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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001423 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ OPPOSITION CALLS FOR DEMONSTRATION, AGAIN 
 
REF: A. BISHKEK 1302 
     ¶B. BISHKEK 1333 
     ¶C. BISHKEK 626 
     ¶D. BISHKEK 796 
 
BISHKEK 00001423  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Charge Lee Litzenberger, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  On September 29, the "For Reforms" 
opposition movement announced it would organize a mass 
demonstration beginning on November 2 to demand the 
resignation of President Bakiyev and Prime Minister Kulov, 
unless the government meets a growing list of opposition 
demands, including constitutional reform and an end to 
corruption, by the end of October.  Opposition leaders appear 
re-energized, especially after recent heavy-handed government 
crackdowns on Islamic extremists in the south, a provocative 
move against former Speaker of Parliament Tekebayev, and the 
muddled constitutional reform process.  Reminiscent of the 
situation last spring, neither the government nor the 
opposition seems prepared to resolve the growing political 
stalemate in a constructive manner.  END SUMMARY. 
 
FEEDING THE OPPOSITION 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The Kyrgyz political opposition has used recent events 
-- increased crackdowns against alleged religious extremists 
in the Ferghana Valley; personal attacks against current and 
former parliamentarians, including the scandal surrounding 
former Speaker Tekebayev (ref a); and direct attacks on the 
press -- in an effort to rally support for their ultimate 
cause:  to remove Bakiyev and, possibly, Kulov from the 
Kyrgyz White House and replace them with "their own." 
Leading up to and, most notably, following the September 17 
Kurultai (ref b), opposition groups have re-energized their 
efforts to demand immediate and concrete reforms from the 
Bakiyev administration.  Citing their belief that the 
government has had more than enough time to meet the many 
demands put forth during the demonstrations last April and 
May (refs c and d), the opposition, led by the For Reforms 
(Za Reformi) movement, has begun to focus on another mass 
demonstration, planned for November 2.  Similar to the 
ultimatums issued by the opposition in the past, opposition 
leaders are describing the November 2 rally as one last 
chance for the Kyrgyz Government (GOKG) to shape up, or ship 
out. 
 
¶3. (C) For Reforms includes a number of influential figures, 
including former Trade Minister Almaz Atambayev, Deputy Melis 
Eshimkanov, and Deputy Temir Sariyev, all of whom were allies 
of Bakiyev when he was in the opposition.  Deputy Azimbek 
Beknazarov is also flirting with joining the movement.  For 
Reforms leaders feel confident that it could successfully 
take the reins and expeditiously implement its own demands, 
should the government fail to do so itself.  As Almaz 
Atambayev told the Ambassador on October 3, the opposition 
plans to negotiate with the government over the next month. 
If the opposition's demands are not met, the opposition hopes 
to force the government's resignation, create an interim 
government, push through the reforms promised in March 2005, 
and only then hold presidential elections.  He claimed the 
opposition has already developed strategies on issues such as 
constitutional reform and strengthening relations with 
Kyrgystan's neighbors, as well as Russia, and is, therefore, 
able either to share its ideas with the government or to take 
over if the GOKG is not willing to cooperate.  What the 
opposition has not done is create a strategy that will ensure 
the departure of Bakiyev and Kulov.  When asked why the two 
would resign voluntarily, the opposition simply says they 
must and that the opposition is ready to "die for the cause" 
-- although it will not take up arms itself.  Atambayev went 
on to speculate that the government is probably trying to 
figure out how to "rub out" opposition leaders, like himself, 
rather than how best to collaborate with the opposition 
before the November 2 deadline.  With that 
less-than-optimistic approach, opposition leaders have 
continued to voice their concerns regarding the government's 
 
BISHKEK 00001423  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
ability to reorient the country towards the democratic ideals 
that sparked the March 2005 "revolution" and Bakiyev's rise 
to power. 
 
¶4. (C) In separate meetings, with former Ambassador to the 
U.S. Roza Otunbayeva and Almaz Atambayev, the Ambassador 
noted that forcing political change with ultimatums may not 
be helpful for the country's long-term stability or for 
implementing the kind of reforms the opposition says they 
want to implement.  In response, both Otunbayeva and 
Atambayev agreed, but felt that new leadership is needed 
nonetheless.  Otunbayeva claimed that the Kyrgyz people are 
ready for change and will, as a result, rally behind the 
opposition to support its aims, should the need arise. 
Atambayev said that the opposition would like to maintain 
stability by allowing the current administration to reform 
itself and the country, but the GOKG has been unwilling to 
implement much needed reforms.  Instead, the government has 
attacked independent media outlets, allowed the SNB to be 
taken over by foreign elements, and condoned the actions of 
criminal groups that have been used by the GOKG to suppress 
the opposition, according to Atambayev.  As a result, said 
Atambayev, the people have willingly rallied behind the 
opposition in order to ensure that change does occur, and 
stability is created. 
 
A BEWILDERED GOVERNMENT 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Foreign Policy Advisor Ermek Ibraimov, who is usually 
calm and optimistic, reflected his disappointment in the 
leadership during a September 25 meeting with the Ambassador. 
 He complained that the government spends roughly seventy 
percent of its time trying to clean up its own mistakes. 
Citing the scandal surrounding Tekebayev, Ibraimov said that 
the government is still trying to put out fires that have 
been burning since the summer and is unable to move forward 
on a constructive agenda.  He noted that Chief of Staff 
Abdildayev is having "a hard time" and there are worrying 
trends in the White House.  He concluded by stating that the 
Tekebayev scandal would have repercussions into November. 
New Executive Secretary of For Reforms Omurbek Abdarakhmanov, 
who has enjoyed good relations with the President and the 
White House apparat, told the Ambassador the President said 
on October 3 that he was unwilling to negotiate and unwilling 
to compromise with the opposition.  Speaker of the Parliament 
Marat Sultanov told the Ambassador that he would meet with 
the President on October 5 and encourage him to make 
concessions to the opposition, as the President is "the 
stronger" of the two parties. 
 
THE MANY IN THE MIDDLE 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) A number of Parliamentarians, including Iskhak 
Masaliyev, who has strong ties to the opposition as well as 
the President, have also expressed their doubt in the GOKG's 
ability to stabilize the country, create stronger bonds with 
Parliament, and build collaborative relations with the 
opposition.  Masaliyev told the Ambassador that serious 
issues, including religious extremism, rising ethnic tension 
in the south, and constitutional reform are being ignored by 
Bakiyev.  Convinced that former president Akayev's 
undemocratic tactics are continuing to be used by the current 
administration, Masaliyev said that many believe Akayev's 
supporters remain in power.  As a result, the people's 
confidence in the government is waning.  Masaliyev asserted, 
however, that Kyrgyzstan's citizens would stick by their 
president, to show their support for a stable, unified 
government.  Calling for Bakiyev's resignation and a complete 
reshuffle in the government, according to Masaliyev, is 
counterproductive and ill-timed.  He observed that Kyrgyz 
society is not ready for yet another revolution.  Rather, 
citizens should work within the system already in place to 
create better relations between the executive and legislative 
branches, said Masaliyev.  Doing so will, in his view, enable 
the government to meet opposition demands and, in doing so, 
 
BISHKEK 00001423  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
improve Kyrgyzstan's image. 
 
COMMENT: DEJA VU OR SOMETHING NEW? 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) This latest call for action by the opposition reveals 
two realities:  one, that opposition leaders think the Kyrgyz 
are growing impatient with the GOKG's apparent inability to 
implement needed reforms; and two, that those within the 
opposition who have not been co-opted by the government are 
hungry for power themselves.  The GOKG's floundering reaction 
to the opposition's demands has, as a result, helped the 
leaders of the somewhat floundering opposition convince 
themselves that they may, in fact, have a chance to succeed 
in taking over the government next month.  Much like the 
events that transpired before the demonstrations last April, 
it looks like both sides are heading toward confrontation, 
but will most likely pull back from the brink and continue to 
muddle through.  The irony is that both the opposition and 
the government may be operating under misconceptions.  The 
opposition plan is based on the uncertain assumption that the 
people will take to the streets and, if they do, that Bakiyev 
(and Kulov) will resign.  Bakiyev, for his part, seems overly 
confident that he can ignore with impunity the opposition's 
call for reforms.  The resulting political stalemate has 
raised tensions here, but gives no clear indication whether 
Bakiyev or the opposition will come out on top. 
 
LITZENBERGER