VZCZCXRO9600
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHYN #1833/01 1751316
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 241316Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4427
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001833 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016 
TAGS: PREL MNUC PINR IR YE
SUBJECT: YEMENIS TELL GEN ABIZAID ABOUT IRANIAN 
INTERFERENCE AND REGIONAL INTENTIONS 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D 
). 
 
¶1. (S/NF)  SUMMARY:  President Saleh and Minister of Interior 
Rashad al-Alimi told CENTCOM Commander GEN John Abizaid on 
June 18 that, while Iran's Revolutionary Guards have been 
active in Yemen since 1983, their recent support for 
insurgents in Yemen's Saada region was unacceptable and, 
along with other activities in the region, constituted proof 
of Tehran's desire to "re-establish the Persian empire."  In 
that connection, President Saleh asked GEN Abizaid to provide 
imagery of 1/50,000 resolution of Saada in order to assist 
the Yemeni Government's plans to "strike" insurgent leader 
Abdul Malik al-Houthi and finish this insurgency once and for 
all.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (C)  The MinInt, who is concurrently Deputy Prime 
Minister, met with GEN Abizaid on June 18 with the new 
Minister of Defense and Chief of Armed Forces also in 
attendance.  After a brief update on the needs and plans of 
the Yemeni Coast Guard, the discussion turned to the growing 
threat from Iran and cooperation in improving regional 
defenses. 
 
¶3. (C)  Warming to the subject, the MinInt explained that 
Iran's interference in Yemen began in 1983, when the 
Revolutionary Guard trained terrorist groups and executed 
operations in Yemen.  A cinema was bombed, acid was thrown in 
women's faces, and an attempt was made to bomb the Saudi 
Embassy in Sanaa. 
 
¶4. (C)  In 2004, Alimi continued, Shia from Iran and Saudi 
Arabia began supporting followers of insurgent cleric Badr 
al-Din al-Houthi in the northern governate of Saada. 
"Documents we seized in Saada proves this support," Alimi 
contended.  The Yemeni Government rolled up a cell linked to 
al-Houthi in Saana that was planning to attack the Embassy 
and assassinate the Ambassador.  "This is what the 
Revolutionary Guards are doing in Yemen," Alimi concluded. 
 
¶5. (C)  GEN Abizaid noted that Yemen was facing threats from 
al-Qaida on one hand and from the Revolutionary Guards on the 
other, to which a senior military official added, "and the 
threat from the Revolutionary Guard is greater."  Alimi 
opined that the threat from Iran was actually greater for 
Gulf countries than for Yemen, but that Iran's support of the 
al-Houthi insurgency was nonetheless dangerous, "given 
Saada's proximity to Shia areas of Saudi Arabia and the oil 
fields." 
 
¶6. (C)  In a separate meeting on the same day, President 
Saleh advised GEN Abizaid that Iran has destructive 
intentions in Iraq and Bahrain, because Tehran "wants to 
restore the Persian empire."  He said it was in the interests 
of all nations to work with the USG to prevent Iran from 
acquiring nuclear weapons. 
 
¶7. (S)  Responding to a statement by GEN Abizaid about the 
importance of Yemen working with the USG to improve border 
and coastal security, Saleh said that what Yemen needed most 
urgently was imagery of Saada at 1/50,000 resolution.  Saleh 
explained, "I want a decisive operation in Saada before the 
election against Abdul Malik al-Houthi," the current leader 
of the insurgency.  "I want to track his phone calls and then 
strike him like we did Harithi."  (NOTE:  Saleh was referring 
to Abu Ali al-Harithi, an al-Qaida affiliate who was killed 
with a Hellfire missile fired from a U.S. unmanned aerial 
vehicle in Yemen in 2003.) 
 
¶8. (S)  GEN Abizaid said that this kind of imagery would 
require overflight permission from the Yemeni Government and 
that he would see what he could do to fulfill Saleh's 
request. 
 
¶9. (C)  COMMENT:  Saleh from time to time rails in private 
meetings with us about Iranian meddling in Yemen's internal 
affairs, but he is careful to keep a correct relationship 
with Tehran.  Ambassador pointed out during the meeting with 
MinInt Alimi that Iran's National Security Advisor had 
recently visited, but we heard nothing but statements that 
were positive and supportive of Iran.  Alimi replied simply 
that Yemen had voted with the USG to refer Iran to the UNSC 
in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  Post 
 
SANAA 00001833  002 OF 002 
 
 
believes Yemen's concerns about Iranian involvement here are 
genuine and Saleh does not wish to see a nuclear Iran at his 
doorstep.  Given the balancing act that the ROYG has to play, 
however, we can expect quiet votes from Yemen at the IAEA, 
but not outspokenness against Iran's nuclear ambitions. 
 
¶10. (U)  GEN Abizaid has cleared this message. 
Krajeski