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Viewing cable 06TOKYO7097, U.S.-JAPAN CENTRAL ASIA DIALOGUE: PART ONE,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO7097 2006-12-21 08:22 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO3460
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKO #7097/01 3550822
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 210822Z DEC 06 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9297
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 0119
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 0160
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 0198
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1430
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5259
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1351
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 8238
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0411
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1945
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 5187
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1657
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2812
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 TOKYO 007097 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y  (ADDED INFO ADDRESSEE) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2016 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV ECON ZK JA
SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPAN CENTRAL ASIA DIALOGUE:  PART ONE, 
STRATEGIC OVERVIEW 
 
TOKYO 00007097  001.3 OF 009 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Joseph R. Donovan. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and 
Central Asian Affairs Evan Feigenbaum and a team of State and 
USAID officials met December 8 with Japanese officials for a 
day of consultations on Central Asia.  The U.S. team aimed to 
integrate an intensive strategic and policy consultation with 
focused discussions of U.S. and Japanese foreign assistance 
priorities in the region.  The MOFA delegation was co-chaired 
by Shinsuke Sugiyama, Deputy Director-General of the Middle 
Eastern and African Affairs Bureau, and Takeshi Yagi, Deputy 
Director-General of the European Affairs Bureau, with 
participation from five MOFA bureaus and five Japanese 
government ministries and agencies.  At the opening session, 
which focused on strategic priorities, topics of discussion 
included: (1) U.S. and Japanese strategic objectives in 
Central Asia, (2) relations among Central Asian states, 
Afghanistan, and others, and (3) U.S. and Japanese policies 
toward Central Asia, especially Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. 
 
2.  (C) Summary, continued: Both sides agreed that Japan and 
the United States share the same broad goals for Central 
Asia, thus it would be beneficial to pursue complementary 
programmatic efforts in the region.  Both explicitly rejected 
the nineteenth century "Great Game" as an analogy for the 
region's current strategic environment, although aspects of 
Russian and Chinese involvement in the area raise a number of 
questions for both Washington and Tokyo.  Each side shared 
its assessment of the political and economic situation in the 
five Central Asian countries, generally agreeing that 
Uzbekistan, while perhaps the country with the most inherent 
potential, has been difficult to work with and continues to 
be a disappointment, while Kazakhstan, less populous but with 
natural endowments of oil and gas and better macroeconomic 
policies, is showing promising signs, despite insufficient 
progress on political reform.  Relations with Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan also present challenges, but 
both Japan and the United States are willing to continue 
focused engagement on a spectrum of interests in each 
country.  The Japanese side stressed Russian and Chinese 
sensitivity about Japan's role in Central Asia and asked that 
the United States not broadcast the fact that the two allies 
had held a consultation on the region; doing so, the Japanese 
said, would raise questions in Moscow and Beijing about 
Tokyo's motives.  Septels report DAS Feigenbaum's discussions 
concerning foreign assistance and trade and investment in the 
region. END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------- 
SHARED INTERESTS 
---------------- 
 
3. (C) DAS Feigenbaum opened the meeting by thanking the 
Japanese for hosting and by pointing out that it made sense 
for two allies with an increasingly global partnership to 
compare and coordinate, as feasible, their strategic plans 
for Central Asia.  Washington tries to pursue an integrated 
strategy involving the coordination of strategies and 
policies with programs and budgets, he said, thus it made 
sense to try to do this, too, in consultations with key 
partners.  For this reason, said Feigenbaum, he had brought 
to Japan a team that included USAID representatives, both 
from the field and from Washington, and he had also brought 
the SCA bureau's senior advisor for regional economic 
integration.  Feigenbaum noted that while the United States 
has more traditional partners on Central Asia, especially in 
Europe, not all of them are as serious as Japan with respect 
to assistance budgets and project finance.  The United States 
and Japan each hit the four major baskets of interest in 
Central Asia; both countries have:  (1) strong strategic and 
policy interest, (2) commercial activism, (3) robust 
assistance programs, and (4) a demonstrated capacity for 
project finance in the region. On that basis, said 
Feigenbaum, there may be opportunities for the two 
 
TOKYO 00007097  002.3 OF 009 
 
 
governments to implement Central Asia programs in a 
complementary, though not necessarily joint, fashion. 
 
4. (C) Sugiyama agreed and then described Japan's overall 
policy in Central Asia in the context of FM Aso's recent 
foreign policy speech, in which he described the strategic 
importance to Japan of cultivating strong political and 
economic relationships with nations that lie along a path of 
what Aso described as an "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity."  As 
described by Aso, the arc begins in Northeast Asia, continues 
into Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam) through Central 
Asia and the Caucuses, and into northern Europe. 
 
5. (C) While the FM's presentation did not particularly 
emphasize Central Asia, Sugiyama continued, it did refer to 
the region in an important manner.  In Central Asia and 
elsewhere, Japan intends to pursue what Aso described as 
"values-oriented diplomacy," aimed at promoting modern values 
such as freedom, the rule of law, market-oriented economies, 
and human rights, etc.  Based on Japan's experience in the 
Middle East and Africa, Tokyo officials believe this 
values-oriented approach is the only way free people can 
achieve economic and social prosperity, he said.  The process 
of adjusting Japan's diplomacy will take some time, he added. 
 Japan will need to employ values oriented diplomacy in a 
prudent manner, taking into account the diversity inherent in 
each Central Asian state. 
 
6. (C) Sugiyama cautioned that the U.S. and Japan should 
avoid being seen as "ganging up" on Central Asian countries, 
or on other countries with interests in the region, notably 
Russia and China.  Tokyo would not insist on doing things 
Japan's way -- some nations in the area must be able to adopt 
their own approaches to development, especially political 
development.  Japan seeks to employ a "sensitive approach" to 
states of the region, even as it implements values-oriented 
diplomacy, he said.  The Japanese delegation hoped to hold 
more detailed discussion with the U.S. side about each nation 
in the region. 
 
7. (C) European Affairs Deputy Director Yagi concurred. 
Noting that he had read some of Feigenbaum's recent speeches 
on Central Asia, he pointed out that Tokyo's language on 
Central Asia was almost identical to the views expressed in 
Feigenbaum's speeches.  "Like you," he said, "we are not 
'anti-anyone'" in the region, he said. 
 
------------------------------ 
CHALLENGES FACING CENTRAL ASIA 
------------------------------ 
 
8. (C) Yagi provided an overview of basic Japanese strategies 
toward Central Asia.  In Japan's view, he said, the Central 
Asian region faces a number of challenges. These challenges 
range from classic geopolitical problems to new transnational 
threats, and they include the resurgence of Russian influence 
in the area -- especially following the withdrawal of U.S. 
forces from Uzbekistan.  Continued instability in Afghanistan 
is worrisome.  China, meanwhile, has a growing strategic role 
backed by an economic focus on the countries of the region. 
Although the threat of political instability does not appear 
to be a problem, said Yagi, Russian influence, especially 
when combined with Chinese influence, is most undesirable for 
Japan.  As a result, Yagi noted, Japan has two main aims in 
Central Asia: (1) pursue regional development, conducted in a 
sustainable manner, that will leave Central Asian nations 
open to the international community, and (2) share the 
universal values of democracy, human rights, and market 
economics. 
 
9. (C) China and Russia, on the other hand, do not, said 
Yagi, demand that Central Asian governments adhere to 
internationally accepted standards of human rights.  The 
region's leaders are therefore more comfortable with Russia 
 
TOKYO 00007097  003.3 OF 009 
 
 
and China than with the United States and Japan.  Especially 
following the "color" revolutions in Ukraine and elsewhere, 
Central Asian heads of state have become alarmed by the 
concept of democracy.  Their reaction in this regard tended 
to be somewhat illogical, he maintained.  A second 
complicating factor for Japan involves Russian and Chinese 
trade with Central Asia, which amounts to USD 8-9 billion, 
according to Yagi; U.S. and Japanese trade with the region 
amounts, he said, is just one-third that amount.  However, 
Yagi maintained, despite an affinity among the region's 
leaders for Russia and perhaps China, they, too, are 
nevertheless concerned about the rising influence of these 
two major outside powers.  And they also seem open to 
increased economic cooperation with Japan and the West to 
counter trade barriers from these two giant neighbors. 
 
10. (C) Faced with these challenges to Japanese interests, 
Yagi continued, FM Aso hopes to promote bilateral and 
regional cooperation with Japan.  In the absence of 
cross-border coordination, Central Asian nations would find 
it difficult to face challenges such as transnational 
narcotrafficking, terrorism, and environmental problems.  On 
the economic front, regional leaders might find it useful to 
develop a common market.  FM Aso hopes to emphasize three 
guidelines for Japan's work with Central Asia: (1) look at 
the area from a broad-based perspective, especially with 
regard to the southern neighbors, e.g. Afghanistan, (2) 
develop several trade routes that could be used as 
alternatives to the PRC and Russia by stressing regional 
cooperation, and (3) strive to work in a coordinated fashion 
with the United States, "because we share the same values and 
ideas about democracy, and because resources are limited." 
 
11. (C) Turning to Afghanistan, Sugiyama said that observers 
sometimes remark that while the Taliban did nothing correct 
in Afghanistan except to halt the narcotics trade, the 
current Karzai administration appears to be doing everything 
better except stopping narcotrafficking.  Sugiyama stressed 
that Japan understands the importance of achieving political 
stability in Afghanistan and that Tokyo is prepared to 
further international efforts in that direction.  The United 
States and Japan, he said, still have much to do in trying to 
support Karzai's government.  Asked by SCA Senior Advisor 
Robert Deutsch about whether Japan would move forward with 
tenders on its section of the Ring Road, Sugiyama reaffirmed 
the Japanese government's commitment to complete its segment 
of the Ring Road project, noting that the tender process was 
underway. 
 
---------- 
U.S. VIEWS 
---------- 
 
12. (C) DAS Feigenbaum responded to the Japanese presentation 
by stating that although Central Asia is admittedly not the 
most pressing region of foreign policy concern to the United 
States, the issues manifest there constitute a microcosm of 
nearly everything that is important in current U.S. foreign 
policy, with the obvious exception of the future of Iraq: (1) 
a resurgent Russia, increasingly active in its neighborhood, 
(2) an emerging China, with its growing regional and global 
footprint (3) a problematic Iran, (4) the challenge of 
Islam's future and the struggles within Islam, (5) the future 
of Afghanistan, (6) the promotion of democracy in tough, 
often hostile, environments; (7) the challenge of terrorism, 
and (8) balancing promotion of political liberalization with 
other goals.  All of these challenges are manifest in Central 
Asia in interesting, sometimes complicated ways, thus the 
region receives more high-level attention than one might 
expect from simply looking at its remote location on a map. 
The United States, said Feigenbaum, remains committed to 
staying involved in the area and is committed for the 
long-haul -- by virtue of its presence, assistance, programs, 
and high-level policy attention. 
 
TOKYO 00007097  004.3 OF 009 
 
 
 
13. (C) The United States, Feigenbaum noted, looks to avoid 
the debilitating effects of Great Power confrontation and 
rejects the "Great Game" metaphor for Central Asia.  This is 
not to say that competition among the major powers does not 
exist.  But the term is an oversimplification that is, in the 
first place, insulting to Central Asian states because it 
reduces countries of the region to little more than passive 
receptacles of a game played by others, as if they lacked 
independent interests, policies, goals, or capacity to pursue 
those goals.  Indeed, Feigenbaum said, some Central Asian 
countries had pursued a balance to maximize their 
independence, sometimes playing the major powers off against 
each other.  He offered the example of Kazakhstan's 
"multivector" foreign policy; Kazakhstan had sought to 
balance relations with Russia, China, the United States, and 
now Europe.  The "Great Powers" -- the United States, Russia, 
China, India, Japan, and others -- also enjoy relatively 
productive relations at a global level, with many of the 
powers improving their relations with one another.  The major 
outside powers have some overlapping interests in Central 
Asia, including the problems of narcotrafficking and 
counter-terrorism.  Central Asians should not, therefore, be 
seen merely as objects of a struggle among outsiders. 
Rather, said Feigenbaum, they are the very focus of U.S. 
(and, hopefully, Japanese) policy in this part of the world. 
 
14. (C) Washington takes a multi-dimensional approach to 
Central Asia, he continued, focusing on several "baskets" of 
interests simultaneously, including security, trade, 
diversification of energy supply, promotion of political 
reform, and combating transnational challenges.  The United 
States has worked to build capacity in the region across the 
seams of these baskets -- for example, promoting the rule of 
law has implications for both democracy promotion and trade; 
modernizing customs and borders prevents terrorism but also 
facilitates commerce.  The U.S. has supported the development 
of Drug Control Agencies in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
provided vaccinations to several hundred thousand children in 
Uzbekistan (where U.S. assistance has constituted some 10 
percent of Tashkent's public health budget), and offers 
micro-credits to small businesses in various countries. 
Among U.S. programs in the region, the economic "basket" 
remains the largest. 
 
15. (C) The U.S., Feigenbaum noted, also takes an active role 
in promoting regional economic integration by: (1) 
encouraging Central Asian states to integrate with each other 
by removing economic and political obstacles to trade, such 
as cross-border travel, (2) promoting integration between 
Central Asia and its southern neighbors by looking to 
Afghanistan as a bridge; and (3) helping Central Asia 
integrate into the global economy by promoting WTO membership 
and improving their investment climate.  In short, the U.S. 
has an "omni-directional" approach to the region, pressing 
for expansion of economic linkages in every direction on the 
compass; but Washington now places special emphasis on trade 
routes to the south because it is the least developed 
direction and new opportunities exist for energy trading and 
infrastructure development.  Supporting Central Asia's 
sovereignty and independence, said Feigenbaum, means giving 
these countries options:  more than one dominant trading 
partner, more than one market, and more than one pipeline 
through which to move exports to the world.  This policy is 
not "anti-Russian," just "anti-monopoly."  The countries of 
the region, he concluded, deserve to have choices. 
 
16. (C) Sugiyama agreed that political and institutional 
development must advance in tandem with social, economic, and 
trade reform.  This, however, is difficult to do, and 
presents an important impetus for the United States and Japan 
to work together.  Yagi concurred that Aso, too, rejected the 
Great Game analogy, stating that Japanese policy toward the 
Central Asians was to give them ownership of the issues.  In 
 
TOKYO 00007097  005.3 OF 009 
 
 
addition, Japan wants to be careful not to do anything that 
will provoke or upset Russia or China. 
 
17. (C) Japan also realizes that enhancing regional 
cooperation in Central Asia is more easily said than done, 
said Yagi.  When it comes to promoting regional cooperation, 
it is best to start with issues that involve only one or two 
countries but which might have regional impact and hope that, 
by demonstrating success, other projects will follow. 
 
------------------------------ 
COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS 
------------------------------ 
 
Uzbekistan 
---------- 
 
18. (C) Yagi observed that for Japan, Uzbekistan was the most 
difficult country in Central Asia to work with.  At the same 
time, it is the indispensable nation in Japan's Central Asia 
policy.  It has the largest population of the Central Asian 
states and a long border with Afghanistan that can 
potentially be destabilized.   Whether or not President 
Karimov remains in power, it will remain critical to work 
with the Uzbeks.  Everyone, said Yagi, is familiar with the 
human rights and democratization problems of the country.  He 
noted that when former Prime Minister Koizumi visited 
Tashkent in August, he personally raised the issue with 
Karimov of the need to make progress on human rights and 
reform, pointing to Japan's own experience to illustrate the 
point.  Karimov's responded that Japan's experience offered 
useful lessons, and predicted his relations with the United 
States would improve.  Yagi said the Japanese have a 
"realistic" view of this response, but nevertheless thought 
it was a positive, if vague, statement.  Japan views some 
recent steps by the Uzbeks as positive improvements, such as 
agreeing with the European Union to discuss Andijan and to an 
Uzbek-EU human rights dialogue.  Yagi asked for a U.S. view 
on Uzbekistan. 
 
19. (C) Feigenbaum responded that he was pleased Koizumi had 
raised the issues of reform and human rights.  The United 
States (and Japan, for that matter) share several goals in 
their approach to Central Asia:  expansion of markets, more 
openness and political reform, and promotion of regional 
cooperation and integration.  On all of these counts, said 
Feigenbaum, Karimov's government appeared to be pursuing 
policies at odds with our common approach to the region.  In 
contrast with Kazakhstan, Karimov had made some poor economic 
choices, relying on discredited planning methods and 
emphasizing cotton and gold.  Politically, the GOU maintained 
that the U.S. vision of democracy is a threat.  On regional 
cooperation, instead of being the economic lynchpin it should 
be, Uzbekistan had rejected many aspects of integration, 
insisting on its own way or no way. This is not, said 
Feigenbaum, a uniquely "American" view of Uzbekistan; the 
Tajiks, Kyrgyz, and Kazakhstanis all are skeptical of Uzbek 
policies, find Tashkent a difficult partner, and have a 
jaundiced view of its role in the region.  The United States, 
moreover, has a unique problem that Japan does not face, 
namely Uzbekistan's effort to reduce the U.S. presence in the 
country by removing the Peace Corps, NGOs, corporate 
investors, a U.S. airbase, and some U.S. personnel.  Yet the 
United States continued to pursue dialogue with Uzbekistan 
and would continue to do so.  In 1991. most observers 
expected  Uzbekistan to be the most successful country in the 
region.  Instead, we are struggling to move forward even on 
the issues we ostensibly agree upon, such as the threat of 
terrorism or the need for investment in youth and education. 
In short, Uzbekistan is a very difficult country, but we can, 
and should, have a better relationship, and the United States 
will continue to try, running programs and pursuing dialogues 
where it is realistic to do so. 
 
 
TOKYO 00007097  006.3 OF 009 
 
 
20. (C) Asked by Yagi about the U.S. view of Europe's 
sanctions and dialogues, Feigenbaum noted that the U.S. 
approved of the decision to extend sanctions.  The U.S. hoped 
the dialogue would produce progress but had cautioned EU 
partners not to conflate dialogue in itself with forward 
movement on expressed European concerns.  Yagi asked whether 
the measures taken by the Uzbeks to harass non-governmental 
organizations were aimed only at American NGOs.  USAID's 
Central Asia Mission Director Christopher Crowley responded 
that steps have been taken to shut many NGO's, not just 
American ones.  Karimov simply sees the long term development 
of a civil society and democratization as a threat.  In 
addition, the Uzbeks seem to be trying to block our 
cooperation with other countries in the region.  Highlighting 
again that we are not hostile to the Uzbeks and that we want 
to work with them, where feasible, Feigenbaum explained that 
it is important that the United States, Japan, and the 
European Union work together. 
 
Kazakhstan 
---------- 
 
21. (C) Kazakhstan is viewed by the Japanese as relatively 
more stable than Uzbekistan, and is very important to Tokyo's 
programs in the region, Yagi said.  Japan maintains good 
foreign relations with Kazakhstan but recognizes that, in 
essence, it is still ruled by an authoritarian regime.  In 
addition, Russia remains Kazakhstan's most important partner. 
 
22. (C) Feigenbaum agreed that President Nazarbayev should 
move forward on political reform but noted macroeconomic and 
structural reforms in Kazakhstan.  Corruption remains a 
problem.  Washington enjoys a robust and multi-dimensional 
partnership with Astana and had hosted Nazarbayev in 
September and issued a forward-looking Joint Statement. 
Nazarbayev appears persuaded that we and our programs are not 
a threat to him and has played an active role in promoting 
educational exchanges.  Crowley noted that, in a first for 
USAID programs, Kazakhstan is actually co-financing many of 
U.S. assistance projects in that country. 
 
Kyrgyzstan 
--------- 
 
23. (C) Kyrgyzstan is a "bitter disappointment" to the 
Japanese, said Yagi.  The few projects the Japanese have 
agreed upon have not gone well, and the country seems plagued 
by a basic instability.  Nevertheless, Tokyo will continue to 
support the Kyrgyz and look for ways to work with them. 
 
24. (C) Feigenbaum agreed that the Tulip Revolution had not 
lived up to expectations, but noted that Kyrgyzstan faces 
many challenges, including grinding poverty, a lack of 
political will, and neighbors who are not supportive of 
Kyrgyz democracy.  After a rough patch over the summer, 
U.S.-Kyrgyz relations had improved.  Recent street 
demonstrations had ended peacefully, Kyrgyzstan had a new 
constitution, and the media and civil society remain brighter 
spots.  The U.S. maintains its airbase at Manas. 
 
Tajikistan 
---------- 
 
25. (C) Yagi noted that Tajikistan is the only country in the 
region in which Islamic parties are active.  Japan is unclear 
on the direction President Rahmanov is taking the country. 
It appears that in his most recent cabinet shuffle he had 
dismissed many of his allies, and this might be a setback. 
Feigenbaum replied that the country had come a long way from 
its civil war and was an increasingly important U.S. partner. 
 Tajikistan faces many challenges in the economic basket, but 
we are excited about the potential for developing the 
country's hydropower potential.  We have also seen successes 
in the field of counternarcotics, and Rahmanov seems eager 
 
TOKYO 00007097  007.2 OF 009 
 
 
for more American investment, even if the challenges remain 
great. 
 
Turkmenistan 
------------ 
 
26. (C) Yagi and Feigenbaum agreed that prospects for 
improved relations with Turkmenistan are bleak.  Yagi pointed 
out that, despite Japanese attempts to engage, the Turkmen 
refuse all proposals for cooperation and rarely participate 
in regional meetings, such as the "Central Asia plus Japan" 
Forum.  When they do come, it is usually at a low level. 
Feigebaum agreed the country is suffering from a personality 
cult, but argued that efforts should continue to be made to 
work constructively with Ashgabat.  The U.S. maintains a 
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in Central Asia that 
includes Turkmenistan.  We also engage in some 
security-related cooperation.  The human rights situation is 
poor. 
 
------------------- 
RUSSIA, CHINA, IRAN 
------------------- 
 
27. (C) Over a restricted luncheon hosted by MOFA, discussion 
turned to the role of Russia, China, and Iran in the region. 
With regard to China, Yagi said Japan casts a wary eye on its 
activities in the region.  Japan has noted the expansion of 
Chinese commercial activity and is concerned that the large 
loans Beijing is making in the region, e.g., 637 million USD 
to Tajikistan, will lead to a debt burden and thus financial 
instability.  Although not interested in full membership, 
Japan would like to know more about what the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization is about.  Tokyo is inclined to view 
the SCO as an organization where ideas are exchanged but 
little actually gets done.  Nevertheless, the potential for 
cooperative political action exists, such as SCO summit 
meetings or even military exercises.  Feigenbaum raised 
similar questions about the functions of the SCO.  "What is 
it," he asked, "a security group?  an economic group?  an 
anti-American vehicle?  or a "safe-zone," as A/S Boucher had 
put it, for authoritarian leaders?  The United States, he 
noted, also wonders about SCO goals and purposes, 
particularly in the field of security.  The role of Iran in 
the SCO and its 2005 statement about the U.S. military 
presence were of concern.  But the Chinese are playing an 
interesting role in the region, building infrastructure and 
restoring old trade patterns.  This had begun to produce some 
disquiet in the region, e.g., in Kazakhstan. 
 
28.  (C) Japan, said Yagi, fears provoking China in Central 
Asia because it hopes to improve relations with Beijing more 
broadly, particularly with regard to the Six Party Talks.  So 
far, according to Yagi, the Chinese have not reacted to 
Japan's activities in Central Asia, e.g., the Japan plus 
Central Asia forum.  They seem preoccupied with promoting 
stability in the Uighur areas of northwest China and 
advancing their economic penetration of the region. 
 
29. (C) Feigenbaum asked about Japan's views of Iran's 
involvement in Central Asia.  Despite the fact that the 
Iranain brand of political Islam makes Central Asian leaders 
nervous, they seem to willing to engage with Iran at least as 
far as economic links are concerned.  Hiroshi Fukada, Deputy 
Director General of MOFA's International Cooperation Bureau, 
noted that Iran seems to be seeking expanded influence in the 
region, perhaps through involvement in the SCO.  He warned 
that the rise of radical or fundamentalist Islam is something 
that should be watched.  Sugiyama said there is concern that 
Iran is trying to recreate the Persian Empire and is looking 
to expand its influence, including to the north. 
 
30. (C) Yagi noted that, among the major outside powers, 
Russia seems most concerned about Japanese activities in 
 
TOKYO 00007097  008.3 OF 009 
 
 
Central Asia.  The Russians have made it clear to FM Aso that 
they are opposed to any "outside" activities in in the region 
and that Moscow believes Central Asia is "theirs."  As a 
result, Tokyo is trying to be very transparent about what it 
is doing in the region in order to avoid raising suspicions. 
It has briefed Russia on the Central Asia plus Japan dialogue 
and will continue to pursue this type of dialogue and 
engagement with Moscow to lessen its suspicions.  Feigenbaum 
agreed the Russians are sensitive about Central Asia.  He 
noted A/S Boucher's recent trip to Moscow:  we, too, have 
tried to engage in bilateral discussions about Central Asia, 
he said, but Moscow still feels threatened and is not much 
interested in talking to us.  They have occasionally tried to 
block U.S. initiatives.  The United States is realistic about 
Russia's role, said Feigenbaum. 
 
------------ 
PARTICIPANTS 
------------ 
 
31. (SBU)  The following participants attended the meeting: 
 
U.S. Delegation 
--------------- 
 
SCA Deputy Assistant Secretary Evan Feigenbaum 
 
SCA Senior Advisor for Regional Economic Integration Robert 
Deutsch 
 
USAID Central Asia Mission Director (Almaty) Christopher 
Crowley 
 
USAID Europe and Eurasia Bureau Senior Program Officer 
Timothy Alexander 
 
Embassy Tokyo Political Officers (notetakers) 
 
Japanese Delegation 
------------------- 
 
Deputy Director General Shinsuke Sugiyama 
Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau, MOFA 
 
Deputy Director General Takeshi Yagi 
European Affairs Bureau, MOFA 
 
Deputy Director General Hiroshi Fukada 
International Cooperation Bureau, MOFA 
 
Director Takeo Mori 
First North America Division, MOFA 
 
Director Manabu Miyagawa 
Economic Security Division, MOFA 
 
Director Akira Muto 
Fourth Division, Intelligence and Analysis Service, MOFA 
 
Director Tsutomu Nakagawa 
Policy Planning Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, MOFA 
 
Director Hideki Uyama 
Central Asia and Caucasus Division, MOFA 
 
Director Toshikazu Masuyama 
Middle East/Africa/Russia Division, Trade Policy Bureau 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
 
Senior Deputy Director Rintaro Tamaki 
International Bureau 
Ministry of Finance 
 
Deputy Director General Hiroshi Niino 
 
TOKYO 00007097  009.3 OF 009 
 
 
Regional Dept. II (including Central Asia) 
Japan International Cooperation Agency 
 
Team Director (Afghanistan) Yodo Kakuzen 
Regional Dept. V, Middle East, Europe) 
Japan International Cooperation Agency 
 
Team Director Hiroto Kamiishi 
Global Development Partnership Team, Planning Group 
Japan International Cooperation Agency 
 
Director Shohei Hara 
Division 2, Development Assistance Dept. IV 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
 
31. (U) This cable was cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Feigenbaum. 
DONOVAN