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Viewing cable 06PARIS7541, FRENCH STRESS REGIONAL FALL-OUT OF DARFUR, PLEAD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PARIS7541 2006-11-27 08:17 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Paris
VZCZCXRO8779
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #7541/01 3310817
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 270817Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3358
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0126
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE 1107
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1025
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007541 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2016 
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPKO PINR CD CT SU FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH STRESS REGIONAL FALL-OUT OF DARFUR, PLEAD 
FOR CROSS-BORDER MANDATE TO PROTECT REFUGEE CAMPS 
 
REF: A. PARIS 7177 
 
     B. PARIS 846 
     C. HOTR P210908Z NOV 06 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton. Reasons 1.4b,d 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY: Special Envoy for Sudan Natsios and 
Ambassador Stapleton met on November 18 with French 
Presidential Africa Counselor Bonnecorse and MFA/AF 
A/S-Equivalent de Gliniasty  Bonnecorse stressed French 
concern at the regional fallout of the Darfur catastrophe. 
The Sudanese program of ethnic cleansing in Darfur now 
foreshadowed the forced migration of the non-Arab Black 
populations into the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad. 
 Bonnecorse confided that France was transferring additional 
forces into the Central African Republic (CAR) to backstop an 
imminent military campaign by FOMUC forces to retake 
townships lost to rebels in northern CAR.  Bonnecorse warned 
that anti-Deby campaigns launched from Darfur risked toppling 
the Chadian leader.  He reproached the Addis Ababa 
consultations for failing to provide for cross-border 
security as part of the mandate of any AU-UN hybrid force. 
Bonnecorse and Gliniasty warned that France could intervene 
to help protect refugee camps only if afforded some form of 
international legitimacy in terms of operating in concert 
with international cross-border monitors.  Concerning the 
AU-UN hybrid force, Bonnecorse doubted its efficacy and 
voiced some skepticism regarding financing via the UN scale 
of assessments; France and U.S. should jointly demand broader 
burden-sharing, notably by the Arab League, he said, and 
should link UN financing to the concession of some kind of UN 
chain of command.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C)  Special Envoy for Sudan Andrew Natsios and 
Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton met on November 18 with Michel 
de Bonnecorse, Counselor to President Chirac for African 
Affairs.  Deputy Presidential Africa Counselor Jacques 
Champagne de Labriolle and MFA AF A/S-Equivalent Jean de 
Gliniasty also took part, together with AF/SE COS Andrew 
Steinfeld and Embassy Paris Africa Watcher. 
 
3.  (C)  Bonnecorse observed that France and the United 
States shared common goals and a similar analysis of the 
Darfur situation.  He judged the outcome of the Addis Ababa 
consultations on Darfur to be more or less satisfactory, 
although he afterward criticized the conference's treatment 
of border security (para 10 below).  Bonnecorse stated that 
he had two abiding preoccupations:  1) whether Darfur rebels 
could reach a common position that would facilitate real 
negotiations, and 2) the modalities for deployment of an 
AU-UN hybrid force. 
 
4.  (C)  Bonnecorse noted that his talking points called for 
designation of a "democratic SLM leader;" he sneered at 
invoking the epithet of "democratic" in the context of a 
Darfur leader, but he stressed the self-evident need for the 
emergence of authoritative leadership.  Bonnecorse questioned 
whether an AU-UN hybrid force would be effective.  If 
composed mainly of African troops, then, he quipped, it would 
exhibit African efficiency.   Bonnecorse said the AU-UN 
hybrid was essentially a face-saving device for the West, 
after the deadlock over UNSCR 1706 caused by GoS refusal to 
accept UN rehatting of AMIS.  France raised questions about 
financing an AU-UN hybrid force by applying the UN scale of 
assessments; such a hybrid force would be a novelty and an 
innovative approach to funding was more appropriate. 
Bonnecorse advocated burden-sharing by the Arab League. 
 
Regional Fallout, Need for Containment on Darfur 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
5.  (C)  The regional fallout of the Darfur crisis loomed 
large in French thinking, Bonnecorse stated.  France, he 
thought, could also provide maximum assistance in terms of 
the regional crisis.  French forces in Chad had a mandate to 
defend against external threats to Chad; originally, these 
were Libyan in character, but now the threats stemmed from 
Sudan.  Bonnecorse stated that France would protect Deby 
insofar as he represented the internationally recognized 
leadership of Chad and because he had a relative claim to 
some sort of democratic investiture.  Above all, France would 
stand by Deby for want of any credible successor, as 
Bonnecorse noted he had conveyed to former Deputy Secretary 
Zoellick (Refs A, B). 
 
6.  (C)  Deby's staying power was unclear, but, with sixteen 
 
PARIS 00007541  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
years at the helm, he had already beaten the national record 
for Chadian leaders, Bonnecorse quipped.  That said, France 
recognizes that Deby's tribal group only accounts for 3 
percent of Chad's population, with more than half of his own 
tribe now in the opposition.  There were now three or four 
rebel groups, fielding some 10,000-12,000 armed rebels. 
Bonnecorse anticipated successive waves of rebel attacks, 
with Deby inevitably succumbing in the end.  The Sudanese 
were fanning the anti-Deby rebellion.  However, most rebels 
-- about two-thirds, he estimated -- were Chadian nationals, 
and the French military had clear instructions not to fire on 
Chadians.  The French military would provide "moderate" 
support to Deby, Bonnecorse declared, and would take action 
to oppose external aggression, as appropriate, and to prevent 
the fall of N'djamena. 
 
7.  (C)  Deby was now acting in the mode of a warlord, rather 
than a president, Bonnecorse asserted.  Talk of fostering a 
political dialogue with the opposition was, "frankly, 
completely unrealistic," Bonnecorse said, referring to his 
October 20 conversation with U.S. Ambassador to Chad Marc 
Wall (Ref A).  Among Deby's opponents, Mahamat Nouri was now 
in pole position, his chief advantage being that he was not 
Zaghawa but Goran, and also enjoyed the fealty of numerous 
smaller groupings, including the Chadian ethnic group known 
as "Arabs." 
 
French to Help Repulse CAR Rebels 
--------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C)  Bonnecorse warned that a next step in the Sudanese 
plan for ethnic cleansing would be to expel or provoke the 
migration of the non-Arabic, black Darfur population into the 
Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad.  Sudanese had 
infiltrated northern CAR from Darfur with a mission to pave 
the way for the flight of the black Darfur population.  The 
FACA, the CAR military, was virtually non-existent, unable to 
offer any resistance.  CAR President Bozize had requested 
French military assistance and France would now engage in 
support of FOMUC forces.  The French would form the backbone 
of a military intervention in Northern CAR, Bonnecorse said, 
but they needed the cover of an African flag, hence the FOMUC 
mission (Ref C).  Bonnecorse confided that France would act 
imminently, "next week,"  in order to take back Birao and 
other townships recently seized by rebels in Northern CAR. 
France was transferring additional military forces to CAR, he 
said.  The French aim was to shock the CAR rebels and cause 
them to rethink their agenda. 
 
Addressing Cross-Border Violence from Sudan 
------------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C)  SE Natsios asked Bonnecorse to what extent he 
attributed border violence to the GoS proper.  Bonnecorse 
replied that Sudan provided safe haven for the preparation 
and launching of attacks against Deby.  Sudan provided 
logistic support, notably petrol but also weaponry and 
equipment.  President Bashir, however, was not necessarily 
implicated, Bonnecorse suggested.  That said, without some 
form of Sudanese complicity, the conflict targeting Deby 
would never have gained such momentum.  Libya was also 
contributing to the problem, delivering military hardware 
destined ostensibly for Chad, but with more than two-thirds 
actually diverted into Darfur. 
 
10.  (C)  Bonnecorse regretted that the Addis Ababa 
consultations on Darfur had failed to devote sufficient 
attention to international deployment along the 
Darfur-Chad-CAR frontier.  Bozize had made an explicit 
request.  Deby, for his part, would accept an international 
presence if France and the U.S. jointly made the request. 
Securing the borders with Darfur would require between 
3,000-4,000 troops deployed at 3 or 4 key positions, 
Bonnecorse said. 
 
11.  (C)  MFA AF A/S-Equivalent de Gliniasty, who had also 
attended the Addis Ababa consultations, voiced disappointment 
that the U.S. and UK, in his view, had only paid lip-service 
to the cross-border dimension of the Darfur problem, thereby 
forcing Gliniasty to take on Sudan all alone on the matter. 
By contrast, representatives from the EU, South Africa, Libya 
and Egypt had been more supportive.  At the least, France 
needed some reference, however ambiguous, to a cross-border 
force. 
 
12.  (C)  SE Natsios replied that the U.S. wanted to 
 
PARIS 00007541  003 OF 003 
 
 
reinforce SYG Annan's hand during the remainder of his UN 
tenure.  Annan in Addis Ababa had wanted to focus primarily 
on Darfur, not the cross-border situation, which he intended 
to address instead through the dispatch of two assessment 
missions to the region.  SE Natsios emphasized to Gliniasty 
that the USG did indeed recognize the cross-border dimension 
of the Darfur catastrophe and equally wanted to avert chaos 
in Chad.  The goal in Addis Ababa, he reminded Gliniasty, was 
to break the deadlock on deployment of peacekeepers to 
Darfur.  Gliniasty countered that SCR 1706 had carved out 
space for cross-border deployment, as part and parcel of the 
Darfur mission.  Bonnecorse commented that without help in 
preventing cross-border attacks, there was a real risk of 
Deby's imminent collapse, which he noted dryly would be a 
great Christmas present for Bashir.  It was imperative, 
Bonnecorse reiterated, to institute "a policy of containment" 
for the violence originating from Sudan. 
 
Threat to Refugee Camps 
----------------------- 
 
13.  (C)  SE Natsios noted evidence of a resurgence in Sudan 
of Arab supremacists, who could move to shut down IDP and 
refugee camps.  These hardliners, who were affiliated with a 
movement known as the Arab Gathering, were layered throughout 
the Sudanese administration.  Their vocabulary included 
phrases like extermination with reference to the Darfur black 
populace.  SE Natsios warned, if U.S. intelligence proved 
valid, the refugee camps in Chad could be targets for 
large-scale attacks.  How would France respond? Would France 
intervene to defend the camps? 
 
Conditions for French Intervention 
---------------------------------- 
 
14.  (C)  In the event of attacks against the refugee camps 
in Chad, Bonnecorse said France would aim to reinforce an 
intervention by others, whether African or AU-UN hybrid 
forces.  For that reason, the mandate for the AU-UN hybrid 
force had to be broad enough to encompass action related to 
cross-border violence.  Gliniasty chimed in to emphasize that 
only international monitoring could establish the legitimacy 
necessary for international intervention.  Bonnecorse echoed 
the need for juridical foundations for a response.  He 
regretted there had been no mention of the 10 February 2006 
Tripoli Agreement in the Addis Ababa declaration, because 
Tripoli had set forth the parameters of an international 
African monitoring force on the Darfur border.  Without the 
cover of an internationally sanctioned cross-border force, 
however insubstantial, the French reaction capability was 
undercut by a good 90 percent, Gliniasty opined. 
 
15. (C)  Returning to the question of finances for an AU-UN 
force, Bonnecorse and Gliniasty said the price of UN 
financing had to be incorporation of a UN chain of command. 
Gliniasty said he had told FM Lam Akol to ask Bashir if he 
could accept inclusion of a UN strategic cell if there were 
an AU command structure.  Lam Akol indicated consent, 
Gliniasty said.  SE Natsios warned Lam Akol lacked the 
authority to commit Bashir.  SE Natsios was supportive of the 
French concern about the command structure, but remarked that 
the U.S. did not wish to get in the way of SYG Annan's 
current initiative. 
 
16.  (C)  EMBASSY COMMENT:  This is the first time that the 
French have explicitly conditioned a French role in 
protection of refugee camps in Chad on an internationally 
sanctioned cross-border force or inclusion of border 
monitoring in the mandate of a Darfur force.  The actual 
deployment of international cross-border elements counts less 
than the cover such would provide for French intervention. 
Presumably, even a skeletal FOMUC-type presence would suffice 
so long as it were operating under an international mandate 
that could guarantee so-called legitimacy for a French 
military response. END COMMMENT. 
 
17.  (U)  AF/SE COS Steinfeld has approved this message. 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
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