VZCZCXRO8443
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2739/01 3301410
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261410Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5363
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002739 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM KDEM SOCI SU KHDP
SUBJECT: SUDAN - SOUTHERN KORDOFAN SITUATION REPORT 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00002739  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
------------------- 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
¶1. On September 2, USAID staff visited Kadugli and Abyei towns in 
Southern Kordofan State to track progress on the implementation of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and determine appropriate 
areas for USAID support.  In the state capital, Kadugli, some 
administrative restructuring has occurred and opportunities to move 
forward with CPA implementation exist.  However, the lack of a state 
constitution impedes progress, as does the centralized control over 
development resource allocation, which is a sign that resources are 
not yet being redistributed according to the CPA.  A noticeable lack 
of devolution of the development planning process continues to 
undermine the state government's objectiveness and risks further 
increasing existing inequities in the state, counter to the 
principles of the CPA.  In Abyei, implementation of the CPA is not 
advancing as planned, largely due to a lack of an official regional 
government.  USAID staff report that current challenges for Abyei 
include conflict over land rights between the Dinka and Misseriya 
ethnic groups, conflict over nomad migration routes, resettlement of 
groups in contested areas, the slow disarmament process, and weak 
human rights monitoring.  End summary and comment. 
 
---------------- 
Local Governance 
---------------- 
 
¶2. Equitable distribution of development assistance is a key 
principle of the CPA and should be a central criterion for the 
distribution of central funds.  Two major issues are currently 
impeding equitable distribution:  1) in Southern Kordofan, current 
structures that allow for money allocated for development to be used 
instead for government operations; and 2) in Abyei, relations 
between the Dinka and Misseriya. 
 
¶3. The CPA stipulates that, in addition to standard central 
government transfers, 2 percent of oil revenues in Southern Kordofan 
should be given to the state. According to the State Minister of 
Economy and Investment, Southern Kordofan State received a monthly 
contribution of 1 percent share in oil revenues, approximately USD 
1.2 to 1.4 million, in August.  This contribution indicates that 
indeed money has begun to be distributed according to CPA 
stipulations.  In conversations, it was reported to USAID that this 
money was spent on government operations, specifically on the 
procurement of vehicles, rather than on development-related projects 
because the central government had not transferred expected 
operational funds to the state.  The separation of development and 
operational funds would help prevent development funds from being 
spent on operational budget items.  (Comment:  The diversion of 
development funds to government operations is particularly harmful 
during the pre-interim period because the general population sees 
government officials well-outfitted with vehicles and other assets, 
while people's home areas remain without any development.  This 
could cause significant tension and difficulty for the fledging 
government.  End comment.) 
 
¶4. The Ministry of Economics and Planning has been formed out of the 
old Department of Economics and Planning, which was formerly under 
the Ministry of Finance.  In the future, development funding is 
supposed to be funneled through this new ministry, while operations 
funds will be channeled through the Ministry of Finance.  (Comment: 
This division of responsibilities could improve transparency in 
development planning and expenditures, but close coordination 
between the two ministries will be needed to assure that sufficient 
operational budgets will be allocated to implement and sustain 
development projects.  End comment.) 
 
¶5. In Abyei, an impediment to equitable distribution of development 
is that tension over land makes it difficult for the Dinka and 
Misseriya to jointly discuss development priorities.  Traditionally, 
the two groups negotiate the Misseriya's access to pass through 
Dinka land along three separate routes in committees formed 
annually.  The two groups are in agreement that:  1) there are Dinka 
areas that are uncontested; 2) there are Misseriya areas to the 
north and west of Abyei that are uncontested; and 3) the Misseriya 
have rights of passage to migrate into Dinka areas with their cattle 
under negotiated terms.  In conversations over development 
priorities in Abyei, the Dinka perceive any involvement of the 
Misseriya as an acknowledgment of Misseriya rights to resettle in 
Dinka areas, as defined by the Abyei Boundaries Commission. 
 
KHARTOUM 00002739  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
(Comment:  The annual fora, however, may provide a rare opportunity 
to discuss development priorities as long as the Dinka are assured 
that any discussion is clearly related only to seasonal migration of 
the Misseriya, and not permanent settlement in Dinka areas.  End 
comment.) 
 
¶6. Currently, the majority of development programs are concentrated 
around Abyei, with few activities in uncontested Misseriya areas, 
such as Al Muglad and Al Fula towns located to the north and west of 
the capital, providing an implicit incentive for Misseriya groups to 
settle closer to Abyei rather than in contested areas just north of 
Abyei.  (Comment:  Development activities in uncontested Misseriya 
areas would greatly mitigate the tension and, therefore potential 
conflict, over resources in Abyei.  End comment.) 
 
----------------- 
Areas of Conflict 
----------------- 
 
¶7. In the coming dry season, Ngok Dinka are expected to return to 
Abyei and villages in the far north of the state.  Most resettlement 
in 2005, the first year of CPA implementation, was around Abyei town 
and the southern parts of the state.  Recently, Misseriya groups 
have settled in the villages of Allal, Langar, and Mabaik, which the 
Ngok Dinka fled in 1964 after the war destroyed these areas.  These 
are the same towns where the Ngok Dinka are expected to return in 
the coming months, which could lead to violence.  Currently, many 
Ngok Dinka returnees are waiting near Makere town to assess the 
security situation before moving back to Allal, Langar, or Mabaik 
villages. 
 
------------ 
Human Rights 
------------ 
 
¶8. In Abyei, the National Congress Party (NCP) continues to restrict 
the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) from monitoring north of Abyei town, 
by requiring special permits.  UNMIS has declined to request a 
permit because it claims it should have unrestricted access to these 
areas and fears a permit would set a precedent for future 
requirements.  Although other UN bodies such as the UN World Food 
Program (WFP), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and UN Development 
Program (UNDP) are permitted in the area without UNMIS, there is 
currently no formal human rights monitoring taking place. 
 
¶9. Since the end of the Joint Military Commission (JMC) operations 
in January 2006, human rights monitoring in the Nuba Mountains has 
decreased significantly.  Currently, UNMIS Human Rights Unit 
(UNMIS-HR) is the only organization monitoring human rights in the 
area.  However, UNMIS-HR only conducts periodic patrols and 
occasional investigations of cases.  To bolster human rights 
monitoring, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) has 
initiated a project to train local human rights monitors.  The UN 
has also expressed interest in setting up a local monitoring 
institution in the future. 
 
¶10. The UNDP Rule of Law program is currently documenting customary 
law practices throughout the Nuba Mountains and Abyei.  UNDP plans 
to use this information to facilitate the adaptation and 
standardization of customary law practices with international human 
rights standards.  Although UNDP has funding for the current study, 
the organization lacks the resources to disseminate the findings and 
to facilitate law reform based on the findings.  USAID/OTI is 
considering how best to support UNDP and law reform in the Nuba 
Mountains. 
 
----------- 
Conclusions 
----------- 
 
¶11. USAID concludes that strengthening the role of local development 
planning, including pressuring the central government to fully 
comply with CPA stipulations on wealth sharing is important to 
long-term peace and advancement of the implementation of the CPA in 
Southern Kordofan State.  USAID will support efforts by 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the UN in these areas. 
Additionally, USAID recognizes the importance of developing programs 
in uncontested Misseriya areas to decrease incentives to settle in 
Dinka areas around Abyei. 
 
¶12. USAID will work in coordination with UNMIS-HR and UNDP Rule of 
 
KHARTOUM 00002739  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Law programs to support increased local human rights monitoring 
around Dilling, Lagawa, and north of Abyei.  Pressure from the 
international community on the Government of National Unity to 
remove movement restrictions on UNMIS north of Abyei, however, is 
needed. 
 
HUME