VZCZCXYZ0012
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0511/01 1741339
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231339Z JUN 06
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5137

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000511 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC IAEA IR KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/BOG/IRAN: STATEMENTS CALL ON IRAN TO 
COOPERATE, RESTORE CONFIDENCE, AND NEGOTIATE 
 
REF: UNVIE 500 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Further to Reftel, this message provides detailed 
information on the June 15 IAEA Board of Governors debate on 
Iran.  During that discussion, 33 countries delivered 
statements, with a preponderance calling on Iran to cooperate 
with the IAEA to resolve the outstanding issues identified in 
the DG's reports, implement confidence building measures 
(CBMs) to restore international confidence in the nature of 
Iran's program, and respond positively to the P5 plus one 
diplomatic effort.  It was particularly notable that most of 
the NAM countries, diverting from the official NAM line, 
echoed these themes in their individual country statements. 
Twenty-three countries mentioned Iran's need to cooperate 
with the IAEA; eleven called on Iran to implement CBMs; 
twenty noted Iran's need to implement Board calls; and eight 
mentioned the UNSC.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------- 
Austria Delivers EU Statement 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Austria, representing 37 EU countries, said that 
"several outstanding safeguards issues and other 
international concerns about Iran's nuclear program remain to 
be resolved, and that repeated requests by the Board remain 
to be fulfilled."  It "welcomed" the P5 plus one package and 
gave its "full support to the balanced approach incorporated 
in the Vienna understandings," while encouraging Iran to 
respond positively to the P5 plus one package.  There was no 
reference to the UNSC or possible future sticks that the EU 
could deploy. It also did not call on Iran to suspend its 
enrichment activities or directly call for the implementation 
of other CBMs.  (Comment: The EU statement was, regrettably, 
one of the weakest.  We took the Austrians to task for 
failing to deliver more.  End Comment.). 
 
----------------------------- 
EU3 Statement Tougher Than EU 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) France (speaking for the EU3) endorsed the EU 
statement and noted that the DG's two most recent reports 
spoke for themselves, as Iran's cooperation with the Agency 
had "dwindled to almost nothing."  It flagged the litany of 
outstanding issues in the DG's reports and the fact the Iran 
was not implementing the Additional Protocol or other CBMs. 
It provided a short recitation of the P5 plus one-related 
developments over previous weeks, including the June 1 Vienna 
ministerial that produced agreement on the P5 plus one 
proposal, UK FS Beckett's press statement and corresponding 
posting on the Agency's website, and Javier Solana's June 6 
delivery of the offer to Tehran.  France noted that the six 
had agreed not to public!fk!eoQqIc9^8Pid not 
mention the UNSC option, or "other path," as a consequence if 
Iran rejects the P5 plus one package.  End note.). 
 
---------------------------------------- 
"Like-minded" Generally Stronger Than EU 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The U.S. (full text below), Japan, Korea, Canada, 
Australia, Norway, and Argentina hit on similar themes, 
reflecting close coordination in the weeks prior to the 
Board.  Japan noted Iran's need to restore confidence and 
provide cooperation to the Agency to resolve the outstanding 
issues.  It cited concern over Iran's lack of cooperation, as 
well as Iran's decision to conduct enrichment and, since 
February, to stop implementing the Additional Protocol.  It 
called on Iran to abide by the Board's resolutions and 
supported the P5 plus one initiative. It noted U.S. 
willingness to engage in negotiations should Iran decide to 
halt enrichment activities.  It also noted that the Japanese 
Foreign Minister has privately urged his Iranian counterpart, 
Manuchehr Mottaki, to accept the P5 plus one offer and come 
to the negotiating table. 
 
¶5.    (SBU) Canada, noting the DG's reports, urged Iran to 
accelerate cooperation with the Agency and to implement CBMs, 
as called for by the Board and UNSC. It lauded the P5 plus 
one initiative and urged Iran to respond positively.  This 
deal provides broad economic and political opportunities for 
Iran and would enhance Tehran's access to peaceful nuclear 
capabilities.  Canada also asked the Agency to make the 
previous two DG reports available to the public. (Note: 
These reports are now publicly available on IAEA.org.  End 
 
note.) 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Australia noted that Iran has defied Board 
resolutions that called for a  halt to enrichment activities, 
reconsideration of the  construction of the heavy water 
research reactor at Arak, and implementation of the AP.  The 
DG's reports show that Iran has not provided the access 
necessary for the Agency to resolve outstanding issues.  It 
noted that Iran has also ignored the March 29 UNSC 
Presidential Statement.  Iran needed to restore the 
confidence of the international community and cooperate with 
the Agency.  Australia lauded U.S. willingness to engage Iran 
as part of the P5 plus one offer.  Iran faced an important 
choice and was encouraged to respond positively.  Australia 
echoed Canada's request to make the DG's reports public. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Norway, while indicating that the Agency had a key 
role and mandate, said that Iran must implement Board and 
UNSC requests, which was essential to restoring confidence in 
the nature of its program.  Norway applauded the P5 
initiative and the U.S. willingness to engage, and called on 
Iran to respond positively to the offer. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Korea lauded the P5 plus 1 initiative and U.S. 
willingness to engage and called on Iran to respond 
positively.  Noting the litany of outstanding issues cited in 
the DG's report, Korea said that Iran must cooperate with the 
Agency to resolve these issues and restore confidence.  Iran 
also needed to heed Board and UNSC requests. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Argentina said that Iran must take steps to fulfill 
Board requests -- including all previous resolutions -- and 
to restore confidence in the peaceful nature of its program. 
It urged Iran to make progress in its negotiations with the 
P5 plus one and urged all parties to engage in "meaningful" 
negotiations. 
 
---------------- 
Russia and China 
---------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Russia said that Iran's cooperation was necessary 
to dispel the international community's concerns about the 
nature of Iran's program, while calling on Iran to respond 
positively to this "very serious" proposal.  Russia also 
noted the necessity of a political and diplomatic resolution 
of the problem.  Russia "counts on" Iran's constructive 
response and comprehensive cooperation to resolve the 
outstanding issues.  It noted that the P5 plus one proposal 
could ensure Iran's rights while guaranteeing that the 
nonproliferation regime would be maintained.  It did not 
mention the UNSC. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) China supported the Agency's efforts and role in 
addressing the Iran nuclear issue, and hoped for a positive 
response from Iran to Board resolutions and the UNSC 
Presidential Statement. China lauded the U.S. decision to 
engage Iran, noting that the P5 plus one had reached 
"consensus" on far reaching proposals to Iran and expressing 
hope that Iran would adopt a constructive attitude and resume 
negotiations.  It reaffirmed Iran's rights to peaceful 
nuclear technologies, while noting that Iran had obligations 
as well.  China also called on all parties to display 
"further flexibility."  Iran needed to cooperate fully with 
the Agency to resolve the outstanding issues. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
NAM Reads Ministerial Statement Verbatim 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The Malaysian Ambassador, representing the NAM, 
provided a verbatim reading of the May 30 NAM Ministerial 
Statement, which regurgitated well-known NAM themes:  states' 
rights to peaceful nuclear cooperation in conformity with 
their legal obligations; voluntary confidence-building 
measures should not be construed as legal obligations; the 
IAEA was the sole competent authority for safeguards 
verification; a pitch for a Middle East nuclear weapon free 
zone; Israel's need to join the NPT; condemnation of threats 
of attacks against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful 
purposes; and support for negotiations without preconditions. 
 The statement welcomed Iran's cooperation with the Agency, 
but seemed to ignore the DG's reports and comments to the 
Board demonstrating Iran's lack of cooperation with the 
Agency.  It also did not call on Iran to take steps that 
would enable the P5 plus one initiative to succeed. 
 
------------------------------- 
Tougher NAM National Statements 
------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Most of the NAM countries associated themselves 
 
with the official statement, but almost every one called on 
Iran to cooperate with the Agency and respond positively to 
the P5 plus one package.  Brazil noted that Iran's NPT rights 
to peaceful nuclear technologies also entailed obligations. 
It noted that the DG had reported that the Agency was not in 
position to certify the peaceful nature of Iran's program and 
urged Iran to provide full cooperation and transparency, and 
to implement CBMs.  It lauded U.S. willingness to engage with 
Iran and expressed hope that Iran would respond favorably to 
the P5 plus one initiative, which would keep the issue within 
the IAEA's purview. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Singapore, as expected, delivered a very tough 
statement, calling on Iran to enhance its cooperation with 
the Agency.  The IAEA's credibility was at stake because 
member states must heed Board resolutions.  Iran must restore 
confidence in the peaceful nature of its program and was 
encouraged to respond favorably to the P5 plus one package. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Venezuela (associated with the NAM) made some 
comments supportive of Iran noting states' inalienable rights 
to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, DG reports on the absence 
of  evidence of diversion of nuclear materials, and that Iran 
had "strictly met" its legal obligations.  Nevertheless, 
Venezuela went on to defy expectations by calling on Iran to 
cooperate with the Agency to resolve outstanding issues.  It 
encouraged "all parties" to respond positively to the 
diplomatic initiative of "certain member states."  It said 
that we did not need the involvement of "other" international 
organizations to resolve this issue, and it encouraged all 
parties to continue the dialogue.  In addition, Venezuela 
made a pitch for disarmament. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) South Africa (associated with the NAM) noted the 
"limited progress" in the DG's reports and said that Iran's 
cooperation with the Agency needed to be strengthened. 
Iran's full transparency and active cooperation was required, 
even going beyond the AP.  It mentioned Member States' 
Article II obligations, as well as the lack of confidence in 
Iran's program.  Iran needed to implement CBMs, including 
ratifying the AP.  This was essential to resolving the 
outstanding issues and keeping the question within the IAEA. 
South Africa commended the P5 plus one initiative and U.S. 
willingness to engage, and called on Iran to carefully 
consider the package. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Egypt (associated with the NAM) noted states' 
rights but called on Iran to provide the cooperation required 
to resolve the outstanding issues cited in the DG's reports. 
It lauded the P5 initiative and called on all parties to 
respond positively, but did not call on Iran to abide by 
previous Board resolutions-despite voting "yes" in February. 
As expected, Egypt reiterated its call for a Middle East 
nuclear weapons-free zone and disarmament. 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Indonesia (associated with the NAM) gave an 
equivocal statement that mentioned that the DG's reports 
showed that the Agency's three-year investigation of Iran has 
"gone through challenges."  It said Iran's full cooperation 
was essential for the DG to resolve the outstanding issues. 
It welcomed the P5 plus one initiative, noting there was a 
need to establish confidence while addressing Iran's rights. 
 
¶19.  (SBU) India said that the DG's reports showed that there 
has not been much progress in resolving the outstanding 
issues.  It noted that promising diplomatic efforts are 
underway (the P5 plus one initiative) and that this was a 
significant opportunity for Iran.  It underscored the 
importance of previous Board requests and urged Iran to 
cooperate with the Agency, which still played a central role 
in resolving these issues. 
 
¶20.  (SBU) Belarus (associated with NAM) cited a need for 
diplomacy and dialogue and welcomed ongoing efforts by the 
international community to reach a diplomatic solution. 
However, it did not call on Iran to cooperate or create 
conditions that would enable such a solution. 
 
¶21.  (SBU) Ecuador said that states have the right to 
peaceful nuclear technologies but also have obligations.  It 
recalled previous Board resolutions that reflected 
international concerns about the nature of Iran's program. 
It expressed support for the P5 plus one initiative and U.S. 
willingness to engage, citing this as a real opportunity for 
negotiations.  Iran must create favorable conditions for 
negotiations to move forward by adopting the measures called 
for by the Board that would provide assurances to the 
international community. 
 
¶22.  (SBU) Algeria urged Iran to increase its cooperation 
with the Agency to resolve the outstanding issues and dispel 
suspicions about the nature of its program.  It welcomed the 
 
P5 plus one proposal and U.S. willingness to engage as a 
means to restore confidence between Iran and others.  Algeria 
appealed to all parties to resume negotiations and make the 
package work. 
 
¶23.  (SBU) Colombia noted that NPT members had rights to 
peaceful nuclear technologies, but also had clearly specified 
obligations.  It supported previous Board decisions, and 
called on Iran to cooperate to provide assurances on the 
peaceful nature of its program.  No progress had been made to 
resolve the outstanding issues.  Because Iran had a "deficit 
of trust," it must implement CBMs that went beyond its formal 
legal requirements and provide more transparency.  Colombia 
hoped the February Board resolution would be fulfilled.  It 
lauded the P5 plus one initiative and urged Iran to respond 
positively. 
 
¶24.  (SBU) Libya (associated with NAM), while noting their 
preference to resolve this issue within the IAEA framework, 
called on Iran to cooperate and respond to the Agency's 
requests.  It called on Iran to return to the path of 
dialogue.  It said there were several important questions: 
(a) would the UNSC, with U.S. support, suspend a resolution 
in favor of the P5 plus one proposals; (b) would Iran be 
ready to respond favorably and implement the AP; and (c) 
would Iran comply with BOG resolutions.   Libya urged Iran to 
respond favorably to the P5 plus one proposal.  It also made 
the obligatory mention of Israel's nuclear weapons. 
 
¶25.  (SBU) Ghana cited the DG's reports as indicting that 
scant progress had occurred toward resolving the outstanding 
issues, and that Iran had not implemented CBMs.  It urged 
Iran to cooperate with the Agency, citing Tehran's failure to 
provide, as promised, a timetable for resolving the 
outstanding issues.  All sides were encouraged to negotiate 
on the basis of the P5 plus one initiative. 
 
¶26.  (SBU) Syria (associated with NAM) said the IAEA had an 
important role, emphasized states' rights to peaceful nuclear 
technologies, and noted the positive steps Iran had taken in 
the past to cooperate with the Agency.  Some states had 
portrayed Iran as dangerous and moved this issue to the 
Security Council, even though the DG had reported no 
instances of diversions of nuclear material.  It cited 
Israel's nuclear weapons and the need for a Middle East 
nuclear weapons-free zone. 
 
¶27.  (SBU) Sri Lanka lauded the P5 plus one offer and 
encouraged all parties to seek a negotiated diplomatic 
outcome.  The IAEA had an important role in resolving the 
outstanding issues, but Iran must implement CBMs as called 
for by the Board and increase cooperation and transparency 
because the Agency was not making progress.  Sri Lanka also 
asserted that negotiations should address not only nuclear 
issues, but also the political and economic needs of Iran. 
 
¶28.  (SBU) Cuba was Iran's most ardent supporter of the day, 
seeming to blame the recent lack of cooperation cited in the 
DG's reports on the Board's decision to refer Iran to the 
UNSC, which it said should never have happened.  It cited 
"recent events" which increased the prospects for 
negotiations and appreciated efforts by countries to find a 
way forward.  It said that it would not be right to impose 
sanctions on Iran because there was no evidence that Iran's 
nuclear program was a problem. 
 
¶29.  (SBU) Yemen was the only Board member not to provide a 
statement (counting the inclusive EU and EU3 statements), 
telling us they did not have a representative of sufficient 
stature to deliver one. 
 
---------------- 
Rule 50 Speakers 
---------------- 
 
¶30.  (SBU) New Zealand, Chile, Pakistan, and Panama made 
statements under Rule 50, which allows non-Board members to 
speak, and called on Iran to increase its cooperation with 
the Agency and respond positively to the P5 plus one offer. 
New Zealand welcomed the P5 plus one diplomatic initiative 
and encouraged Iran, which had an historic opportunity to 
respond favorably, while implementing CBMs and cooperating 
with the IAEA to resolve the outstanding issues. 
 
¶31.  (SBU) Chile noted that the DG's report showed little 
progress toward resolving the outstanding issues, emphasizing 
the need for Iranian cooperation and transparency.  Iran 
needed to implement CBMs to assure the international 
community that its nuclear program was peaceful.  Chile 
welcomed the P5 plus one proposal and urged Iran to respond 
favorably. 
 
¶32.  (SBU) Pakistan used this opportunity to trumpet 
Islamabad's efforts to shut down the A.Q. Khan network, 
emphasizing that people from about 30 countries had been 
involved and imploring states to take steps to curtail 
development of other proliferation networks.  Regarding Iran, 
Pakistan welcomed the P5 plus one proposal and urged Iran to 
respond favorably. 
 
¶33.  (SBU) Panama urged Iran to cooperate with the Agency to 
resolve the outstanding issues and welcomed the P5 plus one 
package. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Iran: Ready To Negotiate On Its Terms 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶34.  (SBU) Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh thanked the NAM for 
their support, which he claimed reflected the views of 116 
countries.  He then delivered, at least for him, a rather 
subdued speech that played up Iran's cooperation with the 
Agency, citing the litany of over 2000 man days of 
inspections, implementation of the Additional Protocol prior 
to its ratification (even though they are no longer 
implementing the AP), over 20 complementary accesses with 
short notice, and over 100 samplings conducted at military 
sites.  He also noted that the DG had found no evidence of 
diversion of declared materials.  He claimed that referral of 
the Iran file to the UNSC was a "historical mistake" and 
suggested that the file should be returned to the IAEA.  The 
referral did not result from verification issues but rather 
from Iran's halt to CBMs, he said. 
 
¶35. (SBU) Regarding the P5 plus one offer, it was notable 
that Soltanieh specifically mentioned the other five partners 
but omitted the U.S.  Echoing the official Iranian line, he 
proclaimed Iran's willingness to negotiate without 
preconditions and repeated the characterization that the 
package has "some positive elements as well as ambiguities" 
(which were not specified).  Iran would respond to the offer 
in "due course," which he characterized as "a clear 
indication of (the) political will of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran to find (an) amicable solution through dialogue and 
negotiation."  He then requested that the Board remove Iran 
from the agenda of subsequent Board meetings, something that 
most delegations, including UNVIE, will not support. 
 
------------------------------------ 
U.S. Statement, As Delivered June 15 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶36.  (U) Begin Text: 
 
Mr. Chairman, 
 
Last September, the IAEA made two important findings: 
first, that Iran had violated its safeguards obligations 
under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and second, that 
Iran had lost international confidence that its nuclear 
program is exclusively peaceful. 
 
The IAEA and the UN Security Council have called on Iran to 
cooperate, fully and proactively, in resolving troubling 
questions about its nuclear program. 
 
The IAEA and the UN Security Council have also called on Iran 
to refrain from activities to enrich uranium and produce 
plutonium. Iran failed to heed these calls. Instead of 
suspending uranium enrichment-related activity, Iran is 
conducting small-scale operations and has announced ambitious 
plans to proceed with larger-scale operations. Instead of 
halting work on a heavy water reactor that will produce 
plutonium, Iran is forging ahead with construction. Instead 
of granting IAEA requests for greater access, Iran has 
limited the number and location of visits by inspectors and 
refused Agency requests to upgrade monitoring capabilities. 
Instead of answering IAEA questions, Iran has: declined to 
satisfy IAEA concerns about ties to the A.Q. Khan network, an 
illicit market for nuclear weapons technology and assistance; 
declined to meet the IAEA' s request to turn over a document 
from the A.Q. Khan network on fabricating components for 
nuclear weapons; declined to answer IAEA questions about 
advanced and potentially 
undeclared centrifuge programs; declined to explain apparent 
connections between an undeclared uranium conversion program 
and the design of a missile warhead. 
 
Last week's report by the Director General is sparing in 
words but clear in content: Iran continues to withhold 
cooperation with the IAEA on almost every outstanding issue. 
Iran is not implementing any of the confidence-building 
measures requested by the Board and backed by the Security 
Council. 
 
 
Mr. Chairman, 
 
No one disputes the right of Iran to a peaceful nuclear 
program in conformity with its NPT obligations. But Iran's 
program makes no sense from a civil perspective. Iran's 
leaders say they need the heavy water research reactor at 
Arak to produce medical isotopes. But why this large 
investment when an existing research reactor in Tehran 
remains underutilized?  Iran's leaders claim they need 
enriched uranium for nuclear power plants. But Iran has no 
nuclear power plants. The one under construction at Bushehr 
will receive fuel from Russia.  Iran's leaders claim they 
need the capability to enrich uranium to be self- 
sufficient. But Iran's known reserves of natural uranium are 
only sufficient to power a single reactor for under seven 
years. Even adding speculative reserves, Iran would run out 
of uranium soon after completing construction of just seven 
reactors. Compare Iran to the examples of South Korea and 
Sweden. South Korea has twenty nuclear power plants. Sweden 
gets 40 percent of its electricity from nuclear power. Both 
are advanced countries. Neither enriches uranium. 
 
The programs and actions of Iran's leaders are not consistent 
with a peaceful program. 
 
Mr. Chairman, 
 
Our goal is to secure a diplomatic solution, one in which the 
leaders in Tehran provide tangible assurances that they do 
not seek to acquire atomic weapons.  With that goal in mind, 
we have worked with Europe, Russia, China, and other 
like-minded countries to present Iran's leaders with a clear 
choice. The negative choice is for Iran's leaders to maintain 
their present course, ignoring international concerns and 
international obligations. If Iran's leadership makes this 
choice, the Islamic Republic will only incur great costs and 
lost opportunities. The positive choice, the constructive 
choice, the choice that would most benefit the Iranian 
people, is for Iran's leaders to alter their present course 
and to cooperate in resolving the nuclear issue. 
 
This must start by Iran meeting IAEA and Security Council 
requests to suspend all activities related to uranium 
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, including research and 
development. These activities, once pursued covertly, and now 
pursued in contradiction of IAEA resolutions, are not 
necessary for Iran to enjoy the benefits of civil nuclear 
power. But they are a necessary step in mastering the 
technology and acquiring the material and know-how to produce 
weapons-grade material. Hence our concern. And hence the 
requirement by the Security Council, the Board, and the six 
Ministers to suspend these activities. 
 
Suspending these activities will allow the Security Council 
to suspend its action. And suspending these activities will 
allow the EU3 countries, joined by the United States and 
others, to open negotiations for a long-term agreement. Such 
an agreement would both reaffirm and advance Iran's right to 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including access to 
nuclear fuel and civil nuclear technology. Such an agreement 
would also open the prospect for increasing political 
dialogue and economic cooperation with the rest of the world. 
This choice will lead to the real benefit and long-term 
security of the Iranian people. 
 
Mr. Chairman, 
 
 
When the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, Russia, China, and the United States met here in 
Vienna two weeks ago, the substance of the message could not 
have been more clear -- a choice of two paths for the Iranian 
government: one offering considerable benefits, including 
peaceful nuclear technology and civil nuclear power; the 
second bringing to bear the weight of the Security Council. 
 
And the delivery of the message could not be more clear: Six 
Ministers representing Europe, Russia, China, and the United 
States standing side-by-side, in complete solidarity. We hope 
that Iran's leaders will think carefully about the proposal 
from the six Foreign Ministers. 
 
We hope that Iran's leaders will think about what is best for 
the economic prosperity and long-term security of the Iranian 
people. And we hope that other countries, including all 
represented here today, will encourage Iran's leaders to make 
the right choice: a choice for cooperation and negotiation; 
and a choice to grasp the diplomatic opportunities now being 
offered. 
 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
 
End Text. 
SCHULTE