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Viewing cable 06NAHA228, PAC3 SUCCESSFULLY INTRODUCED TO OKINAWA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NAHA228 2006-10-16 10:19 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Naha
VZCZCXRO0063
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHNH #0228/01 2891019
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161019Z OCT 06
FM AMCONSUL NAHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0633
INFO RHMFISS/18WG CP KADENA AB JA
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUSFNSG/CDR10THASG TORII STATION JA
RHMFISS/CDR1STBN1STSFGA TORII STATION JA
RHMFISS/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI
RHMFISS/CG FIRST MAW
RHMFISS/CG II MEF
RUHBABA/CG III MEF CAMP COURTNEY JA
RHMFISS/CG III MEF
RUHBBEA/CG THIRD FSSG CAMP KINSER JA
RUHBABA/CG THIRD MARDIV CAMP COURTNEY JA
RUHBABA/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMFLEACT OKINAWA JA
RHMFISS/COMMARCORBASESJAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RHMFISS/COMMARFORPAC
RHHMHAA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RHHMDBA/COMSUBPAC PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUHBVMA/CTF 76
RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA
RUESOK/FBIS OKINAWA JA
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 0203
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RHHMBRA/JICPAC PEARL HARBOR HI
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 0683
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/NAVCRIMINVSERVFO FAREAST YOKOSUKA JA
RHMFISS/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA OKINAWA JA
RUHBANB/OKINAWA AREA FLD OFC US FORCES JAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 0277
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 0239
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0632
RHMFISS/USARPAC G5 FT SHAFTER HI
RHMFISS/USPACOM REP GUAM ISLAND GU
RUALBCC/YOKOTA AB HQ USFJ
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NAHA 000228 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/16/2031 
TAGS: MARR PINS JA
SUBJECT: PAC3 SUCCESSFULLY INTRODUCED TO OKINAWA 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Carmela A. Conroy, Acting Consul General, U.S. 
Consulate General Naha, U.S. Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (d) 
 
 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  The introduction of the Patriot PAC-3 Air 
Defense Battalion into Okinawa is a success, with the locally 
(in Okinawa) most difficult part, the ground movement of 
sensitive equipment from port and pier to its destination within 
Kadena AFB, completed October 13. Despite some miscalculations 
of the tenacity of protestors blocking the gate to the 
ammunition pier, the GOJ rather quickly provided necessary 
support.  For the second time this year, the GOJ and the Okinawa 
Prefectural Police physically removed protestors attempting to 
block progress towards implementing the alliance transformation 
and realignment initiatives contained in the October 29, 2005 
report of the Security Consultative Committee ("2+2"). End 
summary. 
 
2.  (U) Equipment for the 1-1 Air Defense Patriot PAC-3 
battalion arrived in Okinawa on two separate ships, the first 
carrying supporting equipment and vehicles and the second 
carrying the more sensitive and visually distinct missiles, 
launchers and radar equipment.  The first ship arrived Naha 
Military Port (NMP) slightly ahead of schedule on September 29. 
During the wee hours of October 2 through 5, convoys of those 
wheeled vehicles, trailers and containers drove from NMP to the 
Kadena Air Force Base (Kadena AFB). 
 
3.  (C) The two local daily newspapers gave blanket coverage to 
the notices of arrival and sought remarks from Okinawan 
officials, academics and anti-base organizations, repeatedly 
declaring that the arrival of the Patriot 3 (Pac3) battalion 
would generate strong opposition from the people of Okinawa. 
Okinawa Prefectural Police (OPP) and Okinawa Defense Facilities 
Administration Bureau (DFAB) reportedly told journalists that 
the Army had not requested assistance from the OPP in 
transporting equipment between facilities.  (The 10 ASG and DFAB 
officials extensively discussed the planned movements on 
September 28 and 29.  The Army command intended to reduce the 
visibility of the movements in order to minimize the amount of 
attention to them.)  Despite intensive daily press coverage of 
the movements, anti-military protests were small, peaceful, and 
in no way impeded military operations from September 29 through 
completion of the transfer of the first shipment to Kadena AFB 
on October 5. 
 
4.  (C) Weather, and avoiding conflict with a major Naha City 
festival, resulted in postponing the arrival of the second ship 
carrying missiles and launchers from October 5 to October 9, a 
 
NAHA 00000228  002 OF 004 
 
 
Japanese and U.S. holiday.  The missiles were to be off-loaded 
at Tengan Pier and transported to the Muns, just five km away. 
Note: This is the usual arrival point, ground transportation 
route, and storage point for U.S. military ammunition coming to 
Okinawa.  End note.  The ship was then to take the launchers and 
radar to NMP for onward transport by road to Kadena AFB. 
Coverage by the Okinawa daily newspapers of the details of the 
sea and land movements provided anti-base activists plenty of 
time to organize a protest outside Tengan Pier's sole gate, with 
smaller protests outside the NMP and Kadena AFB.  Protestors 
stationed themselves outside Tengan Pier from October 5, and 
that same day the 10th Area Support Group (10thASG) requested 
support from the OPP through its liaison office to ensure egress 
on October 9. 
 
5.  (C) The morning of October 9 the protestors blocked all 
access to Tengan Pier with a sit-down demonstration.  Despite 
the previous request from the 10th ASG, only two uniformed 
police officers were present at Tengan Pier.  They took no 
apparent action to disperse the 50-60 protestors from the gate, 
and by 1030 the uniformed police officers left the site.  The 
protestors erected tarps to protect themselves from the sun, 
plus loudspeakers, floodlights and generators.  This ensured 
20-25 media personnel could see and hear protestors as well as 
three requests by a DFAB official that they desist from blocking 
access to the facility. 
 
6.  (C) After the 10th ASG alerted ConGen Naha to the problem, 
we notified the Embassy and top officials of the Defense 
Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA), DFAB and OPP.  The GOJ 
officials asked for a written request from the 10th ASG 
commanding officer and/or Consul General Naha for police 
assistance with the transfer of the PAC3 missiles from Tengan 
Pier to the Kadena Munitions Area.  Consul General Maher 
responded with a letter requesting DFAB and OPP assistance 
ensuring our Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) article 5 access 
to, and movement between, U.S. military facilities and areas. 
 
7.  (C) The commanding officer of the 10th ASG spent much of 
October 9 meeting with GOJ officials trying to accomplish the 
move that day.  The 10th ASG, ConGen Naha, and DFAB all 
pressured the OPP to gain access to Tengan Pier on October 9, 
but the OPP replied it could not act that day, since additional 
forces would have to be brought from the mainland.  OPP said it 
could not undertake an operation to clear the gate without more 
planning and reinforcements.  Late afternoon October 9, OPP 
agreed to ensure access and ensure safe movement of the missiles 
on October 11. 
 
8.  (C) On October 10 commanding officers of the 10th ASG, the 
1-1 ADA, and 835th Transport Group, chief of the US Forces Japan 
 
NAHA 00000228  003 OF 004 
 
 
Okinawa Area Field Office, representatives of the (Navy) 
Commander Fleet Activities Okinawa and ConGen Pol-Mil Officer 
met with DFAB and OPP officials to plan security for the October 
11 access to Tengan Pier and transportation of the missiles to 
the Muns, and October 13 access to and movement of the remaining 
equipment between the NPM and Kadena AFB.  Once logistical 
details were set, the OPP requested an additional written 
request to cover the October 13 activities.  OPP and DFAB said 
the situation in Okinawa was sensitive, and the Okinawan public 
would not understand the exercise of police power in support of 
the Pac 3 movements without a request from the USG. 
 
9.  (C) Pol-Mil Officer noted that the SOFA serves as a standing 
USG request for, and standing GOJ assurance of, access to and 
movement between military areas and facilities.  Furthermore, 
there had been countless phone calls and at least six hours of 
bilateral meetings as evidence of the USG's specific 
requirements.  OPP and DFAB assured USG participants that the 
Pac 3 deployment was a unique case, and the US side's providing 
a written request would not be cited as precedent for the GOJ 
demanding such formalities in the future.  The OPP and DFAB also 
reluctantly agreed that, even if the USG did not provide the 
written request in this case, the SOFA and multiple bilateral 
communications sufficed to necessitate GOJ action in support of 
all remaining Pac 3 movements. 
 
10.  (U) Setting up before dawn October 11, the OPP and DFAB 
assisted the U.S. military in gaining access to Tengan Pier to 
off load the Patriot 3 (PAC3) missiles from the ship where they 
had been waiting since October 9.  The appearance of 
approximately 100 riot police and 20 traffic police officers and 
a verbal warning convinced many protestors blocking the gate to 
depart.  Thirty minutes later, the riot police firmly pushed the 
remaining 20-30 protestors away from the gate onto the sidewalk. 
 Neither the police nor the protestors resorted to violence. 
The U.S. Army successfully unloaded the ship and transported all 
24 containers of missiles to the Muns, with the OPP keeping 
protestors at bay and traffic controlled until the job was done. 
 
 
11. (C) The ship, still carrying four missile launchers and 
several other pieces of equipment, continued to NMP on October 
11.  It was unloaded October 11 and all equipment placed in 
warehouses at NMP.  The night of October 12, prior to the 
movement of the equipment to Kadena AFB, several DFAB officials 
stood by at NMP and OPP posted officers at every intersection 
along the route and at the gates of both facilities.  The 
launchers were covered with tarps and the equipment broken into 
several small convoys and transported to Kadena AFB without 
incident early the morning of October 13. The Okinawa Times put 
the story on the front page of the October 13 morning edition 
 
NAHA 00000228  004 OF 004 
 
 
with a color photograph above the fold, but the Ryukyu Shimpo 
printed only a short, factual story with no photograph. 
 
12.  (C) Comment/Conclusion:  The introduction of the Pac 3 
Battalion into Okinawa is a success.  When stories of the 
deployment began appearing in the local media in June, we 
anticipated extensive coverage and local opposition.  The daily 
newspapers responded as expected, printing sometimes literally 
minute-by-minute accounts of vehicle movements, conducting 
surveys, and printing all protests and anti-deployment 
activities that came their way.  The July 4 ballistic missile 
launches and October 9 purported nuclear test by the DPRK, 
however, sapped the energy from Okinawan protests.  Moderate, 
and even a few publicly immoderate anti-base reformists in 
private, admitted that there might be a valid reason for a 
ballistic missile defense system. 
 
13.  (C) Comment/Conclusion continued:  That the DFAB and OPP 
did not anticipate, and better prepare to cope with, protestors 
blocking entry to Tengan Pier, appears to us to be more a case 
of internal miscommunication and lack of preparation than a 
political decision.  Once the Okinawa-based GOJ offices were 
notified October 9 by the ConGen, they were quick to respond. 
Just 48 hours after the Army hoped to unload the ship at Tengan 
Pier, a professional and overwhelmingly large number of Japanese 
riot police and local traffic police deployed.  They cleared the 
protestors and their equipment from the gates, allowing Army and 
Navy personnel and their contractors access to the pier, and 
rapid movement between Tengan Pier and the Kadena Munitions 
Area.  The remaining movements were also fully supported by the 
OPP and DFAB.  In sum, we assess that the deployment of police 
with respect to the PAC-3 movement, along with the deployment of 
police to remove protestors blocking access to Camp Schwab for 
the FRF cultural assets survey, indicates that the GOJ is 
serious and determined to implement our agreed transformation 
and realignment plans. 
 
14.  (U) The 10th ASG cleared this cable for content. 
CONROY