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DE RUEHRL #1494/01 1531338
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3405
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0350
RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001494 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/AGS, EUR/ERA, PM AND T 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2016 
TAGS: NATO MARR MOPS PREL GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN VIEWS ON THE "ROAD TO RIGA" 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. John K. Bauman; 
reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  In meetings May 18-19 with USNATO Ambassador 
Victoria Nuland, German officials were cautious across the 
board.  Nuland focused on the strategic rationale behind our 
Riga summit initiatives but made only modest headway in 
broadening German thinking.  Nuland found Chancellery and MOD 
officials generally far more open-minded then the MFA. 
Specifically, the Germans questioned whether the time was 
ripe for NATO to grant Georgia Intensified Dialogue (ID) 
status.  They expressed general support for the idea of a 
NATO "Global Partnership" initiative, but advocated keeping 
the approach practical and informal.  On possible enhanced 
NATO support for the African Union (AU) mission in Darfur, 
the Germans confirmed political support but remained cautious 
about the prospects for German contributions.  They agreed 
with the need to promote closer NATO-EU cooperation, though 
tended to overestimate the value of informal NATO-EU staff 
contacts. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary continued:  Looking ahead to the NATO Riga 
Summit, the Germans agreed that training is one of NATO's key 
strengths.  They are prepared to work on a training 
deliverable, but were hesitant with regard to the idea of a 
NATO training center in the Greater Middle East (GME).  They 
suggested that NATO expand ongoing training activities for 
personnel from the region first to test the commitments of 
potential regional partner governments.  MOD officials were 
fairly cool to the idea of participating in an initiative for 
NATO countries to purchase and operate C-17s on behalf of 
NATO, citing Germany's role in the recent stand-up of the 
Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) as a reason for 
Germany not doing more now.  They were, however, generally 
open to the idea of increased interoperability between NATO 
special operations forces (SOF), though they will need to 
study the proposal further.  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (U) During a May 18-19 visit to Berlin, Amb. Nuland 
discussed USG priorities in the run-up to the Riga Summit 
with senior German officials, including in separate meetings 
with MFA State Secretary Reinhard Silberberg, Chancellery 
National Security Advisor Christoph Heusgen, MOD 
Parliamentary State Secretary Christian Schmidt, and MFA 
Deputy Political Director Ulrich Brandenburg.  During the 
visit, Amb. Nuland also emphasized the U.S. message in 
interviews with German print and broadcast media, as well as 
in public outreach events with the Aspen Institute Berlin and 
the 23rd International Workshop on Global Security. 
 
---------------- 
NATO Enlargement 
---------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Citing "EU enlargement fatigue", MFA State Secretary 
Silberberg was skeptical about near-term prospects for 
Ukraine moving to a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP).  He 
also stated that he thought that the June Informal Defense 
Ministerial in Brussels would be too soon for NATO to offer 
Georgia ID, and questioned Georgia's progress on reforms. 
Beyond "enlargement fatigue", Silberberg highlighted possible 
Russian reactions as a concern, arguing that "we need to find 
ways to avoid having Russia spoil the party."  NSA Heusgen 
asked for assurances -- which Nuland said she could not give 
-- that the USG would not push for MAP for Georgia at the 
Riga Summit, if Georgia received ID now.  MOD Parliamentary 
State Secretary Schmidt agreed that Georgia's political 
leadership needs ID sooner than later, in order to 
demonstrate to the Georgian public the benefits of staying 
the reform course, saying he personally supported it. 
However, he noted that the German government had not yet made 
a decision on ID for Georgia.  Amb. Nuland underlined that 
there is no linkage between EU and NATO enlargement 
processes, that Ukraine and Georgia should be judged only on 
NATO criteria, that Russia should not be given a veto over 
Alliance enlargement decisions, and that the Georgian 
leadership needs ID now to keep them on course.  In a 
follow-up to her meetings, Amb. Nuland subsequently provided 
Silberberg, Schmidt, and Heusgen detailed information 
regarding Georgia's recent achievements on reform. 
--------------------------- 
Global Partnership for NATO 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Silberberg said that Germany is interested in working 
closely with countries such as Australia, Japan, and New 
Zealand, but wants to avoid creating "formalized frameworks" 
that could lead to expectations that cannot be met.  Amb. 
Nuland explained the USG's concept for a flexible "big box" 
that would provide current and future partners opportunities 
for increased cooperation with NATO, without replacing any of 
the current frameworks.  While generally positive in his 
response, Silberberg stressed the advantages of keeping the 
approach "practical" and informal, cautioning that otherwise 
the initiative could run into resistance. 
 
------ 
Darfur 
------ 
 
¶6. (C) Amb. Nuland outlined current USG thinking about a 
two-step approach to enhanced NATO support for the AU as it 
prepares to transition its operations to a UN mission.  She 
explained that the USG hoped that German staff officers at 
NATO would be able to participate as called upon in a first 
phase of further developing AU capacities, and that at least 
a handful of German military personnel would serve in a 
second phase as embedded trainers with AU troops, if NATO and 
the AU decide on this.  Silberberg said he thought the 
approach made sense in political terms, but made no 
commitment about possible German troop participation.  PStS 
Schmidt noted that, in his former capacity as opposition 
parliamentarian, he had raised concerns about a possible 
Darfur mission.  With reference to current German 
parliamentary scrutiny of the EU's upcoming Congo mission, he 
said he could not yet say what additional contributions 
Germany would make in Darfur, or even whether there would be 
any additional contributions.  MFA NATO Desk Director 
Eberhard Pohl was positive on the prospect of German staff 
officers at NATO being able to provide enabling assistance to 
the AU, but more cautious about the idea of embedded 
trainers.  Heusgen took Amb. Nuland's message on board, 
noting the importance of getting through the domestic debate 
on Congo before Germany could seriously consider even a 
modest Darfur contribution.  In a similar vein, Chancellery 
Director for Transatlantic Relations Dirk Brengelmann said 
Germany sees the decision point on the NATO-Darfur issue as 
"months" down the road, not weeks.  Nuland urged them to be 
ready for decisions in June. 
 
----------------- 
NATO-EU Relations 
----------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Deputy PolDir Brandenburg remarked that there is 
considerable interchange at the staff level between the EU 
and NATO.  Amb. Nuland countered that such staff-level 
interactions are having insufficient effect on EU and NATO 
institutional relationships, noting that there had not even 
been informal NATO-EU consultations on the EU's upcoming 
Congo mission.  She said things won't change much unless and 
until EU Allies push within the EU for more consultation with 
NATO.  Thinking ahead to the German EU Presidency, Heusgen 
said he wants to brainstorm further on strengthening formal 
and informal NATO-EU ties, an offer Nuland welcomed. 
 
------------- 
NATO Training 
------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Brandenburg remarked that training is one of NATO's 
key strengths and that programs such as the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) are a model for security cooperation.  He said 
that Germany is interested in learning more about current USG 
thinking about a NATO training center in the Middle East. 
Brandenburg reported that Germany also was looking at ways to 
enhance already existing training programs with countries in 
the region.  He wondered if it would not be possible to "put 
something together that would fly" at the Riga Summit.  MFA 
NATO Desk Director Eberhard Pohl said that it will be 
important that NATO "not fail" in this effort.  Therefore, he 
explained, Germany was thinking of ways to test the 
commitment of countries in the region to training with NATO, 
possibly by bringing the trainees out of the region to 
already established centers/programs.  Observing that NATO 
countries already were doing that, Amb. Nuland explained the 
advantages of building long-term relationships both with and 
within the GME by having a center there.  She emphasized the 
need to ensure regional "buy in" by requiring Middle East 
states to finance the building and its operational costs, and 
to participate in curriculum development. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
NATO Strategic Airlift:  C-17 Initiative 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Amb. Nuland urged MOD PStS Schmidt to give careful 
consideration to a forthcoming USG proposal for NATO 
countries to purchase and operate C-17s on behalf of NATO, to 
help to address the Alliance's dire shortage of strategic 
airlift.  Schmidt responded that, because Germany had just 
gotten the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) 
arrangement up and running, a "second system is not on the 
agenda for us."  However, he said he would be interested in 
seeing the details of the C-17 proposal. 
 
------------------------------ 
NATO Special Operations Forces 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Amb. Nuland briefed MOD StS Schmidt on the pending 
proposal for NATO to increase the interoperability of Allies' 
national SOF.  The initiative possibly could be announced at 
the Riga Summit.  Commenting that he will be in Tampa 
(CENTCOM) in June, Schmidt underlined that there had been 
good cooperation among national SOFs in Afghanistan.  While 
indicating general openness to the idea, he conceded that he 
had not yet thought about enhancing SOF interoperability in 
the NATO context. 
BAUMAN