VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #1425/01 1780956
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 270956Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6141
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4118
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1334
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001425 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR P, T, SCA, ISN, EUR/UBI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2016 
TAGS: PREL KNNP PARM ENRG EU AORC MTCR NL ETTC
KSCA, IN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: U/S JOSEPH'S JUNE 21 VISIT TO THE 
HAGUE 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Jason Grubb, reasons 1.4 (b,d 
) 
 
¶1. (S) Summary: Under Secretary for Arms Control and 
International Security Robert Joseph held bilateral 
consultations at the Dutch MFA, met with Dutch defense and 
foreign affairs committee spokespersons, and spoke to the 
press on June 21.  Topics covered during his meetings 
included: the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Iran, 
North Korean preparations for a long-range missile launch, 
the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperative Initiative, the Fissile 
Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), a Dutch proposal to protect 
biological facilities, nuclear fuel assurances, and the AQ 
Khan network and Dutch businessman Henk Slebos.  End summary. 
 
Bilateral Consultations 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) U/S Joseph consulted with Dutch MFA Director General 
for Political Affairs Hugo Siblesz on June 21.  Dutch 
attendees included Security Department Director Robert de 
Groot, Deputy Director of the Western Hemisphere Department 
Jos Schellars, Head of Nuclear Affairs and Non-Proliferation 
Paul Wilke, and Senior Advisor for PSI Frank van Beuningen. 
U.S. attendees included Amb. Arnall, Senior Advisor Patricia 
McNerney, and polmiloff Jason Grubb. 
 
¶3. (C) U/S Joseph began discussion with an update of the 
U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Initiative.  He emphasized the 
positives, but noted the "step-by-step" approach has been 
slowed by a "wait-and-see" attitude in New Delhi, the Nuclear 
Suppliers' Group (NSG), and Congress.  He added that the USG 
is encouraging India to do more in terms of implementation, 
and noted positive discussions during a recent visit by a 
U.S. experts group, which suggested reason for optimism.  He 
also highlighted an upcoming visit to New Delhi by IAEA 
experts that should result in further progress.  Siblesz 
concurred with the description that New Delhi was adopting a 
"wait-and-see" approach, and related a recent visit by Indian 
officials to The Hague.  He said the GONL generally views the 
initiative positively, but still has concerns about its 
affect on the non-proliferation regime, particularly for the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), FMCT negotiations, and CTBT. 
Joseph argued for the need to be realistic when dealing with 
countries outside the NPT.  This initiative gets India to 
make certain commitments -- such as banning sensitive 
technology transfers -- which will bolster the regime. 
 
¶4. (C) Siblesz suggested that India was a special case with a 
"clean bill of health" on proliferation.  Pakistan, on the 
other hand, has a completely different proliferation track 
record.  Joseph agreed; Pakistan's ties to the AQ Khan 
network prohibits such a deal.  Over time, Pakistan's track 
record might be resolved, but first Pakistan must demonstrate 
credibility, he said.  Siblesz questioned if the U.S.-India 
initiative would throw off the precarious India-Pakistan 
regional balance, as India might now be free to pursue the 
development of nuclear military options now that its civilian 
needs will be assured.  Joseph rejected this argument; if it 
wanted to, India would find a way to develop its military 
capabilities despite limited sources of uranium.  In that 
sense, Joseph said, one could make a stronger argument in 
favor of the U.S.-India initiative, which would place 
safeguards on Indian civilian facilities, thereby preventing 
India from using them for military purposes in the future. 
 
¶5. (C) Turning to the FMCT, Siblesz welcomed the U.S. draft 
treaty and negotiating mandate tabled at the Conference on 
Disarmament (CD), and hoped the USG will be flexible on 
"effective verification," which will require resolution 
during negotiations.  But he stressed a fine line between 
rejecting linkage with other non-proliferation efforts and 
addressing concerns voiced by partners, such as the 
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS).  Siblesz 
offered the GONL's services in working with the USG to 
determine PAROS redlines.  Joseph denied the existence of an 
arms race in outer space, and suggested PAROS was an attempt 
to criticize the USG for missile defense plans.  He added 
that missile defense will protect both the United States and 
allies -- with North Korea prepared to launch a long-range 
missile, such missile defense plans would seem to be timely. 
He said the FMCT is a test for the CD, which has been inert 
for the past ten years.  If the CD chooses to hold up 
 
consideration of the FMCT to discuss something as "vacuous" 
as PAROS, then we need to start thinking about the utility of 
the CD, Joseph said.  On FMCT, he said the USG determined 
"effective verification" was not possible following a 
thorough review.  He indicated the USG would be willing to 
exchange views on its findings but not to engage in 
negotiations of a verification element for addition to the 
FMCT.  Siblesz welcomed this, but hoped the USG would be 
prepared to "try and convince" partners. 
 
¶6. (C) Siblesz noted the upcoming Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC) review conference, and proposed the creation 
of a fund to help cover security for bio facilities and 
institutions.  Wilke added that the fund could be based on 
the IAEA nuclear security fund to protect installations. 
Outstanding questions include which countries would 
contribute to the fund, and whether an organization should be 
created to manage it.  Wilke noted U.S. reluctance to 
institutionalize the BWC; perhaps the managing organization 
could reside outside the conference.  Joseph said the 
proposal seemed constructive and indicated interest in 
hearing more. 
 
¶7. (C) On nuclear fuel assurances, Joseph ran through the 
background of the U.S. proposal to the IAEA.  Siblesz 
questioned whether the proposal could function as a market. 
Joseph argued that it could -- based on Russian experience 
with Iran on Bushehr, it would seem Moscow would be keen to 
make money by providing nuclear fuel.  Siblesz asked if the 
proposal should be available for countries under sanctions. 
Joseph argued against their inclusion, especially if their 
intention is to acquire a nuclear military capability. 
Siblesz made clear that the GONL believes Iran's uranium 
enrichment program has military objectives.  But, if Iran 
chooses to abandon this pursuit, would the fuel be available? 
 Joseph replied affirmatively. 
 
¶8. (C) Turning to PSI, Siblesz lamented that more publicity 
could not be generated from the successful cooperation and 
corresponding interdictions.  Joseph agreed, but said some 
countries would prefer to be anonymous in terms of their 
cooperation, given regional sensitivities.  But he argued 
that PSI has been an overwhelming success, most notably 
playing a key role in knocking Libya out of the proliferation 
business. 
 
¶9. (S) Referring to the AQ Khan network, U/S Joseph raised 
points on Dutch businessman and AQ Khan associate Henk 
Slebos.  He argued the importance of punishing each member of 
the network to keep them out of the business and deter others 
from proliferating.  Joseph suggested the sentence received 
by Slebos was relatively lenient in comparison to the actions 
he committed, and certainly would not deter others.  Siblesz 
acknowledged the point, and refrained from commenting on the 
Dutch legal system.  However, he said the Dutch prosecutor's 
office has appealed the sentence due to the leniency.  He 
also noted that Dutch intelligence authorities continue to 
monitor Slebos in order to "keep him under wraps."  He 
welcomed any information the USG might be able to provide in 
order to assist Dutch authorities in continuing to build the 
case against Slebos.  U/S Joseph welcomed continued dialogue 
on ensuring Slebos was not allowed to reconstitute his 
activities. 
 
¶10. (C) On Iran, Siblesz said the GONL supports the efforts 
of the P5 1.  He noted, however, that it was difficult to 
publicly support the incentive/disincentive package developed 
in Vienna without knowing its contents.  Siblesz argued the 
EU will become instrumental, should Iran reject the package 
-- and the Dutch can be very helpful in making sure the EU is 
tough.  The Dutch support the approach, but being "left in 
the dark" is disappointing when some portions of the package 
are printed in the International Herald Tribune, Siblesz 
said.  Joseph stressed the package is an attempt to allow 
diplomacy to work.  However, if Iran rejects the package, 
then the international community should be very skeptical of 
Iran's intentions.  Siblesz agreed; it was very useful to 
force Iran to "show its cards." 
 
¶11. (C) Turning to North Korea, Joseph said Iran will be 
watching closely to see how the international community 
responds to North Korean plans to launch a long-range 
missile.  He also emphasized the impact on strategic thinking 
 
in Asia, and suggested a weak response might catalyze the 
nuclear debate within Japan.  Siblesz wondered whether China 
might play a constructive role in convincing North Korea not 
to launch, but added that China does not appear willing to 
even "go through the motions" regarding North Korea. 
 
¶12. (C) On the CTBT, Siblesz said we "agree to disagree." 
However, the Dutch have heard rumors that the USG might 
"unsign" the CTBT; this would not be viewed positively in the 
Netherlands.  Joseph discounted these rumors, stating that he 
had not heard of such internal discussion for a number of 
years. 
 
Meeting with Dutch Parliamentarians 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (U) U/S Joseph met members of the Dutch parliamentary 
foreign affairs and defense committees during a breakfast 
roundtable hosted by Ambassador Arnall.  Dutch 
parliamentarians included Green Left foreign affairs 
spokesperson Farah Karimi, Defense Committee Chair Nebahat 
Albayrak (Labor Party), VVD foreign affairs and defense 
spokesperson Hans van Baalen, CDA defense spokesperson Roland 
Kortenhorst, CDA foreign affairs spokesperson Henk Jan Ormel, 
D-66 foreign affairs spokesperson Bert Bakker, and D-66 
defense spokesperson Koser Kaya.  U.S attendees included 
senior advisor Patricia McNerney, Polcouns Andrew Schofer, 
and polmiloff Jason Grubb. 
 
¶14. (C) U/S Joseph began discussion by explaining his 
attendance at the PSI conference in Warsaw, and relating 
recent PSI successes, including the infiltration of the AQ 
Khan network.  Karimi noted the Netherlands' own ties to the 
AQ Khan network through Dutch businessman Henk Slebos. 
Discussion turned to Iran after U/S Joseph noted Iranian 
centrifuge cascades were based on AQ Khan's plans.  Karimi 
asked if the United States would be able to convince Iran to 
accept the Vienna incentive package.  U/S Joseph replied that 
convincing Iran was a responsibility of the entire 
international community, not just the USG.  Otherwise, Iran 
will have breathing room to manipulate the international 
community with its "right to enrich". 
 
¶15. (C) Van Baalen suggested the new U.S.-India nuclear 
cooperative initiative creates "holes" in the NPT.  U/S 
Joseph disagreed, noting India has been at odds with the NPT 
for the last 20 years, and that it is better to have India 
"half-way in" than completely outside the regime.  He argued 
the positives, including India's agreement to IAEA 
safeguards, FMCT negotiations, and NSG guidelines.  He added 
that IAEA Director General El Baradei supports the 
initiative.  Van Baalen asked if Pakistan will get the same 
deal; U/S Joseph said Pakistan's negative proliferation track 
record and association to the AQ Khan network prohibited a 
similar initiative. 
 
¶16. (C) Van Baalen noted fears of non-state actors acquiring 
nuclear weapons from lapse security situations in the former 
Soviet Union.  U/S Joseph acknowledged rumors of missing 
"suitcase" nuclear weapons, but indicated there is no firm 
information on such items and suggested terrorists, given 
their record, would have used nuclear weapons if they had 
them.  Even so, Joseph noted, President Bush said the 
preeminent threat we face is a terrorist armed with a nuclear 
weapon -- in that sense, we need to work together to detect 
and interdict to avoid catastrophic consequences.  Ormel 
pointed to the need for reliable intelligence, and asked 
about U.S. intelligence failures in Iraq.  Joseph pointed to 
the creation of the Director of National Intelligence as one 
of several ways the USG is addressing intelligence 
credibility. 
 
¶17. (C) Bakker asked about North Korean preparations to 
launch a long-range missile.  U/S Joseph acknowledged that it 
appears North Korea intends to launch in violation of its 
moratorium on missile tests and the spirit of its agreement 
in the Six-Party talks.  U/S Joseph stressed the importance 
of a strong response from the international community. 
Otherwise, he suggested it might embolden nations like Iran 
while sending mixed signals to allies like Japan.  He added 
that Japan began debating the nuclear question after North 
Korea's last launch in 1998; a new launch may resurrect this 
debate. 
 
 
¶18. (U) U/S Joseph also addressed questions on reducing 
nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, the extent to which 
proliferation issues are debated in the U.S. public, the 
administration's proliferation strategy, whether the USG 
planned to leave the moratorium to test a new generation of 
nuclear weapons, and his participation in the U.N. small arms 
and light weapons conference at the end of June. 
 
Press Interviews 
---------------- 
 
¶19. (U) U/S Joseph gave two interviews to the television 
documentary program NETWERK and the Dutch national newspaper 
"de Volkskrant".  U/S Joseph answered questions regarding the 
North Korean long-range missile plans, the nuclear impasse 
with Iran, his experience during the Cold War, the 
administration's proliferation successes, CIA overflights, 
and PSI. 
 
¶20. (U) U/S Joseph has cleared on this cable. 
 
BLAKEMAN