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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 007501 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, INL/AAE 
DOJ FOR ICITAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR KHUM KDEM ASEC TH
SUBJECT: THE NEW PUSH FOR THAI POLICE REFORM 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 07388 (LUNCH WITH PM SURAYUD) 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 07331 (THE AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY 
        CALL ON NEW INTERIOR 
     ¶C. MINISTER ARI WONG-ARAYA) 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton. Reason 1.4 (B,D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Plans to reform Thailand's notoriously venal 
and abusive police may be gaining steam, in part due to 
strong interest from the Prime Minister's office.  While many 
people agree on the need for change--and the legislature is 
already drawing up plans--the exact prescription for reform 
remains murky.  Two legislators involved in the debate 
recently outlined separate, dramatic blueprints for reform, 
including breaking up the national police into 76 different 
local units, or subsuming the entire law enforcement 
community under the military.  Both of our contacts agree 
that it will take most of a year to debate and produce any 
legislative change to the police force.  Police reform is 
always a difficult subject to tackle, with few easy fixes, 
but the military background of the current government will 
make the debate over such plans even more heated.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
TO SERVE AND PROTECT? 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) While the Thai military (specifically the Army) 
remains widely respected and publicly perceived as a 
(relatively) honorable organization focused on defending King 
and country (if not always democracy), the Royal Thai Police 
(RTP) are almost the exact opposite.  In a culture that 
maintains a broad tolerance for some activities that in 
Western eyes would reek of corruption, most Thai would agree 
that the police go too far.  The police are generally seen as 
venal, corrupt and eager to abuse their power, even earning 
the nickname "land sharks."  The type of sensational 
racketeering, murder, gambling and prostitution stories that 
dominate the most popular tabloid newspapers frequently 
include a corrupt police angle.  While this sentiment may not 
be completely accurate--internal efforts to "clean up" the 
most egregious ethical lapses of the police appear to have 
had an impact, and military leaders have had their share of 
"special business deals"--the frequency of contact between 
most citizens and the petty, rent-seeking behavior of the 
police has cemented this image in the national consciousness. 
 Even the most rudimentary conversation with a taxi driver in 
Thailand will eventually touch on frustration with the police. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Critics also charge that the national police system 
remains a throwback to an older era of centralized rule.  In 
the late 19th century, King Rama V began a process of placing 
the far-flung territory of Thailand under more direct control 
through the Ministry of Interior.  The police were a key part 
of that effort.  Today, over 210,000 police officers are 
divided into a number of Bangkok-based specialized units 
(Central Investigation, Forensics, Anti-Narcotics, Special 
Branch) and nine provincial regions, but all are beholden to 
central police headquarters in Bangkok.  In the past, the RTP 
operated under the Ministry of Interior (MOI)--which still 
appoints career officials to serve as Governors of 75 of 
Thailand's 76 provinces--but in the 1990's, the Chuan 
administration made the RTP an independent agency operating 
under a supervisory committee chaired by the Prime Minister. 
 
¶4. (C) To make matters more interesting, the police and 
military have been traditional rivals: for budgets, authority 
and even royal affection.  Thaksin, a former cop himself, was 
widely seen as favoring the police, putting them in charge of 
southern policy and moving to expand their influence and 
funding.  Following the coup, some police officials are 
beginning to worry that their uniformed cousins will make a 
power-grab at their expense.  In 1991, after the last coup, 
word leaked that the Army-dominated junta was considering a 
plan to place the police directly under the military, which 
prompted shrill cries of opposition from the law enforcement 
community.  The plan was eventually dropped. 
 
¶5. (C) Over the last six weeks or so, the Surayud government 
has revived the debate over police reform and the PM has 
established several commissions in the National Legislative 
 
BANGKOK 00007501  002 OF 004 
 
 
Assembly (NLA) to consider the issue.  The tenor of the press 
coverage of this issue has been evenly split between 
academics and activists calling for dramatic restructuring 
efforts and senior police officials hysterically denying the 
need for such comprehensive change. 
 
 
LEGISLATURE LOOKING AT POLICE REFORM 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) In a meeting with poloff on December 6, NLA member Dr. 
Sungsidh Piriyarangsan outlined his plan for police reform. 
Dr. Sungsidh, an academic who serves on the NLA commission 
charged with pursuing police reform and heads a separate 
independent 28-member committee studying the same issues, 
explained that Prime Minister Surayud is the driver behind 
this initiative.  According to Sungsidh, shortly after taking 
office Surayud contacted Sungsidh--a longtime critic of the 
police--to discuss his desire for dramatic reform.  Echoing 
comments he made to the Ambassador (ref A) Surayud reportedly 
told Sungsidh that this was his second priority as PM (after 
the restive South), and he had been thinking seriously about 
police reform even before the coup.  Sungsidh says that he 
and Surayud agreed that any reform effort had to be handled 
carefully and transparently, given the sensitivities 
involved.  Sungsidh says that it was his idea to put together 
a separate, independent commission made up of legal experts, 
activists and retired police to study the issue. 
 
¶7. (C) Sungsidh says that his independent committee has only 
met twice so far.  In his estimation, the various bodies 
considering police reform will take two to three months to 
study the issue and develop proposals.  These proposals will 
be discussed in public NLA hearings and may even be the basis 
for some public polling.  At that point, the NLA will draft 
an appropriate law representing these deliberations. 
Sungsidh hopes to have the entire legislative process 
accomplished in a year.  Sungsidh says that only two plans 
are in circulation right now: a paper crafted by the Ministry 
of Justice PermSec that calls for breaking up the police into 
regional units and his own, more detailed plan.  Sungsidh 
laughed when asked if he had heard of any plans for 
comparably dramatic military reform under the current 
government. "How can you (reform the military) when they are 
in charge?  Besides, the Army has legitimacy that that the 
police lack." 
 
DECENTRALIZING THE POLICE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) In Sungsidh's view, the police are too centralized and 
disconnected from local communities.  This is a throw-back to 
an earlier era of militarized rule and contributes to the 
police tendency to misuse their authority.  Cops are only 
beholden to other, more senior cops.  Even in the modern era 
under Thaksin, the police have been guilty of shocking abuses 
of power, such as the wave of extrajudicial killings during 
the "War on Drugs" and the disappearance of human rights 
lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit.  Sungsidh believes that, when 
central government officials have the authority to use the 
police for their own ends, this has resulted in abuses of 
power.  Overcentralization--and the limited oversight that 
comes with it--also exacerbates the problem of police 
involvement in underground and illicit economic activities. 
 
¶9. (C) With this view in mind, Sungsidh's proposal for police 
reform would place all provincial police under the direct 
supervision of the MOI-appointed governor in each province 
(except for Bangkok, where the police would report to the 
only elected Governor in Thailand).  Sungsidh also wants to 
boost civilian oversight of each provincial police force and 
improve cooperation with provincial courts, prosecutors and 
lawyers' associations.  By making the police more accountable 
to the local people, Sungsidh hopes to improve their 
performance and focus on public service.  Sungsidh says that 
alternative plans, which would place police under the MOI 
again would not go far enough. 
 
¶10. (C) When asked if he is concerned that local criminal 
figures could end up exerting even more control over the 
cops, Sungsidh scoffed, saying "how do you say that the mafia 
will influence the cops when the cops are the mafia?"  The 
 
BANGKOK 00007501  003 OF 004 
 
 
key will be keeping local, elected political leaders and 
criminal bosses from exerting any influence over the local 
police through the use of oversight boards.  Sungsidh also 
envisions a more aggressive internal affairs function based 
in each province, in Bangkok and also with the Ministry of 
Justice's Department of Special Investigation (DSI).  (Note: 
Sungsidh believes that DSI needs its own reform plan, as 
well.  According to him, it is far too heavily influenced by 
former RTP officers. End Note.)  Even if not perfect in 
combating corruption "it has to be better than what we have 
now."  According to Sungsidh, if a police officer is accused 
of corruption under the current system, he is often merely 
transferred to another province.  In the new system, this 
would not be possible and would force the opening of an 
internal investigation. 
 
¶11. (C) Sungsidh's plan would retain the several specialized 
units currently based in Bangkok, but they would be free to 
pursue trans-provincial criminal activities and provide 
expertise in difficult cases to local cops.  Additionally, 
Sungsidh wants to cut the overall number of police in the 
country, boost their salaries and improve their educational 
level, all in an effort to cut police corruption.  "We need 
to adjust the entire system of justice."  Sungsidh is very 
interested in foreign views on police reform and will be 
meeting with UN officials to discuss their experiences soon. 
He underscored his desire for any available U.S. expertise or 
training available. 
 
¶12. (C) Sungsidh understands that any police reform will be 
tough.  "The Prime Minister says it may be the toughest 
problem in Thailand."  Many cops do not like Sungsidh's 
ideas.  Some police officials have strongly criticized him, 
even threatened him, but he is working to build support among 
those officers who do see merit in his approach.  For those 
who oppose him, Sungsidh says he exaggerates and tells them 
that it will take 20 years to implement his plan in an effort 
to lull them with a false sense of security.  He also 
understands critics who point to efforts in the U.S. and 
other countries to centralize law enforcement efforts.  That 
said, polls show strong public dissatisfaction with the 
police, and Sungsidh hopes that social pressure can be built 
to push aside any objections from the police.  "It's all 
about meeting the needs of the people."  Even if social 
pressure isn't enough, Sungsidh is confident that Surayud's 
personal commitment to reform--and the PM's strong control 
over the NLA--will result in success.  That said, he has not 
briefed the PM on the specifics of his plan yet. 
 
PLAN B: PUT THE MILITARY IN CHARGE 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) In a separate meeting with the International Law 
Enforcement Academy's (ILEA) U.S. Director on December 11, 
RTP General Watcharapol Prasamrajkit, himself an NLA member 
on the Police Reform Committee, outlined a distinctly 
different plan for reform that is circulating in police 
circles.  Watcharapol was the first Thai Director at ILEA, is 
a former Commissioner of the RTP Narcotics Suppression Bureau 
and is considered a progressive leader in the RTP.  He echoed 
Sungsidh's timeline of a year to develop, draft and pass a 
law reforming the RTP, but does not believe that this is 
sufficient time to produce an effective plan.  Watcharapol 
agrees that the police need reform, but he had hoped former 
cop Thaksin would undertake these efforts himself. 
 
¶14. (C) Under the plan outlined by Watcharapol--he did not 
specify who authored it--the RTP would be broken up into nine 
regional units (paralleling their current administrative 
regions), the Bangkok Metropolitan police and a separate 
Royal Thai Police Headquarters for administration.  Each of 
these eleven new police units would have their own 
Commissioner General possessing independent control over 
their unit's region and budget.  However, each of these RTP 
Commissioners would report directly to the Army Regional 
Commander.  A variation of this plan would further undercut 
police authority, according to Watcharapol.  The newly 
reinstated Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) would 
hire an additional 60,000 of its own personnel to provide a 
"homeland security" function, with the police reporting to 
the local ISOC commander (who would almost certainly be the 
local Army commander.) 
 
BANGKOK 00007501  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶15. (C) Watcharapol expressed strong unhappiness with this 
plan to militarize the police saying that, in his view, no 
Western nation would want to work with Thai police if such a 
system is installed.  He added, however, that neither he, nor 
any of his RTP colleagues in the NLA would publicly broach 
this subject with Surayud and his cabinet.  Watcharapol hopes 
that U.S., Australian and other Western nations can explain 
to the PM how bad it would look to the world if Surayud 
placed Thai law enforcement under direct military control. 
 
¶16. (C) These concerns aside, Watcharapol admits that the RTP 
needs reform.  In his view, the police need better education 
opportunities and increased civilian oversight.  When asked 
if higher pay could improve police performance, Watcharapol 
responded that increasing pay for a 210,000 member police 
force is impossible due to budgetary constraints.  Moreover, 
if police pay is increased, the military and the civilian 
bureaucracy would demand pay raises as well.  Watcharapol is 
also a proponent of increased in-service educational 
opportunities--which enables officers to move up the ranks 
easier and develop better skills.  He would also like to see 
a set term for the Commissioner General position, in order to 
avoid the politicization that inevitably occurs with the top 
cop position.  In fact, Watcharapol would even support the 
installation of a civilian in the CG slot.  In his view, (and 
with little elaboration) no matter how good a cop may be, if 
he steps into the CG position he immediately becomes 
ineffective.  Finally, Watcharapol would like to pursue a 
community-based policing program like that used in Hong Kong. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶17. (C)  Much like recent government efforts to reform the 
lottery or alcohol sales, these two proposals to fix the 
police seem to have been cooked up by very smart people in an 
insulated laboratory far, far away from the reality of Thai 
politics.  While we don't doubt Surayud's personal interest 
or commitment to this issue, his ability to ramrod proposals 
as dramatic as these through the legislature--not to mention 
his ability to implement such ideas--is far from certain.  We 
are concerned by the idea of institutionalizing military 
control over the police, but recognize that this is just one 
option under consideration.  We would certainly use every 
opportunity to discourage this solution.  Perhaps the most 
troubling aspect of this debate is that some much-needed, 
achievable reforms may be sidelined by the tug-of-war over 
much more dramatic, and in the end, overly-ambitious plans 
for change. 
ARVIZU