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Viewing cable 06MANAMA873, SCENESETTER FOR U.S.-BAHRAIN MILITARY CONSULTATIVE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAMA873 2006-05-18 14:08 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO9600
OO RUEHDE
DE RUEHMK #0873/01 1381408
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181408Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4745
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM CCJ5 - PERSONAL FOR MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAMA 000873 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SECDEF PASS TO //USDP/ISA// 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS ASEC BA REGION BILAT
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U.S.-BAHRAIN MILITARY CONSULTATIVE 
COMMITTEE, 23-24 MAY 
 
MANAMA 00000873  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador William T. Monroe for Reasons 1 
.4(b) and (d) 
 
1.  (SBU) Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Long, we 
warmly welcome you and the U.S. Delegation to the 13th Annual 
U.S.-Bahrain Military Consultative Committee (MCC) 23-24 May. 
 We have requested meetings with the Minister of Defense, 
Lieutenant General Khalifa bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, the Bahrain 
Defense Force Chief of Staff Major General Duaij Salman Al 
Khalifa, the Director of the Bahrain National Security Agency 
Khalifa bin Ali Al Khalifa, and Vice Admiral Patrick Walsh, 
Commander of the Fifth Fleet stationed here in Bahrain. 
 
2. (S)  U.S. relations with Bahrain are strong and positive, 
anchored by the long and welcomed presence of NAVCENT/Fifth 
Fleet headquarters in Bahrain.  Bahrain has consistently 
supported U.S. policy in the region, most notably on Iraq and 
Iran, and greatly values the U.S. as a friend and ally. 
Economic/commercial relations are soon expected to receive an 
important boost with the implementation of the U.S.-Bahrain 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA),  the first FTA we have signed 
with a Gulf country.  This is not to say that there have not 
been some issues of contention between our two countries. 
NAVCENT sent home more than 900 dependents in 2004 in the 
wake of concerns about the GOB commitment to deal with a 
small cell of Sunni terror suspects; counterterrorism 
cooperation has since improved significantly, although we 
remain concerned about Sunni extremist activity on the 
island, however small in scale.  While we have regularly 
praised Bahrain for the important steps it has taken in 
introducing democratic reform, we were not pleased when 
Bahrain recently forced the departure of  NDI's 
representative in Bahrain, effectively closing the NDI office 
here.   On the Bahrain aside, press coverage of the remaining 
three Bahraini detainees at Guantanamo has been has been 
heavy and critical, putting some pressure on the Government 
to resolve, or be seen as trying to resolve, this issue with 
its good American friend. 
 
3. (C)  There are three issues of paramount importance to the 
Bahraini leadership and people at the current time: Iraq, 
Iran, and the upcoming parliamentary elections.  The fact 
that Bahrain, with a Shia majority population, sits on the 
fault line of Sunni-Shia sectarian relations in the region, 
plays into each of these issues.   On Iraq, Bahrain's Shia 
welcomed the fall of Saddam and were no doubt encouraged by 
Shia successes in Iraq there as they made the decision to 
participate in Bahrain's upcoming elections.  While the 
Government has fully supported our policy on Iraq, 
developments there have raised concerns among some Sunni 
about the potential threat of Shia empowerment in Bahrain and 
the region.   On Iran, Bahrain's leadership is deeply 
concerned about Iranian interference in Iraq, Iran's nuclear 
program, and President Ahmadi-nejad's bellicose rhetoric. 
The government supports our policy on Iran, but worries about 
Iran's ability to interfere with Bahrain's Shia community. 
It understands that Bahrain could be a prime target if Iran 
sought to retaliate for increased pressure on its nuclear 
program.  All this comes in the context of upcoming 
parliamentary elections.  The main Shia opposition political 
society, which boycotted the 2002 elections, recently 
announced that it will participate in this year's election. 
Although Shia opposition participation has long been a stated 
goal of the King, recent moves, such as the hard-line the 
government has taken on USG-funded NDI programming, seem to 
reflect uneasiness among at least some in the leadership as 
we head into the election season. 
 
-------------------------------- 
DEALING WITH IRAN 
-------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) .  Bahrain is watching developments  in Iran closely 
The Crown Prince has requested several times U.S. or NATO 
consideration of a formal security umbrella for Bahrain in 
the event of a nuclear threat.  During his May 8 meeting with 
CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid, the CP inquired about 
obtaining Patriot missiles.  State Department Counselor 
Zelikow, Under Secretary Joseph, and an interagency 
delegation led by Assistant Secretary Hillen visited Bahrain 
recently and raised the concept of a U.S.-GCC strategic 
dialogue addressing regional threats, especially Iran.   The 
Foreign Ministry has told us Bahrain intends to endorse the 
Proliferaton Security Initiative (PSI) and will formally 
confirm this shortly.  Bahrain has been invited to 
participate in the PSI Anatolian Sea Exercise later this 
month.. 
 
MANAMA 00000873  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
5.  (C) Bahrain's relationship with Iran is complex.  The 
Bahraini leadership is united in its suspicion of Iranian 
intentions regarding Bahrain and often sees an Iranian hand 
in incidents involving Bahrain's Shia community, which 
comprises some 70 percent of the country's citizens.  They 
are convinced Iran seeks to develop nuclear weapons and 
assert its influence around the region.  At the same time, 
Bahrain faces the reality that it must live with its large 
neighbor across the Gulf.  The Iranians, angered when Foreign 
Minister Shaikh Khalid accused elements from Iran of "playing 
with fire" in the Gulf, have been actively pursuing 
engagement with Bahrain, including most recently a May 8 
visit by FM Motakki, a recent Ahmadi-Nejad phone call to the 
King, and a visit by NSC Secretary General Larijani.  Trade 
relations are reportedly growing.  It is not clear that the 
Bahraini leadership has come to grips with how it will handle 
efforts to ratchet up the pressure on Iran if that includes, 
for example, calls for cutbacks in trade and engagement.  The 
Foreign Minister recently told us Bahrain will have no 
problem applying sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council. 
 
-------------------------------- 
NEXT STEPS ON IRAQ 
-------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) The GOB has issued public statements in support of 
each step in Iraq's political development.  We have urged the 
government to look for ways to show public and tangible 
support for the new Iraqi government once it is announced. 
You can reinforce this message during your visit. 
 
7.  (C) The Bahraini leadership is concerned about the 
spillover of sectarian tensions in Iraq to Bahrain.  Tens of 
thousands of Bahrainis, Sunni and Shia, marched peacefully to 
protest the Samarra mosque bombing in February, and there has 
been no spike in inter-communal friction.  However, some in 
the Sunni community worry about Shia political empowerment in 
the run-up to parliamentary and municipal council elections 
later this year. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
DOMESTIC POLITICS HEATS UP 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
8.  (U) The government has yet to set a date for the 
elections (anticipated this fall), and some rumored 
amendments to the election law may be designed to inhibit 
Shia participation in the elections.  Leading Shia opposition 
society Al Wifaq held a press conference May 3 to announce 
formally that it will field candidates in the parliamentary 
elections, and opposition society Al Wa'ad has also announced 
its intention to participate.  Both societies boycotted the 
2002 parliamentary elections. 
 
9.  (C) During the month of March, there were repeated 
clashes between small groups of Shia men and security forces. 
 The incidents typically began with young masked men burning 
tires or trash dumpsters on the edge of a village, and 
throwing Molotov cocktails at police vehicles when security 
forces responded.  Police routinely employed tear gas to 
disperse protesters.  Villagers caught in the middle demanded 
that the youth stop provoking the police, as small children, 
the sick and elderly were harmed by the gas.  Following 
public statements by Shia leaders calling on the instigators 
to stop, the incidents subsided.  The clashes were likely 
organized by the breakaway hard-line Shia Haq Movement, which 
is in competition with Al Wifaq for the support of the Shia 
community.  In this case, it appears that Haq overreached and 
provoked a backlash that could damage its longer term support. 
 
10.  (C) In a recent development, an explosive device that 
newspapers referred to as a "stun grenade" or "sound bomb" 
exploded the evening of April 26 in the upscale commercial 
district of Adliya.  There was no damage or injuries, but 
word of the incident hit the international news, including 
CNN.  A police patrol vehicle carrying two officers was hit 
by Molotov cocktails on April 29, and seven other vehicles 
were burned the same night.  The Embassy is in close contact 
with the Ministry of Interior about these incidents.  The 
confrontations appear to be a further extension of Shia 
extremists' activities against the government.  There is no 
indication that American or Western interests are being 
targeted. 
 
--------------- 
U.S. NAVY 
 
MANAMA 00000873  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
--------------- 
 
11.  (U) The U.S. Navy has worked closely with Bahrain for 
more than fifty years.  Bahrain is the only country in the 
region that hosts a permanent component command headquarters, 
specifically, headquarters facilities for the Commander of 
Naval Forces, U.S. Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT). 
COMUSNAVCENT directs naval operations in the Arabian Gulf, 
Arabian Sea, and Gulf of Aden in support of Operations 
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, CJTF Horn of Africa, as 
well as Maritime Interception Operations to enable freedom of 
navigation and to prevent oil smuggling, piracy and various 
other operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism. 
Bahrain's relatively stable and secure political environment 
allows deployed U.S. Navy ships to stop, replenish supplies, 
and provide crews much needed onshore rest and recreation 
opportunities. In 2004, 421 U.S. Navy ships called at Manama 
while 377 ships called in 2005. Additionally, U.S. military 
and military-contracted air traffic at Bahrain's 
International Airport and other local facilities encompassed 
3521 landings in 2004 and 3415 landings in 2005. 
 
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MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
----------------------------------- 
 
12.  (U) The Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) maintains an 
infrastructure capable of handling U.S. deployments in 
support of our regional policies and forms the first line of 
defense for the headquarters of the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet. 
To continue to be an effective coalition partner, the BDF, 
which deployed its navy in support of Operations Enduring and 
Iraqi Freedom, must be fully compatible with the U.S. 
military.  Maintaining this capability has become 
increasingly expensive, stressing a BDF budget that is 
already insufficient to purchase the advanced U.S. hardware 
needed to achieve interoperability.  U.S. provided Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF) has been declining over the past few 
years, making it increasingly difficult for the BDF to meet 
its needs.  With the advent of a democratically elected lower 
house of parliament that requires the BDF to operate within a 
budget, funding for purchases under the Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) program have also become scarcer.  FMF and 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) will 
continue to be important for both regional stability and 
force protection goals. FMF and IMET funding for 2006 are 
$15.593 million and $644,000 respectively.  Estimates for 
2007 are $15.750 million for FMF and $640,000 for IMET.  You 
can expect to hear from multiple fronts that if the BDF is to 
remain fully compatible with the U.S. military and other 
coalition  partners, that more FMF is required.  During its 
May 14 meeting, the Hillen delegation floated the possibility 
of the U.S. increasing the amount of military assistance it 
provides to Bahrain. 
 
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GUANTANAMO 
----------------------- 
 
13.  (C) There were initially six Bahraini detainees at 
Guantanamo  Three were returned last fall.  Bahraini press 
coverage of the remaining three has been steady and intense, 
focusing on allegations of mistreatment and hunger strikes. 
Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid has come under parliamentary 
pressure to be a more aggressive advocate for their return, 
and he has told the press and parliament that he raises the 
issue with senior USG officials at every opportunity. 
 
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AIR DEFENSE 
-------------------- 
 
14.  (C)  In his recent visit to Bahrain, General Abizaid 
proposed building up the defenses of our allies in the Gulf, 
looking specifically at a shared early warning system and 
improving air defense capabilities.  The Crown Prince 
expressed  interest in leasing Patriot PAC-3 batteries, and 
noted the coming TPS-59 air defense radar system would 
improve Bahrain's integration with allies.  The topic of 
Patriots for Bahrain has been broached on several occasions 
and will most certainly come up during the MCC or during one 
of your meetings.  We have asked that representatives of the 
U.S. delegation be prepared to provide the Bahrainis facts, 
figures, and possibilities for obtaining Patriots.  The Crown 
Prince and the Minister of Defense have requested making an 
exception for Bahrain's Stinger missiles. 
 
 
MANAMA 00000873  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
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PROPOSAL FOR BAHRAIN TO HOST REGIONAL CT CENTER 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
15.  (C)  Bahrain was pleased that GCC leaders at their 
recent summit in Riyadh designated Bahrain as the home of a 
proposed regional counter-terrorism center.  Bahrain will 
present a proposal for the center at a meeting of GCC 
Ministers of Interior later this month, with the goal of 
presenting solid recommendations at the GCC Summit in 
December.  Bahrain would look to the United States for 
support on the technical side to improve the sophistication 
of the local intelligence system, and will undoubtedly seek 
financial support from its GCC partners.   We have invited a 
representative from the Ministry of the Interior to attend 
the MCC, and expressed an interest in receiving a 
presentation from the MOI on their plans for developing and 
implementing this Regional CT Center. 
MONROE