VZCZCXRO8076
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTA #0280/01 2970734
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 240734Z OCT 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7411
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNOSC/OSCE POST COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1636
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000280 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO (A/S BOUCHER), SCA/CEN (SPRATLEN, O'MARA) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2015 
TAGS: OSCE PREL PHUM PGOV KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: FOREIGN MINISTER KEEPS COURSE FOR 2009 
OSCE CIO 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Kevin Milas; Reasons 1.5(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  On October 23, Foreign Minister Tokayev 
told Ambassador Ordway that the GOK would not accept the OSCE 
CiO compromise laid out in the October 4 USG "non paper." The 
existence of "pre-conditions" to the Kazakhstani 
chairmanship, he said, "would embarrass us."  Tokayev 
informed the Ambassador that he intended to address the 
non-paper proposal in his October 27 speech to the OSCE 
Permanent Council in Vienna. The GOK, Tokayev said, "would 
continue to insist" on the 2009 chairmanship.  However, he 
added, if no consensus on the issue could be achieved during 
the December OSCE Ministerial, the GOK would prefer that a 
decision be postponed until 2007, when Kazakhstan's political 
reforms could once again be evaluated.  In explaining the GOK 
resolve to press forward with its 2009 bid, Tokayev 
emphasized that, of the OSCE countries, "only the U.S." had 
proposed 2011 as an alternative. End Summary. 
 
Non-Paper Approach "Embarrassing" to Kazakhstan 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2. (C) Asked by Ambassador Ordway for the GOK's views on the 
USG non-paper on Kazakhstan's OSCE CiO candidacy (delivered 
to the Kazakhstani Embassy in Washington on October 4), 
Tokayev told the Ambassador that the "memo was taken very 
seriously, but to us it isn't a case of implementing 
benchmarks."  He termed the proposal that Kazakhstan would 
delay its CiO bid until 2011, with OSCE member support 
conditional upon GOK implementation of agreed-upon democratic 
reforms,  "unacceptable to Kazakhstan...preconditions would 
embarrass us." 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador Ordway told Tokayev that his main concern 
was not to debate Tokayev on the CiO issue, but rather to 
understand and convey the GOK's position to Washington. 
However, he emphasized, the non-paper proposals for 
democratic reform had been taken from Deputy Foreign Minister 
Aliyev's own remarks.  Thus, the USG was not attempting to 
impose benchmarks, but rather to react to, and even accept, 
what the GOK itself had proposed. 
 
Tokayev: "Only the U.S." Has Proposed 2011 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) Several times during the conversation Tokayev 
reiterated that Kazakhstan's bid had the support of a 
"majority" of OSCE members, even an "overwhelming" majority. 
"We have no right to reject the support of the countries that 
have offered it," he said, and "we still believe Kazakhstan 
deserves to be supported in 2009."  The Executive Secretariat 
of the CIS, he mentioned, would "make another appeal in 
December" supporting Kazakhstan's candidacy.  Tokayev also 
emphasized that "only the U.S." had proposed 2011 as an 
alternative to 2009.  "No other OSCE country has done so," he 
observed. Summing up the GOK position, Tokayev said that 
"there is no reason for us to renounce our application (for 
the 2009 CiO)." 
 
Tokayev to Address Non-Paper in Vienna 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Tokayev informed the Ambassador "in a friendly way" 
that he intended to "address" the non-paper proposal in his 
October 27th address to the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna. 
 (Note: Tokayev plans to depart Kazakhstan for Vienna on 
October 26. End Note.) 
 
 
December OSCE Ministerial: Better to Defer than Disagree? 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Tokayev acknowledged that, despite what he termed 
"overwhelming" OSCE-member support for Kazakhstan's 2009 bid, 
 OSCE rules made it clear that "we need a consensus" to 
resolve the issue.  At the December OSCE Ministerial meeting, 
he said, there would be "only two options -- 2009 and 2011." 
While the GOK would "continue to insist" on 2009, he 
explained, if no consensus could be reached, "the whole issue 
can be postponed until 2007," at which time a final decision 
could be made based on an evaluation of Kazakhstan's 
intervening progress on political reform.  In the case of 
continued opposition to Kazakhstan's candidacy, he concluded, 
"the best decision is no decision." 
 
GOK Will Not Veto Another Country's Candidacy 
 
ASTANA 00000280  002 OF 002 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Tokayev mentioned that the GOK "had heard of" Greece's 
possible candidacy for the 2009 CiO.  That proposal "wouldn't 
be so good," Tokayev remarked, citing the fact that Greece 
had not mounted a campaign for the CiO.  However, although 
the GOK had the right to block any country's candidacy, he 
said, we "won't do it."  On the CiO issue, Tokayev reported 
to Ambassador Ordway, he had told Belgian Foreign Minister 
Karel de Gucht that "we are not interested in creating fault 
lines" within the OSCE. 
 
Affirming the Need to Implement Political Reform 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶8. (C) Tokayev affirmed that, notwithstanding the GOK 
objection to preconditions to its CiO bid, "we strongly 
believe we have to make progress in political reforms." 
Toward that end, President Nazarbayev would make a "special 
statement" on democratic reform, perhaps early in 2007.  At 
roughly the same time, the GOK would begin to undertake 
reforms, to include "changing the role of Parliament," and 
"changing the function of Deputies." 
ORDWAY