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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #0783/01 1560718
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 050718Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2015
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0376
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 1118
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0919
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0356
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000783 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PASS TO EUR/SCE STEPHEN GEE; EUR/NCE SCOTT BRANDON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2026 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KRKO SR BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA OFFERS ITS SUPPORT ON KOSOVO TALKS 
 
REF: SOFIA 719 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In May 25 meetings with Ambassador Wisner, 
Bulgaria's prime minister and foreign minister emphasized 
Sofia's firm support for Ahtisaari's efforts to negotiate a 
final status for Kosovo and acknowledged that independence 
was the most likely outcome.  Apart from continuing to 
encourage reconciliation between the two sides through 
various initiatives, Prime Minister Sergey Stanishev and 
Foreign Minister Ivailo Kalfin agreed that Bulgaria could 
help by sharing its own experience with Euro-Atlantic 
integration with Belgrade and Pristina.  Stanishev and Kalfin 
both saw it as vital that Serbia be offered some 
incentives--possibly a fast track to Euro-Atlantic 
integration or infrastructure projects--in order to accept 
the final outcome and preserve some degree of dignity.  Both 
pressed for continued international--but especially 
U.S.--engagement in Kosovo following the negotiations and 
underscored the importance of maintaining unity among the 
Contact Group to avoid repeating the tragedy in the Balkans 
in the 1990s. End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Stanishev: U.S. Can Count on Bulgaria's Support on Kosovo 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶2. (C) PM Sergey Stanishev told Amb. Wisner that Bulgaria 
fully supports the priorities and tasks of Ahtisaari and said 
the U.S. can count on Bulgaria's assistance in encouraging 
both sides to reach a peaceful solution.  Stanishev explained 
how Sofia has tried to encourage reconciliation between the 
two sides by sponsoring a number of confidence-building 
initiatives, but acknowledged that Belgrade and Pristina 
still remain far apart.  The talks have produced some 
positive results, according to Stanishev, but remain fragile. 
 The prime minister expressed concern that the international 
community may be suffering from "fatigue" in Kosovo and could 
not stay there forever.  Stanishev suggested that some fear 
this is the reason why the international community is focused 
now on Kosovo's independence. 
 
¶3. (C) Stanishev said it was clear "one way or another" that 
the outcome of the talks would have to be imposed.  This 
should not, however, be humiliating for the Serbs.  He feared 
that leaving the Serbs in a corner "with everything taken 
away from them" would have serious internal consequences and 
will strengthen the Radical party in Serbia.  Inevitably this 
would also affect Bosnia and Herzegovina.  According to 
Stanishev, something should be granted to the Serbs to make 
the outcome more acceptable and to help them sell it to their 
public.  He said Bulgaria is ready to support any initiatives 
that will help Serbia. 
 
¶4. (C) According to Stanishev, the implementation of 
standards in Kosovo is important for Bulgaria and necessary 
for ensuring that the stability of the region is not 
jeopardized.  It is not only significant "what" the final 
status is but also "what happens inside" this status, said 
Stanishev.  Unless the Kosovar Albanians can demonstrate 
their ability to uphold standards on issues like human 
rights, it would be difficult for full independence to come 
into being. 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Wisner explained to Stanishev the 
importance of reestablishing the strategic relationship 
between the U.S. and Serbia in order to bring long-lasting 
stability to the region.  He reassured Stanishev that 
Kosovo's independence would be closely monitored by an 
international civilian presence and that NATO would remain in 
Kosovo after final status.  Wisner praised Stanishev for 
Bulgaria's efforts to get the two sides to talk to one 
another, saying such actions clearly help Ahtisaari in his 
job.  He encouraged the prime minister to share Bulgaria's 
experience in dealing with issues like taxation, 
privatization, crime and corruption with the Kosovar 
Albanians.  He said Kostunica and Tadic still do not 
understand the logic behind Bulgaria's decision to strive for 
Euro-Atlantic integration and that it would be useful for 
Bulgarian leaders to explain their motivations and thinking 
to the Serbs.  He encouraged Stanishev to use an upcoming 
visit by Tadic to speak to the Serbian President privately 
and ask him how the U.S. could assist Serbia in the current 
 
SOFIA 00000783  002 OF 003 
 
 
talks. 
 
¶6. (C) Stanishev agreed to speak to Tadic and said Bulgaria 
was well situated geographically to act as a natural 
go-between between Serbia and Kosovar Albanians.  Stanishev 
reiterated that his overall message is that Bulgaria is ready 
to cooperate, to share its own experience with its Western 
Balkan neighbors and to work with Ahtisaari.  He underscored 
the importance of the Contact Group to stay unified on this 
issue and to keep the talks on a high level. 
 
¶7. (C) Update: Stanishev's foreign policy adviser 
subsequently told Ambassador Beyrle that the prime minister 
had delivered the message to Tadic, but said Tadic's response 
had focused on the difficulties facing Belgrade over Kosovo 
without references to how he planned to manage those 
difficulties. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Kalfin: Serb Position Does Not Allow for Much Flexibility 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶8. (C) Foreign Minister Kalfin in his meeting with Ambassador 
Wisner echoed many of the same points as the prime minister. 
He said Bulgaria's position on Kosovo is essentially to 
support what Ahtisaari is doing and the GOB is trying to 
position its initiatives to help Ahtisaari in his work.  The 
foreign minister regarded the current format of talks as 
important and was pleased to hear Ahtisaari had refused 
Belgrade's latest attempt to restructure the talks, saying no 
one should be able to stop the process of the negotiations. 
The foreign minister said he did not see a reason for setting 
a deadline for the talks but agreed it could make the talks 
more dynamic. 
 
¶9. (C) Kalfin expressed concern that the current government 
in Belgrade would be held responsible for the loss of Kosovo, 
despite the absence of many options.  "The problem of Kosovo 
came long before this government," Kalfin noted, and 
Belgrade's position does not allow for much flexibility.  The 
foreign minister emphasized the need to stimulate the Kosovar 
Serbs to participate more in the process.  Bulgaria had 
repeatedly raised this with Belgrade--stressing that Serbia 
cannot help their minority if they do not participate more. 
According to Kalfin, Kosovo Serb leaders all agree with this 
view privately, but are afraid to express it publicly.  He 
felt the Kosovar Albanians had assumed a "wait-and-see" 
attitude and needed to be pushed to show progress on 
standards and to demonstrate more clearly that they are ready 
to govern. 
 
¶10. (C) Kalfin viewed the economic sustainability of Kosovo 
as a potential problem in the future, saying "there is not 
much light there."  Regarding security, he believed the 
international community needed to remain in Kosovo for an 
undefined amount of time and saw the Kosovo protection force 
as "not adequate" and "potentially dangerous."  Kalfin warned 
Wisner not to overestimate the EU's ability to take over in 
Kosovo and said the EU cannot totally replace UNMIK.  He also 
believed that it would be better to first stabilize Kosovo's 
economy before establishing a Kosovar army, which might 
become aggressive towards minorities. 
 
¶11. (C) In order for Serbia to accept independence, which 
Kalfin said he knew would be the final outcome, Serbia should 
be offered a number of carrots.   According to Kalfin, Serbia 
should be offered an economic package, starting with 
investment and loans to stimulate growth.  Additionally, if 
not a "fast-track" to EU accession, Belgrade should at least 
be given a more clear promise of EU accession, Kalfin said. 
The easing of visa regimes by European countries could be one 
way to build greater public support for the outcome. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
PASSY: Kosovo's Independence is Not News for Many 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶12. (C) Ambassador Wisner also met with select members of the 
parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, including its 
chairman former Foreign Minister Soloman Passy.  Committee 
members asked a number of questions regarding the Kosovo 
talks, such as what would be the conditions of Kosovo's 
independence, and the role of the EU in the plan. Other 
members asked about Russia and its fears that Kosovo will 
 
SOFIA 00000783  003 OF 003 
 
 
represent a precedent for other currently "frozen" separatist 
conflicts.  Passy told Wisner that the independence of Kosovo 
is not news for many, but instead has been a "delayed 
reality" since 1998.  Passy echoed the concerns of others on 
how to effectively make the Serbs part of the European family 
and reiterated the need for certain incentives for Belgrade. 
Other Bulgarians who met Ambassador Wisner, expressed 
concerns about the potential for a rise in Albanian 
nationalism, arguing that Albania is still a relatively new 
Balkan state whose regional ambitions may still be evolving. 
To this, Wisner responded that he felt reassured by 
discussions in Tirana and Skopje, that Albanians were focused 
squarely on joining Europe, rather than on creating a Greater 
Albania. 
Beyrle