China were owned by private individuals and 
twenty percent owned by institutional investors.  (Note: Xiong's 
characterization of China's stock market investors as gamblers 
is consistent with almost every Consulate interlocutor on this 
issue.  End note.) 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Shanghai Stock Exchange: Celebrating Quietly 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) SSE Deputy Director Chao Kejian and SSE's Li Chian 
told Pol/Econ Chief and Econoff on December 8, 2006, that the 
SSE was "celebrating quietly" the revival and growth of the 
Shanghai's stock market.  The SSE, he said, was institutionally 
aware that bullish markets could turn bear.  Chao also noted 
that SSE employees were not benefiting personally from the 
market gains because SSE employees, their immediate families, 
and their parents were all forbidden by regulation to purchase 
stocks listed in China.  The SSE, as a government institution, 
also had no mechanism to award bonuses for performance.  Chao 
criticized this policy, saying that it would be far better to 
allow SSE employees who were not directly involved in listing 
companies to be allowed to trade, so long as proper public 
disclosure of these trades was made, as allowed at other 
international exchanges.  While its employees are paid more than 
most Shanghai city employees, Chao noted, they are still far 
behind employees of the Hong Stock or London stock exchanges 
with whom he had frequent contact.  According to Chao, the SSE 
had been considering allowing its employees to purchase shares 
of mutual funds, but as of January 8, this was still not 
allowed.  Meanwhile, Chao and Li were investing in real estate. 
 
12. (SBU) Another reason that the SSE was "celebrating quietly," 
according to Chao, was that despite the record gains, "at least 
half" of investors had not made any money.  He noted that while 
the index was higher, not every stock had gone up.  (Note: See 
paragraph 18 for a further explanation of the SSE's indexing 
process and a January 5, 2007 reform taken to adjust 
expectations.  End note.)  Chao was concerned that any "loud 
celebrations" of the gains would appear unseemly to those who 
were not profiting as much as the rise in index value would 
suggest. 
 
--------------------------- 
Reforms to Continue in 2007 
--------------------------- 
 
13. (SBU) Chao said that he expected that stock market reforms 
would continue in 2007.  He said that he anticipated that the 
CSRC would widen the band, or allowable trading range, of 
China's "blue chip" companies from 10 percent of value to 20 
percent per day.  He said that this liberalization would 
demonstrate to Chinese investors that these companies really 
were major companies with sound earnings and above-average share 
performance.  He said these companies were the ones that made of 
the SSE 50 list. 
 
14. (SBU) Chao said that the CSRC was considering allowing 
certain brokerages to experiment with margin trading, as had 
been announced last summer.  His understanding was that the CSRC 
would allow these brokerages to establish separate institutions 
to experiment and gain experience prior to opening this up to 
other investors.  He expected that this would happen sometime in 
mid-2007. 
 
15. (SBU) Chao told Econoff on January 8 that he believed 2007 
would be a "key year" for the development of derivatives 
products and new trading mechanisms.  He said that these 
products would include covered warrants and short selling.  He 
said that announcements concerning the development of derivative 
products would probably come sometime after the March 2007 
National People's Congress meetings in Beijing. 
 
 
SHANGHAI 00000025  004 OF 004 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Both NYSE and NASDAQ Courting SSE 
--------------------------------- 
 
16. (SBU) On December 8, Chao informed Pol/Econ Chief and 
Econoff that the SSE had signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) 
with 27 different stock exchanges around the world to share 
information and enhance cooperation.  He noted that the SSE had 
just signed an MOU with NASDAQ.  This three-part MOU would, in 
the short run, give SSE employees training opportunities at 
NASDAQ and start the process of designing a product made up of 
NASDAQ shares that would be traded on the SSE in future as well 
as another possible product based on SSE shares to be traded on 
NASDAQ.  The third stage of the MOU discussed SSE and NASDAQ's 
relationship should the SSE be demutualized. 
 
17. (SBU) The NYSE was also pursuing a relationship with the SSE 
in anticipation of its being demutualized.  Chao said that NYSE 
Chief Executive Officer John Thain met with SSE Chairman Geng 
Liang on the margins of the World Federation of Exchanges 
meetings in Sao Paulo in October 2007 and, then again in 
Shanghai at the end of November 2007.  Chao noted that he did 
not expect the SSE to be demutualized for the next five to ten 
years. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
IPOs and Indexes: Too Much Too Soon, Not Good 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
18. (SBU) SSE's Li told Econoff on January 9 that one of the 
reforms the SSE had already implemented in 2007 was the timing 
for adding a newly-listed stock to the benchmark, as had been 
reported in the media.  She said that IPOs would no longer be 
listed in the SSE's benchmark indexes until their 11th trading 
session.  According to Li, this was actually a return to a 
policy the SSE had in place before its "bear market period." 
During the bear market, the SSE started including newly-listed 
companies on their first day of trading in an attempt to bolster 
its sagging index. 
 
19. (SBU) Since most Chinese stock IPOs are priced lower than 
their value, the massive gains in their initial value registered 
as large gains on the SSE composite index, Li said.  She noted 
that the ICBC listing had actually accounted for more than 40 
percent of the total 2006 gains in market value.  Over the 
course of its recent gains, Li said, many investors had 
complained that despite the dramatic rise of the market, they 
were not making any money.  These complaints resulted in the 
SSE's January 5 announcement that newly listed firms would not 
be counted until their 11th trading day.  According to Li, SSE's 
hope was that the indexes would better reflect the entire 
market, rather than merely gains of individual new listings. 
JARRETT