VZCZCXRO1366
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0847/01 1671131
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 161131Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3940
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1174
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0383
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0790
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0658
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1093
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0241
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0865
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1441
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2711
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1835
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1231
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0734
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0797
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0243

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000847 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR AF, AF/C, DRL, PRM, S/CRS 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KCRS CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: POLITICAL OPPOSTION TO TAKE FRANCE TO TASK 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 826 
 
Classified By: POL/ECON OFFICER MICHAEL P. ZORICK, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND 
(D). 
 
-------- 
SUMMARY: 
--------- 
 
¶1. (C) Chad's political opposition intends to tell the 
visiting French Minister-Delegate for Cooperation that she 
should see President Deby's initiative for political dialogue 
as they see it: a red herring designed to tell the 
international community what it wants to hear.  That said, 
the opposition is engaged in its own efforts at conforming to 
the desires of outsiders.  Their proposals for dialogue were 
designed to confirm to what they think the AU, EU and USG 
will support, and not necessarily as a viable approach to 
resolving Chad's domestic political crisis.  END SUMMARY 
 
---------------------- 
THE DOCTOR MUST TALK 
TO THE PATIENT 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Pol/Econ Officer met June 14 with Salibou Garba, head 
of the National Alliance for Democracy and Development Party 
(AND) and member of the opposition umbrella group 
Coordination of the Political Parties for the Defense of the 
Constitution (CPDC).  Garba gave us a confidential preview of 
the CPDC's letter to France's Minister Delegate for 
Cooperation and Francophony, Brigitte Girardin, who is 
visiting Chad June 15-16. 
 
¶3. (C) The CPDC letter repeated much of the crisis analysis 
that had filled a good part of the group's recent draft 
proposals for dialogue that Garba had passed to us June 8 
(reftel).  It contained none of the proposals -- Garba said 
those were for USG eyes, as the CPDC's direct response to AF 
DAS Yamamoto.  The letter differs significantly in tone as 
well, calling on France, as an "international partner who 
seems to want to come to Chad's sick-bed", to understand that 
"therapies concocted without first knowing the patient often 
lead to fatal and tragic consequences, from which comes the 
necessity of listening to the patient, and learning where he 
is sick." 
 
¶4. (C) The CPDC letter stresses that political dialogue must 
be non-exclusive -- CPDC code-word for including in some 
fashion Chad's armed opposition.  It calls for any such 
dialogue to be "god-fathered" by the international community, 
and to be prepared under the aegis of the African Union, 
given that the AU's Peace and Security Council had declared 
itself seized with the Chadian crisis at its 49th session. 
 
¶5. (C) The CPDC written submission to Minister-Delegate 
Girardin closes with a reference to conducting politics as 
usual with a president the group considers illegitimate.  The 
letter asks the rhetorical question, "Can we accept the idea 
that in politics, the lie can be institutionalized?  For our 
part, realism must not mean validating the false and 
cleansing the filthy."  It warns the Minister not to be 
fooled by the call for political dialogue emanating from the 
Presidency only one week before Girardin's arrival in Chad, 
calling it a red herring of the same sort as the memorandum 
on electoral transparency which the President signed just 
before the February 2004 visit of France's then-Foreign 
Minister de Villepin. 
 
------------------- 
DIALOGUE A LA CPDC 
------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Pol/Econ Off followed up with Garba on the draft 
 
NDJAMENA 00000847  002 OF 002 
 
 
proposals contained in the CPDC's "Note for the Attention of 
Mr. Donald Yamamoto -- Political Crisis in Chad -- Framework 
for a Resolution".  To the question of just how realistic the 
CPDC's suggestions were, Garba stated that this was the 
CPDC's attempt to design an approach and structure that 
responded to what the group perceived to be ideas that the 
AU, EU, and USG could support.  Garba noted that various 
international community members had proposed a strong Prime 
Minister from the opposition; to get there, the CPDC thought 
it would require changes to the constitution, and fencing in 
the President, as suggested in the draft proposals.  He 
reminded us that the international community's suggestions 
were similar to the structures developed in the 1993 National 
Conference in Chad -- and which President Deby had dismantled 
within only a year. 
 
¶7. (C) We questioned whether Garba or his CPDC colleagues 
thought that it was sufficient to have international backing 
to operationalize an approach to pursue results that bore 
striking similarities to those that had been sought, and not 
achieved in the past.  Garba noted that there was no chance 
of success in any dialogue without full support from strong 
foreign partners to back the President into a corner.  He did 
not, however, believe that this would guarantee success, and 
in fact implied that Deby might be past influencing, and 
would only cede or leave power if forced. 
 
-------- 
COMMENT 
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¶8. (C) It would appear that both the political opposition and 
the Presidency are playing "Please the Foreigners" with their 
proposals of political dialogue.  As long as Deby fills the 
newspapers with regular announcements of dialogue-planning 
activities, and the parties in the MPS alliance declare 
themselves willing to engage, there will appear to be a 
process in train to which the international community will 
have to react.  The CPDC will point out that Deby's process 
has no sanity check in it -- the international community will 
be kept at arms distance.  They will call for outsiders to 
organize, finance, facilitate, and ultimately impose change 
on the President -- a level of engagement in Chadian affairs 
that is unlikely to be quickly forthcoming.  The two groups 
are set to continue talking past each other.  Meanwhile, the 
men with guns sit to the East and South.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶9. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered. 
WALL