VZCZCXRO6301
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPS #1121/01 3630830
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 290830Z DEC 06
FM USOFFICE PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6884
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0978
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHFMISS/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUFOANA/USNIC PRISTINA SR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 001121 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DRL, INL, AND EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR 
DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PBTS INR UNMIK YI KTIA
SUBJECT: KOSOVO AND MACEDONIA: THE WAY FORWARD ON BORDER 
DEMARCATION 
 
 
Classified By: CDA ALEX LASKARIS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (U) The following is a joint cable from U.S. Office 
Pristina and Embassy Skopje. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY:  When Macedonian FM Milososki visited Kosovo 
on November 23, he reiterated the GoM's position calling for 
inclusion of the demarcation of the Kosovo-Macedonia border 
in the UNSCR on Kosovo's final status.  This prompted a 
negative reaction from PM Ceku's office and highlighted the 
issue's sensitivity in Kosovo.  Border demarcation remains a 
controversial issue, but Kosovo will have to accept border 
demarcation based on the 2001 agreement as part of the final 
status package.  However, we should do what we can to make 
this bitter pill more palatable to the PISG so it does not 
become a stumbling block to implementation of the status 
agreement. 
 
¶3.  (C) U.S. Office Pristina and Embassy Skopje met recently 
to discuss possible ways forward.  Given the highly-charged 
emotions on the issue, we propose urging PM Ceku to accept 
the 2001 agreement, but softening the blow bilaterally by 
encouraging the GoM to be among the first to recognize Kosovo 
independence and suggesting confidence-building measures, 
such as having American and perhaps other international 
experts involved in the technical demarcation, to help that 
process proceed more smoothly.  Our underlying argument to 
the Kosovars will be that good relations with Kosovo's 
southern neighbor are considerably more important than the 
insignificant bit of territory involved.  High-level U.S. 
engagement, including by Ambassador Wisner, may be required 
to reorient Kosovar thinking.  We would appreciate Department 
guidance on this approach and possible sweeteners.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
Background 
 
¶4. (SBU) When Macedonian FM Antonia Milososki visited Kosovo 
on November 23, 2006, Kosovo media reported that he 
reiterated the GoM's position calling for the UNSCR on 
Kosovo's final status to include demarcation of the 
Kosovo-Macedonia border based on the February 23, 2001 border 
agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and the 
then-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  Milososki's comments 
caused a negative reaction by PM Ceku's office, bringing the 
contentious border demarcation issue to the surface again. 
PM Ceku immediately told reporters, "the issue of demarcation 
of the border with Macedonia has not been discussed with 
(United Nations Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti) Ahtisaari 
and we hope that it would not be included in his package. 
Kosovo will be recognized as an independent country within 
its current administrative borders." 
 
¶5. (SBU) According to a Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
(INR) Office of the Geographer and Global Issues paper dated 
June 10, 2002, about 26 square kilometers, or 2,620 hectares, 
changed hands as a result of the 2001 border agreement. 
Macedonia gained the most land, while Kosovo was the biggest 
loser.  Macedonia ceded 6.552 sq. km. to Serbia and 1.778 sq. 
km. to Kosovo, while Serbia ceded 3.2 sq. km. to Macedonia 
and Kosovo ceded 14.633 sq. km. to Macedonia.  Kosovo's net 
loss was 12.8 sq. km., while Serbia's net gain was 3.4 sq. 
km.  An INR GIS inspection revealed that the larger segments 
Kosovo ceded to Macedonia generally gave the Macedonians an 
elevation advantage or consolidated farmlands.  According to 
INR, if demarcation occurs, the agreement permits the 
boundary teams to make adjustments 150 meters in either 
direction of the boundary to accommodate property claims. 
 
¶6. (SBU) On March 7, 2001, the President of the UN Security 
Council issued a statement emphasizing that the 2001 border 
agreement "must be respected by all."  It was reaffirmed by 
the UN Secretary General and the USG in February 2002.  On 
May 23, 2002, the Kosovo Assembly passed a resolution 
rejecting the agreement, arguing that it had been negotiated 
over the Kosovars' heads.  Then-Special Representative of the 
Secretary General (SRSG) Michael Steiner immediately annulled 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PRISTINA 00001121  002 OF 003 
 
 
the resolution.  That day, the Department issued a statement 
endorsing the SRSG's decision and reiterating our position 
that "the border agreement stands."  The Department also 
called on "all parties to move to the agreement's fair and 
full implementation, including the accommodation of affected 
persons in the border area."  Since 2001, the GOM has tried 
to identify the correct legal partner in Kosovo in order to 
complete the technical demarcation of the border.  However, 
the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) 
and UNMIK have not been able to determine who has the legal 
authority to complete this process. 
 
The Kosovar Position 
 
¶7. (C) Kosovo sentiment with regard to the border, despite 
the relatively small area involved, remains visceral.  PM 
Ceku adviser Arben Qirezi told us recently that the PISG 
"cannot accept" the 2001 border demarcation agreement "on top 
of swallowing decentralization."  He said the PISG would 
prefer not to have border demarcation mentioned at all in the 
status package, but "might accept" a vague reference to 
border demarcation being a technical issue to be worked out 
between Skopje and Pristina based on the 1974 agreement 
establishing the administrative boundary line (ABL) between 
the then-Yugoslav Republics of Serbia and Macedonia.  Qirezi 
said he was "dismayed" by what he termed a change in position 
by the Macedonian government, claiming that the Kosovo and 
Macedonian governments agreed in May 2006 that Kosovo would 
release a statement calling border demarcation a technical 
issue to be worked out between Kosovo and Macedonia. 
According to Qirezi, the statement was painstakingly 
negotiated and the two governments understood that they would 
demarcate the border based on the 1974 agreement.  He also 
maintained that then-Macedonian Prime Minister Vlado 
Buckovski clarified as much a day after the statement was 
released. 
 
The Macedonian Position 
 
¶8. (C) The GOM is seeking U.S. support to ensure that the 
UNSCR setting forth Kosovo's final status includes a 
reference to the validity of the 2001 border agreement, as a 
matter of legal succession of international treaties of the 
former Yugoslavia, and also calls for full and final 
demarcation of the border.  The 2001 agreement provides the 
legal framework for the technical demarcation, and the GOM 
believes all concerns expressed by either side can be 
addressed within that framework.  The Macedonians would like 
the technical process of demarcation to start as soon as 
possible after adoption of the UNSCR, fearing that any delay 
could open the door to politicization of the issue on both 
sides and have a negative affect on regional stability. 
 
The Way Forward 
 
¶9. (C) USOP and Embassy Skopje met on December 15 to discuss 
the best way forward, and agreed that there must be clear 
acceptance on both sides of the 2001 agreement.  However, 
some possible softeners for the Kosovars could help the PISG 
accept the bottom line more gracefully.  It might in the 
first instance be possible to suggest that the reference to 
the border issue in the Ahtisaari document establish that 
Kosovo's border shall be defined by the Yugoslav frontiers as 
they stood on December 31, 1989, except as amended by 
internationally-recognized agreements.  A footnote would 
contain a specific reference to the March 7, 2001 statement 
by the U.N. Security Council President.  Other inducements to 
make the issue more palatable for Kosovo include encouraging 
the GoM to be among the first to recognize Kosovo's 
independence, and urging the two sides to introduce 
confidence-building measures (CBMs) to help the actual 
demarcation go more smoothly.  These CBMs might deal with 
having the technical team that demarcates the border include 
American experts among any internationals on the team; adding 
border crossings to facilitate cross-border communications 
and trade links; improving infrastructure to include paving 
roads; providing mobile medical care teams to service remote 
 
PRISTINA 00001121  003 OF 003 
 
 
areas; working with farmers and villagers to minimize the 
impact of demarcation on property holdings. 
 
¶10. (C) On our end, we propose raising the issue directly 
with PM Ceku and possibly other members of the Unity Team to 
prepare them for accepting the 2001 agreement in the final 
package.  We would stress that it is far more important for 
Kosovo to maintain good relations with its neighbor to the 
south than to quibble about what amounts to an insignificant 
bit of territory, particularly given the strained 
relationship Kosovo will almost certainly have with Serbia in 
the immediate post-status period.  This message may need an 
additional push by Ambassador Wisner and other high-level 
U.S. officials in discussions with the Kosovars. 
 
¶11. (C) Comment:  Border demarcation is a very emotional 
issue for Kosovo, but Kosovo will have no choice but to 
accept border demarcation based on the 2001 agreement as part 
of the final status package.  However, we should do what we 
can to make this bitter pill more palatable to the PISG so it 
does not becoming a stumbling block to implementation of the 
status agreement. USOP would appreciate Department guidance 
to help prepare the ground in Kosovo for this sensitive 
issue, especially in the immediate run-up to Ahtisaari's 
presentation of his package in Pristina.  End comment. 
 
¶12. (SBU) U.S. Office Pristina does not clear this cable for 
release to U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. 
LASKARIS