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Viewing cable 06KUWAIT1637, UNDERSTANDING THE KUWAITI MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KUWAIT1637 2006-05-09 10:49 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Kuwait
VZCZCXRO8181
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHMOS RUEHPW
DE RUEHKU #1637/01 1291049
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 091049Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4355
INFO RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 001637 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NSC FOR RAMCHAND, LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS 
FOR ZEYA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2026 
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM KISL KU ISLAMISTS
SUBJECT: UNDERSTANDING THE KUWAITI MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S 
POLITICAL WING: THE ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT, PART I 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 1057 - MFA UNDERSECRETARY DESCRIBES VISIT 
        OF HAMAS LEADER 
     B. KUWAIT 995 - FREEDOM AGENDA: ISLAMISTS SHARE 
        VIEWS ON ELECTORAL REFORM IRAQ AND IRAN 
     C. KUWAIT 661 - KUWAIT SHI'A AND SUNNI CONDEMN IRAQ 
        SHRINE BOMBING SOME BLAME U.S. 
     D. KUWAIT 467 - AMIR APPROVES NEW CABINET: SHI'A 
        AND ICM GAIN 
     E. 05 KUWAIT 4313 - FREEDOM AGENDA: MUSLIM 
        BROTHERHOOD SPOKESMAN SAYS ORGANIZATION 
        COMMITTED TO WORKING WITHIN POLITICAL 
        SYSTEM 
     F. 05 KUWAIT 3266 - READING WRITING AND QUR'ANIC 
        RECITATION: THE ISLAMIST INFLUENCE IN 
        KUWAIT'S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM PART II 
     G. 05 KUWAIT 656 - ISLAMISTS IN KUWAIT: CONTOURS OF 
        A GROWING INFLUENTIAL FORCE 
     H. 04 KUWAIT 1274 - NEW ICM LEADERS STRIVE FOR 
        MAINSTREAM 
     I. 04 KUWAIT 495 - KUWAIT FINANCE HOUSE OPENS UP TO 
        OFAC 
     J. 03 KUWAIT 3536 - POLITICAL ISLAM WORKING GROUP: 
        KUWAIT SNAPSHOT 
     K. 03 KUWAIT 3217 - DEFEATED ISLAMIST OFFERS VIEWS 
        ON KUWAITI POLITICS 
     L. 91 KUWAIT 2068 - KUWAIT'S PRO-DEMOCRACY GROUPS: 
        SKETCH OF THE ICM 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
(C) This is Part I of a two-part cable.  Part I deals with 
the origins of the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM), its 
political influence and popular support, its structure and 
leadership, and the relationship between the ICM and the 
Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood (KMB).  Part II addresses the 
ICM's policies and publications, and the potential for 
limited USG engagement with the organization to promote 
political reform in Kuwait. 
 
1.  (C) Introduction and Summary: The Islamic Constitutional 
Movement (Al-Haraka Al-Dusturi Al-Islamiyya), the political 
arm of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, is one of, if not the, 
largest and most influential political associations in 
Kuwait.  (Note: The Government does not officially recognize 
political parties.  End note.)  As the country begins to 
slowly implement political reforms, the ICM will play an 
increasingly important role in Kuwait's political life.  This 
cable, based on numerous conversations with ICM leaders and 
members, and Kuwaiti political analysts, examines the ICM's 
origin, organizational structure, affiliation with the Muslim 
Brotherhood, policies, and, ultimately, potential as a 
pro-reform partner. 
 
2.  (C) After a crushing electoral defeat in 2003, the ICM 
reorganized, emerging with a new, younger leadership and a 
reformist agenda (ref H).  Since then, ICM leaders claim the 
organization's popularity and political influence has 
increased.  Highlighting this growing influence, one of the 
ICM's top leaders, Dr. Ismail Al-Shatti, was appointed 
Minister of Communications in the recently-formed Cabinet 
(ref D).  Today, the ICM is one of the most vocal advocates 
of political reform in Kuwait.  However, with respect to USG 
interests, our concerns center on the organization's support 
for very conservative social policies, such as the 
implementation of Islamic Shari'a; its criticisms of U.S. 
policy towards Israel; and its connection to the Muslim 
Brotherhood. 
 
3.  (S/NF) While these concerns should not be overlooked, 
neither should they be overblown.  It is important to 
recognize that the ICM's commitment to democracy appears 
genuine: the ICM, and previously the KMB, has participated in 
Kuwaiti politics peacefully for decades.  Many of the ICM's 
social policies are more representative of the organization's 
conservative tribal base than they are of MB ideology.  The 
notable exception is Islamic Shari'a which remains a 
contentious issue, but not one that should obstruct 
constructive U.S. engagement with the ICM.  In tandem with 
our support for Kuwaiti liberals, occasionally nominating 
moderate ICM members for IVP and MEPI-funded programs 
focusing on political reform would expose them to the USG's 
vision for democratic reform in Kuwait and the region, help 
us better understand the organization and social objectives 
of the ICM and KMB, and hopefully further marginalize the 
ICM's more conservative "old guard."  The alternative is to 
promote political reform here without engaging the political 
associations that may benefit most if these reforms are 
implemented.  Liberal and Shi'a political associations are 
 
KUWAIT 00001637  002 OF 004 
 
 
not as organized and popular as the Islamists, and the 
increasingly influential (Islamist) Salafi associations are 
more reactionary and less compromising than the ICM.  End 
summary and introduction. 
 
Origins of the ICM 
------------------ 
 
4.  (C) The ICM was established as an independent, uniquely 
Kuwaiti political movement on March 30, 1991 by members of 
the KMB disillusioned by the international Muslim 
Brotherhood's (IMB) tacit support for Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait in August 1990 (refs H and L).  (Note: The Muslim 
Brotherhood (Jamiyyat Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen), founded in 
Egypt in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna, has branches in roughly 70 
countries.  End note.)  The ICM grew out of the Social Reform 
Society (SRS), a KMB-affiliated Islamic charity that still 
exists.  The SRS was created in 1961 as a reconstituted 
version of the Islamic Guidance Society (IGS), the original 
MB organization in Kuwait.  The IGS was established in the 
early 1950s by Abdul Aziz Al-Ali Al-Mutawa, the brother of 
the current SRS chairman and KMB spiritual mentor, Abdullah 
Al-Ali Al-Mutawa, but lost influence in the staunchly Arab 
nationalist Kuwait after the IMB supported an attack on 
Egyptian President Gamel Abdul Nasser in 1956.  It was 
finally closed in 1959. 
 
5.  (C) Initially, the SRS focused primarily on promoting its 
conservative social agenda.  The organization lobbied 
successfully for the segregation of male and female students 
at Kuwait University and the prohibition of alcohol in 
Kuwait.  Recruiting heavily among students, the SRS came to 
dominate the influential National Union of Kuwait Students 
(NUKS) and Kuwait University's Student Union, organizations 
the KMB continues to dominate.  Gradually, the SRS's 
political influence also grew, particularly in the mid-1970s 
when the Government increased support for Islamist groups to 
balance the influence of Arab nationalists.  Members of the 
SRS were included in the new Cabinet created after the Amir 
dissolved Parliament in 1976, and concessions were made to 
allow the organization more influence in zakat (religious 
tax) collection and Islamic banking, specifically in Kuwait's 
first Islamic bank, the Kuwait Finance House (KFH), 
established in 1977.  This rising influence led to the 
election of two SRS members in the 1981 parliamentary 
elections.  In successive Parliaments, the organization 
expanded its political influence, though it increasingly had 
to compete with Salafi groups for support among Islamists and 
Kuwait's conservative tribes. 
 
6.  (C) The KMB reputedly split with the IMB after the Iraqi 
invasion, resulting in part in the establishment of the ICM. 
The ICM became the "political wing" of the KMB, and the SRS 
its "social wing."  Through much of the 1990s, the ICM 
enjoyed strong political support and was represented in every 
Parliament.  In the 2003 elections, however, the group 
suffered a crushing defeat, losing three of its five 
parliamentary seats.  Prompted by its poor performance, the 
ICM dramatically altered its organizational structure, 
elected new, younger leaders, and adopted a "reform" agenda 
(ref H). 
 
Influential, But How Popular? 
----------------------------- 
 
7.  (S) The ICM wields considerable political influence, as 
evidenced by the appointment of Dr. Ismail Al-Shatti, the 
head of the ICM's Ideological and Civilization Dialogue (i.e. 
Foreign Relations) Office, as Minister of Communications in 
the new Cabinet formed in February (ref D).  It is more 
difficult, however, to determine the organization's popular 
support.  Since the Government does not recognize political 
parties, there is no official party registration and ICM 
leaders refuse to "guess" the number of ICM members.  Some 
observers claim the ICM "dominates" the country, having 
substantial support in government ministries, academia, and 
the financial sector.  These estimates are likely overblown. 
 
8.  (C) Of the 13 ICM-supported candidates who ran in the 
2003 parliamentary elections, including five incumbents, only 
Dr. Nasser Al-Sane and Mohammed Al-Basiri were re-elected, 
receiving 920 and 2,108 votes, respectively.  This poor 
performance suggests the group's popular support is not as 
substantial as some claim.  ICM officials argue, however, 
that elections are not indicative of the organization's true 
support due to Government manipulation of electoral outcomes. 
 One credible liberal Kuwaiti political analyst estimated the 
number of ICM members to be "several hundred, but less than 
 
KUWAIT 00001637  003 OF 004 
 
 
500," plus a much larger, and unspecified, number of 
"supporters."  One influential younger Al-Sabah recently told 
the Ambassador he believed the ICM had 27,000 members, though 
it was not clear if he made any distinction between the ICM 
and the KMB.  The organization has 100 members who hold 
official positions, a likely indication that its base is 
substantially larger.  The ICM is not known to be represented 
on the 16-member (six appointed and ten elected) Municipal 
Council. 
 
The ICM's Organizational Structure and Leadership 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
9.  (C) After its electoral defeat in 2003, the ICM 
drastically restructured, creating a 70-member General 
Assembly in addition to its 21-member General Secretariat and 
nine-member Executive Secretariat (also called the Political 
Office).  General Assembly members, including fifteen women, 
elect members of the General Secretariat, which in turn 
choose members of the Executive Secretariat.  The General 
Secretariat, which includes three women, meets monthly and 
 
SIPDIS 
the Executive Secretariat weekly.  According to ICM 
officials, this re-organization was intended in part to 
prepare the organization to become an official political 
party, once permitted by the Government. 
 
10.  (C) The ICM also overhauled its leadership, replacing 
its older, more conservative leaders with younger, more 
"moderate" members.  Today, the ICM leadership includes 
Secretary General Dr. Bader Al-Nashi (46), Official Spokesman 
 
SIPDIS 
Mohammed Al-Elaim (46), and Assistant Secretary General MP 
Dr. Nasser Al-Sane (51), who also serves as President of the 
Arab Organization of Parliamentarians against Corruption and 
Vice President of International Parliamentarians against 
Corruption, a Canada-based NGO. 
 
11.  (C) In addition, the ICM has seven offices that assist 
the Executive Secretariat: the Political Relations Office 
headed by Mohammed Al-Dallal (41); the Ideological and 
Civilizational Dialogue Office headed by Dr. Ismail Al-Shatti 
(56) (Note: Al-Shatti told Poloff this is the "Foreign 
Relations Office," but the ICM cannot adopt that name without 
provoking the Government.  End note.); the Parliamentary 
Affairs Office headed by MP Mohammed Al-Basiri (51); the 
Women's Affairs Office headed by a woman, Suad Al-Jarallah; 
the Developmental Programs Office headed by MP Dr. Nasser 
Al-Sane; the Electoral Constituencies Office headed by Nasser 
Al-Khaldi; and the Public Relations and Media Office headed 
by Musaed Al-Thafiri. 
 
12.  (C) Key policy positions, like the decision to oppose 
women's suffrage, are determined by a General Assembly vote 
and then referred to the General and Executive Secretariats 
for approval.  More routine decisions are made by the 
Secretariats.  ICM leaders claim all decisions are made 
 
SIPDIS 
internally by the ICM, not the IMB.  On more controversial 
issues, the ICM engages both Kuwaiti and regional experts to 
prepare studies and provide advice to better inform members 
before a general vote. 
 
13.  (C) In Parliament, the ICM operates primarily through 
the 13-member Islamic Bloc, a loose alliance of Islamist MPs 
that cooperates on certain legislation.  MP Al-Sane said the 
ICM also coordinated with other parliamentary blocs when they 
supported ICM policies.  In a recent interview, Al-Nashi said 
the ICM would support only nine candidates in the 2007 
parliamentary elections to consolidate its electoral support. 
 
 
14.  (S) ICM leaders and liberal political analysts alike 
note that there is a conflict within the ICM between the more 
conservative "old guard" who led the organization up to 2003 
and the new leadership, which while still socially 
conservative is far more pragmatic and "moderate" (on the 
Islamist scale).  Asked who was winning the internal debate, 
one young, "moderate" ICM member said, "We are," but 
acknowledged there was still opposition within the ICM's 
conservative base to certain reforms.  ICM members who 
regularly criticize the U.S. and advocate the most 
conservative social policies come largely from this weakened, 
but still influential "old guard." 
 
Relationship between ICM and KMB 
-------------------------------- 
 
15.  (S/NF) According to ICM Political Relations Director 
Mohammed Al-Dallal (strictly protect), the ICM and the KMB 
are "the same thing": ICM members are all Muslim Brothers, 
 
KUWAIT 00001637  004 OF 004 
 
 
but not necessarily vice-versa.  Al-Dallal explained that 
neighborhood KMB committees voted for members of the ICM's 
General Assembly.  When pressed, Al-Dallal admitted the KMB 
kept a precise database of its members by neighborhood, but 
refused to give a number or say how many were also members of 
the ICM; he casually mentioned 200 and 500 as examples of the 
number of KMB members per neighborhood, but did not say 
whether these were actual figures nor did he give the total 
number of neighborhood committees.  Although they have 
separate leadership structures, the KMB exerts some 
(undetermined) degree of authority over the ICM. 
 
16.  (S/NF) Al-Dallal told Poloff that the KMB is a "secret 
organization" and, except for its leading personalities, its 
members are kept secret.  Candidates for membership must be 
"referred" by someone who is already a member: generally, a 
relative, friend, or teacher.  Al-Dallal explained that the 
referral process includes writing a report on the candidate's 
loyalty, character, and trustworthiness, which is reviewed by 
KMB leaders before acceptance and initiation.  Al-Dallal 
joined the KMB when he was 17-years-old after being recruited 
in a student group and spending "more than a year visiting 
their mosques and diwaniyas."  He later became involved in 
the ICM through Kuwait University's Student Union (KUSU); 
Al-Dallal was twice elected KUSU President. 
 
17.  (S/NF) Support for the ICM comes mainly from students 
and "conservatives," here incorporating both socially 
conservative tribal elements and religiously conservative 
Muslims (i.e. Islamists).  ICM members are drawn from the 
KMB, which recruits young people through student unions and 
SRS-sponsored spring and summer camps, featuring "boy scout 
like-activities" and Islamic-themed lectures.  The KMB is 
also rumored to have close connections to Kuwait's Islamic 
financial community, specifically the Kuwait Finance House 
(KFH), whose advisory board, according to one report (ref I), 
includes several former SRS officials. 
 
18.  (S/NF) The exact organizational relationship between the 
KMB and the IMB is unclear.  According to ICM leaders, the 
KMB's relationship with the IMB has been "frozen" since 1990. 
 They explain that the KMB is "a separate entity," which 
shares a common ideology, "cooperates informally" with other 
branches of the IMB on charitable activities, and 
participates in some IMB-organized conferences and seminars, 
but is not subordinate to the IMB's leadership.  As proof of 
their independence, ICM leaders note that the ICM voted to 
oppose women's suffrage legislation despite being strongly 
encouraged by other IMB branches, notably in Jordan and 
Egypt, to support the legislation.  Nonetheless, Al-Dallal 
claimed the IMB was "the most active organization in the 
Gulf," especially the Kuwaiti branch due to the degree of 
freedom permitted in Kuwait. 
 
End of Part I. 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
LEBARON