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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAE #0624/01 2121502
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311502Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASMARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8332
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0119
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 5932
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1178
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4607
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1351
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0190
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0209
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1008
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0319
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0525

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000624 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC ETTC ER SU
SUBJECT: THE DARFUR BUZZ FROM ASMARA: NO GOOD NEWS FOR 
THE DPA 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Since early June, Embassy Asmara has 
been following the rumors and activities of key Darfur 
players in Asmara.  PolOff has met with each of the 
leaders of the newly formed National Redemption Front 
(NRF) as well as AbdulWahid Nour and his father-in-law 
Abul Gasem.  NRF leaders in Asmara claim that support 
is waning for both AbdulWahid (reports received July 
31 suggest that he has been replaced; septel) and Mini 
Minawi.  The NRF leaders also forcefully reject the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) as currently drafted. 
While information from the parties is often 
contradictory, all have indicated that they could work 
within the DPA framework if amended to better address 
issues of security, compensation and representation 
for the people of Darfur.  Although the GSE has, like 
the NRF, publicly criticized the DPA, there is 
speculation that is nonetheless trying to get the 
Darfurian non-signatories to ascribe to a common - and 
hopefully constructive - position.  The GSE, however, 
continues to keep its own counsel.  Until we know 
more, and in light of the GSE's reported support for 
the ICU in Somalia, we will continue to remain wary 
about GSE intentions.  End Summary. 
 
BACKGROUND: THE FORMATION OF THE NRF 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) In early June, the National Redemption Front 
was formed in Asmara, Eritrea by a number of the non- 
signatories to the DPA.  The NRF is made up of former 
Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leaders Sharif Harir 
and Khamis Abdalla Abakar, as well as Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim and 
Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) founder and 
former governor of Darfur, Ahmed Diraige.  While there 
was some talk that SLM/A leader AbdulWahid would sign 
on to the NRF, he has stated that he cannot align 
himself with "Islamic fundamentalist" Khalil Ibrahim. 
 
¶3. (C) The initial June founding document of the NRF 
called on the people of Darfur to reject the Abuja 
process and DPA, but did not provide much in terms of 
rationale or recommendations.  The July 14 "Darfur 
People Demands and the Rejection of Abuja Document," 
offers greater clarification.  In particular, the 
document lays out the NRF's main requirements for 
security arrangements, power sharing and access to 
wealth.  Core demands include disarmament of the 
janjaweed and other militias; security arrangements 
for protecting the people in the region; fair and 
adequate compensation; recognition of Darfur as one 
state; and fair representation of Darfurians at all 
levels of government.  (Note: The original documents 
have been faxed to AF/SPG.  End Note.) 
 
VIEWS OF THE NRF 
----------------- 
 
¶4. (C) In separate meetings with Poloff, each of the 
NRF leaders claimed that Mini Minawi and AbdulWahid 
have lost support on the ground. They stated that many 
of the SLM/A and SLM/M commanders - the G-19 - who had 
been loyal previously to AbdulWahid or Mini have 
shifted support to the NRF. In addition, several 
claimed that Mini's political advisor, Ibrahim Ahmed 
Ibrahim, and a number of AbdulWahid's close group of 
nine advisors have defected. The NRF believes it is 
imperative to defeat Mini militarily, to "put him in 
his place."  Sharif and Khamis reasoned that if the 
NRF continues to attack Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and 
can defeat Mini then the international community will 
be forced to recognize the NRF's intrinsic role in 
achieving peace in Darfur.  With joined forces of the 
G-19 and JEM, they believe Mini could be crushed in a 
matter of weeks. 
 
VIEWS OF ABDULWAHID'S FATHER-IN-LAW 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) In a July 21 meeting with Abul Gasem, 
AbdulWahid's father-in-law, Abul Gasem stated that 
AbdulWahid would sign the DPA if certain items could 
be amended or supplemented.  He also stated that 
AbdulWahid could be convinced to step down as leader 
the SLM/A and that Diraige of the NRF was being 
considered as a possible replacement.  When asked why 
he believed so, Abul Gasem alluded to rumors of 
AbdulWahid being ill and internal personality 
conflicts with other SLM members. In meetings with 
Diraige and AbdulWahid, Abul Gasem's comment on a 
change of leadership in the SLM/A appears to be far 
from the truth.  However, as of July 31, a press 
release from the SLM/A reports a possible dethroning 
of AbdulWahid by one of his close advisors and 
commanders.  It is unclear at this time what the 
results may be or whether a change in leadership will 
push the SLM/A closer to signing the DPA or aligning 
with the NRF. 
 
VIEWS OF ABDULWAHID 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) PolOff met with AbdulWahid and his advisor Dr. 
Ahmed Abdallah on July 26 to gauge his support for the 
DPA at this stage and elicit his perspectives on the 
NRF.  From the outset, he appeared agitated by any 
talk about the NRF or Mini Minawi, stating that "you 
guys created Mini".  Throughout the meeting, he would 
occasionally ask where Mini was and seemed upset when 
Dr. Ahmed replied that he was in the U.S. meeting at 
the White House.  AbdulWahid adamantly denied rumors 
that he was losing his support base.  He asserted that 
if he signed onto the DPA or other agreement, the 
commanders would lay down their arms and there would 
be peace in Darfur, because the people of Darfur 
listen to him. 
 
¶7. (C) AbdulWahid explained at length why he opposes the 
DPA, echoing points similar to those voiced by the 
NRF.  He conceded that he could work with the DPA, as 
long as it could be amended to address some of these 
outstanding concerns.  AbdulWahid emphasized that an 
amended DPA needs to designate Darfur as one federal 
region and to stipulate that Darfurians be represented 
at all levels of government with representation 
proportional to their percentage of the population. 
In his view, without majority rule in Darfur, the SLM 
or any other party would have difficulty implementing 
a peace agreement. AbdulWahid called for the immediate 
disarmament of the janjaweed and other militia forces 
to enable IDPs to move back into their villages and 
homes.  However, the GNU could not be responsible for 
providing security, at least immediately.  For people 
to feel safe and return to their homes in Darfur, a UN 
or NATO force must provide security in the region and 
undertake the disarmament of the janjaweed and 
militias. "Without this, there will be no peace in 
Darfur," he noted. 
 
¶8. (C) Once the security and power sharing 
arrangements are worked out, AbdulWahid explained, the 
people of Darfur should be compensated for what they 
have endured. Darfur, he said, "is different from the 
South.  The people of Darfur were not just caught in 
the fire, they were victimized."  Compensation should 
address not only rehabilitation, but also entail 
"corrective justice," to include moral, financial, and 
educational compensation.  While AbdulWahid was 
adamant that it was not just about the money, he did 
emphasize that the $30 million in seed money was 
inadequate to fully compensate the Darfurians.  (Note: 
AbdulWahid did not provide an amount but others in 
Asmara have been using the figure of $150-200 million. 
End Note.)  When asked whether he believed that the 
international community should be responsible, he 
explained that some if not all of the money should 
come from the national government itself and derived 
from national revenues. 
 
ERITREA'S ROLE IN DARFUR 
------------------------ 
 
¶9. (C) The Sudan watchers in Asmara remain baffled as 
to the extent of GSE involvement or its intent vis-a- 
vis Darfur.  Speculation runs the gamut from a GSE 
strategy to undermine Bashir to one that instead seeks 
to strengthen bilateral relations with Sudan.  The GSE 
continues to deny any ulterior motives in bringing the 
non-signatories to the Darfur agreement together in 
Asmara and has not publicly acknowledged any role in 
the creation of the NRF.  The GSE has, in its view, 
been upfront with the GNU about its role in Darfur and 
they arguably could be playing the role of honest 
broker, much as they seem to be in the negotiations 
between the GNU and the Eastern Front.  Even during 
the last round of Abuja, the Eritrean representative 
there reportedly told VP Taha, when it seemed apparent 
that some parties would not sign on to the DPA, that 
he believed it was important to keep all the non- 
signatories together and continue to try for unity. 
We also have been told that the Eritreans have 
reiterated this point directly with Bashir and told 
him that the Eritreans would invite the non- 
signatories to Asmara. 
 
NRF WHEREABOUTS 
--------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Many of the NRF will be out of Asmara for most 
of August.  Khalil left July 20 for Paris.  We have 
been told he had meetings in Berlin earlier this week 
and believe he is traveling on to N'djamena in the 
near future.  Diraige departed the evening of July 26 
for London and Botswana.  Sharif is rumored to have 
departed July 30 for Norway and plans to visit Darfur 
in the coming weeks.  Khamis also claims to be leaving 
town in the next few days for Darfur.  AbdulWahid did 
not seem to have any plans to leave Asmara.  Abul 
Gasem has informed post that he will depart Asmara on 
August 1. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) The buzz in Asmara indicates a decline in 
support for both AbdulWahid and Mini Minawi but 
quantifying the level of either man's support remains 
difficult as allegiances continue to shift like the 
sand.  The decline in both men's standing among the 
Darfurians we encounter, however, seems clear and the 
most likely beneficiary is the NRF.  Although even the 
NRF remains open to using the DPA as a starting point 
for further discussion, we have yet to see any 
indication that new signatories for the DPA "as is" 
are ready to come forward. 
 
¶12.  (C) As for the GSE's intentions regarding Sudan, 
they continue to keep their own counsel.  Their 
actions as mediator in the Eastern Front negotiations 
have appeared to be constructive and we welcome their 
efforts to date.  However, no one is clear as to what 
role, if any, the GSE played in the formation of the 
NRF.  Nor do we really know whether its goal is 
stability in western Sudan or whether it sees 
continued instability (and a GSE handle on the NRF) as 
giving it greater leverage there.  Time will tell. 
However, given the GSE's opposition to a UN force in 
Darfur, its recent caustic rhetoric about the USG role 
in the Horn, and its reported support for the ICU in 
Somalia, we will, for now, remain wary about GSE 
intentions in Sudan. 
 
End Comment. 
 
DELISI