VZCZCXRO6444
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA
RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #1248/01 1721656
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211656Z JUN 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9392
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0893
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0728
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0686
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0066
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA PRIORITY 0585
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0457
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0643
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0846
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0471
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0442
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001248 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SO UNSC IGAD
SUBJECT: UNSC/SOMALIA: MOST MEMBERS ANXIOUS FOR ACTION ON 
ARMS EMBARGO EXEMPTION 
 
REF: SECSTATE 99561 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. At June 19 United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) consultations on Somalia, Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General (SRSG) Fall discussed humanitarian, 
political and security aspects of the current crisis, 
outlining five possible scenarios that could result from the 
power struggle between the Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).  The first such 
scenario foresaw an undermined TFG; the second assumed no 
unified UIC leadership; the third envisaged TFG President 
Yusuf's assertion of authority in Baidoa; the fourth supposed 
UIC control of Baidoa; and the fifth imagined outside 
intervention.  Fall reported on the Transitional Parliament's 
June 14 adoption of a National Security and Stabilization 
Plan (NSSP), which recognized deployment of an 
Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace 
support operation.  According to Fall, preparations for this 
deployment continue apace, including a request for an 
exemption of the arms embargo imposed under resolution 733 
(1992), and will be presented to the UNSC in July by the 
African Union (AU) and IGAD.  Most Members spoke in favor of 
a waiver of the embargo to support the TFG in its bid to 
counter the UIC political (and possibly military) offensive, 
but there were several hold-outs (including the UK, which had 
previously been a major proponent of the idea) who went along 
with Qatari PermRep al-Nassar in his urging the Council 
against 'short-sightedness' in opting for too hasty a 
solution to Somalia's complex problems.  Chinese efforts to 
launch a Press Statement at the end of the session were 
deferred.  END SUMMARY. 
 
UIC INTERNAL DIVISIONS CREATE UNCERTAIN FUTURE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶2. (SBU) At June 19 UNSC consultations on Somalia, SRSG Fall 
discussed humanitarian, political and security aspects of the 
current crisis in the wake of the UIC victory in Mogadishu 
over forces of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and 
Combat Against Terrorism, two of whose leaders had just left 
Mogadishu the weekend of June 16.  Despite the spread of UIC 
influence to Jowhar and toward Baidoa, Fall noted that the 
Union was not monolithic and had no clear internal dynamics, 
divided as the movement was along sub-clan lines, each with 
differing ideologies and with no precise information on 
exactly who was in overall charge and prepared to address 
such internal divisions.  Fall acknowledged the presence of 
extremist elements within the UIC which might harbor 
terrorists sympathetic to al-Qaida among their ranks and 
which seek to seize power and disrupt the Transitional 
Federal Institutions (TFIs), in turn creating a re-emergence 
of the sub-clan rivalries so entrenched in Somali politics. 
In response to a question from USUN, SRSG Fall said that in 
his visit during the week of June 12 to Somaliland, President 
Dahir Rayale Kahin expressed deep concern with the current 
developments in Somalia, which he feared would disrupt the 
peace in Somaliland and make Puntland the next UIC target. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Fall predicted that the UIC's next step would be to 
consolidate control and impose Sharia law in some areas of 
Somalia, but he presented five alternative scenarios that 
could also result from the power struggle between the UIC and 
the TFG.  First, if moderate UIC members asserted control, it 
would undermine the leadership of the TFG and create sub-clan 
friction.  Fall noted that dialogue between the sides might 
nonetheless be possible.  Second, if no united leadership 
emerged, the UIC's 'union' would be threatened, allowing the 
TFG to negotiate with divided elements of its composition. 
Third, TFG President Yusuf could assert his authority in 
Baidoa, imposing total military control if the UIC advanced 
toward the city.  However, if Yusuf failed to defend Baidoa, 
his national credibility and authority would be jeopardized. 
Fourth, Fall suggested that the UIC could assume control of 
Baidoa, which would frustrate regional security interests and 
effectively bring to an end the TFIs.  Finally, Fall raised 
the possibility of interference by regional, sub-regional and 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001248  002 OF 003 
 
 
international players to challenge the UIC, in the middle of 
which scenario the TFIs would inevitably be caught.  In this 
regard, Fall cautioned specifically against the intentions of 
Ethiopia and acknowledged its troop movements to the Somali 
border in what he considered a 'show of strength' against UIC 
advances. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  Fall's recommendation was for the Council to 
continue its close scrutiny of the situation, as the AU was 
currently doing by featuring Somalia prominently on its 
agenda, including for an upcoming Peace and Security Council 
meeting.  He pointed out that under the fourth scenario, the 
TFG would be forced to vacate Baidoa and likely to leave the 
country, representing a regression in Somali politics to a 
time when the ruling power could not even reside in-country. 
To prevent this, Fall recommended the Council adopt a united 
approach to protect the 'fragile' TFG and TFIs, give the TFG 
the means to establish a constructive dialogue within the 
framework of the Transitional Federal Charter and strengthen 
the TFIs' negotiating position with the UIC.  On these three 
points, the Council was unanimous in its support. 
 
EMBARGO EXEMPTION AS MEANS OF ASSISTING TFG 
------------------------------------------- 
¶5. (SBU) Council unanimity evaporated when SRSG Fall reported 
on the Transitional Parliament's June 14 adoption of a 
National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP), which inter 
alia recognized deployment of an IGAD peace support 
operation.  According to Fall, preparations for this 
deployment had begun April 18 and now continued apace, 
including a request for an exemption of the arms embargo 
imposed under resolution 733 (1992), and will be presented to 
the UNSC in July by the AU and IGAD, per a request from the 
Council in its March 2006 Presidential Statement 
(S/PRST/2006/11).  Fall noted that the AU and IGAD were 
meeting June 19 on this topic.  Fall identified the issue as 
two-fold: one problem was the embargo exemption, and the 
other problem was deployment of forces, against which the UIC 
was vehemently opposed, insisting instead that Somalis 
resolve their own security problems and threatening to 
withdraw its commitment to dialogue with the TFG if such an 
operation were to deploy.  Deployment also brought to bear 
divisions within the TFIs, some of whom opposed border 
states' sending troops to Somalia, as well as within IGAD on 
the nationality of participating troops. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Most UNSC Members were willing to accept a partial 
lifting of the embargo to accommodate military assistance to 
the TFG, including some P-5 members.  Chinese PR Wang cited 
the Liberia sanctions case as a model for the legal 
channeling of weapons to allow for law enforcement.  French 
PR de La Sabliere argued that a waiver was critical for the 
international community to ensure integration of militias 
into the national army and to provide for the creation and 
training of police forces.  The Russian representative urged 
Council support for the IGAD operation, which would 
nonetheless require a detailed plan supported by the Somali 
people.  Representatives of Ghana, Argentina and Slovakia 
expressed moderate support for IGAD's peace support 
operation.  Danish PR and present UNSC President Loj raised 
the possibility that the operation might not in fact lead to 
reconciliation, and Tanzanian PR Mahiga inquired about 
possible repercussions on such a deployment by the reported 
build-up of Ethiopian troops around Baidoa. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The UK Deputy PR, however, was more cautious than 
her delegation has been in the past, now saying that the UK 
supports 'in principle' deployment of a peace support 
operation but only on the basis of a clear request for it by 
the TFG and of concrete planning by IGAD and the AU.  She 
argued for a strengthening of UNSCR 733, including 
consideration of targeted sanctions (NOTE. The UK 
representative at the June 15 Somalia Contact Group meeting 
made the same call for targeted sanctions.  END NOTE).  USUN 
PolMinsCouns, drawing from reftel points, pointed out that 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001248  003 OF 003 
 
 
divisions within the UIC, TFIs and IGAD itself made it 
premature to consider a waiver but agreed with the UK on 
enforcing the existing embargo provisions.  Qatari PR 
al-Nasser advised the Council against 'short-sightedness' in 
opting for too hasty a solution to Somalia's complex 
problems.  Tanzanian PR Mahiga reiterated a question he 
raised in the June 15 Somalia Contact Group meeting about the 
fate of the Alliance warlords who had left Mogadishu and who 
had been subsequently banned from Kenyan territory, warning 
that they, with their deep clan links, could still pose a 
threat. 
 
HUMANITARIAN SITUATION WORSE 
---------------------------- 
¶8. (SBU) SRSG Fall reported that the UN would dispatch later 
this week an initial mission to Jowhar to meet with the UIC 
on allowing humanitarian access in areas of greatest need, 
which had been further exacerbated by the recent fighting and 
the drought.  This mission, he added, would be followed by 
deployment of humanitarian organizations to Somalia.  Members 
echoed his concerns, calling for increased levels of 
humanitarian assistance, respect for human rights and 
involvement by all relevant parties (including the Contact 
Group, the AU, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and 
IGAD). 
 
DEFERRED PRESS STATEMENT 
------------------------ 
¶9. (SBU) Due to amendments from the Danish and UK 
delegations, as well as opposition from USUN, the Chinese 
delegation opted to defer consideration of its proposed draft 
Press Statement. 
BOLTON