VZCZCXRO9135
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0669/01 1951250
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141250Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4925
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 4109
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000669 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: VMRO-DPMNE LEADER BEGINS BUILDING A 
GOVERNING COALITION 
 
REF: SKOPJE 648 
 
Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). 
 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶1. (C) Recent Macedonian parliamentary election winner 
(reftel) and VMRO-DPMNE leader Gruevski is engaged in trying 
to build a broad-based inter-ethnic governing coalition to 
help ensure stability as he pursues an economic reform agenda 
and continued implementation of NATO and EU integration 
reforms.  Gruevski has offered both major eAlbanian parties 
-- DUI and DPA -- a place in a future government, but neither 
party appears ready to jump at his current offers of 
ministerial and other high-level positions.  So far at least, 
each is indicating a clear preference for being Gruevski's 
exclusive eAlbanian partner. 
 
¶2. (C) Gruevski faces personal and practical barriers to an 
inclusive coalition with both DUI and DPA.  One alternate 
scenario is a coalition with DPA only, with nationalist 
VMRO-NP providing minority support, an option Gruevski would 
find politically expedient but personally distasteful due to 
his long-term political rivalry with VMRO-NP's leader. 
Gruevski has shown good negotiating skills in the coalition 
discussions so far,  but we have questions about his ability 
to manage a broad-based coalition that includes both DUI and 
DPA. END SUMMARY. 
 
CHALLENGE OF BUILDING AN INTER-ETHNIC PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY 
 
¶3. (SBU) In the wake of his party's victory in Macedonia's 
July 5 parliamentary elections (reftel), VMRO-DPMNE leader 
Gruevski has begun building a "parliamentary majority" that 
will form the core of the next government.  VMRO-DPMNE 
expects the constitutive session of the new parliament to be 
held on or about July 26, after which they expect President 
Crvenkovski to give Gruevski the mandate to form a new 
government.  Gruevski then would have 20 days to form a 
government and present it and his program for approval.  In 
the event that he could not form a government, which we 
believe is unlikely, Gruevski would return the mandate and it 
would then be passed to another party, probably the current 
government coalition leader, SDSM. 
 
¶4. (C) Gruevski needs at least 61 seats in the 120-seat 
unicameral parliament to form a government.  The electoral 
coalition headed by his party currently holds 44 seats. 
Having completed preliminary talks over the July 8-9 weekend 
with ethnic Albanian DPA (leading eAlbanian opposition party, 
11 seats), NSDP (a party formed after its leader broke away 
from the governing SDSM, 7 seats), and two smaller one-seat 
parties (DOM and PEI), Gruevski cobbled together a 
parliamentary majority of 64 MPs.  That would have given him 
an adequate but fragile majority, leaving the SDSM (32 
seats), the eAlbanian DUI/PDP coalition (18 seats) and the 
nationalist VMRO-NP (6 seats) as a strong opposition. 
 
WANTED: A BROADER INTER-ETHNIC COALITION THAT PRESERVES 
STABILITY, EXCLUDES NATIONALIST PARTY 
 
¶5. (C) On July 9, Gruevski met with DUI representatives to 
discuss a broader coalition, including DUI and DPA, that 
would give a VMRO-DPMNE-led government 82 seats, and a 2/3 
majority in the parliament.  Gruevski told us during meetings 
on July 11 and 12 that he wanted a stronger coalition that 
would guarantee stability in the country to allow him to 
focus on implementing his economic reform plan (tax cuts, 
continued privatization and liberalization, and combating 
corruption).  He did not want VMRO-NP, headed by his former 
mentor and now bitter rival Ljupco Georgievski, in the 
coalition.  He acknowledged that Georgievski still retains 
influence within VMRO-DPMNE, and also with DPA, and said the 
larger coalition would help dilute that influence. 
 
¶6. (C) Gruevski said he initially offered both DPA and DUI a 
place in the coalition, but that DPA (VMRO-DPMNE's 
traditional governing partner) had rejected the offer.  DPA 
Vice President Thaci had insisted that DPA could not work 
with DUI.  He pledged that, if DPA entered government without 
DUI, he would secure VMRO-NP support for the coalition as a 
minority partner, giving the coalition an additional six MP 
votes. 
 
SKOPJE 00000669  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) However, Gruevski said he did not want VMRO-NP 
support, which he believed would put the coalition under 
pressure to weaken Macedonia's money-laundering laws and to 
give amnesty to former VMRO-NP members accused of financial 
malfeasance.  He had tried to persuade DPA to reconsider 
joint participation with DUI, since he believed it would be 
necessary to have DUI inside the government for at least a 
year to guarantee stability.  A coalition with DUI and DPA 
also would make it more difficult for VMRO-NP to "blackmail" 
the government, since the NP votes would be unnecessary for 
any legislative purposes. 
 
¶8. (C) With both parties in the government, Gruevski argued, 
his government could focus on building the economy, instead 
of dealing with security issues.  He could also focus on 
implementing NATO and EU-related reforms.  Furthermore, the 
combination would guarantee stability on Kosovo's southern 
flank during the final status process.  However, DPA still 
was playing hard to get. 
 
POWER-SHARING FORMULA 
 
¶9. (C) Gruevski said DUI had been willing to work in 
coalition with DPA, provided VMRO-DPMNE gave up some of its 
own ministerial posts to DPA, which would increase the spoils 
for DUI.  Gruevski had counterproposed with a power-sharing 
formula of five ministerial posts for DUI and DPA together, 
with DUI getting three ministries and DPA getting two.  He 
also would offer DUI one of the Deputy Prime Minister slots, 
and would offer DPA one of the two Deputy Speaker of 
Parliament positions.  In the meantime, he would look for 
three to five additional MPs from some of the smaller parties 
to bolster support for his incipient coalition. 
 
GRUEVSKI'S QUANDARY: BIGAMY OR A SINGLE BRIDE? 
 
¶10. (C) Gruevski acknowledged the political risk inherent in 
courting DUI and DPA for a future government.  He conceded 
that his political support base would strongly resist the 
sole inclusion of DUI -- which he consistently had criticized 
as unreformed rebels and criminals during their four years in 
government -- despite the fact that he believed DUI was "an 
easier negotiating partner." 
 
¶11. (C) It would be equally difficult for his supporters to 
swallow the exclusion of DPA, which was VMRO-DPMNE's 
traditional partner, Gruevski said.  He was concerned that 
VMRO-NP would organize protests from within his party if he 
ended up with only DUI as his eAlbanian partner.  In the end, 
Gruevski concluded that he would favor a coalition with only 
DPA if he could not persuade both parties to join.  He was 
confident DPA was prepared to offer qualified candidates with 
solid credentials for ministerial slots. 
 
DPA AND DUI WEIGH IN -- NEITHER SIDE READY TO TAKE THE PLUNGE 
 
¶12. (C) The Charge met with DPA leaders Xhaferi and Thaci, 
and separately with DUI leader Ahmeti, in Tetovo on July 12 
to convey to them the USG position (also delivered to 
Gruevski) that: 1.) the Embassy would not press for inclusion 
or exclusion from a future coalition government any party, 
and would work with any government constituted under proper 
constitutional and parliamentary procedures; 2.) the next 
government should focus on implementing NATO and EU-related 
reforms and on strengthening rule of law in order to more 
effectively combat crime and corruption; and 3.) the next 
government must not include anyone with a record of 
corruption, election-related malfeasance, or involvement in 
criminal activities. 
 
¶13. (C) Both parties agreed with the USG position.  DPA's 
Thaci argued against inclusion of DUI in the government.  He 
claimed that DPA was VMRO-DPMNE's natural negotiating 
partner, that including DUI would legitimize that party's 
alleged abuses of power over the last four years, and that 
there was no easy way to divide ministerial and other 
high-level government positions among the two eAlbanian 
parties.  He also said the planned return of ICTY war crimes 
cases to Macedonian jurisdiction, scheduled to begin by the 
end of this year, would pose a problem for DUI, since several 
of the suspects in those cases were DUI members. 
 
 
SKOPJE 00000669  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶14. (C) DUI leader Ahmeti told the Charge he felt obliged to 
pursue a place in the governing coalition, since his party 
had won the majority of the eAlbanian vote.  He said talks 
with Gruevski were going well, and had focused on future 
legislation governing the use of language and state symbols, 
as well as other FWA-related matters.  He claimed the issue 
of how to divide ministries in a future government would only 
be discussed at a later date, and that the issue of including 
both DUI and DPA in a governing coalition had not been 
seriously raised by Gruevski. 
 
PERSONAL AND PRACTICAL OBSTACLES TO A COALITION WITH BOTH DUI 
AND DPA 
 
¶15. (C) Should Gruevski find himself in a governing coalition 
with both DUI and DPA, he will face personal and practical 
obstacles to effective coalition management.  Gruevski has a 
reputation as a prickly leader who can be stubborn and who is 
not easily disposed toward compromise.  Additionally, his 
political base strongly favors a coalition with DPA and will 
not take easily to inclusion of DUI, whose members are viewed 
by many VMRO-DPMNE supporters as unreformed rebels from the 
2001 conflict.  Gruevski also would face the prospect of 
persuading his DUI partners to accept the return of the ICTY 
cases to Macedonian jurisdiction, something VMRO-DPMNE has 
long called for and which DUI has fiercely opposed. 
 
¶16. (C) Gruevski also is aware of the strong potential for 
intra-coalition tension and strife as DPA and DUI jockey for 
position after an initial government coalition honeymoon. 
There is no small amount of personal animosity between Thaci 
and Ahmeti, and each party likely would feel driven to outdo 
the other in terms of ministerial posts obtained, and the 
patronage those portfolios would afford. 
 
¶17. (C) In the end, Gruevski will need to balance the 
practical challenges inherent in a joint coalition with DUI 
and DPA against the mathematical advantage of holding 82 
seats in parliament through a broad-based partnership. 
Keeping DPA alone as a coalition partner may prove to be the 
less demanding option in terms of coalition management.  It 
would assuage VMRO-DPMNE's political base of support, give 
the party more ministerial posts to distribute internally, 
and require less time and effort devoted to coalition 
maintenance.  At the same time, however, it could leave 
Gruevski dependent from time to time on rival VMRO-NP for 
support, a scenario he clearly views with distaste. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶18. (C) Gruevski so far has shown more impressive diplomatic 
and leadership skills in the ongoing coalition negotiations 
than he has demonstrated previously.  His broad-based 
approach to building the coalition, while leading with the 
"DPA only" option first to put pressure on DUI, suggests a 
keen negotiating sense and a shrewdness that eluded him in 
earlier political endeavors while VMRO-DPMNE was in the 
opposition.  Of continuing concern, however, is how Gruevski 
will manage to hold a broad-based coalition together if it 
includes both DUI and DPA, something we expect to find out in 
the next several days. 
WOHLERS