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Viewing cable 06SEOUL3465, ROH-ABE SUMMIT DOMINATED BY HISTORY AND NORTH KOREA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06SEOUL3465 2006-10-11 09:38 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0012
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #3465/01 2840938
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 110938Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0653
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1349
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1441
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7544
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1369
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003465 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KS KN JN
SUBJECT: ROH-ABE SUMMIT DOMINATED BY HISTORY AND NORTH KOREA 
 
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b), (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (C) MOFAT Asia Bureau DG Lee Hyuk told POL M/C on October 
11 that Japanese Prime Minister Abe's summit with President 
Roh in Seoul on October 9 provided momentum for an 
improvement in the strained bilateral relationship.  The 
summit meeting, conducted in a frank and sincere manner, was 
dominated by history issues, which took up 80 minutes in the 
two-hour encounter.  The North Korean nuclear test, which 
occurred earlier on October 9, was the other major issue 
discussed.  The two leaders tentatively agreed to meet on the 
sidelines of APEC next month in Hanoi, but Roh was 
noncommittal on an invitation to visit Japan in 2007.  Lee 
commented that Abe, and especially his wife, who speaks good 
Korean and is a fan of Korean TV dramas, made good 
impressions in Seoul and encouraged hope that an Abe 
administration would contribute to improved ties.  A Japanese 
Embassy official separately confirmed that the GOJ viewed the 
summit favorably, and said that the surprise DPRK nuclear 
test had highlighted the ROK-Japan common regional security 
interests.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) On October 11, Lee Hyuk, Director General of the Asia 
and Pacific Affairs Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (MOFAT) provided POL M/C with a detailed readout of 
President Roh Moo-hyun's October 9 summit with Japanese Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe.  Lee characterized the Abe visit as a 
good trip that was conducted in a frank and respectful 
manner.  The summit, originally planned for 90 minutes, ran 
for two hours with about 80 minutes devoted to history issues 
and the remaining time spent on other bilateral topics and 
the North Korean nuclear test.  A 30-minute small group 
meeting was followed by a larger plenary session. 
. 
OPENING POSITIONS 
----------------- 
 
3.  (C) In the opening small group session, Prime Minister 
Abe commented that the ROK-Japanese relationship was 
important but irritants needed to be overcome to develop a 
future-orientated partnership that benefited not only Korea 
and Japan but the rest of Asia.  Korea and Japan shared a 
common view on democracy, freedom, and human rights and both 
countries had contributed to international peace and 
stability.  Over the past sixty years, Japan was deeply 
remorseful over the suffering and damage caused by its 
actions in WWII.  Since then, Japan had championed freedom, 
democracy, and human rights and this policy would remain. 
Japan also took seriously the views of Korea, and Abe would 
do his best to build a more future-oriented partnership based 
on trust and understanding. 
 
4.  (C) President Roh agreed that the bilateral relationship 
was important, so the two leaders should build a 
future-oriented partnership to influence the political and 
economic landscape of Asia.  It was regrettable that 
political difficulties had become an impediment for the 
further promotion of the bilateral partnership.  Japanese 
leaders should understand how Koreans feel and show a correct 
perception of history.  Korea suffered from Japanese colonial 
rule and would remain concerned about Japanese actions for 
the foreseeable future until these history issues were 
resolved.  Roh expected Abe's visit would create a 
breakthrough in the relationship and expressed hope that both 
sides would reinvigorate cooperation for a sustainable 
relationship. 
. 
YASUKUNI, JOINT HISTORY COMMISSION, COMFORT WOMEN 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
5.  (C) In the large group session, Roh brought up the 
Yasukuni Shrine emphasizing that in 2001 President Kim 
Dae-jung and Prime Minister Koizumi, on the margins of the 
APEC meeting in Shanghai, explored the option of Japan 
building a memorial separate from the Yasukuni Shrine. 
Koizumi at the time reportedly undertook to look into it. 
However, five years later there was little movement.  Roh 
urged Abe to pay more attention to the matter. 
 
6.  (C) Abe replied that his own visits in the past to 
Yasukuni were meant to pay respect to those who sacrificed 
their lives for Japan and pray for eternal peace.  His intent 
was not to glorify militarism.  Abe said that he was mindful 
that visits by Japanese leaders could be viewed differently, 
and they had become political and diplomatic issues.  Now 
that he was a leader he preferred not to mention possible 
visits to Yasukuni.  He undertook to properly deal with this 
issue to overcome policy problems.  He would look carefully 
at the issue of separate memorial sites, noting that such a 
move was not easy because there were diverse opinions in 
Japan, especially among the families of Japanese whose 
ancestors suffered during WWII. 
 
7.  (C) Roh and Abe agreed to launch a second Joint History 
Commission by the end of the year.  According to DG Lee, the 
first scholarly meeting of the Joint History Commission ran 
from 2002-2005.  When then Prime Minister Koizumi visited 
Korea in 2005 both sides agreed to launch a second commission 
but it got delayed by Japan's inability to appoint members to 
its panel; Lee said the ROK had already decided on its own 
contingent. 
 
8.  (C) Roh insisted that a perception existed in Korea that 
conservative Japanese politicians were now denying Japanese 
military involvement in the wartime "comfort women" issue. 
In 1993, however, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono 
announced that Japanese government authorities indeed had 
been involved.  Roh urged Japan to clarify its position.  Abe 
responded that there was no change in the Japanese 
Government's position since Kono's 1993 statement. 
. 
SUMMITS, TRADE 
-------------- 
 
9.  (C) Abe invited Roh to visit Japan in early 2007 and said 
the two capitals should revive shuttle diplomacy.  Roh 
remained noncommittal about visiting Japan in 2007, saying he 
would need to consider the wisdom of shuttle diplomacy, but 
stated that he would like to go to Japan at an "appropriate 
time."  Roh and Abe tentatively agreed to meet again on the 
sidelines of APEC in Hanoi in November and possibly at the 
EAS meeting in the Philippines in December. 
 
10.  (C) Abe noted that the Japanese and Korean economies 
accounted for about one-eighth of the world economy.  The two 
leaders should now accelerate discussions for a ROK-Japanese 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).  Roh supported EPA 
negotiations in principle, but said a big difference remained 
on rates of concessions for agricultural and fisheries 
products.  Roh urged Japan to change its position on 
concession rates to revive joint negotiations. 
. 
DPRK NUCLEAR ISSUE 
------------------ 
 
11.  (C) Turning to North Korea, Abe said the DPRK missile 
tests in July and the day's nuclear test sharply changed the 
security landscape in the region and nuclear proliferation 
would become a bigger threat to Northeast Asian and global 
security.  The international community had to send a strong 
message to North Korea that if it failed to abandon its 
nuclear programs, the situation for North Korea would only 
worsen.  The United Nations and concerned nations should 
consult more closely, and Korea-Japan-U.S. coordination was 
more key than ever.  Abe also raised the abduction issue, 
indicating ROK-Japanese cooperation could help to resolve the 
matter with North Korea. 
 
12.  (C) Roh agreed that the DPRK nuclear issue was a serious 
threat to both Korea and Japan and to global nonproliferation 
efforts.  What was needed was a focused response that would 
get North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambition.  The message 
must be firm, cool, and strategic.  Roh added that Seoul and 
Beijing, which had placed a greater importance on dialogue, 
now had no other choice but to get firmer on North Korea. 
For a strong response to be effective, the United States and 
other Six Party members needed to respond in a 
well-coordinated manner.  Roh also said that Seoul would help 
Tokyo to resolve the abduction issue, and recommended that 
Tokyo not separate nuclear, missile, and abduction matters. 
. 
ATMOSPHERICS 
------------ 
 
13.  (C) DG Lee Hyuk concluded by saying that Roh was not 
totally satisfied on the history issue, but the important 
thing was that Abe appeared sincere and gave the impression 
that he wanted a positive change in the relationship.  Abe, 
for example, said a few sentences in Korean during a dinner 
speech, and Mrs. Abe visited a Korean primary school where 
she read a textbook in Korean and spoke Korean to some of the 
children.  This kind of approach played well with Korean 
audiences, Lee said. 
. 
EMBASSY JAPAN CONCURS 
--------------------- 
 
14.  (C) Japanese Embassy Political Officer Asahaki Sunami 
also described the summit as successful from the GOJ point of 
view, saying that the surprise nuclear test, which Prime 
Minister Abe learned about just before his aircraft landed in 
Seoul, had actually improved the atmosphere by throwing into 
relief that common regional security interests that Japan and 
the ROK share.  He said PM Abe, when the subject of him 
visiting Yasukuni came up, had been careful not to say yes or 
no, but that the GOJ understood that Roh could not visit 
Japan if such a visit were to occur.  Sunami also said that 
the GOJ noted Roh's coolness toward EPA negotiations, and 
pressed for increased access to defectors as a means of 
learning more about the fate of abducted Japanese citizens. 
Summing up, Sunami said the two sides remained well aware of 
landmines in their relationship, but had agreed to tiptoe 
around them. 
. 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
15.  (C) Not surprising, history again took up so much of the 
meeting between the leaders of South Korea and Japan.  We 
understand that in the pre-meeting negotiations, the ROK side 
agreed not to dwell at length on these history issues, but to 
no avail.  By all accounts, Abe took it well, remaining calm 
and respectful during Roh's long monologues.  Roh did not get 
any commitments, yet he apparently came away satisfied that 
he had been heard.  The Japanese side could not agree to a 
press statement which included references to history issues, 
which was why there was no joint press statement. 
 
16.  (C) Also helpful to their frank but friendly exchanges 
was the sobering announcement by North Korea that it had 
tested a nuclear device.  We understand that President Bush's 
phone calls to Roh and Abe just after their dinner left a 
deep impression on the two Asian leaders.  DG Lee remarked to 
us that he believed U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral consultations 
could be resumed soon at the highest level, perhaps in 
Vietnam on the margins of APEC meetings. 
VERSHBOW