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Viewing cable 06SHANGHAI7112, CITI'S RICHARD STANLEY ON GDB AND BANKING IN CHINA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06SHANGHAI7112 2006-12-08 03:51 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Shanghai
VZCZCXRO9763
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHGH #7112/01 3420351
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 080351Z DEC 06
FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5340
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0681
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0451
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 0362
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0341
RUEHMT/AMCONSUL MONTREAL 0006
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0013
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0029
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE HQ WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0357
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 5668
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 SHANGHAI 007112 
 
SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/30/2031 
TAGS: EFIN ECON PREL PGOV PINR CH
SUBJECT: CITI'S RICHARD STANLEY ON GDB AND BANKING IN CHINA
 
REF: A. SHANGHAI 5625 B. SHANGHAI 1354
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Mary Tarnowka, Political/Economic Chief, U.S. 
Consulate Shanghai, State Department. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
1. (C) Summary:  On December 1, Citibank China CEO Richard 
Stanley updated a visiting Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) delegation 
led by Governor Kevin Warsh on the status of Citi's efforts to 
purchase a minority stake with management control in the 
Guangdong Development Bank (GDB).  According to Stanley, the 
deal, signed on November 16, needed to be finalized no later 
than December 18, and could potentially be part of the 
deliverables for the December 14-15 Strategic Economic Dialogue 
(SED) meetings in Beijing.  To meet this deadline, Guangdong 
Province, responsible for removal of about USD 7 billion in bad 
loans, would need to sell its stake in Southern Grid and deposit 
the cash in GDB by December 10.  Stanley also described Citi's 
China business strategy and, with his usual candor, outlined 
Citi's views on some of the challenges facing foreign banks in 
China, including the new banking regulations.  He encouraged USG 
officials participating in the SED to take a "publicly 
accommodating, privately tough" stance in convincing China to 
continue to open up it is market to the world.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) As part of a recent visit to Shanghai to assess 
macroeconomic and financial sector development, FRB Governor 
Kevin Warsh, San Francisco FRB President Janet Yellen, and VPs 
Rueven Glick and Teresa Curran, accompanied by P/E Chief and 
Econoff, met with Citibank China CEO Richard Stanley and VP 
Christie Ho on December 1. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Citi's Three-Pronged Strategy for China 
--------------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Stanley outlined Citi's three-pronged strategy for 
continued growth in China.  He identified these as: 1) Citi's 
own organic growth; 2) its relationship with the Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank (SPDB); and 3) its efforts to acquire a 
minority stake with management control in GDB. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Citi's Organic Growth as the American-flag Bank 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
4. (SBU) Stanley said that Citi's top priority would be to 
continue to enlarge its organic (independent Citibank) growth, 
and take advantage of its 104-year history in China using its 
well-known brand, which in Chinese meant "American-flag Bank" 
(Huaqi yinhang).  According to Stanley, Citi had 3,000 employees 
located in six cities across China.  He expressed continued 
frustration with the obstacles Citi had encountered opening up 
new branches, noting that other countries' foreign banks seemed 
to be allowed to expand more rapidly, and said that the approval 
of "a branch or two" of a Chinese bank in the U.S. would help 
Citi's approval process here in China.  Warsh and Yellen smiled, 
noting that had heard similar suggestions in their meetings with 
People's Bank of China (PBOC) and China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) in Beijing. 
 
-------------------- 
Citi's Stake in SPDB 
-------------------- 
 
5. (C) Stanley said Citi's second priority was to develop its 
"synthetic joint venture investment" in SPDB.  Stanley explained 
that Citi's initial 4.9 percent stake, acquired in 2002, had 
been reduced to a 3.2 percent stake, due to non-tradable share 
reform.  The main business of the investment was a joint credit 
card operation, which had 700,000 cardholders.  Stanley 
explained that the business was doing well now, but had been 
delayed at the outset. Apparently former CBRC Chairman (now 
Tianjin Mayor) Dai Xianglong had approved the credit card JV, 
but Liu Minkang tried to stop the deal, resulting in the 
business not being launched until 2004.  Stanley said that while 
he sat on the board of directors and Citi had employees seconded 
to the SPDB as advisors, the day-to-day management was done by 
SPDB.  Stanley noted SPDB was already listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and planned another listing, and said Citi had 
the option to increase its stake to 19.9 percent, and would do 
so likely when the price dropped. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Citi's Efforts to Acquire a Stake in GDB 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Stanley was most excited by the third part of Citi's 
growth strategy, the contract to acquire a 20 percent stake in 
GDB, signed on November 16.  According to Stanley, the deal 
would give Citi an option to purchase up to a 65 percent stake, 
exercisable "the minute the law changes."  Stanley said, 
although the Central Government clearly wanted to retain a 
majority stake in the Big Four or Big Five Banks at least for 
the medium-term, it had expressed an intent to raise the 
ownership caps on foreign ownership in other Chinese banks. 
Stanley's conversations with National Development and Reform 
Commission staff led him to believe that 3-5 years out, the cap 
still might be around 49 percent, but that eventually majority 
foreign ownership would be allowed.  Once Citi had more than a 
50 percent stake, it would merge GDB into Citibank China, and 
possibly list it, as it had done with similar acquisitions in 
other counties.  Under a worst case scenario, it would just list 
and take its money out.  From Stanley's perspective, however, 
GDB was "a long term investment" in building Citi's penetration 
into China's market.  According to news reports, GDB had 500 
branches, 12,000 employees and USD 48 billion in assets. 
Stanley said GDB had about USD 100 billion in loans and about 
USD 40 billion on its balance sheet. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Citi and GDB: Anatomy of the Deal 
--------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Expressing thanks for continued strong USG support, from 
Treasury Secretaries Paulson and Snow, Commerce Secretary 
Gutierrez and Ambassador Randt, Stanley said that Citi and GDB 
signed the take-over contract on November 16 and were scheduled 
to close the deal by December 18.  He said there had been some 
discussion of including the signing in the SED meetings and he 
was certainly supportive.  He recollected spending the prior 
Christmas holiday in negotiations and said he did not want to 
repeat that experience.  He commented that someday, he and 
Christie Ho, would write a book about their negotiating 
experience, a la "Beijing Jeep."  He noted that Citi, unlike its 
two competitors for the GDB deal, continued to be a tough 
negotiator.  Societe General was ready to sign whatever was 
offered and Ping An had offered an additional USD 800,000 after 
bids were closed.  Stanley said he thought China's financial 
leaders were willing to accept Citi's terms because 1) they 
wanted to do something for the United States, and 2) they wanted 
a capable partner who could turn the bank around as a showcase. 
 
8. (C) Stanley explained that Citi, and its consortium partners, 
agreed to purchase 85.6 percent of GDB for about USD 3.1 
billion.  Citi would own 20 percent and International Business 
Machine (IBM) would own 4.7 percent.  Stanley commented that 
CBRC had raised some concerns about Citi's financing of a 
portion of IBM's stake, but he didn't think they were serious 
since Citi had always been very transparent about this and IBM 
was also obtaining some financing from unrelated parties. 
According to reports in Caijing, an influential Chinese business 
periodical, Citi's other partners include China Life Insurance 
Company (20 percent share), National Electricity Net (20 percent 
share), Puhua Investment Company (8 percent share), and 
Cititrust (12.8 percent share). 
 
9. (C) The deal was scheduled to close by December 18 after GDB 
resolved the issue of 58 billion RMB (about USD 7 billion) in 
nonperforming loans (NPLs), what Stanley referred to as "the 
core cancer."  The adjusting entry to handle the write-off was 
supposed to occur by December 10 to allow GDB's auditor, KPMG, 
time to review the financial statements.  Stanley said that Citi 
already had a 100-person transition team in Guangzhou working 
with GDB.  He said that business had basically been frozen this 
year but that the transition team now had the opportunity to 
review any new big loans before they were issued. 
 
10. (C) Stanley also indicated that, what he had once termed 
"the worst Bank in China" (ref B) was actually in better 
condition than he had expected.  He said although there were 
"legacy problems" in Guangdong, the branches in Shanghai, 
Hangzhou and Nanjing were relatively well-run.  KPMG had been 
auditing GDB for three years and was ready to give it a clean 
opinion -- provided the cash came in to write-off the NPLs. 
Stanley told Warsh that Citi had actually been hoping for a more 
conservative classification.  Nonetheless, he said that after 
KPMG and Citi had gone through GDB's books, there were only "a 
few hundred million RMB" in loans that they could not agree on. 
He said this was "really amazing" given GDB's reputation. 
 
11. (C) Under the terms of the agreement, GDB's board would 
elect Citi's Michael Zink, currently Citi Korea Senior Executive 
VP for Corporate and Investment Banking, as President later that 
afternoon.  There would be 17 total directors -- 14 executive 
and three independent.  Citi could nominate six directors, five 
executive and one independent.  The three executive directors 
would include Zink, a tough-talking Citi risk management expert 
from North Carolina, and a consumer banking expert from Citi's 
Singapore operations.  One of the independent directors Citi 
would bring on was Y.S. Wong, who had retired after 35 years of 
experience with Citi as a risk management expert.  Stanley said 
Chinese officials openly admitted that Citi would have 
management control.  The President would have the ability to 
appoint a new management team, and hire and fire staff.  While 
Citi could nominate the bank's chairman, it currently planned to 
retain GDB's chairman for the next one and half years to see 
through the transition process. 
 
12. (C) Stanley said that at the working level, GDB employees 
were "welcoming Citi like the arrival of the Savior."  He 
estimated that it would take Citi one year to implement basic 
compliance and anti-money laundering policies and a more-robust 
audit process.  Stanley observed that the biggest challenge was 
human resources.  He said that all of GDB's branch managers 
located in Guangdong were "political appointees," many of whom 
were responsible for the bad loans.  Stanley said the Guangdong 
Deputy Party Secretary had advised Citi to "go in and fire two 
branch managers on the first day to show who is boss." 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Guangdong Province Has to Clean Up its Own Mess 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
13. (C) According to Stanley, GDB, the PBOC and the CBRC agreed 
that 58 billion RMB worth of NPLs would be resolved in a 
"pre-closing adjustment" prior to Citi's final signature. 
Stanley said these loans were too politically sensitive to ever 
see the light of day since he understood they were largely 
channeled to Guangdong's current and former leaders and their 
friends.  In the end, the question came down to who would pay. 
Guangdong Government had tried to place the responsibility on 
the PBOC, but Chairman Zhou Xiaochuan had made clear that PBOC 
would only take care of the Big Four banks.  CBRC acknowledged 
that the NPLs needed to be removed to make the sale, but had no 
money of its own.  Eventually, PBOC told Guangdong's political 
leaders that they needed to clean up their own mess.  The 
current plan was that Guangdong Province would sell its stake in 
Southern Grid and parts of the Guangdong Electricity Group to a 
State Grid and China Life consortium.  The sale of these 
provincial assets was due to bring in roughly 50 billion RMB. 
The Citi-lead consortium would be responsible for the other 8 
billion RMB. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Stanley Never Sleeps, Wen is Weak; Hu is Sick 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
14. (C) An obviously exhausted Stanley described the hectic pace 
he had maintained over the past several months conducting his 
own brand of shuttle diplomacy in order to resolve the business 
and regulatory issues surrounding the GDB acquisition.  He said 
he tried to start and end each week at the office in Shanghai, 
and traveled to Guangzhou and Beijing for meetings from Tuesday 
to Thursday.  Part of the problem he encountered was that "PBOC 
and CBRC don't like each other" and kept asking Citi to relay 
messages and information back and forth. 
 
15. (C) Stanley said that in his discussions in Beijing, he had 
heard that Huang Ju was sick with cancer and resided in 
Shanghai; Huang was "technically retired" and would probably be 
officially retired in March 2007.  He also had heard that Hu 
Jintao was also "not healthy" and that the Party had begun the 
process of looking for the next generation of leaders.  Stanley 
added that, compared to Zhu Rongji, Wen Jiabao was "a weak 
premier" and not effective in leadership circles. 
 
16. (C) Stanley said that he had seen "radical political change 
in the last eight months" and a "general backlash against 
foreign investment."  He mentioned that Huijin Investment 
Company CEO Xie Ping had come under a lot of criticism for 
pricing the China Construction Bank (CCB) sale of stock to Bank 
of America too cheaply (after BofA made large paper profits from 
the CCB listing on the Hong Kong exchange) and many other 
Chinese officials began to question why they should be so open 
to investment after the failure of the CNOOC and Dubai Port 
deals.  Stanley said "hard line communists" now had more say in 
the governing process and the media had become "increasingly 
vocal in opposing foreign encroachment" in China's economy.  He 
said China's leadership, to its credit, had taken a more 
populist tack in addressing issues such as the wealth gap, and 
environmental degradation.  However, in the process, it had 
dismantled the more business-oriented polices of the previous 
government and tried to address these economic problems by 
"pouring money into fixed asset investment" through the hands of 
local party bosses. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
China's Financial Services Advisory Committee 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
17. (C) Stanley said that with Huang's sickness and Wen's weakness, all decisions about China's exchange rate, monetary policy, and interest rates were made by a twelve-person Financial Service Committee headed by State Councilor Hua Jianmin. He said that Hua was "a very mysterious guy" who Citi executives had never met, despite having previously employed his daughter, Hua Qin. PBOC Zhou Xiaoquan and CBRC Liu Minkang also sat on this committee. Stanley added that Zhou was quite open about the constraints on his power, sometimes stating, "If I was an independent Central Bank Chairman..."
 
------------------------------------- 
The Dribbling Pace of Banking Reforms 
------------------------------------- 
 
18. (C) Stanley said the November 28 regulations requiring 
foreign banks to incorporate locally to carry out RMB business 
were "not bad" and that Citi had undertaken local incorporation 
in other markets around the world.  Citi looked forward to being 
able to conduct RMB business with Chinese citizens.  The 
"dribbling out" process of releasing the regulations had caused 
lots of heartburn, but there had been many opportunities for 
Citi and others to provide comment.  He noted that the new 
banking rules benefited banks, such as Citi, that were already 
established in China with capital.  If a new bank wanted to open 
up in China, he said, it would be "virtually impossible to get 
in."  "How could a bank be profitable for three sequential years 
if it couldn't do RMB business?" he added. 
 
19. (C) Stanley said China was engaged in an ongoing process of 
de-politicizing its banks, but still had a long way to go.  The 
FRB participants were delighted to hear Stanley note the 
increased teeth CBRC had gotten in requiring Chinese banks to 
reclassify loans, a process he had observed at SPDB.  While 
generally optimistic on the reform path Chinese banks had taken, 
Stanley said that the "Big Four" Chinese banks would never 
entirely get out of the business of making "political" loans. 
He discussed the difficulty that Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) had in securing loans, despite CBRC policy support, 
quipping: "A bad loan to an SOE is patriotic -- a bad loan to an 
SME is idiotic."  Banks, he said, have no incentive to make 
loans to SMEs and no real experience in making the 
forward-looking valuations necessary to effectively 
differentiate between good and bad companies. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Less Progress on Capital Market Reforms 
--------------------------------------- 
 
20. (C) Stanley said the security market was "still totally 
closed" except for investment banks profiting from cross-border 
listings in Hong Kong.  He said the current stock market boom 
was "ridiculous."  He observed that the high domestic stock and 
real estate prices merely reflected the excess liquidity caused 
by the failure of monetary policy and the limited types of 
assets available to soak it up, noting that bond market yields 
were zero. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
SED: Be Soft on the Outside, Tough on the Inside 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
21. (C) In response to a question by Governor Warsh, Stanley 
advised that U.S. officials coming to participate in December's 
SED adopt a posture that is "publicly accommodating, but hard 
behind the scenes."  In his experience, he had found that it was 
never useful to "publicly beat them up," but that the USG should 
be "tough" on such issues as market access.  He said it was in 
China's own interest to adjust its currency policy to manage its 
excess liquidity.  Market access was the real problem, and if 
China didn't open up, its unchecked enormous trade surplus would 
increase the potential for U.S. or EU trade retaliation. 
Stanley said it was important that SED participants made clear 
that "We, in the Cabinet, are your friends, but we are getting 
fed up as well."  He believed that Chinese officials "had the 
feeling that they need to be friendly to Americans," and would 
be receptive to such tough talk so long as it was presented 
privately and couched in terms of steps taken being in the 
mutual interests of both China and the United States. 
 
22.  (U) The FRB delegation did not have an opportunity to clear 
on this cable. 
JARRETT