VZCZCXRO5325
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHFR #7139 3041420
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311420Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2724
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 1026
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0956
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 007139 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2016 
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPKOUNSC UNSC IV FR
SUBJECT: MINISTER CONVOKES AMBASSADOR OVER COTE D'IVOIRE 
UNSC NEGOTIATIONS 
 
REF: STATE 179974 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton.  Reasons 1.4b,d 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Cabinet Minister Girardin convoked the 
Ambassador October 31 to urge U.S. support for the French 
draft Security Council resolution on Cote d'Ivoire, pleading 
that France was in a very difficult situation.  After taking 
into account core U.S. objections, the draft now represented 
the "bare minimum" for France, although Girardin was prepared 
to authorize a final concession in Op 4 in order to preclude 
any interpretation of juridical overreach.  A split vote in 
the Security Council could sink the Ivoirian peace process 
and provoke renewed civil war.  Girardin asked the U.S. not 
to abandon France.  With elections coming up in France, 
Girardin voiced concern that the French public could grow 
critical of the costly and arguably ineffectual deployment of 
Operation Licorne in Cote d'Ivoire and call for withdrawal of 
French troops.  Comment:  This was the first time that the 
French Government formally convoked the Ambassador since his 
arrival in 2005.  End Comment and Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Brigitte Girardin, Minister-Delegate for Cooperation, 
Development and Francophonie, convoked the U.S. and UK 
ambassadors separately on October 31 to urge support for the 
draft Security Council resolution on Cote d'Ivoire.  Girardin 
underlined that France was in a very difficult situation. 
The draft, as submitted "in blue," took into account the core 
objections of the U.S. and UK delegations, she said.  The 
draft now represented only a very slight improvement over SCR 
1633 (2005) and was the "bare minimum" as far as France was 
concerned.  If adopted, President Gbagbo would perceive the 
draft's lack of substance, but France, through the media, 
would nonetheless play up the SC resolution to the hilt in 
order to bolster PM Konan Banny's efforts to advance the 
electoral calendar. 
 
¶3.  (C) France feared abstentions by the U.S., UK, Russia and 
China.  A split vote in the Security Council could have dire 
consequences, she warned, effectively sinking the credibility 
of the Ivoirian peace process.  Gbagbo would proclaim his 
victory over the Security Council.  Opposition elements and 
rebel elements would give up on the road map for an electoral 
transition.  Renewed civil war could be the direct result. 
Girardin asked that the U.S. not leave France in the lurch. 
She stressed French support for U.S. policies in Liberia and 
Sudan. 
 
¶4.  (C) Girardin stated she was prepared, on her own 
authority, to make a final concession to preclude any 
interpretation of juridical overreach, namely to substitute 
the verb "to declare" for "to decide" in Operative Paragraph 
4 with reference to the invocation by any Ivoirian, e.g. 
President Gbagbo, of any unspecified legal provision in order 
to impede the political process.  The UK Ambassador, convoked 
immediately beforehand, had suggested the amendment to 
Girardin, and indicated that the UK could then support the 
draft.  Girardin said the UK did not want an open break with 
France in the UNSC over Cote d'Ivoire. 
 
¶5.  (C) Should the Ivoirian peace process falter for want of 
UNSC backing, France would be driven to face hard choices, 
Girardin observed, particularly with regard to the 4,000 or 
so French soldiers deployed in Cote d'Ivoire under Operation 
Licorne.  France was entering its own election season, which 
would be in full swing by January 2007.  Faced by civil war 
in Cote d'Ivoire, the French public would inevitably 
scrutinize Operation Licorne, criticize it as ineffectual, 
and question its 250 million euro annual budget given other 
military commitments, notably in Lebanon.  Withdrawal of 
Operation Licorne would be a real possibility, she feared, 
and UNOCI would be unable to pick up the slack. 
 
¶6.  (C) Comment:  This was the first time the Ambassador has 
been formally convoked by the French Government during his 
tenure in France. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
STAPLETON