VZCZCXRO7472
RR RUEHBC
DE RUEHBC #0002/01 0021732
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 021732Z JAN 07
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0493
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0099
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0012
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0513

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000002 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/2/2017 
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREL PINS PHUM
SUBJECT: SECURING BASRAH 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Louis L. Bono, Director, REO Basrah, DOS. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
 
 
 
1.(S) Summary: MND (SE) commanders are increasingly frustrated 
by the ineptitude of local security officials. Iraqi support for 
a recent joint operation to disband a rogue police force never 
materialized, and local officials are now disavowing the 
operation. MND (SE) has asked MNC-I to prompt the GoI to declare 
its support for the operation and to consider replacing the 
Basrah Chief of Police. Many senior security officials have 
links to rogue militias and remain fearful of them. We also 
should urge the GoI to cut out this cancer and install 
individuals who will not be intimidated. If the GoI does not 
intervene, the security situation in Basrah is likely to further 
destabilize. End summary. 
2.(C) In the early morning hours of December 25, British forces 
conducted a raid on the Jameat building, home of the notorious 
Basrah police Serious Crimes Unit (SCU). The SCU was ridden with 
Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) and other anti-coalition militia members 
who exploited their power, using the SCU as a platform for death 
squads and crime syndicates. The objective of the raid was to 
disband the SCU and destroy the Jameat, which was previously 
used as a torture chamber by Saddam Hussein's secret police. 
3.(C) The raid, codenamed Operation Thyme, was approved by Prime 
Minister Maliki and reinforced by Interior Minister Boulani. It 
was to be a joint operation with units of the Iraqi Army 10th 
Infantry Division and Iraqi military police. However, the 10th 
ID units never appeared. They were ordered to stand down by 
Basrah Emergency Security Committee (ESC) member (and acting 
Chairman) Ali Ibrahim, who reportedly feared retribution. 
Ironically, Ibrahim originally told the British commander he 
wanted to detonate the charges on the building. 
4.(C) No SCU members were captured as most received advance 
notice of the raid. British forces recovered dozens of SCU 
prisoners being held at the Jameat and took video images to 
substantiate the torture allegations, before turning the 
prisoners over to Iraqi police. We are told MND (SE) may provide 
the footage to various news outlets. 
5.(S) Local security officials continue to complicate matters. 
Ibrahim denied ESC ever approved Operation Thyme and has ordered 
Iraqi security forces to disengage from coalition forces. While 
the Army continues to cooperate with the British, Chief of 
Police Brigadier General Hamadi has implemented Ibrahim's order. 
Hamadi, who reportedly is fearful of JAM, has agreed to 
reinstate some members of the SCU once a new crime unit is 
established. Further Hamadi has reportedly allowed SCU members 
access to the Jameat prisoners, but denied Interior Ministry 
officials access. Meanwhile, Hamadi's brother, who is the ESC 
security chief, has been conveniently away on Haj. 
6.(S) Despite widespread public support for Operation Thyme, 
several members of the Basrah Provincial Council (BPC) are 
advocating for official disengagement with MND (SE). Many 
privately support the raid but fear retribution from SCU 
members. Others seek restitution for the destruction of public 
property. The Governor, who is no beacon of virtue, has remained 
absent from the mix. Reportedly, he is furious with MND (SE) 
after "wanted" flyers of his brother and a bodyguard were 
issued. He has reportedly gone to Damascus for a few days to 
cool his heels. 
7.(S) MND (SE) Commander MG Shirreff wrote LTG Odierno on 
January 1 and asked him to intervene with the GoI.  "Ideally" he 
wrote, "we would like Minister Boulani to take up the baton 
against the SCU and make it clear to his subordinates, 
especially the [Chief of Police], that the old SCU is disbanded 
in accordance with the PM's direction."  He continued "we now 
need the Iraqis to have the courage to fulfill their part of the 
bargain in preventing the SCU from resurfacing."  He suggested 
Minister Boulani consider replacing BG Hamadi. Expressing his 
frustration, MG Shirreff continued "if the Iraqis do not back up 
their stated intent to close the SCU, then we will have no 
alternative but to step back and let them face the consequences." 
8.(S) We concur that the GoI must intervene in this situation. 
Local security officials are unwilling to discharge their 
responsibilities because of links to and fear of JAM and other 
rogue militia elements. Further, neither the Governor nor the 
BPC have the capability or political will to stand up to the 
militias. The ESC was established by the Prime Minister in June 
2006 to address this very power vacuum. However, its members too 
have been largely ineffective. It is time for the GoI to 
recognize this fact and replace the current ESC with individuals 
who will not succumb to threats or intimidation. We urge you to 
impress this point on GoI officials. 
9.(S) In addition to political action, we need to maintain 
operational momentum. British commanders, buoyed the recent 
successes of Operations Thyme and Phoenix, and the apprehension 
of JAM leader Sayed Naji, are anxious to continue the fight and 
have requested SIGINT and Special Forces support. One local UK 
commander noted they had been trying to capture Naji for months 
in Basrah, and SAS was able to do it in hours, while Naji was in 
Baghdad. We should encourage and facilitate MND (SE) efforts to 
 
BASRAH 00000002  002 OF 002 
 
 
neutralize those who terrorize the city and attack coalition 
members. (Note: Operation Phoenix involved the detection and 
capture of several insurgents who fired on a coalition base. 
British forces also recovered caches of weapons, body armor, SCU 
ID cards, maps of coalition bases and firing coordinates. End 
note.) 
10.(S) We are now at a crossroads. The SCU represented an 
omnipresent threat to the citizens of Basrah, and its 
disbandment was an important step toward our goal of 
stabilization. However, if the GoI does not commit to its end of 
the bargain, we should expect the situation to deteriorate. 
BONO