VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLU #0070/01 0250621
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 250621Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY LUANDA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3649
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNSE/US SECRET SERVICE WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS LUANDA 000070 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EB/IFA/OMA AND AF/S 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON EAID AO
SUBJECT:  Angola: USAID-Central Bank Monetary Policy Workshop 
Tackles Central Bank Role and Powers 
 
REF:  06 Luanda 1261 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  On January 11 to 13, USAID Angola and the Angolan 
National Bank sponsored a monetary policy workshop featuring local 
and international experts.  The workshop provided a forum to openly 
and frankly discuss the next steps required to help Angola take full 
advantage of increasing oil revenues while avoiding problems such 
huge inflows had caused in other countries.  In addition, the 
workshop allowed GRA officials to develop working relationships and 
exchange ideas with world financial experts, thus creating their own 
network for future consultations.  The workshop, which the USG 
developed and funded, was much appreciated by the GRA.  The workshop 
is a milestone in Angolan willingness to discuss the options and 
challenges of new monetary policy with the USG, and reinforces 
Embassy Luanda's belief that a U.S. Treasury Advisor would be 
welcomed and of great service to the GRA. End Summary. 
 
The Resource Curse and Angola's Economy 
--------------------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) From January 11 to 13, 2007, international group of 
experts, whose travel was fully funded by the USG, met with 
approximately sixty Angolan mid- and high-level officials of the 
National Bank of Angola (BNA), Ministry of Finance, and the Office 
of the President.  During intense discussions, BNA and GRA 
participants debated the limitations of the current GRA system and 
brainstormed on possible solutions to both manage the massive 
oil-generated inflows of foreign exchange and curb inflationary 
effects on the economy and exchange rate policy.  The USG organized 
the event and sponsored panelists including speakers recently 
retired from the United States Treasury and the New York Federal 
Reserve Bank, as well as the former Governor of the Central Bank of 
Bolivia.  Other panelists included representatives of the IMF, World 
Bank, and the central banks of Ghana and Uganda as well as 
academics. 
 
Stabilization Fund v. Savings and Infrastructure Fund 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) BNA officials discussed the structure, management, pay-in, 
and pay-out of a stabilization fund.   BNA Deputy Governor Rui 
Miguens, for example, asked why Angola should lend its money to 
developed countries, as would occur with a stabilization fund, 
rather than investing it immediately within the country.  Panelist 
Ragnar Torvik, of the Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology, granted that Angola's reconstruction needs justify 
spending most of the oil money for several years before putting an 
increasing share of oil revenue into savings.  Other panelists 
contended that public investment projects must yield at least a 20 
percent rate of return to be viable, and that the fund should smooth 
out government spending.  Panelists and Angolan interlocutors agreed 
that a fund could be a powerful tool combining the functions of 
saving and investment and thereby combating Dutch Disease. 
Professor Torvik noted that Norway's fund, which has grown to equal 
the country's GDP, is designed to reach four times this value over a 
period of years, through lending to creditworthy entities, many of 
which are developed countries.  Norway's fund has serviced the 
national debt and will fund the national pension system, he 
continued. 
 
Setting Monetary Policy 
----------------------- 
¶4.  (SBU) Citing the inherent restrictions on BNA operations, one 
BNA official noted that the bank must hold 20 percent of its own 
funds in reserve.  Another BNA official conceded that the BNA's 
sterilization of the effects of huge foreign currency inflows, 
undertaken under central government instruction, limits its freedom 
of action.  Rui Miguens added that high interest rates on BNA bonds 
kill the non-oil domestic economy.  Former Governor of the Central 
Bank of Bolivia Juan Antonio Morales, countered that the BNA will be 
on its way to a solution once it puts developing the private 
financial sector ahead of serving the government. 
 
¶5.  GRA officials agreed that price stabilization is the primary 
mission of the BNA.  While a stable exchange rate had already helped 
Angola achieve economic expansion, they must remain on guard lest a 
return to high inflation jeopardize those gains. Robert Corker of 
the IMF agreed that reducing the inflation rate had brought the 
economy much needed stability, but argued that now Angola needed to 
let the open market set its exchange rate.  BNA Deputy Governor Rui 
Miguens, insisted however, that as long as the Bank's main goal 
remains price stabilization, it must develop usable policy 
instruments, like the interest rate, in order to increase its own 
effectiveness. 
 
The Bank of Ghana in the Driver's Seat 
-------------------------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) Mahamudu Bawumia, deputy governor of the Bank of Ghana 
 
(BOG) described his bank's success in its inflation targeting 
operations.  The BOG started its campaign with enhanced power, a 
recapitalization, a new banking law and a budget oversight role with 
the government.  Participants compared central bank techniques 
during a lively debate highlighting the Ugandan and Ghananian 
central banks as models. 
 
Developing the "Angolan Model" 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) BNA officials' comments betrayed their sense of operating 
under certain constraints and without the full set of policy 
instruments available to most central bankers.  The Bank of Ghana 
presentation, particularly, illustrated to the Angolans the 
importance of a central bank with full use of its powers. 
Afterwards, one participant overheard Rui Miguens tell a colleague, 
"We must go to Ghana."  Angola and the BNA have a long road ahead of 
them before changes can be realized because of legal prohibitions 
limiting the effectiveness of available policy tools, such as a 
maximum maturity on BNA paper of 364 days, and still institutions - 
no interbank lending put other limits on the BNA.  Nonetheless, 
Robert Corker, for example, noted that Angolan officials are asking 
more and more detailed questions at each successive meeting as they 
attempt to develop the Angolan model. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Members of the BNA expressed their gratitude to Embassy 
Luanda for organizing the workshop and commended the contributions 
of our speakers.  They especially noted the value added by the USG 
speakers in increasing the BNA's understanding of tools available to 
tackle monetary policy problems. 
¶9. (SBU) Comment.  This conference is significant because of the 
opening it provides for the USG to directly influence the 
development of transparent economic policies in Angola.  The BNA 
came to the USG seeking assistance, and USAID ably responded by 
bringing together a world-class discussion group.  Post recommends 
that Washington agencies follow-up on this opening to enhance our 
efforts of bringing good governance to Angola through the provision 
of a Department of Treasury Resident Advisor for the BNA.  End 
Comment. 
EFIRD