VZCZCXRO7196
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #1869/01 3060922
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 020922Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7153
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0664

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 001869 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN UNFICYP TU CY
SUBJECT: TALAT ON FINNISH PROPOSAL, UN PROCESS 
 
REF: NICOSIA 1842 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  In a November 1 meeting with Ambassador 
Schlicher, Turkish Cypriot "President" Mehmet Ali Talat was 
pessimistic about the prospects of the Finnish proposal on 
Varosha/ports -- and criticized the EU process for making 
"unfair" and one-sided demands of his community for the sake 
of Turkey and the ROC.  He suggested that the Finns, Cyprus 
problem neophytes, had been maneuvered into presenting what 
was essentially a reheated version of an earlier, 
unacceptable Papadopoulos proposal.  Talat said that the 
Turkish Cypriots were nevertheless ready to negotiate in good 
faith -- starting with his November 3 meeting in Brussels 
with FM Tuomioja and in subsequent proximity talks Talat's 
representatives plan to attend in Helsinki.  Talat claimed to 
have no idea whether or not Turkey would attend the Helsinki 
talks.  On the UN track, Talat stressed that the current 
deadlock was the result of Greek Cypriot unwillingness to 
move forward; Papadopoulos wanted to "cripple" the UN process 
so it would not undermine his ability to extract concessions 
from Turkey in the EU forum.  Ambassador Schlicher pressed 
Talat for flexibility with both the EU and UN; Talat agreed 
that it would not be in the Turkish Cypriot interest to be 
responsible for a failure on either track.  END SUMMARY. 
 
FINNISH PROPOSAL "UNFAIR..." 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In a November 1 meeting with Ambassador Schlicher, 
Turkish Cypriot "President" Mehmet Ali Talat expressed 
several misgivings about Finnish efforts to broker a 
Varosha/ports/trade deal.  The benefits on offer for the 
Turkish Cypriots, he said, were minimal, especially since the 
economically important Ercan Airport was not on the table. 
As it stood now, Talat said, the Greek Cypriots stood to gain 
a great deal -- access to Turkish ports, the prospect of a 
return to Varosha, and the surrender of Turkish Cypriot 
"sovereignty" over the operations of Famagusta port. 
(COMMENT: Our understanding from the local Finnish Ambassador 
(reftel) is that they have proposed a Commission role in the 
management of trade, but not of the port itself, as Talat 
contends. END COMMENT). 
 
¶3. (C) The Finns, Talat complained, did not understand the 
Cyprus problem and had been maneuvered by the Greek Cypriots 
into offering a warmed-over version of Papadopoulos's 
original, unacceptable proposal on Varosha.  For its part, 
the EU was inherently biased.  "Greek Cypriot" membership had 
skewed the Union's ability to act as an honest broker, Talat 
claimed, and as a result the EU was now reneging on its 2004 
post-referendum promise of direct trade -- which the Turkish 
Cypriots had already earned with their "yes" to the Annan 
Plan.  Talat said the GOC would certainly seek to complicate 
the implementation of any direct trade package adopted as 
part of the Finnish deal, as it had with the long-delayed 
financial aid measure.  Although the Finnish compromise could 
benefit the Greek Cypriots and even Turkey, the Turkish 
Cypriots would probably get nothing in exchange for their 
concessions. 
 
¶4. (C) Ambassador Schlicher refuted the idea that the Finnish 
proposal was unfair, noting that it contained plusses and 
minuses for each side.  The Greek Cypriots were unhappy that 
the Finnish proposal did not envision the immediate and 
unconditional return of Varosha.  He acknowledged that the EU 
had been slow to fulfill its 2004 commitments to the Turkish 
Cypriots, but noted the Union's financial aid package had 
finally been approved despite GOC objections.  The Finnish 
presidency was now engaged in an honest effort to move 
forward on trade for the Turkish Cypriots in a way that would 
also avert a crisis in Turkey's accession process.  The 
Turkish Cypriots, he stressed, would get no closer to ending 
their isolation by being inflexible with the Finns. 
 
... BUT WE'LL PLAY BALL.  WILL TURKEY? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Talat agreed that it was not in his community's 
interest to be responsible for a Finnish flame-out, and 
acknowledged that continued progress on Turkish EU accession 
was a prerequisite for a solution to the Cyprus problem. 
Therefore, he said, he was "ready" to negotiate on the 
Finnish proposal.  First, Talat would travel to Brussels on 
November 3 for a meeting with FM Tuomioja.  His "Foreign 
Minister" Turgay Avci and "presidential undersecretary" Rasit 
Pertev would attend FM-level talks in Helsinki.  Oddly, Talat 
said he had been under the impression these would be direct 
talks -- which would be "better" than proximity talks -- but 
said the Turkish Cypriots would nonetheless participate "in 
good faith." 
 
NICOSIA 00001869  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Asked about Turkey's participation in the Helsinki 
talks, Talat said he understood and supported the GOT's 
desire to include Greece in the talks.  Negotiations without 
GOG representatives would set a bad precedent for the UN 
track, where Cyprus's "guarantor powers" were traditionally 
included in tandem.  Ultimately, however, Talat said he did 
not know whether the Turks would attend the talks if their 
conditions were not met. 
 
UN TRACK: "GREEK CYPRIOTS TO BLAME" FOR DEADLOCK 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶7. (C) Turning to the UN track, Talat stressed that he was 
ready and eager for an "early resumption of talks."  This was 
in his interest since he wanted to see a lasting solution on 
the island -- and in the interest of Turkey, whose EU 
accession would be continually "poisoned" by any ongoing 
settlement deadlock.  Talat expressed hope that the Gambari 
Process would be a success.  He supported the UN's latest 
bridging proposal, the substance of which the Turkish 
Cypriots had negotiated "sincerely" with SRSG Moller. 
 
¶8. (C) The problem, Talat insisted, was the Greek Cypriots -- 
who at first objected to the specific timelines in the 
proposal and then (after those timelines were softened to 
meet their concerns) raised objections over the UN's plans to 
put the proposal in writing.  Talat suggested that the real 
Greek Cypriot goal was to "cripple" the UN process, where 
both sides were on an equal footing, by keeping it as vague 
and non-committal as possible.  Meanwhile, Papadopoulos would 
continue to press for concessions from Turkey in the EU 
forum, where the Greek Cypriots enjoyed the upper hand. 
 
¶9. (C) Ambassador Schlicher noted that the UN had not 
accepted Greek Cypriot demands for an open-ended process. The 
Turkish Cypriots had shown the right attitude by engaging 
Moller on the substance of the bridging proposal; the GOC's 
recent public rift with Moller and the UN was evidence that 
Papadopoulos was feeling uncomfortable.  Continued Turkish 
Cypriot flexibility and engagement on the UN track would keep 
the pressure on Papadopoulos, take some of the pressure out 
of Turkey's EU accession, and increase the chances of 
renewing active and meaningful settlement talks. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) Although Talat was concerned that the Finnish 
proposal might be detrimental to Turkish Cypriot interests, 
he seemed nonetheless willing to give it the old college try. 
 Having been down this road before (with the unsuccessful 
2005 Luxembourg talks), he is understandably skeptical.  But 
Talat recognizes that the stakes are higher this time and, 
especially since he knows that Ankara, Nicosia, and Brussels 
are the real decision-makers, has a pragmatic streak.  He 
would probably be willing to brave domestic political 
criticism and accept a less-than-perfect deal if 1) he felt 
that it offered at least some tangible benefits for his 
community, 2) he felt that it furthered prospects for a 
Cyprus settlement by averting a Turkey-EU train wreck, and 3) 
he was confident that a flexible approach had Ankara's full 
support.  But the 64,000 YTL question is whether Turkey will 
join him and engage in serious give-and-take in Finland at 
the suggested proximity talks.  Only if this happens will 
Papadopoulos be put back on the spot and forced to make a 
choice between "yes" and "no."  END COMMENT. 
SCHLICHER