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Viewing cable 06LUANDA464, ANGOLA: A REALITY CHECK ON THE CHINESE CREDIT LINE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06LUANDA464 2006-05-03 11:53 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Luanda
VZCZCXRO2244
OO RUEHMR
DE RUEHLU #0464/01 1231153
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031153Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY LUANDA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2810
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0085
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LUANDA 000464 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016 
TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV EPET ETRD PREL CH AO
SUBJECT: ANGOLA: A REALITY CHECK ON THE CHINESE CREDIT LINE 
 
REF: A. PARIS 02362 
 
     B. 05 LUANDA 00847 
     C. 05 LUANDA 01341 
     D. LUANDA 00438 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Cynthia G. Efird for reasons 1.4 B and D. 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Since the announcement of a USD 2 billion credit 
line from the PRC to GRA in March 2004, reports of increases 
to the credit line, ranging from USD 1 billion to USD 10 
billion, have proliferated.  Regardless of the promised 
value, actual implementation of the credit line is gradual 
and unspectacular.  By the end of 2005, the first billion 
dollars was obligated but only a fraction of that amount had 
been disbursed.  However, it is important to note that many 
large Chinese projects occur outside the context of the 
credit line.  The PRC also helped arrange USD 3 billion 
oil-backed loan in late 2005, a far more immediate and 
substantial contribution to GRA coffers than the credit line. 
 
2. (SBU) The media has commonly credited the Chinese credit 
line for dampening GRA interest in dealing with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  This is an overstatement; 
the Chinese credit line is only one source of funds among a 
wider influx of credit lines, loans, and oil revenue.  Though 
Angola,s financial position has strengthened dramatically, 
the GRA continues to signal its willingness to work with the 
IMF and is in the process of implementing various 
transparency measures.  These measures may positively impact 
management of the Chinese credit line and other sources of 
government financing as well.  End summary. 
 
SPENDING THE CASCADE OF CHINESE MONEY? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) On March 28, a Reuters article quoted a businessman 
who claimed that China,s EXIM Bank added an additional USD 1 
billion to a USD 2 billion oil-backed credit line agreed in 
March 2004, bringing the total credit line to USD 3 billion. 
Previously, the GRA Minister of Finance openly asserted that 
the government was negotiating to increase the credit line 
with China and the Vice Minister noted that the credit line 
could reach USD 6 billion, an assertion echoed by IMF 
officials in 2005.  In March 2006, Ref A reported that 
Angolan authorities notified the IMF of a new USD 10 billion 
credit line with China,s EXIM Bank.  On April 14, the Vice 
Minister of Finance told Angolan media that China contributed 
58 percent of the USD 5.5 billion Angola has received in 
loans since 2002, or the equivalent of USD 3 billion. 
 
4. (C) Of this litany of promised billions, how much money 
has actually reached Angola to date?  Ref B notes that actual 
implementation of the USD 2 billion credit line has been a 
gradual, drawn-out process, with each project subject to the 
rigorous approval of both the PRC EXIM Bank and the GRA.  In 
April 2005, more than one year after agreeing to the credit 
line, the GRA announced that 18 out of 21 projects to be 
funded by the first USD 1 billion tranche of the USD 2 
billion credit line had been approved, but only 3 had begun 
implementation.  Chinese diplomat in Luanda, Chang Hexi, told 
us in March 2006 that all 21 projects of the first tranche 
are approved and implementation has begun for about 10 
projects.  A major source of delay was the 30 percent local 
Angolan content requirement attached to the credit line, 
which forced Chinese companies to secure local partners.  Now 
that these relationships have been established, Mr. Chang 
believes that the second USD 1 billion tranche of the USD 2 
billion credit line will be disbursed significantly faster 
than the first.  Indeed, by the end of May, the GRA Prime 
Minister informed Parliament members that USD 800 million of 
the second tranche had already been obligated. 
 
5. (SBU) There is ample reason to doubt that the GRA can 
spend the Chinese credit line as quickly as planned.  Of a 
targeted capital expenditure of USD 2.5 billion for 2005, the 
GRA was only able to spend USDS 1.5 billion.  Both the IMF 
and World Bank have questioned whether the GRA can achieve 
its targeted capital expenditure of USD 7.9 billion for 2006, 
more than five times the previous year,s spending. 
 
6. (C) Regarding reports of a third billion-dollar tranche, 
Mr. Chang noted that while the possibility of further 
increases to the credit line exists, no formal agreement has 
yet been concluded.  Negotiations on new credit lines will 
depend on the successful conclusion of at least some projects 
funded by the initial USD 2 billion.  GRA officials, while 
noting the possibility of increases, have never announced a 
third billion-dollar tranche.  The Reuters correspondent who 
reported the credit line increase to USD 3 billion, 
 
LUANDA 00000464  002 OF 003 
 
 
information attributed to a &senior financial source,8 
informed EmbOff that no one else has yet been able to 
corroborate this information. 
 
THERE,S MORE THAN JUST A CREDIT LINE... 
--------------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) It appears that the USD 10 billion dollars reported 
by the IMF refers not to an increase in the Chinese EXIM 
credit line, but rather to the future GRA Public Investment 
Program (PIP) for which China will be the major financier. 
It is uncertain what percentage of the USD 10 billion PIP 
will consist of PRC financing, but it will include projects 
funded by entities other than the PRC EXIM Bank.  Projects 
taking place outside the context of the USD 2 billion credit 
line include the new Luanda international airport (estimated 
USD 400 million), the Luanda and Benguela railroad lines 
(estimated USD 200 to 300 million each), telecommunications 
upgrading (estimated USD 400 million), rehabilitation of all 
domestic airports, and more.  These projects are financed by 
a variety of private and public Chinese entities. 
 
8. (C) The PRC also assisted Angola in the acquisition of its 
largest oil-backed loan.  In late 2005, the GRA and state oil 
company Sonangol worked with the PRC and Chinese oil company 
Sinopec to arrange a USD 2 billion oil-backed loan (Ref C), 
syndicated by France,s Calyon Bank.  According to an 
international banking representative, a consortium of sixteen 
international banks oversubscribed the loan, causing Calyon 
and Sonangol to increase the deal to USD 3 billion.  Part of 
the loan refinances a previous 1.225 billion loan arranged in 
2003, but roughly USD 1.8 billion represents new money.  With 
interest rates at 250 basis points above the London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR) and a 7-year repayment period, the terms 
are significantly better than those for Sonangol,s previous 
oil-backed loan syndicated in 2004, which featured interest 
rates of 312.5 to 337 basis points above LIBOR and a 6-year 
repayment span.  Sinopec subsidiary Unipec plays a critical 
role in the deal as the &offtaker,8 or buyer of oil 
collateral in the loan,s security guarantee. 
 
9. (SBU) While Sonangol and Angola,s rising reputation as 
reliable borrowers helped fuel international lenders, 
interest, leading to loan oversubscription and improved 
terms, China,s involvement through Unipec was instrumental 
in shaping a favorable deal.  Previous oil-backed loans with 
Sonangol had been guaranteed by special purpose vehicles 
(SPVs), juridically independent entities established to 
channel Sonangol,s oil revenues to the lenders.  The 
Calyon-syndicated loan offers a simpler structure by 
replacing the SPV with Unipec.  Unipec, as holder of the 
major offtake contract, will purchase 40,000 barrels of oil 
per day from Sonangol until September 2008 to collateralize 
the loan.  (Note: 40,000 barrels at current production rates 
represents less than 3 percent of daily production.  End 
note.)  Offtake contracts with other oil buyers are also in 
place to cover the period following 2008.  Even at USD 23 per 
barrel, oil revenues would be sufficient to pay off the loan 
within the 7-year repayment period.  International financiers 
have credited this structure, underpinned by Unipec as the 
main oil purchaser, for enhancing the attractiveness and 
pricing of the deal. 
 
10. (SBU) The USD 3 billion Calyon-syndicated loan is a far 
more significant Chinese contribution to Angolan coffers than 
the credit line, even though it has received less media 
attention.  The Chinese credit line is disbursed slowly, 
project by project, and the money is paid directly from the 
PRC EXIM Bank to Chinese companies without passing through 
GRA hands.  The USD 3 billion Calyon oil-backed loan, on the 
other hand, is immediate &money in the bank8 for the GRA 
and could not have been so successful without the PRC,s 
intervention. 
 
...AND THERE,S MORE THAN JUST CHINA 
----------------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) Ref D lists many credit lines that the GRA has 
negotiated with other nations since 2004, including USD 580 
million from Brazil, 400 million euros from Portugal, and 100 
million euros from Germany.  Besides these officially-backed 
credit lines, five private Spanish banks have arranged credit 
lines that range from 100 million euros to USD 400 million, 
totaling as much as USD 1 billion.  Of this amount, 
approximately USD 300 million has already been obligated to 
specific projects whereas the remainder may be obligated by 
the end of 2006.  Just as rumors persist about increases to 
the Chinese credit line, banking sources assert that the GRA 
will receive even more private and government-backed credit 
lines from countries other than China. 
 
A THREAT TO TRANSPARENCY?  SURPRISINGLY NOT 
 
LUANDA 00000464  003 OF 003 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
12. (SBU) Conventional media commentary contends that the 
availability of the USD 2 billion Chinese credit line has 
dampened Angola,s will to implement transparency and good 
governance reforms exhorted by the IMF.  The IMF has 
repeatedly discouraged the GRA from taking out oil-backed 
loans, citing their high cost and negative contribution to 
Angola,s external debt.  The GRA argues that such loans are 
necessary to fund reconstruction work in the absence of other 
sources of financing.  However, the GRA also responded 
positively to an IMF invitation to explain the terms and 
structure of its loans and will send a mission to the IMF in 
the near future. 
 
13. (SBU) The GRA has taken steps to improve good governance 
that directly affects management of the credit lines.  In 
early 2006, the Ministry of Finance issued and enforces a 
decree that established strict credit line release procedures 
for all projects over USD 10 million.  In March 2006, the GRA 
announced that it is preparing a new law of public 
acquisition that will require public bidding for all 
government procurement contracts.  Given the large purchases 
to be made via credit lines, improvement in this area will be 
essential to controlling corruption. 
 
COMMENT: CONTEXTUALIZING CHINA,S INFLUENCE 
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14. (C) GRA officials have made it clear that while they 
welcome a strong working relationship with the IMF, they do 
not need the IMF to carry out domestic economic policy. 
China,s bilateral credit line to Angola without doubt has 
increased Angola,s range of options and bargaining power 
vis-a-vis international organizations such as the IMF. 
However, China is only one contributor of many to Angola,s 
burgeoning coffers, the source of the government,s 
confidence and financial self-sufficiency.  For example, 
Chevron alone delivers more in taxes, royalties, and oil 
production shares to the GRA than China could realistically 
disperse to the GRA through its credit line in any given 
year.  Spanish private banks are offering credit lines that, 
when added together, may exceed USD 1 billion.  The 
Calyon-syndicated oil-backed loan, in which international 
banks and Sinopec played key roles, contributes more to the 
Angolan treasury than any credit line. 
 
15. (C) Comment continued: The major difference is that the 
Chinese credit line, unlike the fragmented and varied 
financial arrangements made by individual private sector 
actors, comes in one consolidated pipeline from a state 
clearly pursuing energy security interests.  This financing 
is thus more high-profile and more overtly political, even 
though the underlying motives for the Chinese credit )- 
demand for Angolan oil and commercial interest in Angola,s 
reconstruction boom )- are the same as those of private 
actors. 
 
16. (SBU) Comment continued: Given the varied sources of 
external financing that the GRA receives, the Chinese credit 
line is only one piece of a far larger puzzle with regard to 
transparency.  The effort to ensure that the Chinese credit 
does not contribute to corruption cannot be divorced from 
larger efforts to improve transparency in oil revenues, 
government procurement processes, credit line disbursement, 
and loan structures.  End comment. 
EFIRD