Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06PORTMORESBY338, SOLOMON ISLANDS - RAMSI FACES A BLEAK TIME

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06PORTMORESBY338.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PORTMORESBY338 2006-08-22 06:28 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Port Moresby
VZCZCXRO6964
PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHPB #0338/01 2340628
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 220628Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4572
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0857
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0194
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 1984
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT MORESBY 000338 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EAP DAS DAVIES 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/22/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL BP
SUBJECT: SOLOMON ISLANDS - RAMSI FACES A BLEAK TIME 
 
REF: PORT MORESBY 203 (AND PREVIOUS) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Robert Fitts, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Port 
Moresby, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
1.(C) SUMMARY: The government installed after the April riots is 
a fractious coalition of five parties, littered with big egos 
with differing agendas.  The agendas are conflicting, but each 
features an ambitious initiative unhelpful to the RAMSI's 
determined efforts to re-build government institutions.  One 
example is devolution of government services to a new system of 
provincial governments, which the country has neither the 
personnel nor the resources to establish. 
 
2.(C) Moreover, though measured in public, the Prime Minister in 
private can be very critical of what he sees as RAMSI's 
political role in the turmoil/riots which led to the formation 
of his government.  He has fired the Attorney General who (on 
RAMSI advice) filed an objection to a commission of inquiry 
looking into whether continued detention of prospective 
government ministers was not politically motivated.  The 
Government may also be contemplating removal of the Australian 
(non-RAMSI, but few Solomon Islanders make the distinction) 
Police Commissioner for his handling of the riots. 
 
3.(U) The April riots destroyed a fair chunk of the capital's 
retail establishments, but it appears the economic damage may 
not be as bad as initially feared.  The two major foreign 
investments on Guadalcanal (a gold mine and a palm oil 
plantation) are reopening. However, given the decline in GDP of 
perhaps a third during the years of ethnic tension, per capita 
income may not return to pre-crisis levels for twelve years, 
well past the envisioned end of the Australian commitment. END 
SUMMARY: 
 
RERUN ON A DOWNWARD SLOPE 
4.(C) There have been better times and worse times over the 
years, but the long-term trend in Solomon Island government must 
be seen as generally downhill.  After ethnic violence beginning 
in 1998, militant immigrants from Malaita in Honiara formed a 
Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) and briefly detained the then Prime 
Minister, bringing down the government. Manasseh Sogavare 
emerged as PM and presided over an ineffectual and corrupt 
government  while the country slid into further disorder.  After 
another election, things became so bad that the new Parliament 
unanimously invited in the Australian-led intervention, RAMSI. 
Order was quickly restored and virtually everyone in Solomon 
Islands is grateful to RAMSI for that.  However, the political 
elite began to chafe privately over Australia's large say in the 
government.  Arrest and conviction of three ministers in the 
former government by the Australian-led and RAMSI dominated 
police, while a tonic to impartial observers, heightened their 
disquiet. 
 
5.(U) New elections in April, 2006, led to rioting supposedly in 
reaction to Taiwanese corrupting influence over the initially 
selected PM. That figure resigned and, once again, Manasseh 
Sogavare emerged from the violent confusion. Two leading figures 
in Sogavare's coalition were allied to the earlier MEF movement 
and are still in jail for inciting these latest riots. 
 
RICKETY GRAND COALITION AND THE USUAL SUGAR DADDY 
6.(C) Billed as a grand coalition, the government is actually a 
rickety amalgam of five parties, littered as is all Solomon 
Islands politics with egos from the past (including three former 
PMs).  Already, Sogavare has threatened to sack three and 
actually sacked one minister for the ostensible reason that he 
backed relations with Beijing rather than Taiwan.  Though the 
government was born in riots over the previous PM's alleged 
funding by Taiwan, the new government has quickly tacked in the 
same direction, likely following the same cash.  The PM's first 
foreign visit, with a large government delegation, was to 
Taipei.  Moreover, he cancelled a trip to PNG.  The reason, 
widely believed in Honiara, was that Taiwan wanted to prevent 
him meeting with the PRC Ambassador in Port Moresby. 
 
OK IT'S BROKE.  BUT HOW TO FIX IT? 
7.(C) As is clear to every observer, over the 28 years since 
independence, modern government has failed to take firm root in 
Solomon Islands soil.  The Grand Coalition's leaders agree and 
have grand plans to set things right.  The problem is that 
different leaders have different plans and none of them seems 
overly taken with RAMSI's effort to make the current organs of 
government minimally efficient.  During a recent visit, 
differing leaders spoke confidently to the Ambassador of the 
government's direction. 
 
 
PORT MORES 00000338  002 OF 003 
 
 
- The PM maintained that the major task is to organize 
reconciliation and compensation to alleviate communal grievances 
still fresh from the earlier crisis.  With the economy still far 
below pre-crisis levels, he dismissed as inconvenient the 
observation that such a level of financing simply wasn't 
available. 
 
- The Finance Minister maintained that the government was going 
to concentrate on rewriting the entire legal code (now based on 
English common law) so that traditional communal concepts would 
be reinforced over private property.  Since not much development 
had taken place in the past 28 years, the minister was not 
overly concerned about the impact that move would have on 
investment. 
 
- The Minister for Finance and Planning (whose turf would seem 
to overlap with the figure above) maintained that the government 
would devote its energies to developing and implementing a 
complex rural development plan which would identify crops and 
industries appropriate to each micro-community rather than push 
a national strategy. 
 
- The Foreign Minister declared that the major task was to 
rebuild the public service from the ground up (a note of sanity 
here) so that it would be unsullied by the bad habits of the 
past entrenched bureaucrats.  However, the Prime Minister 
addressed the same issue, on an opposite tack.  He maintained 
the task was to quickly replace the senior RAMSI civil servants 
with well-qualified locals who could do the jobs and assert 
Solomon Island control. 
 
- All took as given an ADB-researched plan to establish a 
federal government. [ADB went to many local leaders and asked if 
they would prefer to have more political power and work with 
funding provided by donors and the national government.  ADB 
officers believe it a profound result that nearly all said yes.] 
 Current planning is proudly patterned on the provincial 
government system of neighboring PNG. However, the PNG system 
has seen a marked increase in the level of government corruption 
and a dramatic decrease in government services.  Given the 
still-precarious state of Solomon Island finances, this 
politically popular move raises serious fiscal questions.  The 
precedent also bodes ill for a key RAMSI concern, effectiveness 
of government. 
 
FIRST STEPS MAY BE BACKWARD 
8.(C) The political violence from which the current government 
emerged understandably colors its first few steps.  Sogavare 
lost little time in naming as his Police Minister Charles 
Dausebea, one of the two figures who had been arrested by the 
(RAMSI dominated) police for inciting the riots. [Note, the most 
prominent facility targeted by the rioters and burned to the 
ground, was the Pacific Casino which was the only competitor to 
Honiara casino in which Dausebea has an interest. So there may 
have been more than ethnic politics at play.] Though he remains 
in detention and has been repeatedly denied bail, Dausebea is 
widely believed to have a major influence in the government. 
Dausebea is also permanently excluded from entering the U.S. for 
his activities during the violence four years ago. 
 
9.(C) Sogavare has established a Commission of Inquiry to the 
April riots and was immediately in a controversy over charging 
it to determine if the detention of Dausebea was politically 
motivated.  The Attorney General quickly filed a court case 
challenging that mandate as a violation of separation of powers 
since the question was before the courts.  Most observers in 
Honiara (and the PM himself in private) hold that the A/G's 
challenge was at the behest of the RAMSI officer serving as 
Solicitor General. 
 
10.(C) On August 21, Sogavare announced he was sacking the A/G 
over the incident.  His speech noted that the A/G claimed to be 
working in the public interest, but maintained that the 
government was by definition the public interest.  Moreover, the 
PM announced he would appoint an ethnic Indian from Fiji, one 
Julian Moti, as A/G.  [We understand Moti to be of long and 
dubious reputation.] In case anyone missed it, Sogavare 
sharpened the point of contention with RAMSI, saying that Moti 
"is already suffering as a result of willingness to serve."  He 
is being investigated by Australian Federal Police. 
 
11.(C) There is also much talk in town, touched on during our 
meetings with government leaders, that the current Commissioner 
of Police might shortly be replaced.  The Commissioner is an 
Australian-funded Australian officer who was brought on with GOA 
pressure.  As he is not part of the RAMSI structure, he can be 
taken on independently. The charge would be that the police were 
late in responding to the April riots and then handled them 
inexpertly. 
 
PORT MORES 00000338  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
12.(SBU) The current worrisome atmosphere has been reinforced by 
a final development, which would not be crucially important on 
its own.  Members of the Malaita Eagle Force have been 
reconstituted as a security company and been awarded the 
contract to protect the PM's and other major government offices. 
 
RAMSI OUTLOOK 
13.(C) RAMSI remains overwhelmingly popular with the Solomon 
Island public, particularly for the quick return to law and 
order (albeit marred by the April riots).  Even the PM, in 
talking of the need to replace RAMSI civil servants, qualifies 
that by the observation that RAMSI should still remain in the 
police.  However, inevitably, some of the bloom has worn off the 
rose as the public has not seen a quick pick up in the economy 
(beyond the bubble in the capital due to the large number of 
RAMSI expats.)  Indeed, the economy lost fully a third of GDP 
during the earlier troubles.  Given the high population growth 
rates, per capita income will likely not return to pre-crisis 
levels until well after the end of RAMSI's current presumed span 
of ten years. 
 
14.(C) Over the past three years, RAMSI has brought order, but 
the events of April have also shown to all that social and 
ethnic fundamentals have yet to change. If RAMSI officers should 
leave tomorrow, the Solomons could quickly revert to the sad 
state before its arrival.  However, RAMSI may well be having 
some success in reviving the spirit of government institutions. 
The Attorney General, albeit with strong RAMSI backing, did step 
forward to defend the separation of powers. 
 
15.(C) The question is how much more progress will be possible 
if the current government MIRVS into its many contradictory 
directions rather than focusing on the ball as pitched by RAMSI; 
rebuilding current government institutions in the breathing 
space bought by large-scale assistance by Australia and other 
neighbors. 
FITTS