VZCZCXRO0483
RR RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #1404/01 2061330
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 251330Z JUL 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9664
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0676
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0241
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0316
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 0204
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0900
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 0045
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0668
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0785
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 8839
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001404 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IV SU UG UNSC XA XW
SUBJECT: GAMBARI, KALOMOH, GUEHENNO, EGELAND ATTEND CORE 
GROUP MEETING ON NORTHERN UGANDA 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On July 20, the Under Secretary-General 
(U/SYG) for the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, 
Ibrahim Gambari, hosted a meeting of members of the Core 
Group for Northern Uganda, composed of the U.S., UK, Norway, 
and Netherlands, with Canada also in attendance, to discuss 
the July 12 talks held in Juba between the National 
Resistance Movement (NRM) and the Lord's Resistance Army 
(LRA).  Gambari reported that Secretary-General (SYG) Annan 
supports the idea of deploying a Special Envoy to monitor 
future talks and has suggested that former President of 
Mozambique, Joaquin Chissano, be considered for the position. 
 Core Group members discussed the impact of the International 
Criminal Court's (ICC) LRA indictments, the possibility of 
amnesty for LRA leaders involved in the talks, and whether to 
expand UN missions in the region to tackle the LRA.  Less 
than 24 hours after the meeting convened, UKUN circulated 
elements of a draft resolution to Core Group Members for 
consideration, in advance of July 28 Security Council 
consultations on the LRA threat (text in Paragraph 10). 
Guidance request in Paragraph 9.  END SUMMARY. 
 
HIGH LEVEL ATTENDANCE FOR DISCUSSION OF SPECIAL ENVOY 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶2. (SBU) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
Under-SYG Guehenno, Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) U/SYG Egeland, and Department of 
Political Affairs (DPA) Assistant-Secretary-General (A/SYG) 
Kalomoh were also in attendance.  Gambari emphasized that 
Uganda's priorities should be to protect its citizens and 
deter threats from the LRA.  He went on to say that current 
UN mandates for peacekeeping operations in the region do not 
provide sufficient support for these priorities and that the 
UN Security Council (UNSC) should consider the deployment of 
a Special Envoy.  According to Gambari, SYG Annan wants to 
encourage the apparent progress made during the talks in Juba 
by deploying an Envoy who would monitor and facilitate the 
talks between the LRA and Government of Uganda (GOU). 
Gambari stressed that the GOU is receptive to allowing an 
Envoy to participate in addressing the root causes of the LRA 
insurgency and promoting Uganda's national dialogue as well 
as regional security.  According to Gambari, the GOU would 
thus allow the Envoy to engage in national reconciliation 
efforts and internal disarmament of ex-combatants.  However, 
he cautioned that this initiative would require support from 
the UNSC, regional counties, donors, and NGOs.  Gambari also 
noted that leaders from Sudan, Uganda, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo support SYG Annan in this initiative. 
 
SYG SUPPORTS CHISSANO AS SPECIAL ENVOY 
-------------------------------------- 
¶3. (SBU) According to Gambari, SYG Annan has suggested that 
Joaquin Chissano, former President of Mozambique and former 
Chairman of the African Union, take on the role of Special 
Envoy because of his positive relationships with the parties 
involved.  Chissano, who has signaled his availability, has 
the confidence of the Ugandans.  U/SYG Egeland expressed his 
support of the initiative, saying that UN/DPA should lead the 
response.  He went on to say that the progress made during 
the talks in Juba presents a unique opportunity to finally 
end violence in the region. 
 
OPINIONS DIFFER ON GRANTING AMNESTY TO LRA LEADERS 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
¶4. (SBU) Gambari also brought up the issue of the ICC, noting 
that the Ugandan Minister for Security, Amama Mbabazi, was 
unsuccessful in his recent attempts to persuade the ICC Chief 
Prosecutor to grant amnesty to indicted LRA leaders.  When 
U/SYG Guehenno was asked to comment on the role of the UN 
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the UN Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (MONUC), he noted that the limits of UNMIS' 
current mandate could lead to an awkward situation if they 
were presented with the opportunity to arrest an LRA leader. 
He explained that if LRA leaders were arrested, they would 
have to be turned over to the Sudanese government for further 
action.  Guehenno also noted that he is currently consulting 
with the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) to determine what 
actions would be allowable within the mandate.  The Dutch 
representative supported the possibility of MONUC and UNMIS 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001404  002 OF 003 
 
 
playing a role in ICC arrests, but stressed that their role 
should be combined with more robust regional efforts. 
Kalomoh pointed out that the optimistic perceptions of the 
talks in Juba are based on the hope that indicted LRA leaders 
will not be arrested and urged the Core Group to consider the 
impact that amnesty could have on negotiations. 
 
SOME MEMBERS EXPRESS DOUBTS ABOUT TALKS IN JUBA 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶5. (SBU) The Dutch representative expressed doubts about the 
claims of positive outcomes from the Juba talks.  However, he 
did point out that the level of conviction behind the UN's 
proposal of an Envoy was encouraging.  The Dutch 
representative also noted that his delegation would consider 
making a financial contribution, especially if the funds were 
directed toward Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (DDR) efforts.  POL Mins-Couns expressed 
skepticism about the possibility of successful negotiations 
with LRA leaders, but pointed out that there could be hope 
for those who might be persuaded to abandon their leadership 
posts.  He also expressed doubts regarding the GOU's 
willingness to involve an Envoy in the national 
reconciliation efforts and noted that a largely regional 
focus for the Envoy's work could replicate existing 
mechanisms. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In response to these comments, Gambari admitted that 
there had in fact been mixed reports on the progress of the 
Juba talks but stressed that an Envoy would provide the 
support needed for positive results.  He also noted that the 
UN had no comparable figure in Juba to facilitate talks.  POL 
Mins-Couns encouraged the adoption of both regional military 
and diplomatic strategies for dealing with LRA.  The UK and 
Canada welcomed an early discussion among the UNSC about the 
issue, and UNSC consultations were subsequently scheduled for 
July 28.  The representative from the UK expressed her 
support for a UNSC Resolution on the deployment of a Special 
Envoy and a revision of UNMIS and MONUC mandates to tackle 
the LRA, which would first require that Uganda become an 
official item on the UNSC agenda.  She stated that an 
"LRA-centric" resolution is needed and pointed out that the 
ICC incentives was a main driver behind the talks in Juba. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In response to a Norwegian suggestion, A/SYG 
Kalomoh pointed out that Ugandans are adverse to the creation 
of a group of experts and suggested that, if the UNSC 
supports the deployment of an Envoy, they should consider 
delaying the formation of a group of experts.  As a final 
note, Gambari pointed out that the Secretariat is 'inching 
towards a Special Envoy as a way of moving forward,' and that 
if the UNSC tries to simultaneously create a group of 
experts, they could end up losing the opportunity for both. 
 
UKUN DRAFTS BEGINNINGS OF A UNSCR 
--------------------------------- 
¶8. (SBU) Within 24 hours of this meeting, UKUN circulated 
elements of a draft Chapter VII resolution to Core Group 
Members for their consideration before sending it to the 
wider Council membership.  The draft text incorporates 
suggestions made by Foreign Minister Kutesa during his recent 
meeting with the UK High Commissioner in Kampala.  These 
suggestions included referencing the Juba talks to ensure 
that the LRA is aware of the deadline and stressing that the 
Special Envoy would be a 'regional' Special Envoy.  The draft 
resolution also condemns LRA activity, welcomes the 
appointment and engagement of a Special Envoy to the Juba 
talks, and articulates a sanctions regime for LRA members. 
 
GUIDANCE REQUEST 
---------------- 
¶9. (SBU) USUN requests Department guidance on how to respond 
to the UN's plan to proceed on appointing a Special Envoy for 
Uganda.  In addition, USUN requests Department guidance on 
how to respond to UKUN's plan to introduce a resolution on 
the LRA, something about which we have been agnostic in the 
past and which may now have implications (including on the 
ICC issue) for the mandate we are pursuing to get a UN 
operation into Darfur, Sudan.  END GUIDANCE REQUEST. 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001404  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
DRAFT RESOLUTION ELEMENTS 
------------------------- 
¶10. (U) Begin draft resolution elements: 
 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
¶1. Condemn the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA); 
¶2. Demand that illegal armed groups in the region, including 
the LRA, lay down their arms; 
¶3. Condemn violence inflicted by any party on civilians; 
¶4. Call on all states to end impunity for the perpetrators of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; 
¶5. Underscore that governments in the region have primary 
responsibility to protect their populations; 
¶6. Welcome the appointment of a senior level envoy to: 
facilitate regional cooperation to address the security 
issues caused by the activities of the LRA; promote a lasting 
and peaceful settlement to the conflict; and support efforts 
to address humanitarian concerns; 
¶7. Request the senior level envoy to provide to the Security 
Council briefings every three months and written reports on 
the situation; 
¶8. Call upon all governments in the region to deepen their 
cooperation with a view to ending the activities of the LRA, 
and stresses that these States must respect the territorial 
integrity and political independence of their neighbors; 
¶9. Authorise the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) to work closely with 
States and other UN missions in the region, and to make full 
use of its mandate and capabilities to disarm and demobilize 
the LRA and to ensure that those members of the LRA 
responsible for serious violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law are brought to justice; 
¶10. Decide that UNMIS' mandate in Southern Sudan, as outlined 
in Resolutions 1590 (2005) and 1663 (2006), shall be amended 
to allow UNMIS, within its area of deployment and capability, 
to cooperate with efforts, and use all necessary means, to 
disarm and demobilize the LRA and to ensure that those 
members of the LRA responsible for serious violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law are brought 
to justice; 
¶11. Call upon MONUC and UNMIS (south Sudan) to establish the 
necessary operational links with the relevant governments 
armed forces in order to assist attempts to disarm and 
demobilize the LRA and ensure that those members of the LRA 
responsible for serious violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law are brought to justice; 
¶12. Stress the need for States in the region to work together 
to disarm, demobilize and cooperate in the voluntary 
repatriation and resettlement of those LRA members that have 
sought amnesty and reintegration into their commitments; 
¶13. Sanctions: 
-- Arms embargo on LRA, including ban on financial assistance 
(related to military activities); 
-- Assets freeze on five LRA commanders (ICC indictees), 
including ban on making funds available to them; 
-- Review of the above measures in the light of progress on 
reintegration of LRA combatants and bringing to justice of 
ICC indictees; 
-- Establishment of a sanctions committee to monitor the 
above measures; 
-- Establishment of a group of experts to investigate and 
expose the sources of material and financial support to the 
LRA, and to make recommendations; 
¶14. Welcome the establishment of the Joint Monitoring 
Committee and urge the Government of Uganda to ensure that 
clear progress is made on the finalisation and delivery of 
the Emergency Action Plan and look forward to an update on 
progress towards improvements in the living conditions for 
civilians in northern Uganda against clear and measurable 
benchmarks; 
¶15. Encourage the Government of Uganda to reach a clear 
understanding with the international community, UN agencies 
and missions, NGOs and local leaders on the best approach to 
returning people to, or nearer to, their homes. 
 
¶11. (U) End draft resolution elements. 
BOLTON