This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002294 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/MNSA (LUACES), NEA, NEA/IPA (MAHER) 
GENEVA FOR CD 
USUN FOR POL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2016 
TAGS: MNUC PARM PREL KNNP IS CDG ISRAEL RELATIONS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: FMCT: ISRAELI WILL OPPOSE WEOG CONSENSUS; REQUESTS 
POLITICAL-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS ON WAY AHEAD ASAP 
 
REF: A. STATE 92033 
     ¶B. TEL AVIV 2228 
     ¶C. TEL AVIV 1930 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones.  Reasons:  1.4 (b, d). 
 
¶1. (C) Israeli MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic 
Affairs Ambassador Miriam Ziv told Ambassador Jones on June 
12 that Israel will not be able to join consensus on a 
Western Group (WEOG) endorsement of the U.S. FMCT initiative, 
nor remain silent if all other members of the WEOG join 
consensus.  Ziv allowed that Israel could join consensus on a 
formulation of WEOG support for the U.S. initiative if it is 
worded in a way that "excludes Israel as part of a WEOG 
endorsement" of the initiative. 
 
¶2. (C) Ziv, joined by Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) 
Deputy Director General Ariel Levite and MFA Arms Control 
Department Director Alon Bar, made the following additional 
points: 
 
A) Israel feels betrayed by the U.S. decision to table the 
draft FMCT and mandate without consulting first.  In Israel's 
view, U.S. action violates an understanding between two close 
Allies based on recognition of Israel's unique security 
requirements, and acknowledged in exchanges of letters with 
both Presidents Clinton and Bush.  Ziv and Levite noted that 
they both had recently visited the U.S. and asked their USG 
interlocutors to consult with them before any action was 
taken on the FMCT.  They claimed that during those visits, 
they were not given any indication that a U.S. decision to 
table a draft FMCT had been made. 
 
B) Israel is being led to understand that the tabling of the 
FMCT is a tactic designed to bring to the fore the question 
of the CD's relevance.  While Israel can understand the 
thinking behind this approach, it cannot view the FMCT as a 
tactical issue.  For Israel, the FMCT is a strategic issue 
with vital implications for Israel's national security.  Like 
all his predecessors, the new Prime Minister is seized with 
the issue; all nuclear matters fall under his purview. 
Israel will take no decision at the CD without approval from 
the Prime Minster. 
 
C) This issue should have been -- and must now be -- 
discussed at the political level.  Israel sees no value in 
having experts discuss the way ahead.  Israel would prefer to 
have a high-level USG official visit Israel as soon as 
possible, so that any proposed resolution to the current 
situation could be run by the Prime Minister for his 
approval.  The next round of the U.S.-Israel Strategic 
Dialogue, which is to be held in Israel, could serve as the 
forum for such a discussion.  However, Israel might want the 
discussion to take place even sooner than the dialogue.  On 
instructions from PM Olmert, FM Livni said Israel had "grave 
concerns" about the FMCT in a June 10 telephone call to 
Secretary Rice. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
D) Israel does not desire "any unnecessary confrontation" 
with the U.S., nor does it seek to create obstacles in the 
CD.  Ziv cited as evidence of this Israel's silence during 
the June 12 WEOG meeting.  Israel prefers that discussion of 
this issue remain within capitals and out of the press.  A 
small handful of GOI officials deal with the issue in Israel, 
and it is extremely politically sensitive. 
 
¶3. (C) Ziv -- who had previously received talking points 
provided for the meeting that were cleared by NEA/IPA, 
ISN/MNSA, T and the NSC --  presented the Ambassador with a 
non-paper classified SECRET that laid out Israel's objections 
to the U.S. FMCT initiative in detail.  (NOTE:  The non-paper 
was sent the evening of June 12 via classified e-mail to 
ISN/MNSA and NEA/IPA.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶4. (C) Ambassador Jones undertook to relay Israel's position 
to Washington as soon as possible.  On use of the Strategic 
Dialogue to discuss the way ahead, the Ambassador suggested 
that Israel, as host, propose to State one or more dates as 
soon as possible.  The Ambassador stressed that the U.S. 
tabled the FMCT with the view that it is the agenda item most 
likely to achieve consensus and unblock ten years of deadlock 
at the CD. 
 
¶5. (C) IAEC DDG Levite said that Israel thinks the FMCT is 
inherently flawed, and stressed that the timing of the USG 
initiative is problematic.  He claimed that Under Secretary 
Joseph told him in early May consultations that the entry 
into force (EIF) clause would not pertain to Israel, but only 
to the P-5, and that Israel requested written assurances to 
that effect.  Levite claimed he was told that such assurances 
should be easy to obtain.  He stressed that Israel was 
therefore surprised when, two weeks later, the CD WEOG was 
told that the EIF provisions will pertain to the P-5 and 
Israel, India, Pakistan and the DPRK.  Israel thus sees the 
U.S. initiative as a setback in substance as well as to the 
consultative process. 
 
¶6. (C) Levite said that Israel could not realistically join 
WEOG endorsement of the U.S. initiative, and then turn around 
and try to block consensus in the CD plenary.  It does not 
have the leverage that the U.S. has to garner support for its 
position, and risk drawing international approbation that 
would be unacceptable and affect Israel in other fora.  He 
said that Israel feels it is being asked to "pay the price" 
in order to promote the U.S.-India civil nuclear initiative. 
¶7. (C) Levite said that the FMCT will also play into Iran's 
hands as it will establish the principle of civilian 
enrichment which is not in the NPT and which Iran will use to 
claim a right to have a complete nuclear fuel cycle.  He said 
the FMCT will weaken pressure on Iran, noting the following: 
 
A) Article 4 of the NPT, as currently interpreted, allows 
Iran to have nuclear reactors, but not a fuel cycle. 
 
B) The FMCT allows the production of fissile materials for 
civilian purposes.  Iran will produce fissile materials for 
its weapons program, and claim that they are for its civilian 
energy program.  Without any verification provisions, the 
FMCT will be "the worst for Israel."  Iran will say that, per 
the FMCT, it has a right to have a complete fuel cycle. 
 
¶8. (C) MFA Arms Control Department Director Alon Bar said 
that -- based on his readout from the WEOG meeting earlier in 
the day -- he is not sure that other WEOG members will 
endorse the U.S. initiative.  He claimed that there is 
growing concern among WEOG members that taking a consensus 
position to the larger plenary might "create alienation" 
among other CD members.  Bar also argued that other WEOG 
members have concerns about the U.S. draft negotiating 
mandate, and that still others fear the repercussions that 
would follow news that Israel could not support WEOG 
consensus on the FMCT.  Such a development might block 
progress on the FMCT within the CD.  Bar further claimed that 
the U.S. representative pushed for WEOG consensus in the June 
12 meeting, insisting two times that the "group needs to take 
action."  Bar urged that the U.S. reconsider calling for WEOG 
consensus, suggesting that the news of a lack of consensus -- 
which he predicts -- would harm U.S. and Israeli interests. 
 
¶9. (C) Levite used the meeting to ask if the Ambassador had 
any information about the package of "sticks and carrots" 
presented to Iran by EU HighRep Solana.  He claimed that 
Israel's sources suggest that the package Solana presented 
only contained sticks and no carrots.  He noted that, when 
asked, the State Department spokesman refused to comment, but 
did not deny this assertion.  The Ambassador replied that he 
had no information about the package, and that Israel should 
be wary about drawing conclusions from press reporting. 
 
¶10. (C) COMMENT:  Our GOI interlocutors could not be clearer 
about their strongly held views on the FMCT.  If we are to 
effect a change in their position, it will have to be through 
an intervention at the political level with the PM or 
possibly the FM.  Please advise.  END COMMENT. 
 
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JONES