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Viewing cable 06MUMBAI1286, CONDITIONS INSIDE CHHATTISGARH'S IDP CAMPS AS MONSOON SEASON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MUMBAI1286 2006-07-10 12:14 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Mumbai
VZCZCXRO3968
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH
DE RUEHBI #1286/01 1911214
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 101214Z JUL 06
FM AMCONSUL MUMBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4012
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5304
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 8775
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 1127
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 1035
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0591
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 0198
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 0083
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0487
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0602
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0583
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MUMBAI 001286 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV KWMN KCRM PHUM IN
SUBJECT: CONDITIONS INSIDE CHHATTISGARH'S IDP CAMPS AS MONSOON SEASON 
BEGINS ARE WORRYING 
 
REF: A) MUMBAI 1253 B) MUMBAI 358 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) Due to escalating combat between government, 
Naxalite-insurgent, and tribal counter-insurgent forces, 
southern Chhattisgarh had a growing internally displaced persons 
(IDP) problem in its Dantewara district before monsoon season 
arrived in late June.  Dantewara's 27 IDP camps have apparently 
quadrupled in size since the beginning of the year and now 
contain in excess of 60,000 persons.  By most accounts the camps 
lack adequate shelter, food, and security.  There are 
trafficking and other human rights abuses associated with the 
camps as well.  The unspoken hope among Government of 
Chhattisgarh (GOC) officials seems to be that people will return 
to their burned villages and scattered livestock next year, but 
there appears to be little thinking underway about assistance 
packages, land restitution, or de-mining, all of which should 
figure prominently in any durable solution to the large scale 
internal displacement occurring in southern Chhattisgarh. In a 
separate discussion, a top Maharashtra police official told us 
how his state, which neighbors southern Chhattisgarh to the 
west, more effectively came to grips with Naxalism after viewing 
the insurgency primarily as a development issue rather than as a 
security challenge.  End summary. 
 
IDP Camps Grow 
-------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) The Dantewara district in southern Chhattisgarh has 
become India's hub for Naxalite violence in 2006 (ref A). 
Escalating combat between government, insurgent, and tribal 
counter-insurgent forces is swelling the district's twenty-seven 
IDP camp locations, as tribal people flee or are forcibly 
removed from their forest villages by both Naxalite and 
counter-insurgent forces.  Based upon our interviews of GOC 
officials, Post reported in ref B that there were approximately 
15,000 IDPs in Dantewara district as of February.  That number 
swelled to 45,958 by early March, according to the Asian Center 
for Human Rights (ACHR).  Much of that seems to reflect real 
growth, as opposed to amended counting.  For example, the 
neighboring Konta, Arrabore and Dornapal camps opened only in 
mid-February, yet still accounted for 15,482 IDPs by March 4. 
During a conversation with EconOff in late May, Mahendra Karma, 
Dantewara district's Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) and 
alleged leader of the "Salwa Judum" counter-insurgency, 
estimated IDP numbers to be in excess of 60,000.  Post has been 
unable to identify any newer survey numbers. 
 
Camp Conditions 
--------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) Southern Chhattisgarh clearly had a growing IDP 
problem in its Dantewara district before monsoon season arrived 
in late June.  The region should experience heavy rains and 
periodic flooding through late September.  There are potentially 
conflicting reports as to the standard of shelter in the camps. 
Many displaced villagers live in makeshift camps, some of which 
are only open-sided, thatched roof constructions, built without 
tarpaulin and exposed to the slanting downpours of windy monsoon 
storms, according to B.G. Verghese of ACHR, who visited several 
camps in early March.  S.C. Sahai, Secretary of the Red Cross in 
Chhattisgarh, told us on July 6, however, that the GOC has 
completed shed-like constructions for IDPs in all camps.   Sahai 
is relying in part on GOC representations to reach this 
conclusion, however, as he has not been to every camp.  He also 
reports that despite heavy rains to date, and the Indravati 
River recently flowing 2.5 meters above its danger mark in 
nearby Bastar district, there have been no reported incidents so 
far of flooding or marooning in the camps. 
 
4.  (SBU) Dantewara's IDP camps are inadequately provisioned as 
well, we heard.  The Red Cross only provided utensils, clothes 
and bed linen for approximately 15,000 IDPs.  The ACHR 
inspection team reported that daily camp rations were one meal 
of beans and rice.  IDPs lack money to buy food and the GOC's 
planned work-for-food program has been delayed by the monsoons, 
according to ACHR.  Naxalites and Naxalite landmines have been 
 
MUMBAI 00001286  002 OF 003 
 
 
killing hungry IDPs who venture back to abandoned villages for 
food, but they continue to go anyway, local papers report. 
 
5.  (SBU) Other NGOs fear to assist Dantewara's IDP camps 
because they believe Naxalites will attack and close other 
projects they are implementing in rural Chhattisgarh, we heard 
from Catholic Relief Services (CRS).  The provision of supplies 
from Red Cross noted above may be the only non-governmental 
assistance to have reached these IDPs to date. 
 
Trafficking, HIV/AIDS on the Rise in Camps 
------------------------------------------ 
 
6.  (SBU) CRS personnel also told us that lack of food and jobs 
among displaced people leads to higher rates of prostitution and 
sexual exploitation among displaced women and girls, and that 
this was occurring with greater frequency in southern 
Chhattisgarh.  There is also a corresponding concern that 
HIV/AIDS infection rates may climb.  Trafficking in child 
soldiers by Naxalites and Salwa Judum is widely alleged by civil 
society and the media. 
 
7.  (U) Security inside the camps is also an issue.  Not only do 
Naxalites attack camps themselves, but on June 20, papers 
reported that insurgents killed seven persons and injured two 
others at Chikuarguda village in the Konta region in retaliation 
for the village's refusal to accompany them on a camp attack. 
 
Locations and Sizes of Camps 
---------------------------- 
 
8. (U) According to the Asian Centre of Human Rights (ACHR), 
which led a fact-finding mission to Dantewara district in April, 
camp locations and populations as of March 4 were as follows: 
Bhairamgarh (6806), Bangapal (1319), Nelsonar (525), Mirtur 
(1685), Matwada (3167), Kutru (1519), Farseghar (463), Pinkondha 
(165), Khodholi (71), Korkheli (100), Bhodli (210), Bhedore 
(350), Jhangla (2710), Etamkhudum (140), Cherpal (2556), 
Gangalur (3159), Bijapur (905), Murdhanda (551), Awapalli (662), 
Bhangsa Gudha (505), Usur (1230), Geedam (1584), Dantewada (36), 
Fharaspal (58), Konta (5015), Arrabore (4068), and Dornapal 
(6399). 
 
How Maharashtra Dealt With the Naxalite Insurgency 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
9. (SBU) In a separate discussion, J.J. Singh, Additional Chief 
of Police in the Maharashtra Police Anti-Terrorist Squad, 
explained to ConGenOffs Maharashtra's recipe for containing the 
Naxalite insurgency.  Naxalism is more of a development issue 
than a law enforcement or security challenge, Singh said.  Until 
the mid-1990s, Naxalite groups held sway over extended areas of 
eastern Maharashtra, much like the Naxalites effectively control 
southern Chhattisgarh today, he told us.  Police were 
ineffective in fighting the insurgents simply because they had 
such difficulty reaching the areas under Naxalite control due to 
inadequate roads.  In addition, the rebels won over the hearts 
and minds of local tribes because they provided rudimentary 
social services that the state had failed to deliver.  The 
security situation changed, according to Singh, once the state 
began building more roads and hospitals and other facilities of 
the modern state in the previously isolated areas.  The 
Naxalites understood the threat to their authority and 
vigorously tried to stop the development projects.  They were 
ultimately unsuccessful, Singh claimed.  He alleged that the 
state now controls much of the security situation in the eastern 
Maharashtra.  Naxalites continue to attack the police presence 
there because the police are the most exposed and visible 
symbols of authority in the area, but the attacks are 
hit-and-run affairs that have failed to roll back state 
authority.  Naxalites continue to extort companies in the area, 
but they are no longer able to establish and run the large scale 
protection rackets they launched against big companies in the 
1990s, Singh said. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
 
MUMBAI 00001286  003 OF 003 
 
 
10.  (SBU) The situation in Dantewara's IDP camps as the 
monsoons begin is extremely worrying.  Breakdown of social 
relationships and support structures, loss of jobs, hunger and 
inadequate shelter have made these IDPs especially vulnerable to 
violence and human rights violations.  Moreover, the 
government's long term plans for these displaced persons are 
unclear.  The unspoken hope among GOC officials seems to be that 
people will return to their burned villages and scattered 
livestock next year, but there appears to be little thinking 
underway about assistance packages, land restitution, or 
de-mining, all of which should figure prominently in any durable 
solution to the large scale internal displacement occurring in 
southern Chhattisgarh.  End comment. 
OWEN