VZCZCXRO7545
PP RUEHCHI
DE RUEHVN #0655/01 1940926
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 130926Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0125
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 6704
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 2705
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 2149
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 1812
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0896
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0091
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0184
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0663
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0121
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1199
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0037
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0437
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0557
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0097

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENTIANE 000655 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2016 
TAGS: PHUM PREF PREL KIRF TH LA
SUBJECT: LAO REFUSE JOINT DEMARCHE, LIKE-MINDED GROUP LOOKS 
TO UP THE ANTE 
 
REF: VIENTIANE 542 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
¶1. (C) The Lao Foreign Minister has refused to receive a 
joint demarche on the missing children, the GoL saying the 
President's June 22 letter to the UN Secretary General 
provided the government's final word on the matter. The UN's 
Department of Political Affairs (DPA) was not pleased with 
that response, and is looking to follow up, likely with a 
high-level visit to Vientiane and possibly with a follow-on 
letter from the SG. The like-minded group has interpreted the 
FM's refusal as an affront and is visiting a number of ideas 
to push the GoL on the missing children, starting with 
individual calls by members of the group on MFA 
Director-Generals to stress that the issue is costing Lao 
serious political capital.  In the meantime, there is little 
new information about the children, leaving us more concerned 
than ever about their condition.  End comment. 
 
GoL refuses joint demarche 
-------------------------- 
¶2. (C) The like-minded group met July 12 at the residence of 
the Australian Ambassador to discuss next steps on the 
missing children. The Ambassadors of France, Australia and 
the U.S., Charges or mission personnel from the Swedish, 
German, Polish, and EU missions, and the UN Acting ResRep 
attended. In addition, UNHCR's Deputy Regional Representative 
traveled from Bangkok to join the meeting. UNDP, which has 
been the lead agency on the joint demarche, began by briefing 
on the MFA's refusal to receive the demarche.  MFA's 
International Organizations Department told UNDP July 10 that 
the newly-seated FM believed the GoL had already made its 
position on the missing children clear, and that in any event 
he would be unavailable to meet until the end of July. The IO 
Department noted the Lao government had addressed the issue 
on many occasions, most recently in the President's June 22 
response to the UNSG's letter.  The government felt it had 
nothing further to say on the matter.  MFA also emphasized 
that any future discussions of the issue should be made at 
the MFA's DG level. 
 
¶3. (C) The UNDP representative said that the President's 
letter had not gone down well with the DPA in UN New York. It 
was interpreted as arrogant in tone and dissimulating in its 
characterization of the events revolving around the 
children's disappearance. The DPA did not intend to let the 
matter rest, but planned to send a high-level official from 
the office to Laos as soon as practicable, probably in 
mid-August. The DPA was also considering whether the SG, who 
was personally following the issue, would follow up with a 
second letter to the Lao President.  The DPA had also urged 
the Vientiane UNDP office to submit the contents of the joint 
demarche to the Foreign Minister via diplomatic note or 
letter. 
 
¶4. (C) The group generally interpreted the GoL's refusal to 
accept the demarche as a serious miscalculation, and a 
galling protocol breach. Several of those attending offered 
their ideas on why the Lao had chose to "dig themselves 
deeper," in the words of the German Charge; most believed the 
Lao simply thought they could put their foot down and make 
the matter go away, in their usual style.  Others believed 
the Lao could not release the children because they were 
either dead or badly mistreated.  In any event, the GoL's 
strategy had quite the opposite effect, and all the 
participants agreed that they needed to press ahead. The 
question what not whether to follow up, but how. 
 
Next steps 
--------- 
¶5. (C) The group put forward a number of suggestions on how 
 
VIENTIANE 00000655  002 OF 003 
 
 
to leverage the GoL, including: 
 
-- Attempting to organize a meeting between the Lao President 
or PM (one of whom would presumably be attending the 
September UNGA in New York), his Thai counterpart and the SG; 
 
-- Encourage the visit soonest of a senior representative 
from the DPA, and encourage as well a follow-up letter from 
the SG; 
 
-- Seek ministerial level pressure, using for example the 
upcoming ASEAN Post Ministerial Meeting in KL to raise the 
issue directly with the Lao FM.  This could include having 
the respective Foreign Ministers write the Lao FM to express 
concern about the children; 
 
-- Seek to engage the Japanese and ASEAN countries to raise 
the issue with the Lao at appropriate opportunities; 
 
-- Send the demarche points, signed by all the intended 
participants, to the Lao under cover of diplomatic letter; 
 
-- Appeal to the Lao government's "compassion" in some public 
forum. 
 
¶6. (C) In view of the government's refusal to receive the 
demarche, the group agreed that "upsetting" the Lao was no 
longer a concern.  There was an abundance of evidence that 
the children were in Laos and under GoL control.  This fact 
needed to be communicated to the Lao in some fashion to 
demonstrate that the community did not accept their 
protestations about not knowing where the children were -- 
the Lao need to "know that we know that they know," as the 
Australian Ambassador phrased it. This could include 
informing the Lao by some means that there was "proof" the 
government had the children, in the form of the Bolikhamsai 
province police report on the interrogation of the 22 
females. It was also important for the Lao to understand that 
this issue was costing them political goodwill. The longer 
the children remained "disappeared" in the GoL system, the 
more outcry and condemnation there would be from the 
international community. 
 
¶7. (C) Still, care needed to be taken not to challenge the 
Lao so directly that they might retaliate against the 
children. With that end in mind, the group concluded that the 
proposal to submit the demarche points to the Foreign 
Minister was likely to be provocative and therefore 
counter-productive.  A better plan, they felt, was to raise 
the missing children on a one-on-one basis with the 
appropriate DG's in MFA, essentially to remind MFA that the 
international community was not accepting the GoL explanation 
of the event and would continue to press on the issue.  It 
was agreed that each participant would seek a meeting with 
its appropriate MFA DG to convey the continued interest in 
the children. The French Ambassador would use his personal 
relationship with the MFA Press Spokesman (who seems to have 
a direct line to the Politburo on this issue) to make the 
same points. The group would meet again after these series of 
meetings to take stock. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶8. (C) If it was intended to nip the issue in the bud, the 
Lao refusal to receive the demarche on the children could not 
have been more badly calculated.  The GoL's arrogance, not 
only on the demarche but also in the tone of the President's 
letter to the SG, has goaded even the most passive members of 
our like-minded group. Gone is the excuse-making for the Lao. 
The group has unanimously come around to believing that the 
Lao should no longer be coddled, and the government be put on 
notice that the international community does not believe its 
version of events. 
 
 
VIENTIANE 00000655  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶9. (C) Behind our efforts, however, is the fear that the Lao 
won't release them because they can't -- some of the children 
may be dead, or at least badly treated. It is also worrying 
that almost all news about the children has dried up. Sources 
(including family members in Thailand) who several months ago 
could relate limited information now report they are hearing 
nothing, and have no idea about the children's location or 
condition.  The government seems to believe that it can 
simply write them off, and the international community will 
drop the matter.  It also believes it can absolve itself of 
responsibility for their fate.  In fact, this denial of 
responsibility was a repeated theme in the President's letter 
to the SG. But the sense of outrage about the children is 
growing, and this issue is going to continue to haunt the 
GoL. End comment. 
HASLACH