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Viewing cable 06BEIRUT1717, MGLE01: JUSTICE MINISTER COMPLAINS THAT SINIORA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BEIRUT1717 2006-06-01 07:01 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beirut
VZCZCXRO4006
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHLB #1717/01 1520701
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 010701Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3767
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001717 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2016 
TAGS: CASC KDEM LE PGOV PREL PTER SY IS
SUBJECT: MGLE01:  JUSTICE MINISTER COMPLAINS THAT SINIORA 
IS NEEDLESSLY PICKING A FIGHT 
 
 
Classified By:  Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman.  Reason: Section 1.4 (b). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (C)  Justice Minister Charles Rizk voiced disappointment 
with Prime Minister Siniora's apparent decision to reject 
Rizk's proposed list of candidates for Lebanon's Higher 
Judicial Council.  Rizk maintained that Siniora is bent on 
achieving a council majority that would allow him to control 
the Justice Ministry through appointments and the ability to 
remove any judge from office.  In Rizk's opinion, the 
resulting March 14-control of the Higher Judicial Council 
would inevitably produce a backlash from Lebanon's Shia 
political forces, particularly from Speaker of Parliament and 
Amal leader Nabih Berri.  In retaliation, Rizk believes Berri 
would do all he could to derail the establishment of the 
proposed special tribunal with international character on the 
Hariri assassination.  Rizk hopes that Saad Hariri will be 
more reasonable than Siniora on the appointments and step in 
to defuse the situation.  Regarding the special tribunal, 
Minister Rizk said two senior judges, Ralph Riachy and 
Choukri Sader, have returned to New York for further 
discussions with UN Undersecretary for Judicial Affairs 
Nicholas Michel to develop a timeline for setting up the 
tribunal.  Additionally, Rizk characterized yesterday's vote 
in Parliament condemning Syria's issuance of warrants for 
Walid Jumblatt and Marwan Hamadeh as a clever gift from the 
Speaker to Saad Hariri.  Berri, he remarked, is "a man who 
never gives anything away for free."  Finally, the Ambassador 
re-emphasized that our government continues to demand the 
expeditious return of abducted U.S. citizen Kelsey Klotz. 
End summary. 
 
PERCEPTION OF ANOTHER SUNNI POWER PLAY 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  Minister Charles Rizk received the Ambassador and 
poloff on May 31 at the Justice Ministry.  Rizk, who had been 
drifting toward the March 14 movement despite his longterm 
friendship with President Emile Lahoud, criticized PM Siniora 
as a "mean and small man" who has made an error of judgment 
in opposing Rizk's list of candidates for the long-unfilled 
positions on the country's Higher Judicial Council.  Rizk 
acknowledged that he had changed the list slightly (replacing 
one name) from the list of individuals recommended by a panel 
of Lebanon's top judges, and it was to this action that 
Siniora objected.  But Rizk argued that his change was 
necessary, in order to preserve the independence of the 
judiciary -- or at least its freedom from March 14 control. 
(Note:  Rizk kept saying "Sunni control" in the conversation. 
 But this is not technically correct:  there is confessional 
balance in the Council no matter whose list is adopted.  It 
is more a question of political allegiances, or perceived 
allegiances, that is at stake.  End note.) 
 
3.  (C)  Minister Rizk maintained that if Siniora were 
successful in "stacking" the judicial body, giving March 14 
political forces blanket authority to appoint or dismiss any 
judge, there would be an inevitable adverse reaction from the 
Shia political elite, and most definitely from Amal leader 
and Speaker Nabih Berri -- who is still smarting from a 
belief that Siniora had cavilierly dismissed a diplomatic 
initiative (an invitation for Siniora to go to Damascus) 
engineered by the Speaker. 
 
4.  (C)  Rizk defined the key to controlling the Higher 
Judicial Council as the ability to influence eight of its ten 
members.  Under the constitution, this would allow the 
controlling party to appoint and fire at will.  Rizk 
maintained that his minor change to the list of nominees 
would prevent this from happening -- and ameliorate the 
widely held view that Saad Hariri's Sunni-dominant movement 
already wielded too much political power.  Seven of the ten 
judges would still lean toward the March 14 politics, meaning 
that most decisions made by the council -- such as 
disciplinary action short of actual dismissal, assignment of 
judges to undesirable posts, etc. -- would remain in the 
hands of the Hariri-dominated majority. 
 
5.  (C)  He rhetorically asked the Ambassador why Sinora was 
seeking a clash with the Shia that was both unnecessary and 
potentially ruinous to the reform movement.  "He doesn't know 
how to pick his fights, and he's beyond stubborn," the 
minister complained.  Rizk continued that he refused to give 
up control of his ministry, which would be the practical 
consequence of Siniora getting his way on this issue. 
 
BEIRUT 00001717  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
6.  (C)  Rizk believed that Siniora actually wanted him to 
resign, but he indicated he would not -- and if it came to 
it, he still had a card up his sleeve.  After initial 
hesitance, Rizk revealed that if pushed, he would simply 
"kick it upstairs" and allow the nominee list to proceed to 
President Lahoud as required by the constitution.  Rizk 
conveyed obvious relish at the prospect of Lahoud and Siniora 
engaged in a bitter battle over this issue. 
 
THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL AT RISK 
---------------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  But more important than control of his ministry, 
Rizk argued, was the inevitable damage that would be 
inflicted on the reform movement by Siniora's obstinance.  In 
Rizk's opinion, the first and most likely casualty would the 
special tribunal with international character proposed for 
the prosecution of those responsible for the assassination of 
Rafiq Hariri, and possibly of those responsible for other 
acts of political violence.  Minister Rizk said Speaker Berri 
and his Shia allies would obstruct and likely succeed in 
blocking the tribunal's establishment.  If the Shia were 
successful in stopping a project so highly valued by Saad 
Hariri, Rizk believes that current political progress, though 
gradual, could well cease. 
 
8.  (C)  Despite recent criticism from Lebanon's Lawyers 
Association and negative press coverage of the standoff, 
Minister Rizk believes that Saad Hariri would actually 
support his position vice Siniora's due to the consequences 
of the perception that the Sunni elite had taken control of 
yet another lever of power.  Rizk revealed he had sought the 
advice of Minister Marwan Hamadeh, who moves easily among 
Lebanon's political classes, and had been advised to be 
patient and wait for the return of Saad Hariri.  Although he 
had doubts about this course of action, and clearly disliked 
the criticism he has been receiving, Rizk indicated he would 
step back and wait for the more astute Hariri to recognize 
the downside of Siniora's intransigence.  He concluded, "Saad 
doesn't want to battle Berri and Nasrallah over this and risk 
losing the tribunal."  But Rizk also observed that the entire 
March 14 reform movement was amazingly prone to stumbling 
into unnecessary political clashes. 
 
MINISTRY OFFICIALS IN NEW YORK 
------------------------------ 
 
9.  (C)  Minister Rizk described this week's visit of Justice 
Ministry officials Ralph Riachy and Choukri Sader to the 
United Nations as helpful, but not particularly important. 
Both Riachy and Sader are senior judges.  In fact, Rizk was 
somewhat puzzled why UN Undersecretary for Legal Affairs 
Nicholas Michel even went to the effort, when all that was 
really needed was a UN/GOL commitment to a timeline for the 
establishment of the tribunal. 
 
10.  (C)  As he has in previous meetings, the Justice 
Minister projected confidence that, once authorized, the 
tribunal could be established in a relatively straightforward 
manner.  He said that in his last meeting with UNIIIC Chief 
Serge Brammertz, he had learned that Brammertz intended to 
work for an additional six months, and expected that the 
investigation would then be essentially complete.  He 
therefore felt a precise timeline was needed and hoped that 
Riachy and Sader would return from New York with one. 
 
PARLIAMENT'S VOTE ON SYRIAN WARRANTS 
------------------------------------ 
 
11.  (C)  In Rizk's view, the previous day's vote by 
Lebanon's Parliament to condemn Syria's issuance of warrants 
against PSP leader Walid Jumblatt and Minister Marwan Hamadeh 
was more than a justifiable statement of Lebanon's 
sovereignty.  It was also a shrewd political move by Speaker 
Berri to obtain an IOU from Saad Hariri.  Although Berri 
attempted to temper the resolution's wording, his assistance 
in bringing the measure to a vote (and abstaining, along with 
Hizballah) put Hariri in his debt. 
 
12.  (C)  Rizk noted that Berri rarely misses a chance to 
gain an advantage, and can always be expected to demand 
payment at some point in time.  Nevertheless, Rizk believed 
the parliamentary action was necessary and had drawn a 
commendable line in the sand with Syria. 
 
ABDUCTED USCIT KELSEY KLOTZ 
 
BEIRUT 00001717  003 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------------- 
 
13.  (U)  The Ambassador re-emphasized to the Justice 
Minister that U.S. patience was wearing thin on the continued 
inaction by GOL in returning the abducted child to US 
custody.  Minister Rizk conceded it was unacceptable and said 
he was "shamed" that the situation was still unresolved. 
 
14.  (U)  He placed an immediate phone call to ISF Director 
General Rifi and instructed him to maintain maximum effort on 
the task.  The Ambassador also spoke with the ISF chief and 
emphasized the importance of the case to the USG.  Rifi, who 
is on his way to Washington to discuss military cooperation, 
insisted his force was doing all it could to locate and 
return the child.  The Ambassador cautioned Rifi that he 
should expect to hear about this case in Washington. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
15.  (C)  What may appear to outsiders to be a minor issue 
has developed into a full-scale political crisis in Lebanon, 
with the immediate protagonists Siniora and Rizk standing in 
for March 14-vs.-March 8 (i.e., Nabih Berri and the Shia) 
forces.  Yet the cabinet squabbling over the Higher Judicial 
Council appointments looks just childish when one looks at 
the details:  Siniora and Rizk agree on 9 of the 10 judges, 
with only one judge (a Shia) in question.  (Five of the 10 
positions are automatic by virtue of the other positions 
judges hold, so this controversy revolves around naming the 
other five.)  Rizk has Lebanon's much-abused constitution on 
his side when he claims the right to put the names in the 
decree, although that decree must be signed by the PM and 
President.  Asking the judges to give their own 
recommendations was a clever tactic by Siniora to check his 
minister's perogatives -- Siniora can claim he is on the side 
of the independent judiciary, when in fact judges' 
recommendations have no legal authority or even precedent in 
Lebanese judicial history. 
 
16.  (C)  We talked with two lawyer/MPs, Boutros Harb and 
Robert Ghanem, about this issue.  They both criticized Rizk 
for trying to put in a somewhat less qualified judge in the 
place of the Shia recommended by the judges and backed by 
Siniora.  Rizk, they claim, was trying to "make everyone 
happy" by doing a deal with Nabih Berri.  Rizk had not 
anticipated Siniora's stubborness.  But the differences 
between the two judges in question is not so large as to 
constitute a crisis, they claimed.  Both are qualified. 
Thus, at this point, with Lebanon yearning for the Higher 
Judicial Council to take office, Siniora should back down, 
Harb and Ghanem argue, even if principle is on the PM's side. 
 
17.  (C)  Saad Hariri agrees.  The Ambassador spoke to Hariri 
by phone on 5/31.  Hariri said that he was deeply angry with 
Siniora for fighting an unneeded battle with Rizk over a 
single position that wasn't all that important to the basic 
approach of the Council.  Rizk, Hariri said, had politically 
broken with Lahoud and started to lend his support to the 
March 14 movement.  Siniora's undermining of Rizk's authority 
risked sending the Justice Minister back in the wrong 
direction.  Moreover, Siniora had annoyed Nabih Berri, whose 
support was essential for larger issues such as the special 
tribunal.  Siniora, Hariri concluded, may be right, but it is 
more important to be smart.  Asked by the Ambassador whether 
he had conveyed his views to the PM he essentially appointed, 
Hariri said that he had done so through Marwan Hamadeh.  As 
for direct contact, he and Siniora had not spoken in two 
weeks, Hariri claimed. 
 
18.  (SBU)  The Ambassador will raise this issue with PM 
Siniora in a meeting today (6/1).  Given the deeply 
dispiriting impact it is having on the public mood, it needs 
to be solved urgently. 
FELTMAN