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Viewing cable 06UNVIEVIENNA572, IAEA/IRAN: BUSHEHR START-UP UNLIKELY UNTIL AT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06UNVIEVIENNA572 2006-07-26 15:40 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET UNVIE
VZCZCXYZ0015
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0572/01 2071540
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 261540Z JUL 06
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5263
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0765
S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000572 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2021 
TAGS: AORC IAEA IR KNNP
SUBJECT:  IAEA/IRAN: BUSHEHR START-UP UNLIKELY UNTIL AT 
LEAST 2009 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 (c) 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (S) The IAEA's Russ Clark, during a July 18 meeting with 
Msnoff, said that the Iranians would be "lucky" to commission 
the first power reactor at Bushehr (BNPP-1) by 2009 because 
the Russians are "dragging their feet."  Key equipment 
required to finish the plant, such as valves and cables, has 
not been delivered, and there are only about 3000 workers on 
site (or about half of what we might expect for power plant 
construction).  The Russians will not deliver fuel for BNPP-1 
until six months before commissioning; however, they 
undoubtedly will complete the project to enhance marketing 
efforts to Iran and other possible clients.  The BNPP-1 is a 
"bastardized" VVER reactor model resulting from extensive 
redesigns of the original Siemens design.  He said the 
Russians are "not so big" on quality, but did not mention any 
specific problems, particularly pertaining to safety issues. 
He dismissed possible concerns about locating the plant in a 
seismically active area, indicating that the Russians had 
conducted reviews and then "beefed up" unspecified areas. 
Clark lobbied for continued IAEA technical cooperation, 
noting it would be dangerous for the Iranians to try to go it 
alone.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Iranians Will "Be Lucky" To Go By 2009 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (S) Clark, noting that BNPP-1 was supposed to have been 
completed two years ago, said the Iranians would "be lucky" 
to begin preoperational testing of the reactor by 2009, 
assuming that the Russians deliver the fuel and they 
encounter no serious technical glitches.  He said that, even 
though the Iranians are pressing hard to complete the 
project, the Russians are obviously "dragging their feet," 
citing the fact that they are only operating one shift and 
have about 3000 workers (nationality breakdown not specified) 
on site--or about half of what you would expect based on 
plant construction in other countries.  He said that the 
Iranians are growing increasingly frustrated with these 
delays, indicating the project managers are under a lot of 
political pressure to complete it.  Iran's parliament, 
according to Clark, had recently authorized an additional 
$250 million to the project.  As a technical guy who has 
worked in the field, Clark quipped that he almost feels sorry 
for the Iranians because of the way the 
Russians are "jerking them around." 
 
3. (S) Clark provided us with copies of a presentation that 
the Iranians had presented to the IAEA circa mid-July titled 
the "Status and Progress of BNPP-Project." (Note: UNVIE will 
fax copies to ISN/RA.  End note.)  It includes a chart on 
Iran's expected completion of various phases of construction 
and equipment installation, which projects completion of most 
of this work by late 2006.  The presentation includes many 
pictures showing progress of various civil works at the site, 
including physical protection measures, a meteorological lab, 
installation of steam and water pipes, views of the inside of 
the turbine plant (including equipment), transformers, and 
water demineralization equipment.  There is also a chart 
titled "summary status" on how much of this equipment has 
been installed and expected completion dates.  Regarding 
Iran's future plans for nuclear power, there is a chart 
outlining Tehran's plans to eventually develop 20000 MW of 
nuclear energy (unspecified timeline), with 7000 MW online by 
2021.  It indicates that the Iranians have completed a 
feasibility study for a second reactor at Bushehr (designated 
BNNP-2), and has developed a tender for this project. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
No Fuel Until Six Months Prior To Startup 
----------------------------------------- 
 
4. (S) Regarding fuel delivery dates, the Russians, 
apparently at very high political levels, have made it clear 
that they will not provide fuel until six months prior to 
startup.  Clark said that the Russians are obviously delaying 
fuel shipments because of "political considerations" and 
concerns that, once they deliver the fuel, they would lose 
 
leverage over Iran, which could attempt to start the reactor 
without Russian assistance.   Despite these concerns, he was 
almost certain that Russia would complete the plant, even 
with a UNSC resolution, owing to concerns about the negative 
impact on other foreign reactor marketing efforts.  The 
Iranians have also informed the Russians of their plans to 
develop 7 additional 1000 MW reactors by 2021, at a cost 
Clark estimated at about $3 billion per plant. 
 
5. (S) Clark said that once the Russians ship the fuel, 
normal safeguards measures would be in place to verify its 
non-diversion, and that the Safeguard Dept would monitor 
BNPP-1 operations with the "same" (but unspecified) equipment 
that would be used in any other plant.  Regarding physical 
security, he noted that the TC work plan includes projects 
with the IAEA's Physical protection experts to bolster 
internal security.  He indicated that the Iranians had 
initially had a lax attitude about this, but seem to 
understand the importance of this issue. 
 
--------------------------- 
Key Equipment Not Delivered 
--------------------------- 
 
6. (S) Clark also noted that BNPP-1 completion requires about 
250 additional valves of an unspecified type, as well as 
extensive cabling.  The Russians have intimated that they 
might allow the Iranians to produce some of the cables in 
Iran, but even if this were to occur, extensive delays would 
occur due to the time required to develop those capabilities. 
 He indicated that these shortages were largely attributable 
to malfeasance on the part of the Russian general contractor, 
who apparently bilked vendors that had been providing the 
equipment. 
 
---------------------------- 
Bushehr a "Bastardized" VVER 
---------------------------- 
 
7. (S) Asked about Russian work to redesign Bushehr, 
originally a 1970s Siemens design, Clark referred to BNPP-1 
as a "bastardized" VVER that required extensive technical 
modifications.  When asked, he said he was not aware of any 
other instances where a country had done such a redesign of 
an existing plan. The Iranians were not involved in the 
redesign work.  He did not provide further details on the 
types of modifications, but we plan to follow-up to get 
additional information on the design characteristics as 
compared to the standard VVER.  When asked about the quality 
of the construction, he quipped that the Russians are "not so 
big" on quality, but did not cite any specific safety-related 
concerns that his might pose. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Iranian Technicians "Fairly Competent" 
-------------------------------------- 
 
8. (S) Clark said that the Iranian technicians are pretty 
competent, with most having graduate degrees from western 
institutions.  The Russians, who view Iran as a "developing 
country," often look down on the Iranians, which he noted is 
pretty common in these circumstances.  Overall, the Iranians 
and Russians seem to work fairly well together.  One of the 
biggest hurdles, according to Clark, is the language barrier. 
 Many of the Iranians have trained in Russia and have learned 
the language, but others have not.  Clark emphasized that 
this is not a big issue during construction of the plant, but 
this could present problems post-startup if some of the 
operators were using Russian terminology while others did not. 
 
-------------------------- 
Dismisses Seismic Concerns 
-------------------------- 
 
9. (S) Asked whether Bushehr's location in an active seismic 
area posed problems, Clark seemed dismissive, noting that the 
Russians had conducted a seismic review and did not 
anticipate any problems, although he claimed they had 
reinforced some (unspecified) parts of the reactor area to 
"beef things up."  He said that the IAEA had also conducted 
such reviews, indicating that they had not discerned any 
problems. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Lobbies For Continued IAEA Technical Cooperation 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
10. (S) Clark said that an extension of Iran's TC agreement 
is pending and emphasized that he hoped the U.S. would not 
veto it.  Most of these projects, which were approved "years 
ago" and are largely Iranian funded, are intended to 
strengthen Iranian understanding of nuclear reactor 
operations and enhance safety.  In his view, it would be 
better to have the Iranians receive training on reactor 
operations from the IAEA instead of venturing out on their 
own.  Clark conveyed that the Iranians have said that if the 
Russians were to halt cooperation on the BNPP-1, they would 
try to fabricate the fuel and operate the plant on their own. 
 In his view, assuming the fuel were delivered, he thought 
the Iranians would be capable of starting up the BNPP-1 on 
their own, but not operate it safely.  He also noted that it 
is in the U.S. interest for the Agency to maintain this 
cooperation because their access to the site is a valuable 
source of information. 
 
11. (S) Clark provided us with a list of active TC projects 
related to Bushehr extending out to 2008, which we will also 
fax to ISN/RA.  This list contains projects identified under 
the headings of: overall project management, support in the 
development of training systems and human performance, 
quality assurance and quality management, commissioning, 
operations and technical support, and nuclear safety related 
activities. 
 
12. (S) Clark expressed similar concerns about Iran's 
construction of the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, noting 
that Safeguards was monitoring its construction, but 
emphasized that the Safety department is not involved.   On 
that point, he expressed concern that, with the design work 
about 96 percent completed, the Iranians might try to operate 
the reactor on their own-something he said he did not even 
want to contemplate because there could be a major accident. 
In his view, the U.S. at some point may want to re-evaluate 
its position concerning this project.  Msnoff recalled that 
the Board has repeatedly called on Iran to reconsider 
construction of the reactor and that the UNSC would likely 
mandate a halt to this work.  Clark acknowledged these points 
and clarified that this type of assistance could only occur 
via Board-approved TC contracts. 
SCHULTE