VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSL #0929/01 3330910
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 290910Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0492
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0053
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0615
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0023

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000929 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2010 
TAGS: PREL KO LO
SUBJECT: PESSIMISM ON KOSOVO 
 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Lawrence R. Silverman for reason 
 1.4 b and d. 
 
(C) Summary: PolDir Miroslav Lajcak summoned "Quint" 
representatives to the MFA to share concerns that the Contact 
Group may be losing control of the Kosovo process and his 
fear that Russia will veto a UNSC resolution on final status. 
Slovakia fully supports Ahtisaari's work, but Lajcak is 
concerned that Ahtisaari will not have an audience to which 
to present his plan in Belgrade after the elections. Lajcak 
suggested that the international community may need to think 
about alterations. Lajcak was obviously spooked by his 
conversation with the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade; time 
will tell if the Russian's threats were real policy or 
merely scare tactics. Lajcak understands that others 
including the USG do not think Moscow will veto a resolution. 
He hopes he is wrong and they are right. 
 
¶2. (C) A dour MFA PolDir Miroslav Lajcak convened the 
Ambassadors/Charges of the "Quint" on November 27 to provide 
his very pessimistic assessment of the status and future of 
the Kosovo process, based on his recent meetings in Belgrade 
and Pristina and a November 24 dinner with Martti Ahtisaari 
in Bratislava. Lajcak did not propose an alternative 
strategy, but emphasized that the Contact Group has already 
lost control of the process and had to think of changes to 
strategy and tactics if it were to regain control. Lajcak 
said his pessimism was based in large part on his assessment, 
which he acknowledged did not accord with that of the USG or 
other governments, that Moscow would veto any UNSCR. While 
Ahtisaari believes he can present his plan in Belgrade around 
January 30 after the elections, Lajcak thinks that the 
leadership in Belgrade will not accept a visit. In this case, 
Ahtisaari quipped to Lajcak and FM Kubis, he would send it by 
DHL. Internal EU disunity is another key reason for Lajcak's 
pessimism. Ahtisaari told the Slovaks 11/24 that he was 
worried that the Quint was silent, and that opposition to 
independence was noisier. He said he would like to see 
greater Quint activism. 
 
¶3. (C) Elaborating, Lajcak no longer believes there is a 
window of opportunity between the January 21 elections and 
the seating of a new government to present the Ahtisaari 
proposals. There would be no legitimate parliament, and no 
caretaker would be willing to accept responsibility. With no 
parliament to back him, President Tadic would not be wiling 
to receive the report. The alternative would be to table a 
UNSC resolution between the elections and a new government 
taking power, but Russia and Belgrade would present moral 
arguments for why such a momentous issue should be presented 
only after a new government is in power. Lajcak found the 
Serbian government confident of their hand, and said that 
advisors to Tadic with whom he spoke did not really provide 
greater light than did those to Kostunica. The Serbs were 
expecting further delays in the report and suggested to 
Lajcak that everyone consider 2007 as a year of negotiation. 
As for Belgrade's negotiating stance, they described their 
vision to Lajcak: Kosovo not part of the UN; Belgrade 
controls foreign policy and borders; parallel contacts 
between Kosovar Serb municipalities and Belgrade (already in 
plan); possible review of arrangement after 5-6 years. Lajcak 
said he knew Pristina would never accept this. 
 
¶4. (C) Likewise, Lajcak thinks Ahtisaari is expecting that 
the "political" arguments of his report will be more 
persuasive than will be the case. Lajcak does not believe 
warnings of a return to the 1990's absent a UNSC resolution 
will sway either Belgrade or Moscow. 
 
¶5. (C) While others think Moscow would abstain on a UNSCR, 
Lajcak has been led by Moscow's Ambassador in Belgrade to 
think that only a veto would serve Moscow's interest. Lajcak 
bluntly warned that the international community needed to 
"wake up" to the fact this is not the same Russia the West 
has been dealing with in past years, citing its behavior in 
Georgia as an example. Russia wants to show that no global 
issue can be solved without its input, and believes that the 
lack of a solution sets a helpful precedent for other frozen 
conflicts. Moscow probably thinks very few nations would 
recognize a unilateral declaration of independence by 
Pristina. The Russian Ambassador to Belgrade told Lajcak the 
GOR has made its views far too public to back down and 
abstain on a resolution. Doing so would involve Moscow 
sharing responsibility for a bad international decision. 
 
¶6. (C) The bottom line: Lajcak fears that if Pristina says 
yes to independence and Mitrovica no, the stage will be set 
for partition. He could not rule out the Serbs sending police 
forces there per UNSCR 1244. It's a far-out scenario, he 
admitted, but not impossible. 
 
¶7. (C) As for Lajcak's ideas for next steps, he said we 
needed to think about alternative scenarios. FM Kubis does 
not want to change plans or the GOS position, but the Slovaks 
are wondering whether alterations to the plan for instruments 
of sovereignty could provide for greater international 
involvement, thereby improving prospects for broader 
acceptance. In the meantime, Lajcak will invite the Visegrad 
4, Austria and Luxembourg to Bratislava this week. UN Deputy 
Special Envoy Rohan will attend as well. Lajcak urged contact 
by all with the Spanish and Romanians, although he thought 
that we could be naive to think either would change its 
position. Lajcak discussed with Ambassador Polt our view that 
there should be a UNSCR even without the support of all EU 
members. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: Lajcak knows he is in a minority in thinking 
Russia will veto a UNSCR. He strongly hopes we are right and 
he is wrong. He was definitely spooked by the statements of 
the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade; time will tell if those 
statements were genuine reflections of policy or a kind of 
scare tactic. He engaged us because Slovakia continues to 
fully support Ahtisaari's work, and does not want the 
international community's efforts to be undermined by Russia. 
 
VALLEE