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FM AMCONSUL CASABLANCA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7100
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 2825
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0675
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0211
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 3661
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 2188
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 7671
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 1950
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0486

C O N F I D E N T I A L CASABLANCA 000930 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/MAG, INR/NESA/NAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015 
TAGS: MO PGOV PINR
SUBJECT: Casablanca Political Party Leaders Speak Out 
 
 
      REF: A) CASABLANCA 0737 
       B) RABAT 308 
       C) RABAT 565 
       D) RABAT 1358 
 
Classified By: Principal Officer Douglas C. Greene for Reasons 1.4 
(b), (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: In an introductory round of calls on various 
Casablanca-based political party leaders and executive board members 
we heard many similar concerns regarding Morocco's upcoming 2007 
elections. 
 
--Every political activist we encountered expressed an interest in 
the election poll conducted by IRI earlier this year.  The majority 
of those to whom we spoke were concerned about Moroccans 
misinterpreting the poll, which claimed that 46 percent of likely 
Moroccan voters would hypothetically vote for the PJD if the election 
were held at the time of the survey. 
 
--There was strong interest in the subject of continued 
constitutional reform.  Most agreed that to build a strong democracy 
the office of Prime Minister, the Parliament, and the Judiciary must 
be endowed with additional power and greater independance. 
 
--We asked what they would like to see the US do to support 
democratization Morocco in the future.  Our interlocutors praised IRI 
and NDI's good governance and parliamentary programs, and urged 
greater initiative in job development in Morocco as a means to reduce 
the opportunity for extremism.  Finally, several urged that the U.S. 
work to improve its image in the region.  Strengthening American 
credibility would further the process of democratization. 
 
¶2.  (U) During June and July we met with: Ali Belhaj, founder and 
president of Allience de Libertes (ADL); Abderrahim Lahjouji, founder 
and president of Forces Citoyeenes (FC); Ahmed Kadiri, longest 
serving parliamentarian and political bureau member of Istiqlal; 
Fatima Belmoudden, parliamentarian and member of the political bureau 
of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP); and Nouzha Skalli, 
parliamentarian and political bureau member of the Party of Progress 
and Socialism (PPS).  Post requested a meeting with Mostapha Ramid, 
hard-line parliamentarian and outspoken member of the Party of 
Justice and Development (PJD), Morocco's Islamist party. However, 
Ramid refused to meet, citing the US presence in Iraq as the grounds 
for the refusal(ref A).  End Summary 
 
------------------------ 
Reaction to the IRI Poll 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) The PJD's standing with the electorate, as described in the 
IRI poll, was a prominent concern of the political leaders in 
Casablanca with whom we met.  The Parliamentarians from USFP and PPS 
voiced dismay with the poll.  Fatima Belmoudden of USFP was 
concerned, not only with the results of the poll, but with how they 
were presented in the press.  Belmoudden claimed that the results 
sent a powerful message "because the poll was from the U.S."  She 
claimed that, because popular culture is different in Morocco than it 
is in the U.S., the poll is "too foreign a concept" and could be 
easily misunderstood.  She did concede that the poll might be read as 
simply a "warning signal" about the popularity of the PJD.  But she 
was pessimistic that the PJD, if given the opportunity, would reverse 
the reforms that Morocco has undertaken in recent years. 
 
¶4.  (C) Belmoudden went on to say that there are those in parliament 
who believe that the poll results, showing a potentially strong 
performance by the PJD, are the U.S.' way of supporting a moderate 
Islamist party in Morocco.  She expressed concern that both the U.S. 
and the EU are supporting moderate Islamist movements worldwide in 
order to discourage more radical Islamist parties.  She cited a 
recent program that the National Democratic Institute (NDI) conducted 
in Morocco, funded by the USG, for female political leaders. 
According to Belmoudden, the organizers asked for 20 female 
parliamentarians, but she claimed they specifically stated that at 
least two should be from the PJD.  (Note: While USAID, who overseas 
the NDI program, says this is not possible Belmoudden clearly 
believed it. End Note)  This behavior, she said, "sends the wrong 
message."  It registered with Moroccan politicians as specific U.S. 
interest in promoting the PJD. 
 
¶5.  (C) PPS parliamentarian Dr. Nouzha Skalli expressed very similar 
concerns.  She claimed that many politicians were unhappy with the 
poll and saw it as highly misleading. It appears to encourage people 
to "join the PJD."  Like Belmoudden, she believes the poll is further 
evidence that the West is supporting "moderate" Islamic movements at 
the expense of all others.  She mentioned, as an example, the 
international assembly she attended in Istanbul in April 2006, 
sponsored by the Washington-based non-profit National Endowment for 
Democracy.  According to Skalli "the panels were all full of moderate 
Islamists and there was no room for non-Islamist parties."  In her 
opinion the American initiatives to promote democracy were positive 
but the execution was sometimes a problem for her and those like her. 
 In response to each of our interlocutors concerns, we assured them 
that the U.S. is interested in supporting the process of 
democratization and has no interest in favoring one party over 
another. 
 
¶6.  (C) In contrast to the other parliamentarians' sentiments, Ali 
Belhaj, the American educated founder of the liberal ADL, saw the 
poll as a much-needed instigator of public debate.  Belhaj was far 
less concerned with the results of the poll than with the idea of the 
poll itself.  He concluded that the elections are over a year off and 
the situation was likely to change in the coming months.  (Note: Like 
Belhaj, the Ministry of the Interior may have been inspired by IRI's 
poll since it is currently undertaking its own polls which will be 
published regularly on its soon to be launched internet site, 
according to contacts in the Ministry's Communications Office. End 
Note) 
 
------------------------------ 
Democracy and Political Reform 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) Looking beyond the 2007 elections, each politician agreed 
that additional constitutional reform is necessary for Morocco to 
progress, but there was little consensus as to how or when those 
changes could occur.  While all saw Morocco as a budding democracy, 
many conceded that giving real power and greater independence to the 
Prime Minister, parliament, and judiciary, is the only way to form a 
true democratic state.  Some expressed concerns, however, about 
corruption and lack of good governance that could hinder reforms. 
 
¶8.  (C) FC stood alone in its assessment that perhaps "the people of 
Morocco are not completely ready for democracy just yet," although 
they agreed in principle that "ultimately the people need to have the 
power."  FC is a small party of liberal businesspeople and 
intellectuals who have recently signed a compact with the PJD.  What 
the FC gets from the relationship is a broader base because of its 
association with a large and influential party in exchange for 
providing the PJD with economic/business expertise.  In addition, by 
collaborating with the FC the PJD may be seeking to broaden its base. 
 (Note: Recently there has been speculation that the FC and ADL may 
also form an alliance.  In this pre-electoral environment 
partnerships and alliances between parties remain fluid as changes to 
the electoral code are presented.  End Note) 
 
--------------------------------- 
What Can the U.S. do for Morocco? 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Toward the end of each meeting we made it clear that the U.S. 
strongly supports the democratic process in Morocco and asked what 
more the U.S. could do to support the country's efforts in that 
direction.  A number of the political activists immediately pointed 
to IRI and NDI's good governance and parliamentary programs as 
particularly effective.  Our interlocutors also encouraged more 
investment in economic development to help curb unemployment and 
fight poverty and extremism. 
 
¶10.  (C) By contrast to the other party representatives, long time 
parliamentarian, Ahmed Kadiri, of the Istiqlal party, had perhaps the 
most traditional "to do" list for the U.S.  From his opulent 
traditional Moroccan home, Kadiri faulted the U.S. for not taking an 
active enough role in the Western Sahara issue.  He claimed that the 
U.S. has a responsibility because of its understanding of the issue 
and must be more active in helping Morocco find a "political 
solution."  At the same time, he made it clear that the Western 
Sahara is part of Morocco and always will be.  In addition, he stated 
that the U.S. has a strong role to play in economic development and 
reform in his country.  "The US must make more financial investments 
in Morocco and less in Israel," Kadiri declared.  Another step that 
the U.S. should be taking, he stated, is to increase the number of 
Diversity Visas available for Moroccans, as well as making other 
types of immigrant and non-immigrant visas more easily attainable. 
(Note: Kadiri was accompanied in the meeting by his son, a recent 
graduate of the Casablanca American School student who will soon be 
leaving Morocco to attend university in the U.S., where other family 
members are already settled.  End Note) 
 
¶11.  (C) Another prominent topic of conversation was the U.S. image 
in the Middle East.  Abdurrahim Lahjouji of FC claimed the best thing 
that the U.S. could do for Morocco was to "fix" its own image.  He 
declared "you are a true democracy" but in order for others to want 
to follow your example you need to "improve your credibility." 
Lahjouji pointed to U.S. involvement in Iraq and claimed it would 
help the US image enormously to leave the country as soon as 
possible. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Our conversations took place before the recent developments 
in Gaza and Lebanon, and probably would have been quite different if 
held in the past week or two.  While those we met were still mildly 
critical of some U.S. policies, they were also clearly keen to 
express their interest in expanding and strengthening the 
U.S.-Moroccan relationship.  The politicians' apprehension, however, 
over the IRI poll and its misunderstood "prediction" of a PJD win 
stood out as a matter of concern.  We have heard similar sentiments 
from others in Casablanca and will continue to monitor local 
political and business reactions as the elections approach. 
 
GREENE