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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAHA 000241 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/16/2031 
TAGS: JA PREL MARR
SUBJECT: OKINAWA GOVERNOR'S RACE VERY CLOSE, BUT WINDS SHIFTING TO 
CONSERVATIVE CANDIDATE NAKAIMA 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Kevin K. Maher, Consul General, American 
Consulate General Naha, DOS. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) With just three days left until the November 19 Okinawa 
gubernatorial election, all the media in Okinawa and both 
campaign camps still say they see the race as too close to call. 
 Nevertheless, we are willing to go out on a limb and predict a 
narrow victory by the conservative candidate Hirokazu NAKAIMA. 
The most recent polls from last weekend showed the two 
candidates still neck and neck, with up to 30 percent of voters 
still undecided.  But the Okinawa construction and other 
industry groups have become very active later in the week in 
get-out-the-vote campaigns in support of Nakaima.  The junior 
ruling party Komeito also now is actively doing the same, with 
full support from its rank and file.  The same polls showed that 
only 20 percent of voters see "the base problem" as the main 
issue in the campaign, even though anti-base and 
reformist-backed candidate Keiko ITOKAZU has tried to make this 
the focus of the election.  Labor unions, traditionally a 
bedrock of support for the reformists, are lukewarm, with some 
telling their members to vote their own conscience. 
 
¶2. (C) In our view, even though the election remains extremely 
close, the winds have shifted in Nakaima's favor, as most voters 
are citing bread and butter issues such as the need for economic 
development, Okinawa's high unemployment rate, and worries about 
pensions and welfare issues as their main concern.  These are 
areas of strength for Nakaima, given his background as a former 
MITI official, Chairman of the Okinawa Chamber of Commerce, and 
Chairman of the Okinawa Electric Power Company.  Itokazu on the 
other hand has become a one-issue anti-base candidate seen by 
many as having little to say or to offer on these issues.  She 
is, however, a stronger candidate if the floating voters turn 
the election into a beauty contest, since she is much more 
photogenic, charming, and personable than is Nakaima, even in 
the eyes of his conservative supporters. 
 
¶3. (C) In terms of the election's impact on U.S. policy, we note 
that the Governor of Okinawa has little direct role in Japan's 
security policy, which is decided in Tokyo.  Nevertheless, a 
victory by Itokazu would entail four years of shrill antagonism 
to our base presence in general and in particular to the 
Alliance Transformation and Alliance (ATARA) initiatives agreed 
by our two governments at the October 29, 2005 Security 
Consultative Committee.  Throughout her career as a peace bus 
guide, in the Prefectural Assembly, and more recently as a 
national Dietmember, Itokazu has consistently opposed the 
U.S.-Japan security alliance and the Security Treaty, and the 
presence of U.S. bases in Okinawa.  Instead of supporting 
military forces, she says, Japan simply should sign a peace 
treaty with the other nations of Asia.  Her platform calls for 
removing all U.S. bases from Okinawa by 2014, and she says she 
absolutely rejects the plan to relocate Marine Corps Air Station 
Futenma within Okinawa.  At the same time, she stresses that she 
would see her election to Governor as a referendum on the 
 
NAHA 00000241  002 OF 003 
 
 
Futenma relocation and the overall presence of U.S. bases in the 
prefecture. 
 
¶4. (C) But even if Itokazu were to win on Sunday, we should not 
see that as a crisis for our base presence in Okinawa, nor as 
the end of our realignment plans.  We have had reformist 
Governors in Okinawa before, and although they can be a thorn in 
our side, they have little actual authority with respect to base 
issues.  Local mayors have told us that they simply ignore the 
governor's office when they have issues involving the military 
bases, and they instead go directly to Tokyo, since they know 
the Governor's office has no real role other than that of 
influencing public opinion when it comes to our base presence. 
The one important exception to this is the legal requirement 
that the Governor approve permits necessary for landfill work in 
water areas, needed as part of the MCAS Futenma relocation. 
But even in this case, we note that the Government of Japan has 
told us consistently during the realignment discussions the past 
year that it would pass special legislation to remove that 
authority from the Governor in the event the Governor could not 
be persuaded to sign those permits.  We expect this special 
legislation would be needed under an Itokazu administration. 
 
¶5. (C) Just as there would not be a crisis under Itokazu, we 
should not expect all to be rosy under Nakaima.  As a 
conservative backed by the LDP and Komeito, Nakaima is a 
supporter of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and publicly accepts the 
need for a U.S. base presence in Okinawa, although he has said 
he feels Okinawa bears too large of a burden as compared to the 
rest of Japan.  But sounding like current conservative Governor 
Keiichi INAMINE, during the campaign Nakaima has opposed the 
current plan of the two governments to relocate MCAS Futenma to 
a V-shaped runway to be built at Camp Schwab.  Nakaima has said 
that his main objection to the V-plan is that it was decided 
with too little input from Okinawa.  Although he had told us 
privately before the election campaign officially began that he 
would, if elected, accept the Futenma relocation plan in some 
shape, but that he could not publicly accept it as a candidate, 
it remains to be seen how he will reconcile this with his public 
opposition if elected. 
 
¶6. (C) He has maintained some flexibility to come around to 
supporting the Futenma relocation plan by stating that once 
elected he intends to consider the views of the intended hosts, 
the northern communities in Nago surrounding Camp Schwab who 
have accepted the relocation.  He also has affirmed his 
intention to participate in GOJ-OPG-municipal consultations 
about the Futenma plan and the economic promotion measures the 
central government has tied to the relocation. 
 
¶7. (C) In what could be a more troubling initiative, Nakaima has 
called for the "elimination of the danger" of MCAS Futenma 
within three years, even though the aggressive schedule in the 
relocation plan aims at moving Futenma not until 2014 once the 
new facility is completed.  Nakaima's call for "eliminating the 
danger" within three years sounds very much like Governor 
Inamine's call for a "temporary heliport" to be built so Futenma 
can be closed earlier, a proposal which both governments have 
 
NAHA 00000241  003 OF 003 
 
 
studied and repeatedly rejected as unworkable for operational 
and other reasons.  Nakaima has offered no specifics on how the 
danger at Futenma could be eliminated within three years, but 
only says that there must be "some way" that this could be done. 
 
 
¶8.  (C) Despite these campaign statements by Nakaima, clearly he 
would be a better governor in terms of U.S. interests in 
Okinawa, and also better for Okinawa in terms of the 
prefecture's economic development and its relations with Tokyo. 
Our assessment of Nakaima is that he would be a pragmatist with 
whom we could develop a good working relationship. 
 
¶9.  (C) Whichever candidate wins the November 19 election, we 
think we will need to continue to press the GOJ to stick to our 
agreed ATARA transformation and realignment plans and schedules. 
 With respect to Okinawa, our recommendation is that in public 
statements we note that we respect the democratic process in 
Okinawa, congratulate the new Governor, note that our two 
governments have agreed on a transformation and realignment plan 
that will be very good for Okinawa when implemented, state that 
we expect the Government of Japan to continue on its steady 
course of implementing that plan, and that we hope for the 
cooperation of the new Governor in that implementation. 
MAHER