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Viewing cable 06DILI224, FRETILIN PARTY CONGRESS: RECENT EVENTS SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06DILI224 2006-05-11 15:07 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Dili
VZCZCXRO1540
OO RUEHCHI RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0224/01 1311507
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 111507Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2512
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0395
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0457
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0384
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0238
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0252
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0323
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0124
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 1833
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000224 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/11/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM TT
SUBJECT: FRETILIN PARTY CONGRESS: RECENT EVENTS SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER 
PROGNOSIS 
 
REF: A) DILI 222 B) DILI 167 
 
DILI 00000224  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political Officer, Embassy 
Dili, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b) 
 
1. (C) Summary. In light of the serious unresolved issues and 
current potential for unrest, Fretilin party leaders continue to 
discuss whether the party Congress should go forward as planned 
in Dili on May 17-19.  Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri's public 
popularity, never his strong suit, is at its lowest point ever 
and many in the party now fear he could be a liability in the 
2007 elections.  However, he is a shrewd behind-the-scenes 
campaigner and commands the financial and structural resources 
of the party.  Ambassador Jose Luis Guterres is still seen by 
many as having an excellent chance to defeat Alkatiri in the 
race for Fretilin Secretary-General, but the team he is working 
with has garnered little confidence from some potential 
supporters.  The outcome may depend on a few prominent Fretilin 
leaders who have yet to decide whom to support.  Among these, 
Aniceto Guterres, a former human rights lawyer and now a highly 
respected member of the bilateral East Timor-Indonesia Truth and 
Friendship Commission (TFC), may be most important.  There are 
also concerns about whether the Fretilin Party Congress will be 
conducted democratically.  Alkatiri critics accuse him and a few 
key supporters of buying delegate votes, using high-pressure 
tactics, and inciting fear, and they predict that more strong 
arm tactics are prepared should Alkatiri appear in danger of 
losing his position.  End summary. 
 
Congress to go as planned? 
------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The immediate question regarding the Fretilin Party 
Congress is whether it will be held as planned in Dili from May 
17-19.  Public statements by Alkatiri in the last few days have 
emphasized that the Congress will not be postponed, nor will the 
venue be changed.  See Ref A.  However, Embassy sources report 
that serious discussions about a possible postponement are 
nonetheless underway.  Alkatiri may be attempting to delay the 
Congress but publicly distance himself from such a decision, 
which will formally be taken this weekend during the Fretilin 
Central Committee (CCF) meeting.  Separately, we have also heard 
that discussions continue about possibly relocating the Congress 
to the eastern city of Baucau, despite the Prime Minister's May 
9 announcement that he supports holding the conference in Dili 
as previously planned.  In addition to questions regarding the 
date and location of the Congress, there is concern that 
security concerns could deter some delegates from attending, 
regardless of where and when the Congress is held.  This concern 
will be greater if the Congress is held in Baucau where many 
western delegates might be unwilling to go. 
 
Alkatiri: Strengths and Vulnerabilities 
--------------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) The consensus among political observers is that the 
events of the last two weeks have seriously eroded Alkatiri's 
chances for reelection as Fretilin's Secretary General.  Many 
observers have noted that he appears to be frustrated with his 
current situation and uncharacteristically uncertain regarding 
how to proceed to regain political strength.  However, his 
chances are still calculated at about 50-50, given his continued 
strength within the party, weaknesses on the part of his 
opposition within the party, and the role of Alkatiri and his 
allies in the delegate selection process that took place over 
the last several months. 
 
STRENGTHS 
 
-- Alkatiri has the loyal party machinery and substantial funds 
behind him and may still employ these to strong arm or otherwise 
influence the delegates.  Alkatiri's supporters are said to be 
campaigning hard for him and are reportedly engaged in vote 
buying. 
-- He is a skilled behind-the-scenes campaigner, who has 
consistently shown his ability to garner the support he needs 
despite his lack of popularity with the public. 
-- Many still see Alkatiri as the only candidate able to provide 
the strength and competence to run the Government. However, 
 
DILI 00000224  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
Ambassador Guterres has hinted broadly that if elected Secretary 
General he would not ask the party to select him as Prime 
Minister but would instead endorse Foreign Minister Jose 
Ramos-Horta, who is a popular and experienced leader.  Although 
Ramos-Horta has publicly endorsed Alkatiri for re-election, he 
is personally close to Ambassador Guterres and would be 
virtually certain to accept an offer to serve as transitional 
Prime Minister through the 2007 elections. 
-- Sources say that despite recent internal tensions Alkatiri's 
core supporters, such as Minister for State Administration Ana 
Pessoa, are pulling together as they see solidarity as their 
only ticket to political survival. 
 
VULNERABILITIES 
 
-- The events of the last two weeks have resulted in Prime 
Minister Alkatiri's public popularity dipping to probably the 
lowest point ever.  Public trust in his leadership has been 
almost completely undermined by the widely held perception that 
blame for the current situation ultimately lies with his 
government and that he continues to mishandle the situation. 
-- Many within Fretilin now are concerned that Alkatiri will be 
a significant liability to the party in the 2007 elections. 
Some are convinced that an Alkatiri-led Fretilin will lose, 
others that it will still win but with a much slimmer margin of 
victory. 
-- Many of the delegates to the Party Congress are reported to 
be willing to be critical and independent minded, and therefore 
potentially impervious to Alkatiri strong-arm tactics.  Fretilin 
sources report that some reliable Alkatiri supporters failed in 
their bids to be elected as delegates.  It is also important to 
note that party rules require that the delegates to the Congress 
elect a Secretary General by secret ballot. 
-- Alkatiri's apparent calculation that he could strengthen his 
position by having the F-FDTL by his side has backfired 
seriously.  Rather, his association with recent F-FDTL actions 
has weakened his position. 
-- His attempts to undermine President Xanana Gusmao's power 
have also backfired as he severely underestimated the durability 
of Gusmao's popularity.  Despite some public displays of 
solidarity, Gusmao is known to be unhappy with Alkatiri's 
handling of the situation.  Although he has made several public 
appearances with Alkatiri, he has been mostly silent in recent 
days.  It appears that rather than continuing his previous 
efforts to co-operate with Alkatiri to resolve the current 
crisis, President Gusmao now hopes the Fretilin Congress to 
resolve the crisis by removing Alkatiri.  (Embassy will report 
on the President's views septel.) 
 
Guterres: Strengths and Vulnerabilities 
--------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Although other candidates could still emerge in the 
race for Secretary General, so far the only challenger to 
Alkatiri remains Ambassador Jose Luis Guterres.  Key political 
sources describe his chances of winning as having increased 
dramatically in recent weeks.  More and more opposition factions 
within Fretilin are said to be uniting around him and even some 
staunch Alkatiri supporters are said to be considering a shift 
in alliances.  However, he has spent the overwhelming majority 
of his time during the last four years in New York and did not 
return to Timor to campaign until very recently.  More 
importantly, Ambassador Guterres' support comes from an uneven 
assortment of personal friends, genuine reformers, and Alkatiri 
opponents of various stripes, some of whom do not command the 
same respect as the Ambassador himself. 
 
STRENGTHS 
-- Guterres is widely liked and respected and viewed as having 
the competence and gravitas to lead the country.  Despite his 
long absence from the country for his ambassadorship to the 
United Nations and the United States, he remains well known. 
-- In conversations with Emboffs as in his public statements, 
Guterres has conveyed a strong and consistent message focused on 
national unity, transparency in governance, and the need for 
increased openness to dialogue with the opposition and civil 
society, particularly including the Catholic Church.  Especially 
in the current environment, this message is likely to resonate 
strongly. 
 
DILI 00000224  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
-- An increasing number of the various anti-Alkatiri factions 
are reportedly coalescing around Guterres. 
-- Guterres also may be attracting the interest of some 
previously staunch Alkatiri supporters, although this is hard to 
confirm as most are still weighing their options and are not 
divulging any plans they may have to switch sides. 
 
VULNERABILITIES 
-- Guterres has very little time to develop an effective 
campaign and to build networks in the districts.  Having only 
made his intentions to run known less than two months ago, he 
has spent only a few weeks in Timor during the run-up to the 
Congress. 
-- Some of the people and factions with whom he is linked so far 
do not instill confidence among other potential supporters. 
These primarily include members of the "Group of 20" or 
"renovators", who are generally not taken seriously within the 
party.  Other potential allies who could accelerate his 
momentum, such as Aniceto Guterres (see below), have not yet 
decided whether to support him. 
-- So far Ambassador Guterres has no clear running mate for 
Fretilin Party President, the second-ranking position in the 
party.  Many potential supporters are waiting to see whom he 
selects. In a recent conversation with Emboff he identified 
Egidio de Jesus, the Secretary of State for Region III, as a 
possible candidate for party president.  However, de Jesus is a 
relative unknown and it is hard to see what benefit he would 
bring to Guterres' campaign. 
 
Aniceto Guterres Emerging as Possible Kingmaker 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
5. (C) The allegiances of several key players remain unknown or 
undecided, but could be determinative in the Congress's outcome. 
 Of these, Aniceto Guterres --- formerly East Timor's most 
prominent human rights lawyer and head of the Commission for 
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) and current member of 
the bilateral Truth and Friendship Commission (TFC) --- seems to 
be emerging as the key potential kingmaker.  According to 
Embassy sources both the Alkatiri and Guterres camps are avidly 
courting him.  In addition, he is still being pressured by some 
in the party to run for the Secretary General position. He has 
also been mentioned as a possible candidate for President on a 
ticket with Ambassador Guterres. To date, however, Aniceto 
Guterres has indicated that he is deeply reluctant to run for 
either of these positions and apparently remains undecided 
regarding whom he will support at the upcoming Congress. 
 
6. (C) In a conversation with Emboff on May 10, Aniceto Guterres 
conveyed his opinion that there is no candidate strong enough to 
replace Alkatiri, describing Ambassador Guterres as "strong but 
unpredictable" and lacking sufficient time to mount a proper 
campaign.  However, he continued, an Alkatiri-led Fretilin will, 
in his opinion, lose the 2007 elections.  He appeared to be 
deeply uncertain about how to proceed.  He said he prefers to 
not run for any Fretilin office, but he did not foreclose the 
possibility of joining the Ambassador Guterres ticket as the 
candidate for President of the party if he determines during the 
Congress that there is no other alternative.  On the other hand, 
he also indicated that he might be receptive to continued 
leadership by Alkatiri if accompanied by significant changes to 
the party structure leading to a democratization of 
decision-making. 
 
7. (SBU) Meanwhile, Abel Ximenes, the recently resigned Minister 
for Development, remains another unknown quantity in the race. 
He has recently been rumored to be joining Ambassador Guterres' 
campaign, but so far is keeping his options open and still 
considering a run for Secretary General.  Another individual 
whose allegiance is considered important is Aderito Soares, a 
well-known lawyer and human rights activist.  However, Soares 
reports that he is currently advising both the Alkatiri and 
Guterres camps, despite his assessment that Guterres may be the 
best available option. 
 
8. Comment:  The range of opinion among the Fretilin party 
activists with whom Emboffs discussed the upcoming Congress 
differs markedly from the widespread public belief that Alkatiri 
will lose unless the Congress is postponed.   Recent 
 
DILI 00000224  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
conversations with senior Timorese leaders including President 
Gusmao, Foreign Minister Ramos-Horta, and Bishop Basilio 
Nascimento suggest that these leaders also believe Ambassador 
Guterres is the likely winner.  (These conversations will be 
reported in septels.)  Ultimately, however, the matter will be 
decided not by these leaders or by the public but by about 600 
Fretilin party regulars.  The insiders' consensus appears to be 
that Alkatiri is in serious danger but cannot be counted out. 
End comment. 
REES