VZCZCXRO6505
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBM #1673 3051612
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011612Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5480
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 001673 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR/FO FOR DAS VOLKER AND DAS PEKALA 
EUR/NCE JENSEN AND EUR/RPM LAURENDEAU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016 
TAGS: KCFE MARR NATO PREL RO
SUBJECT: ATHENS TEPID TO ROMANIA'S CFE FLANK DEMARCHE 
 
REF: A. ATHENS 2868 
 
     ¶B. BUCHAREST 1637 
     ¶C. BUCHAREST 1576 
     ¶D. USNATO 569 
     ¶E. STATE 110161 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Ted Tanoue; Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C)  MFA Non-proliferation and Arms Control Director 
Bogdan Neculeascu on October 31 briefed Polmiloff on the 
results of Romania's demarche to Athens regarding possible 
CFE Flank ACV Entitlement transfers (refs a and b).  He 
described the exchange between Romania's Ambassador in Athens 
and Greece's  Director for NATO affairs as "cordial, open 
and frank."  The Greeks reportedly argued that CFE Flank TLE 
is about regional balance of forces ("security equilibrium" 
was the term used), which includes the Aegean as well as the 
Black Sea.  Second, ACVs  are higher-value equipment because 
they are multi-functional across the security spectrum, from 
Afghanistan to Kosovo (and Neculeascu added, of course 
Cyprus).  Third, Athens plans to purchase ACVs in 2007, and 
needs sufficient entitlements for that reason.  Athens 
reportedly suggested Romania consider that Norway, Turkey and 
Greece should share the burden evenly in all three respective 
TLE categories (artillery, tanks and ACVs).  In closing, the 
Greek side reportedly thanked the Romanian Ambassador for the 
meeting and suggested that Romania demarche Ankara. 
 
¶2. (C)  Neculeascu said that the GOR was increasingly 
disturbed by an apparently growing benign neglect of CFE, 
including within the HLTF.  He said that Romania's position 
is that it is essential to retain CFE--whether in an adapted 
form or not-- since without some form of CFE (and Open Skies 
arrangements) the region risks chaos.  He added that the MFA 
has been reviewing HLTF reports and it appeared that only 
Romania and the US among the Allies are serious about 
retaining a healthy CFE regime.  He said that Romania is 
feeling increasingly isolated among the EU in its position. 
He noted recent attempts by Belgian OSCE Ambassador deQCrombrugghe to "walk back" on Istanbul Summit commitments, 
adding that some other NATO Allies seem to be leaning in this 
same direction. 
 
¶3. (C) Polmiloff assured Neculeascu that the US could not 
envision a Riga ministerial statement without mention of CFE 
and the Istanbul Commitments.  Neculeascu said that was 
reassuring because Romania was even sensing some hesitation 
from the U.S. in Vienna and Brussels on CFE. 
 
¶4. (C)  Neculeascu said that Romania wants to know what the 
U.S. strategy is on CFE issues on the road to Riga.  He added 
that Romania was willing to assist the US on CFE issues as 
much as possible.  He also reiterated strong support for the 
US-proposed public affairs strategy in response to Russian 
claims on the CFE treaty, but he cautioned that this was not 
enough.  He added that Russia's growing vociferousness on 
CFE, in general and on the Flank in particular, could easily 
spin out of control within the context of the frozen 
conflicts.  NATO needs more coordination, collaboration and a 
more comprehensive response that protects the integrity of 
the CFE treaty.  If the US has any strategy papers to share 
with Romania, Neculeascu said, it would be very much 
appreciated.  In closing, he reiterated that Romania is 
available and eager to work closely with the U.S. on these 
issues. 
 
¶5. (C)  Comment: The MFA believes it took its best shot with 
Athens on the CFE Flank entitlement issue, and will be 
gratified to hear that Athens has relented on this issue (ref 
A).  Romania also recognizes that the US is its best hope for 
getting the Alliance to be more serious about Black Sea 
Security issues, and thus its appeal to work more closely to 
help shape a more comprehensive NATO strategy that takes 
regional concerns into account.  The bottom line is that 
Romania is increasingly concerned that the EU-Turkey-Cyprus 
stalemate (Neculeascu mentioned the upcoming Finnish-Turkish 
meeting) might encourage some NATO Allies to concede Black 
Sea security issues to Russia and Turkey by default--a very 
discomforting prospect for Romania.  End Comment. 
Taubman