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C O N F I D E N T I A L BERN 001626 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016 
TAGS: PTER PHUM PINS PREL MARR CE SZ
SUBJECT: ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING OF SRI LANKA CONTACT GROUP: 
SWISS PLAN TO ATTEND 
 
REF: SECSTATE 140812 
 
Classified By: Poloff Eric Lundberg, Reasons 1.4 b/d 
 
1.(C) Summary:  Switzerland plans to send a delegation to the 
September 27 organizational meeting of the Sri Lanka Contact 
Group, but officials are determined that Swiss participation 
should not compromise their ability to interact with both 
sides in the conflict.  Emboffs underlined the USG's interest 
in input from potential contact group partners with regard to 
both the structure and membership of the contact group(s) and 
encouraged Swiss officials to present their ideas in 
Washington.  Sensitive that some might view Bern as soft on 
the Tamil Tigers, officials stressed the importance of 
toughness, but also for the ability for small players like 
Switzerland to maintain "back channels" in support of a 
peace.  End summary. 
 
2.(C) Swiss DFA deputy Asia director Aldo DeLuca, desk 
officer Boris Richard, and Peace Policy section deputy Markus 
Heiniger told Pol/Econ Counselor and Poloff on August 31 that 
the Swiss government is trying to balance its interest in 
participating in a Sri Lanka contact groups with its fear of 
being perceived as one-sided.  While committed to attending 
the September 27 Washington meeting, the Swiss officials were 
interested in USG clarification concerning the focus of the 
meeting, countries invited, and the intended scope of the 
contact group's activities.  DeLuca noted that the original 
USG demarche in the spring had focused on financial sanctions 
and an arms embargo against the Tamil Tigers.  Switzerland 
would perceive a need to address the activities of the Sri 
Lankan government as well, citing the Sri Lanka Monitoring 
Mission's recent conclusion that Sri Lankan armed forces were 
responsible for the massacre of 17 aid workers.  DeLuca also 
sought assurances that the Sri Lankan government itself would 
not be a contact group member. 
 
3.(C) Emboffs reminded the officials that the purpose of 
their demarches thus far was to seek the views of our 
partners on how the contact group should be organized.  The 
membership and details of the contact groups were not yet set 
in stone.  The USG was pushing this initiative, however, due 
to the need for a group broader than the co-chairs which 
could pressure the parties to engage in peace talks. 
Certainly, reducing the Tigers' ability to commit terrorism 
was an important part of that. 
 
4.(C) Heiniger, who is the Swiss government's point man on 
the Sri Lankan peace process, expressed doubt that sanctions 
would positively influence Tamil Tiger behavior.  "They've 
never responded to force in the past," he said.  Asked what 
had brought them to the ceasefire in 2002, Heiniger offered 
that they must have felt that they could achieve their ends 
better at the negotiating table, though he conceded that the 
post-9/11 environment probably played a role.  Unprompted, 
Heiniger asserted that Switzerland was not soft on the 
Tigers.  Following the August 2005 assassination of Sri 
Lankan Foreign Minister Kadirgamar, Bern had imposed a visa 
ban and prohibition on meetings with Tamil Tiger leaders. 
That said, Bern had decided not to join the EU's recent 
listing of the Tamil Tigers out of concern that such an 
action would have shut off a further Swiss role in the peace 
process. 
 
5.(C) Comment: Swiss officials do want a place at the table 
in any group addressing the Sri Lankan conflict, but their 
bottom line is not endangering their ability to engage both 
sides.  At the September 27 meeting, they will be looking to 
verify that human rights is a part of the contact group's 
focus, as demonstrated in Swiss DCM Witwer's comments in 
reftel.  Having backstopped the Norwegian mediators in the 
past, the Swiss may take their cue from Oslo in their 
decision whether to join the contact group.  End comment. 
URBAN