VZCZCXRO0445
PP RUEHHM RUEHLN RUEHPB
DE RUEHKO #2441/01 1220933
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 020933Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1680
INFO RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 6029
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 6002
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 8656
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 9224
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 7197
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 002441 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR OES/IHA COMELLA 
HHS FOR NIH AMY PATTERSON 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO PTER EAGR JA PARM PREL BWC
SUBJECT: JAPAN: MISUSE OF LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH 
 
REF: A. STATE 56179 
 
¶B. 05 TOKYO 6750 
 
TOKYO 00002441  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 10. 
 
¶2. (U) On April 18, ESToff and EST FSN delivered the 
talking points in reftel on the misuse of life science 
research and left a non-paper with the Ministry of Health, 
Labor and Welfare's (MHLW) Office of International 
Cooperation Director Kaname Kanai, Health Sciences Division 
Deputy Director Noriyo Yoshikawa and Tuberculosis and 
Infectious Diseases Control Division Deputy Director 
Takehiko Suzuki.  Office of Health Emergency Preparedness 
and Response Chief Fumi Irie and International Affairs 
Division official Reiko Akizuki were also present. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The officials present at the meeting acknowledged 
that the dual-use potential of life sciences research could 
be of concern, but admitted that they were not aware of any 
current discussions taking place within the GOJ or Japanese 
academia on the subject.  They also recognized that work on 
dual-use has been taken up under the BWC work program.  The 
officials explained that MHLW is still working on 
incorporating the concept of biosecurity into Japan's 
infectious diseases legal framework, and as a result, 
discussions on dual-use were still off into the future. 
 
¶4. (U) Mostly in listening mode, the officials were unclear 
as to how the work plan and international collaboration 
proposed by the National Science Advisory Board for 
Biosecurity (NSABB) would tie into existing international 
mechanisms.  ESToff explained that what was being proposed 
would not supplant any existing work within the BWC and 
WHO, but rather was a request for the exchange of 
information and opinions between the United States and 
Japan.  The officials offered to circulate the non-paper 
among relevant offices within MHLW, but requested further 
information (questions listed below) and a more concrete 
"concepts paper" that outlined what the Board envisioned 
its cooperation with Japan to look like, before providing a 
more formal response to the demarche and the name of a 
point of contact. 
 
¶5. (U) The officials also asked the following questions. 
 
-- Are the NSABB and/or USG requesting a formalized 
partnership of some sort?  Does Washington plan to 
ultimately establish a multilateral network as a result of 
the collaboration, or will the "global partnerships" be 
strictly on a bilateral level? 
 
-- After Japan exchanges information with the United States 
and the NSABB establishes a relationship with the GOJ POC, 
are there any plans for the USG to put forward some kind of 
international guidelines or proposals on the dual-use of 
life sciences in consultation with other countries?  Or, 
will the relationship be strictly for the exchange of 
information and opinions that both countries' POCs will 
take back to their respective governments? 
 
-- The officials asked for a clarification on the 
relationship between the proposal and the US-Japan Workshop 
on S&T for a Secure and Safe Society (SSS), the BWC and the 
US-Japan Cooperative Medical Sciences Program (CMSP). 
ESToff provided a basic explanation of the differences 
among the four, but the officials requested further 
information if possible. 
 
-- How does the NSABB plan to contact the Japanese POC? 
Would individual agency members of the Board directly 
contact their counterpart agencies in Japan (example: HHS 
and MHLW), or would all contacts go through the POC?  The 
officials commented that it would be confusing if the NSABB 
had only one contact but Japan was to have several, both at 
the government and non-governmental levels. 
 
¶6. (U) On April 25, ESToff and EST FSN met with Yutaka 
Hishiyama, Director for Research, in the Secretariat Office 
of the Science Council of Japan (SCJ) to discuss the same 
topic with the non-governmental science council.  Hishiyama 
also understood the potential threat posed to society by 
 
TOKYO 00002441  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
the potential of dual-use life sciences research, but 
admitted that this topic has not been raised or discussed 
within the SCJ.  He did explain that concerns over such 
dual-use have grown especially since the September 11 
attacks.  As an example, Hishiyama said that MHLW would 
revise pathogen-handling requirements within the Infectious 
Diseases Law based on these concerns.  (For further details 
see ref B). 
 
¶7. (U) Hishiyama explained that the SCJ has drafted a basic 
code of conduct for researchers in Japan.  It covers a 
broad range of general issues that hint at the concept of 
"misuse", stating that scientists must be responsible to 
ensure a safe society, human health and welfare and nature 
conservation.  Though not using the specific term "misuse", 
the code can be interpreted as stating that scientists 
should not produce anything that can harm society, 
including weapons.  It also urges researchers to ensure 
that their studies are open to the public and that they 
follow Japan's laws and regulations.  The code does not 
specifically touch on the dual-use of life sciences.  The 
main purpose of the SCJ's code of conduct is to prevent 
researchers from stealing and/or fabricating data.  The SCJ 
established a committee to work on the code of conduct for 
researchers in December 2005 in response to several 
incidents where data was fabricated or samples were stolen 
by researchers from other institutions. 
 
¶8. (U) Note: The SCJ's mandate is to deliberate on 
important scientific matters, implement its decisions, and 
promote the effective exchange of knowledge between 
researchers to achieve greater productivity in scientific 
research.  Its 210 representative members are elected from 
approximately 760,000 scientists nationwide.  When 
requested, the Council offers advice and recommendations to 
the government, and has the authority to offer the same on 
its own initiative.  It is a member of the InterAcademy 
Council and is the closest equivalent of the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) in Japan.  End note. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Comment:  Both MHLW and SCJ officials were aware 
that a discussion on the potential misuse of life sciences 
research was taking place internationally.  However, it 
does not appear that the topic is being seriously discussed 
among researchers and government officials in Japan.  The 
GOJ is working to steadily boost its measures to protect 
against potential bioterrorism threats.  As international 
engagement on the topic of dual-use increases, the GOJ will 
likely come on board to participate in the discussion.  For 
the time being, MHLW officials are looking forward to 
Washington's answers to their questions.  EST will continue 
to engage the GOJ on this issue as more information becomes 
available.  End comment. 
 
¶10. (U) Action request: Post requests answers to MHLW's 
questions and any further information that can be provided 
to the GOJ on the NSABB's envisioned cooperation with Japan 
on this issue. 
 
DONOVAN