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Viewing cable 06DILI229, RAMOS-HORTA: WOULD ACCEPT PRIME MINISTER POSITION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06DILI229 2006-05-12 15:12 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Dili
VZCZCXRO2918
PP RUEHCHI RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0229/01 1321512
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 121512Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2524
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0405
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0467
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0394
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0248
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0262
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0333
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0134
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 1845
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000229 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
PACOM FOR JOC, POLAD, J5 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/12/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC MARR TT
SUBJECT: RAMOS-HORTA: WOULD ACCEPT PRIME MINISTER POSITION 
 
REF: (A) DILI 189; (B) DILI 203; (C) DILI 213; (D) DILI 219; (E) DILI 220; (F) 
DILI 226; (G) STATE 75819 
 
DILI 00000229  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Grover Joseph Rees, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy 
Dili, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Grover Joseph Rees for reasons 1(b) & 
(d). 
 
1. (S) Summary:  In a conversation with Ambassador Rees, Foreign 
Minister Jose Ramos-Horta said he believes Prime Minister Mari 
Alkatiri will probably be defeated in next week's Fretilin Party 
Congress.  He believes Alkatiri has brought the defeat upon 
himself by his arrogant and sometimes abusive behavior, and he 
expects that the likely new Fretilin Secretary General, Jose 
Luis Guterres, would ask Ramos Horta himself to replace Alkatiri 
as Prime Minister.  Ramos-Horta said he would accept the Prime 
Minister position in order to lead a transitional government 
through the 2007 elections.  The transitional government would 
not include Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato or deputy armed 
forces commander Colonel Lere, and it might include members of 
opposition parties as well as of Fretilin.  Ramos-Horta does not 
believe there will be violence or civil disorder in the days 
leading up to the Fretilin convention, and he is confident that 
if Alkatiri were defeated neither he nor his supporters would 
attempt to retain power by force.  Ramos-Horta also says he 
would reluctantly agree to lead a new Government in what he 
regards as the unlikely event of a constitutional/security 
crisis requiring the President to dismiss the Prime Minister. 
He predicts that in the aftermath of any such crisis, the 
President would have the support of the country's two Catholic 
Bishops and that these three public figures, together with 
Ramos-Horta himself, would be able to unify the country. 
Despite clearly having given serious thought to all these 
scenarios, Ramos-Horta told Ambassador he will spend most of his 
time in the next week trying to calm the population and to get 
leaders of various factions to talk to one another.  Ambassador 
also delivered the demarche in Ref G and Ramos-Horta agreed with 
the points set forth therein.  End summary. 
 
2. (U) In a May 11 evening meeting with Ambassador, Ramos-Horta 
began with what sounded like the Alkatiri Government's party 
line:  he has been traveling around the districts trying to 
listen to people's fears and to calm them; although the people 
are still afraid of recurring violence, there are in fact no 
armed groups preparing to attack Dili; he believes the Fretilin 
Congress will be held on schedule May 17-19; and, all things 
considered, the institutions of government are functioning 
reasonably well.  He added that he is still unconvinced that 
there was a massacre in Dili and/or Tasitolu on April 28-30, but 
he believes the current Government of East Timor (GOET) 
investigation might not be regarded as credible and should be 
supplemented by a separate international investigation, 
preferably under United Nations auspices. 
 
3. (S) When  asked to predict the outcome of the Fretilin 
Congress, Ramos-Horta said "Alkatiri thinks he will win because 
he and his people chose the delegates.  But he is overconfident. 
 It's a secret ballot, and he has alienated too many people with 
his arrogant and abusive behavior."  Ramos-Horta cited a recent 
public statement by Alkatiri that the many thousands of people 
fleeing Dili were going for a "picnic".  He said the Prime 
Minister was "lucky there was so much going on that nobody 
focused on that remark.  Can you imagine?"  He also said 
Alkatiri has become inextricably associated with the extremely 
unpopular recent actions of elements of the armed forces (FDTL), 
and that even Fretilin party regulars who do not dislike him 
will vote against him because they believe Alkatiri's leadership 
could result in a Fretilin loss in the 2007 election.  Asked 
about reports that key Alkatiri supporters were buying delegate 
votes, the Foreign Minister responded, "Yes, there is that. But 
I reminded Alkatiri that this is exactly what the Indonesian 
military thought, that they would win by money and pressure. 
 
DILI 00000229  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
When it came to the secret ballot, our people knew how to vote 
the way they wanted."  (Note:  Fretilin party rules require a 
secret ballot at the Congress for the election of the Secretary 
 
SIPDIS 
General.)    Ramos-Horta said he regarded Alkatiri as an old and 
close friend and that "I really care about him.  I wish things 
had turned out better for him. But he has done this to himself." 
 
 
4. (S) Discussing Ambassador Jose Luis Guterres, Alkatiri's only 
announced opponent in the Secretary General election, 
Ramos-Horta said "Jose Luis is exactly the kind of person the 
country needs.  He's smart and he's an idealist.  He really 
believes in democracy.  Everybody likes him.  He would get along 
with opposition parties and with the Church, and his goal would 
be to unify the country."  He said, however, that Ambassador 
Guterres has had little or no administrative experience, which 
is why he believes Guterres would prefer someone else to become 
Prime Minister while he concentrates on the 2007 campaign.  He 
alluded to the possibility that Guterres could become President 
of Parliament, or perhaps run for President in 2007.  Asked 
about the argument that some of Guterres' supporters were almost 
as unsavory as some of Alkatiri's supporters, Ramos-Horta 
responded to the effect that opportunists are beginning to 
support Guterres because they sense he is going to win. 
 
5. (S) Asked whether Alkatiri or anyone close to him would 
attempt to retain power by force in the event they lost control 
of Fretilin and the party then moved to form a new Government, 
Ramos-Horta said he was confident this would not happen. 
Alkatiri would know when he was defeated --- and has repeatedly 
announced that he will immediately resign as Prime Minister if 
he should be defeated for re-election as Secretary General. 
Others, such as Colonel Lere and Minister Lobato, have no 
particular affection for Alkatiri and would attempt to survive 
within the new order. 
 
6. (S) Ambassador asked Ramos-Horta whether, if Ambassador 
Guterres won the Fretilin contest and asked Ramos-Horta to 
become Prime Minister, he would accept.   Ramos-Horta responded 
immediately, "Yes, I would.  I would lead a transitional 
government lasting until the election.  People might think this 
means I am an ambitious person, but in fact this is much more 
important than any chance I might have to become Secretary 
General of the United Nations.  I would have the obligation to 
try to unify my country."  Ramos-Horta said he would strongly 
consider including talented members of opposition parties in his 
new government.  He also insisted that any government of which 
he (Ramos-Horta) was a part would have no place for Lobato.  "He 
should have been fired years ago."  He suggested that Colonel 
Lere --- assuming the investigations of the April 28-30 events 
do not implicate him in criminal behavior --- should be helped 
to find a life in the private sector. 
 
7. (S)  (Please strictly protect the information in this 
paragraph.) Finally, Ambassador asked Ramos-Horta what he would 
do if he were offered the Prime Ministership under more 
difficult circumstances.  Suppose there were a recurrence of 
violence and disorder, perhaps with the involvement of elements 
of the police and military, and the President invoked his 
constitutional authority to dismiss the Prime Minister "when 
necessary to ensure the functioning of the democratic 
institutions".  (See Ref F).  This time Ramos-Horta paused for a 
moment, then responded, "I would have to accept."  He reiterated 
that he thought this scenario extremely unlikely, but he 
indicated that he believed the President would only invoke this 
constitutional provision if things had really fallen apart.  In 
this case, he presumed the President's action would also have 
the support of East Timor's two Catholic bishops, who 
Ramos-Horta believes represent the most important source of 
moral authority in the country. "It would be my responsibility 
to stand with the President and the Bishops and to work with 
them to unite the country." 
 
8. (U) Ambassador also delivered the demarche set forth in Ref 
 
DILI 00000229  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
G.  Foreign Minister Ramos-Horta responded that the points in 
the demarche closely reflected his own thinking and that he was 
confident the Prime Minister and the President would also abide 
by these principles. 
 
9. (S) Today, May 12, Ambassador called Ramos-Horta for an 
update on various matters, and Ramos-Horta volunteered that "I 
had a good meeting with the President about the matters you and 
I discussed last night," presumably a reference to the 
possibility of a Ramos-Horta Prime Ministership in the event of 
Jose Luis Guterres were to prevail at the Fretilin Congress.  He 
added that "we talked about these things for a long time" and 
that "the President has also had good discussions with Jose Luis 
about this." 
 
10. (S) In the May 11 meeting and the May 12 telephone 
conversation, Ramos-Horta also discussed his visit earlier in 
the day on May 11 with Major Alfredo Reinado, the leader of 
dissident FDTL and police officers who are encamped in Aileu. 
See Ref D.  Ramos-Horta said that tomorrow (May 13) he will 
drive to Aileu to pick up Major Reinado and drive him to 
President Gusmao's house in Balibar (in the mountains above Dili 
on the road to Aileu) where the three will have a conversation 
about the circumstances under which Reinado's group might agree 
to return to Dili.  Ramos-Horta will accompany Reinado back and 
forth to Aileu as a guarantee of safe conduct. 
 
11. (S) Comment:  Although Ramos-Horta has always privately 
acknowledged that Prime Minister Alkatiri has weaknesses as well 
as strengths, his negative assessement in yesterday's 
conversation was stronger by orders of magnitude than any 
previous criticism he has offered.  Like President Gusmao, 
Ramos-Horta appears to be pursuing a two-part strategy:  do 
everything possible to avoid violence or unrest before and 
during the Fretilin Congress, and prepare for a smooth 
constitutional transition to a new Government if, as they 
expect, the Congress replaces Alkatiri with the more popular and 
conciliatory Guterres.  This is a best-case scenario, not only 
because it would likely result in a speedy return to normal life 
in East Timor, but also because a government led by President 
Gusmao, Foreign Minister Ramos-Horta, and Ambassador Guterres 
would be far more committed than the Alkatiri government to 
human rights, genuinely participatory democracy, and other 
values and interests the people of East Timor share with the 
people of the United States.  End Comment. 
REES