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Viewing cable 06ADDISABABA1744, ETHIOPIA: A/S FRAZER DISCUSSES SOMALIA AND SUDAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ADDISABABA1744 2006-06-26 09:08 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXRO0231
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #1744/01 1770908
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 260908Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1293
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001744 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2016 
TAGS: PREL KPKO IGAD AU SO SU
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: A/S FRAZER DISCUSSES SOMALIA AND SUDAN 
WITH FM SEYOUM 
 
 
Classified By: A/S FRAZER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  A/S Frazer discussed Somalia and Sudan with 
FM Seyoum June 24.  Seyoum urged a stronger U.S. role in 
Somalia.  If not leading, he said, the U.S. should at least 
be an active participant in a partners group.  A radical 
change of U.S. attitude will be required, he said. Seyoum 
said the recent statement of the International Somalia 
Contact Group had already sent a strong message of support 
for the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG).  The 
Foreign Minister said that Ethiopia hoped to avoid 
participating in the initial deployment of an IGAD peace 
support mission, but believed it was vital to check the 
advance of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).  Such a mission 
should be on the ground as soon as possible with a mandate to 
protect and build the capacity of the TFG, beginning in 
Baidoa but looking to expand into areas like Puntland and 
elsewhere outside Mogadishu.  Delay would favor extremists 
and could cause defection from the Transitional Parliament. 
Seyoum claimed that "everyone agrees that regional 
intervention is required; the questions are how, when and by 
whom."  While the UIC had tried to sound moderate, several of 
its key leaders were not.  Seyoum told Frazer that the 
TFG/UIC dialogue begun in Khartoum earlier in the week would 
be helpful in isolating extremists.  Frazer agreed on the 
need to develop contingency plans to prevent the 
consolidation of a radical Islamic regime while avoiding 
steps that would play into their hands.  The key was to 
create space for more moderate elements.  She said that the 
Khartoum agreement between the UIC and TFG had created the 
possibility for a political solution.  Turning over known 
terrorists to the USG would send a positive signal, she 
added, and asked the GOE to convey that message to friendly 
clan leaders.  On Sudan, Seyoum agreed with A/S Frazer that 
the African Union could not reverse its decision to transfer 
its mission in Darfur to UN control in spite of Sudan's 
renewed opposition.  He suggested dealing with specific 
Sudanese concern, such as the specific mandate of the mission 
and the pursuit of war criminals.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) A/S Frazer called on Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin 
June 24.  Charge, CJTF-HOA Commander RADM Hunt, Lt. Commander 
Mike Sowa, Pol/Econ Counselor, executive assistant Kendra 
Gaither and Somalia/Djibouti deskoff Nole Garey accompanied 
Frazer.  Seyoum was joined by Ethiopian Ambassador to the TFG 
Abduraziz Akumel, MFA Director for Europe and America Almaz 
Eshete, Americas Deputy Ayalew Mamo and Ayele Lire of the MFA 
Africa division. 
 
----------------------- 
STRONGER US ROLE NEEDED 
----------------------- 
 
3. (C) Seyoum urged a stronger U.S. role in Somalia.  He 
recalled that A/S Frazer had mentioned on the margins of the 
UN General Assembly in fall 2005 that U.S. policy on Somalia 
was evolving.  He commented that while the USG had assisted 
significantly on the humanitarian front since then, it had 
remained "on the fence" politically.  The intervention of 
international extremists had now changed the situation 
dramatically. If not leading political efforts, he said, the 
U.S. should at least be an active participant in a partners 
group.  He argued that Somalia was at a crossroads; the 
international community could either "hand the country over 
to extremists and bleed the whole region" or "take it back 
for the moderates."  There was no time to lose.  A radical 
change of U.S. attitude would be required, he said.  Seyoum 
noted the recent statement of the International Somalia 
Contact Group (SCG) had already sent a strong message of 
support for the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG). 
 
4. (C) A/S Frazer argued that prior to recent developments, 
U.S. policy had been to "push from behind."  She acknowledged 
that current dynamics required more and said that her trip to 
the region was a way to begin.  "We still don't want to be in 
the lead, but will have a stronger presence," she told 
Seyoum, and promised to send representatives to the June 
28-29 AU/IGAD/Partners meeting in Nairobi.  Frazer said that 
the Arab League-brokered agreement between the TFG and the 
UIC had created the possibility of a political solution.  The 
USG approach was now to 1) support the TFG; 2) support the 
Somali people and their humanitarian needs; 3) counter the 
terrorist threat; and 4) build indigenous institutions to 
fill the governance vacuum.  She explained to Seyoum the 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001744  002 OF 003 
 
 
genesis and evolution of the SCG and indicated that SCG 
agreed to include both IGAD and the Arab League in the next 
SCG meeting in Stockholm. 
 
5. (C) Seyoum claimed that while the UIC had tried to sound 
moderate, several of its key leaders were not.  Recent 
contradictory public statements from the UIC clearly 
reflected this.  He suggested that the Khartoum agreement 
with the TFG had merely been a way for the UIC to stall for 
time in order to consolidate its gains on the way to creating 
a radical Islamic state in Somalia.  "We must monitor 
developments closely and prepare ourselves to neutralize this 
threat," he said.  "Our best entry point is to continue 
supporting the TFG.  Fighting terrorism cannot be separated 
from the struggle to establish the rule of law." 
 
------------------------------------------- 
REGIONAL MISSION TO PROTECT AND BOLSTER TFG 
------------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Seyoum claimed that "everyone agrees that regional 
intervention is required; the questions are how, when and by 
whom." The short-term solution would be the deployment of an 
African force in Somalia to check the advance of extremists. 
The longer-term effort should be focused on building the 
institutions of a national police force and army that 
reflected the country's clan make up.  The Foreign Minister 
said that Ethiopia hoped to avoid participating in the 
initial deployment of an IGAD peace support mission (IGASOM), 
since the UIC would seek to exploit popular suspicions of 
Ethiopia.  Ethiopia would go into Somalia only as a last 
resort if no other option appeared viable. 
 
7. (C) Seyoum said that a regional mission should be deployed 
with a mandate to protect the TFG, beginning in Baidoa but 
looking to expand into areas like Puntland and elsewhere 
outside Mogadishu.  Such a mission should be deployed 
immediately, regardless of the UIC's rejection and 
criticisms.  Delay would favor extremists and could cause 
defection from the Transitional Parliament.  The UIC itself 
was a diverse mixture of forces, including both moderate 
militias tied to clan leaders and businessmen as well as 
extreme elements, such as Aden Hashi Ayro.  These disparate 
elements had no other cause to unite them other than opposing 
the TFG, which they accused of having no indigenous support. 
 
8. (C) A/S Frazer said the USG and international partners 
needed to see the TFG's National Security and Stabilization 
Plan before making decisions about supporting and IGAD 
mission in Somalia.  She expressed concern that deployment of 
the mission could have the opposite affect of that desired -- 
rallying Somalis against the TFG.  It would be important to 
plan for all contingencies, since the UIC might indeed prove 
to be radical and aggressive.  In order to minimize the risk 
of a negative popular reaction in Somalia, Frazer urged that, 
at least initially, the focus of an IGAD mission be building 
the capacity of the TFG, rather than simply protecting it or 
fighting the UIC.  The USG and other partners were still 
hesitant about deploying an IGASOM mission, and about lifting 
the arms embargo; framing the issue properly would be 
critical.  Seyoum agreed, saying that any IGASOM mission that 
did not build the TFG's long-term capacity would fail.  He 
claimed that the existing NSSP was already a step in this 
direction, since it gave all the clans a role in security and 
other institutions.  He noted that the TFG already had a 
3,000-man militia.  A/S Frazer replied that the existing TFG 
militia must be broadened so that it would not be perceived 
merely as "Yusuf's militia." 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
DIALOGUE TO ISOLATE THE EXTREMISTS, CREATE SPACE FOR MODERATES 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
9. (C) Frazer agreed on the need to develop contingency plans 
to prevent the consolidation of a radical Islamic regime 
while avoiding steps that would play into their hands.  The 
key was to create space for more moderate elements.  The next 
round of Arab League-sponsored talks would take place July 
15.  Frazer agreed that extremists might use the lapse and a 
false sense of security among the international community to 
consolidate their position and prepare another offensive. 
She asked Seyoum what steps he would recommend in the interim 
to counter UIC hard-liners.  The Foreign Minister replied 
that "only committed intervention of the international 
community will tip the balance in favor of the TFG," and 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001744  003 OF 003 
 
 
argued that it was possible to influence the situation. 
Seyoum told Frazer that the TFG/UIC dialogue begun in 
Khartoum earlier in the week would be helpful in isolating 
extremists.  He said that leaders from the 'Ayr clan had 
already contacted the GOE to convey misgivings about 
extremist activities of UIC leaders.  The killing of a 
Swedish journalist had created an uproar that would redound 
against radical leaders. 
 
10. (C) Frazer emphasized that turning over known terrorists 
to the USG would send a positive signal and asked the GOE to 
convey that message to friendly clan leaders.  The more 
important issue was clearly to prevent Somalia from becoming 
a Jihadist state, but in the short-term a hand-over of wanted 
terrorists would foster positive U.S. engagement.  Seyoum 
replied that "they always deny that they have them," but 
agreed to pass the message.  He noted that the 'Ayr clan had 
seized the properties of other clans in southern Mogadishu 
fifteen years earlier and had been profiting from them.  Clan 
leaders were concerned that a functioning national government 
would force them to return the properties and were looking 
for a way to avoid this.  Finding a way to solve this problem 
would facilitate stability in Mogadishu and bring various 
clan leaders into cooperation with the TFG and international 
partners.  A/S Frazer responded that the Contact Group might 
explore possible solutions. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
SUDAN:  GOE AGREES AMIS TRANSITION TO UN MUST MOVE FORWARD 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
11. (C) On Sudan, A/S Frazer argued strongly that the African 
Union could not reverse its decision to transfer its mission 
in Darfur to UN control in spite of Sudan's renewed 
opposition.  The GOS was simply stalling, she asserted, and 
would back down in the face of a firm position on the part of 
the AU.  Recent statements by President Al Bashir were an 
effort to create chaos in the AU Peace and Security Council 
(PSC).  The A/S added that if the AU were to reverse itself 
on the UN transition, the DPA itself could fall apart. 
Frazer asked that Ethiopia use its influence within other 
African states to maintain the current AU commitment to an 
October transition from AMIS to a UN mission in Darfur. 
 
12. (C) Seyoum agreed that "the implementation of the Darfur 
Peace Agreement (DPA) was not optional.  Furthermore, the GOE 
clearly understood what the PSC had decided at the last AU 
Summit.  There was no doubt about the mission transition at 
the end of September, and there would be no going back. 
Seyoum said that the GOE had already sent the GOS a message 
to this effect.  He suggested that an alternative to giving 
in on the UN re-hatting was to deal with specific Sudanese 
concern, such as the specific mandate of the mission and the 
pursuit of war criminals.  He urged the USG to continue 
intensive bilateral diplomacy to ensure continued member 
state commitment to the PSC decision.  A/S Frazer agreed, and 
said that working on specific language within a Chapter 6 
mandate to protect civilians and the UN Mission itself was a 
viable option. 
HUDDLESTON