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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USUN NEW YORK 002260 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2016 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR PINS ECON XW XY ZF ZU
SUBJECT: UNGA: REPORT ON AFRICAN DELEGATIONS AT THE 61ST GA 
 
REF: USUN 2853 05 
 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor William Brencick for reasons 1.4 (D) 
 
1.(U) Gerald Scott is serving as Senior Area Advisor for 
Africa at USUN during the regular session of the General 
Assembly for the sixth time.  These are his personal 
reflections on African participation as the regular session 
of the 61st GA draws to a close.  (Note that while in the UN 
context the African Group includes the states of the North 
African littoral, usage of the term in this cable reflects 
Ambassador Scott's portfolio which deals only with the 
African governments falling within the purview of State's 
Bureau of African Affairs.) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (SBU) The General Assembly presents particular challenges 
for US interests, not least vis-a-vis the African Group.  It 
is a part of the UN system in which every state has one vote, 
where group dynamics are particularly powerful, and where 
what is left of the Non-Aligned Movement/G-77 are energized. 
Some African delegations are more committed to such an agenda 
than others, but all feel the pressure to conform, knowing 
that advancement of their own candidates or issues will be 
facilitated or hobbled by their adherence to the party line. 
 We, on the other hand, mostly argue that issues deserve to 
be considered on their own merits, and imply that here is one 
forum in which a government can to some degree reciprocate 
the favors received from the USG. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The AF record in the GA up to this point (Dec. 15) 
has been a slight improvement on that of last year.  We 
received solid support from a large number of delegations in 
our successful effort to block Venezuela from the Security 
Council.  While AF delegations voted in slightly larger 
numbers this year for "no-action motions" to block 
consideration of country-specific human rights texts, when 
the drafts themselves came to a vote, there was also a slight 
improvement in AF support. AF delegations were also very 
slightly less supportive of anti-Israeli resolutions this 
year.  We failed to gain election of our candidate to the 
International Law Commission, but Africans appear NOT to have 
been the weak element in this.  On the whole, and in the 
disappointing context of traditional African performance in 
the GA, this has not been a bad record. 
 
THE GENERAL DEBATE 
 
4.(SBU) The first two weeks are occupied by speeches 
providing a statement of the general orientation of a 
delegation towards GA and world issues. These are generally 
delivered by Chiefs of State, Heads of Government or Foreign 
Ministers.  Most are anodyne restatements of the obvious. 
African speeches, with rare exceptions, underline the need 
for more efforts towards economic and social development, and 
more attention to African crisis points.  Some reference is 
generally made to other areas of concern, e.g., the Middle 
East. 
 
5.(U)  Direct criticism of a member state is almost always 
avoided, so when it occurs in this context it should not pass 
unremarked.  We were attacked by name twice.  President 
Mugabe of Zimbabwe referred to "negative forces... bent on 
subverting the democratically expressed will of the majority 
of our citizens and to unconstitutionally effect regime 
change."  In his delivered version, unpublished in the 
distributed text, he continued, "No one from Washington or 
London has the right to take the key to regime change." 
"Those who want regime change are those yesterday we fought 
against."  The Eritrean representative, the Minister of 
Health, blamed the USG almost entirely for Ethiopia's refusal 
to demarcate the boundary as determined by the 
Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission. 
 
6.(U) Our policy towards Cuba was criticized by Namibian 
President Pohamba, but this year (unlike his speech last 
year) he did not mention us by name. 
 
7.(U) On the other hand, we were praised by Burundi (for 
access to AGOA), by Cameroon (for support of the 
implementation of the ICJ decision on Bakassi), by the CAR 
(for our efforts to contain the effects of the conflict in 
Sudan), and by Liberia. 
 
BLOCKING VENEZUELA'S ELECTION TO THE UNSC 
 
USUN NEW Y 00002260  002 OF 005 
 
 
 
8.(SBU) Our most important objective in this GA was to block 
Venezuela's election to the Security Council.  We were 
therefore happy to support Guatemala through most of the 
process which began on Oct. 16th and ended on Nov. 7th after 
both Guatemala and Venezuela had withdrawn in favor of 
Panama; the latter duly elected on the 48th ballot. 
 
9.(C)  Since it was a secret ballot, we cannot be entirely 
sure of the African votes -- and, clearly, Guatemala had more 
pledges than votes as the totals were announced.  (This was 
doubtless true for Venezuela as well; we generally discount 
the pledges in these contexts by up to 30 per cent.)  I 
believe that most of the African delegations voted for 
Guatemala and thus preserved our blocking position. 
(Guatemala was ahead in all the votes, but never by the 
requisite two-thirds majority present and voting.)  However, 
there were some that indications give me to believe supported 
Venezuela: The Gambia, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Zimbabwe; probably Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Somalia; doubtless a few others whose tracks remained 
covered.  Strong advocates for Guatemala were Ghana, Uganda, 
Sierra Leone. It is doubtful we would have been able to block 
Venezuela had President Chavez not directly attacked 
President Bush in the General Debate in language that many 
not otherwise inclined towards us found unacceptable.  His 
language and the presumption that such rhetoric would carry 
over to the Security Council were our best arguments against 
him. The ultimate election of Panama, the compromise 
candidate selected by GRULAC when 47 rounds of voting had 
exhausted everyone's patience, was an undeserved misfortune 
for Guatemala who had inscribed her candidacy long before 
Venezuela.  But it achieved our immediate aim. 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS TEXTS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
 
10.(SBU) The more radical African delegations argue strongly 
against country-specific human rights resolutions: the texts 
are said to be "unhelpful," do not engage the sinning 
countries in "dialogue," and now that the Human Rights 
Council is up and running, the Third Committee and the GA are 
no longer the place for such debates.  Some Africans here 
will admit in private that, while they personally agree with 
our arguments, their real hesitation is the fear that their 
countries are only a coup away from being the object of such 
organized opprobrium.  But so long as the draft is not aimed 
at a fellow African, many will consider themselves free of 
any obligation to oppose country-specific resolutions, and 
some will even support them -- as was the case in this GA. 
There remains the trap of the "no-action motion," a motion to 
adjourn debate on an item, which, if it carries, ends any 
further discussion or possibility of a vote.  Here, many 
Africans who might not oppose a country-specific text will 
vote for the no-action motion with the specious argument that 
it is a "procedural" motion that does not commit them on one 
side or the other of the substance of the matter. 
 
11.(SBU) This year there were no country-specific texts aimed 
at Sudan or Zimbabwe, so that stimulus to African opposition 
was absent.  Instead, the US supported five country-specific 
resolutions: against Belarus, Uzbekistan, Iran, the DPRK and 
Burma.  First up, Uzbekistan was defeated by a no-action 
motion.  But the resolutions on the DPRK, Iran, Burma and 
Belarus all passed in Third Committee, having narrowly 
survived no-action motions.  We then faced a retaliatory 
Belarus text, cleverly drafted, on the Situation of Democracy 
and H. R. in the United States. -- which was defeated 6 - 114 
- 45 (a discomforting number of abstentions).  The AF vote 
was 0 - 14 - 21 and 13 not participating. Posts will have 
received by unclas e-mail a full report on these votes. 
However, I note the positive votes on the DPRK text (our 
priority) of Comoros, Ghana, G-Bissau and Malawi.  Burundi 
supported the Iran and Burma texts. Mauritius supported the 
Burma text. In reviewing these votes, it is useful to 
remember that historically the best one can generally hope 
for is an abstention on a country-specific text; it marks a 
general vague agreement with the text and a refusal to follow 
the AU/NAM line calling for a NO vote.  So an abstention (or 
an absence) on such texts is a favorable step -- at least, in 
the Africa-group context. 
 
ANTI-ISRAELI RESOLUTIONS 
 
12.(U) Annually we face a plethora of anti-Israeli 
resolutions. These pass overwhelmingly, but we try to reduce 
the margin by which they are approved.  We concentrate our 
 
USUN NEW Y 00002260  003 OF 005 
 
 
lobbying effort on three of these: 
 
The resolution on The Committee on the Exercise of the 
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People passed in 
Plenary 101 - 7 (US) - 62.  The AF vote was 30 - 0 - 3 and 15 
not participating.  The helpful abstentions were Cameroon, 
Malawi, and Uganda. 
 
The resolution on the Division for Palestinian Rights passed 
in Plenary 101 - 7 (US) - 62.  The AF vote was  29 - 0 - 4 - 
¶15.  The four abstaining were Burundi, Cameroon, Malawi and 
Uganda. 
 
The resolution on the Work of the Special Committee to 
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 
the Palestinian People and other Arabs of the Occupied 
Territories passed in Fourth Committee 81 - 8(US) - 79.  The 
AF vote was 25 - 0 - 7 and 16 not participating.  The helpful 
abstentions were Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, CAR, 
Ethiopia, Swaziland, and Uganda. 
 
 
RESOLUTIONS ON LEBANON 
 
13.(U)  Posts were asked to demarche on two resolutions 
presented by Cuba in Third Committee on the Situation on 
Human Rights and Children in Lebanon.  Ultimately, only one 
of these came to a vote: Human Rights Situation Arising From 
... Israeli Military Operations in Lebanon.  This passed 109 
- 7(US) - 59.  The AF vote was 34 - 0 - 4 and 10 not 
participating.  The four abstentions were Angola, Cameroon, 
Ethiopia and Kenya. 
 
ELECTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 
 
14.(SBU) Posts were asked to solicit support for the election 
of Michael Matheson to the International Law Commission.  In 
a secret ballot on Nov. 16th, Mr Matheson failed, placing 
ninth for eight Western seats on the Commission.  While it is 
impossible to be sure, our best estimate is that the African 
pledges held firm and that the weakness was from the 
competition in our own regional group. 
 
PERSONAL NOTES ON VARIOUS DELEGATIONS 
 
15.(C) Angola: The PermRep is highly respected, but as first 
chairman of the Peacebuilding Commission, his leadership was 
weak and too open to Egyptian influence. Their man in 2nd 
Committee, Giza Gaspar-Martins, was particularly skillful, 
worked hard and effectively and looks like someone with the 
potential to rise quickly from Advisor to something much more 
significant. 
 
16.(C) Botswana: Ambassador Outlule is one of my better 
contacts. When our policies coincide, he is active in support 
of common positions.  He took the lead on the issue of the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, something 
that we both opposed. 
 
17.(C) Burundi: Ambassador Ntakirutimana, new and willing to 
step out of the box and support us on human rights votes.  I 
am not sure that he is a believer in human rights; perhaps 
more a believer in being seen to help the United States. 
 
18.(C) Cameroon: Ambassador Belinga-Eboutou remains helpful 
and his delegations voting record is among the best. 
 
19.(C) Cape Verde: a moderate and helpful delegation. 
 
20.(C) Comoros: Tiny staff.  The two Ambassadors on the 
diplomatic list are never here.  Charge' Aboud very helpful, 
even though his new government requires him to be more 
NAM-concious than last year.  But when I asked for a special 
effort on the DPRK human rights text, he was one of four who 
voted with us. 
 
21.(C) Congo: almost entirely absorbed by their Security 
Council responsibilities. 
 
22.(C) Cote d'Ivoire: Ambassador Djangone'-Bi tells me he is 
likely to be transferred, perhaps to London.  Helpful, though 
mostly through abstentions and absences. 
 
23.(C) DRC: Ambassador Atoki is helpful, but keeps a low 
profile. 
 
 
USUN NEW Y 00002260  004 OF 005 
 
 
24.(C) Djibouti: Ambassador Olhaye is accredited to 
Washington as well as here (where he is Dean of the African 
corps).  His delegation is helpful behind the scenes, and 
abstains on many key votes, but does not intend to get out in 
front in public. 
 
25(C) Eq. Guinea: helpful by not voting. 
 
26.(C) Eritrea: not easy to work with since almost every 
conversation includes the duty paragraph about our support 
for Ethiopia in the boundary dispute.  Even so, some helpful 
abstentions from time to time. 
 
27.(C) Ethiopia: A goodish voting record, as before, under a 
new Ambassador I do not yet really know. 
 
28.(C) The Gambia: Ambassador Grey-Johnson is personable 
enough, but talks a fairly strong NAM line, presumably a 
reflection of his government. 
 
29.(C) Ghana: Ambassador Effah-Apenteng, also on the Security 
Council, is one of the most influential (and helpful) in the 
Africa Group. 
 
30.(C) Kenya: A new Ambassador; a moderate voting record. 
 
31.(C) Lesotho: Ambassador Maema gets perhaps a C plus.  I 
always think their voting record should be better than it is. 
 
32.(C) Liberia: The new Ambassador Barnes, is very 
approachable, but he is not willing at this stage to stick 
his head over the trench line.  Lots of absences on the 
voting sheets.  Still, a distinct improvement on his 
predecessor -- but then, Monrovia sent the money to turn the 
electricity back on. 
 
33.(C) Madagascar: Moderate voting record; lots of 
abstentions. 
 
34.(C) Malawi: Helpful votes on the Israeli texts and an Aye 
on the  DPRK human rights text.  The new Ambassador and I 
keep making appointments to meet, and then one of us has to 
break off. 
 
35.(C) Mauritius: Ambassador Soborun is new, friendly and 
helpful.  He tells me he would be more helpful if 
instructions permitted.  I am inclined to believe him. 
 
36.(C) Namibia: Ambassador Mbuende has to be an improvement 
on his predecessor, Ambassador Andjaba.  But that doesn't say 
much.  Very much tied to the NAM model of behavior.  Joined 3 
others in voting NO on the DPRK human rights text. However, 
with Botswana, they took leadership on the Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
 
37.(C) Nigeria: Good relations with Ambassador Wali's 
Mission.  We are told that they are exploring the possibility 
of running for the UNSC next year. 
 
 
38.(C) Sierra Leone: Ambassador Joe Pemagbi is pleasant and 
available, but hesitant to act without Freetown's 
instructions.  The presence of the Foreign Minister for both 
Peace-building Commission meetings reinforced this.  Deputy 
PermRep, Ambassador Allieu Kanu was particularly strong in 
the 6th (Legal) Committee.  Sierra Leone was very pleased 
with the election of their man, Kingston Rhodes, to the Intl. 
Civil Service Commission. 
 
 
39.(C) Senegal: I remain impressed by Ambassador Badji. Their 
votes on the Middle East are conditioned by his chairmanship 
of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of 
the Palestinian People and by their membership as one of 
three on the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli 
Practices.  Badji assures me he exercises a moderating 
influence on the Committee on the Exercise, etc., not that 
such moderation cuts much ice, since the U.S. objects to the 
operation in toto. 
 
40.(C)  South Africa: They go on the SC in January. 
Ambassador Kumalo is one of the most active and powerful 
influences here, generally not to our benefit on NAM/G-77 
issues, but his delegation is open to dialogue, even if not 
much results.  First Secretary  Andries Oosthuizen caught our 
eye as an especially able negotiator, intelligent and 
 
USUN NEW Y 00002260  005 OF 005 
 
 
flexible as a lead G-77 representative on economic issues. 
Strikingly more balanced than other members of his 
delegation.  He is returning to the Foreign Ministry. 
 
41.(C) Swaziland: Ambassador Dlamini has been here just over 
a year.  He is more amenable than his predecessor, so perhaps 
over time we will shift some of their votes slightly in our 
direction. 
 
42.(C) Tanzania: Ambassador Mahiga goes off the SC at the end 
of the year.  He is thoughtful and helpful.  Deputy PermRep, 
Ambassador Tuvako Manongi is also highly respected. 
 
43.(C) Togo: Not a good voting record, but Charge Menan, who 
is personally friendly enough, is leaving after nine years. 
 
44.(C) Uganda: Ambassador Butagira is open and helpful. 
Personally committed to human rights and constructive 
diplomacy, he is one of our best contacts here.  His deputy, 
Ambassador Ayebare is also impressive and appears well 
connected in Kampala.  He has also been heavily involved in 
the Burundi peace talks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WOLFF