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Viewing cable 06BEIRUT1339, MGLE01: AOUN DEFENDS HIS POSITION, CRITICIZES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BEIRUT1339 2006-05-01 12:43 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Beirut
VZCZCXRO9704
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHLB #1339/01 1211243
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011243Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3284
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 001339 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/WERNER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2026 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER LE SY IS IR
SUBJECT: MGLE01:  AOUN DEFENDS HIS POSITION, CRITICIZES 
SINIORA AND MARCH 14 
 
REF: BEIRUT 1338 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (S)  In a 4/29 meeting, the Ambassador shared USG 
concerns about Iran, Syria, and Hizballah with presidential 
aspirant and MP Michel Aoun.  Aoun denied being a tool of any 
of the three.  The USG, in his view, should welcome the 
alliances he has made with Hizballah and pro-Syrian 
politicians.  On the one hand, he has "pacified" Hizballah, 
he said, attributing the lack of any serious Blue Line 
attacks by Hizballah in 2006 to the understanding he 
concluded with Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. 
On the other hand, he has rehabilitated pro-Syrian Lebanese, 
with their allegiance to him preferable to their previous 
links to Damascus.  Fouad Siniora is a failed prime minister 
and a failed politician, Aoun insisted, and his cabinet 
should be brought.  Aoun neither denied nor confirmed the 
rumors that he would back street protests to topple the 
government, but he described the social and economic 
situation in the country as "becoming unbearable."  In his 
view, Siniora's reform plan must be fought, as it would 
worsen, not improve, the situation.  While somewhat gentler 
than usual on Druse leader Walid Jumblatt, Aoun criticized 
the March 14 movement generally and Saad Hariri more 
specifically.  When asked if there was any hope of bridging 
the gap between March 14 and his bloc for the sake of 
Lebanon, Aoun rejected working with "dictators" who "refuse 
to share power."  If March 14 wanted to reach out to him, 
they could invite him to name the Christian cabinet ministers 
in a new government.  (See reftel for Aoun's comments on the 
4/28 session of the National Dialogue.)  End summary. 
 
AMBASSADOR EXPRESSES CONCERNS 
ABOUT AOUN'S FRIENDS AND ALLIES 
------------------------------- 
 
2.  (S)  On 4/29, the Ambassador met one-on-one with Aoun. 
Noting that he had been in Washington the previous week, the 
Ambassador shared with Aoun growing U.S. concerns about three 
overlapping problems in Lebanon:  1)  Growing Iranian 
influence through Hizballah, increased Iranian funding to 
radical Palestinians, and Iranian support for Sunni 
extremists in Lebanon's impoverished north.  2)  The seeming 
resurgence of Syrian interference in Lebanon, manifested most 
clearly in the reemergence into public view, after a year's 
disappearance, of Syria's most notorious Lebanese stooges. 
3)  The refusal of Hizballah to disarm and its continuation 
of a "state within a state" presence that weakens Lebanon. 
 
3.  (S)  The Ambassador noted that he was deeply concerned 
that Aoun seemed to be implicated in all three of these 
issues through his alliance with Hizballah and the ever more 
strident pledges of allegiance to Aoun from pro-Syrian 
politicians who remain close to Damascus.  The Ambassador 
emphasized that the USG is not backing personalities in 
Lebanon or taking sides in domestic political battles.  But 
the USG stands firmly behind certain principles -- democracy, 
freedom, independence, sovereignty, reform -- that Aoun's 
allies seem to mock.  Noting Aoun's previous support of the 
Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act 
and UNSCR 1559, the Ambassador commented that, if one has an 
old friend, but that old friend suddenly hangs out only with 
crooks and thieves, one starts to question the honesty of 
one's friend. 
 
AOUN CLAIMS TO BE NUDGING 
THE PRO-SYRIANS T0 PATRIOTISM 
----------------------------- 
 
4.  (S)  Aoun responded that the USG underestimates him.  He, 
too, stands for those principles of democracy and freedom for 
Lebanon and had done so consistently, while the USG still 
indulged Syria's occupation of Lebanon.  "I am not a tool of 
the Syrians," he said, complaining that the March 14 majority 
is too quick to accuse anyone with a different perspective 
with that ugly charge.  It is akin to being described as an 
anti-Semite, he said; how can one fight it without making 
oneself look worse?  Morever, Aoun said, all of the March 14 
leaders had once been in Syria's pocket, which he never was. 
Rafiq Hariri was a tool of the Syrians.  Aoun maintained his 
independence scrupulously, but the March 14 crowd is trying 
to rewrite history. 
 
 
BEIRUT 00001339  002 OF 004 
 
 
5.  (S)  The Ambassador responded that accepting the 
endorsements of Suleiman Franjieh, Talal Arslan, Elie Ferzli, 
Assem Qanso, Wiam Wihab, Abdulrahim Murad, Omar Karami, and 
other pro-Syrians -- people who have not yet made the break 
with Damascus -- was hardly the best way to refute the 
pro-Syrian charges.  The Ambassador noted that he himself 
wondered why such figures, all of whom oppose international 
efforts to support Lebanese freedom and democracy, are so 
eager for an Aoun presidency.  Their comfort levels with Aoun 
give many people pause. 
 
6.  (S)  Aoun said that, with the exception of Wihab 
("definitely a Syrian agent, a gangster"), all of the others 
were, under Aoun's leadership, becoming Lebanese patriots. 
They will use their connections with Syria to help Lebanon, 
not to help themselves as the March 14 crowd had done with 
their own previously active Syrian ties.  The pro-Syrians are 
part of the Lebanese political scene.  Some of them, like 
Karami and Franjieh, have legitimate following.  They cannot 
simply be thrown out with the trash, as March 14 would like. 
Discarding them will backfire in a country with divisions as 
sharp as those in Lebanon.  Ignoring them could lead to civil 
war.  Instead of questioning his motives in accepting 
endorsements from the pro-Syrians, Aoun said, the USG should 
recognize that he alone is making these people more Lebanese 
in approach and harnassing their connections for Lebanon. 
 
AOUN CLAIMS TO "PACIFY" HIZBALLAH 
--------------------------------- 
 
7.  (S)  The Ambassador turned to Hizballah, acknowledging 
that this is a topic that he had discussed with Aoun before. 
Noting the release of the 2005 Country Reports on Terrorism, 
the Ambassador noted in some detail Hizballah's arms inside 
Lebanon, its ability to bring Lebanon into war with Israel, 
its support for Palestinian and Iraqi violence, and its 
global reach.  Hizballah's criminal activities, including 
drug smuggling and money laundering, stand in stark contrast 
to Aoun's calls for an end to corruption.  The USG remains 
opposed to Aoun's written understanding with Nasrallah and 
still wonder how Aoun could have been willing to provide 
cover to a criminal, terrorist organization that is so 
dangerous. 
 
8.  (S)  Aoun responded by stressing two different themes. 
First, he said, the USG was hypocritical, criticizing him 
while accepting the March 14 informal alliance with Hizballah 
during the 2005 legislative elections.  The Ambassador noted 
that, just as we objected to Aoun's written document, we have 
vigorously opposed some of Hariri and Prime Minister Fouad 
Siniora's proposals vis-a-vis Hizballah.  Aoun then noted 
that the Blue Line, while subject to "almost daily" Israeli 
violations, has been quiet from the Lebanese side in 2006. 
Hizballah's restraint, he said, is due entirely to the 
written understanding with Aoun.  As Hizballah needs Aoun 
more than Aoun needs Hizballah, Aoun is able to exercise 
control over Hizballah's activities, control for which the 
USG should be grateful. 
 
9.  (S)  When the Ambassador asked whether the National 
Dialogue might account for the lack of Hizballah attacks 
along the Blue Line, Aoun took credit for the Dialogue as 
well, claiming that he proposed it first.  The Ambassador 
noted that Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah had 
made some particularly alarming statements lately, hinting at 
using kidnapping to release Lebanese detainees from Israeli 
prisons and freely admitting that Hizballah supports 
Palestinian terrorist organizations.  Aoun dismissed 
Nasrallah's rhetoric as unimportant. 
 
10.  (S)  What is happening on the ground, Aoun said, is more 
important than Nasrallah's words.  And what is happening is 
"pacification" (a word he returned to frequently) of 
Hizballah.  The U.S. insistence on Hizballah disarmament will 
never come about by force, Aoun insisted, and any 
international military strikes will just make it harder to 
disarm Hizballah.  So, for lack of anything better, the USG 
should support and be thankful for Aoun's pacification 
efforts, which are already bearing fruit.  In terms of 
property distribution, Aoun said, the Christians and Shia 
together have 80 percent of the Lebanese territory, including 
sensitive border areas with Israel and Syria.  "Pacification" 
will mean that those areas will stay quiet.  Asked by the 
Ambassador what his long-term vision was for Hizballah, Aoun 
said that Hizballah's weapons must be brought into a national 
defense strategy and put under the control of national 
forces.  He did not comment on Hizballah's international 
 
BEIRUT 00001339  003 OF 004 
 
 
activities, describing them as "rumors." 
 
AOUN WANTS SINIORA TO QUIT 
-------------------------- 
 
11.  (S)  The Ambassador asked Aoun why he so bitterly 
attacked Prime Minister Siniora, when it seemed as though 
Lebanon should embrace the fact that there is a secular Sunni 
leadership in Lebanon that has broad international support 
that Lebanon needs.  Aoun -- displaying anger and impatience 
for the first time in the conversation -- described Siniora 
as a failure.  He was a failure as finance minister under 
Rafiq Hariri, and Lebanon now suffers under a crushing debt 
burden because of Siniora.  The corruption that Siniora now 
claims to want to fight took root under Siniora's nose, and 
Siniora's masters benefitted.  He has also proven to be a 
failure as a politician.  It is time for him to go.  The 
Ambassador asked whether the rumors were true that Aoun would 
use the street in an attempt to topple Siniora's cabinet. 
Aoun said that he hoped Siniora would soon resign.  But, if 
he did not, the situation was becoming "desperate."  Who 
knows, Aoun asked, what desperate people might do.  Aoun did 
not answer when the Ambassador asked who might do better than 
Siniora in the current environment. 
 
AOUN DISMISSES SINIORA'S REFORM PLAN 
AS FLAWED; REFUSES TO CONSIDER TAX HIKES 
---------------------------------------- 
 
12.  (S)  The social and economic situation in Lebanon is 
"becoming unbearable," Aoun continued.  Siniora and his 
cabinet are to blame for ignoring the fact that salaries 
don't cover basic expenses, that the systems of education and 
medical care are crumbling, and that Lebanon's youth emigrate 
rather than face certain unemployment at home.  The 
Ambassador noted that Siniora's reform plan, the outlnies of 
which have IMF and international support, aims to address the 
structural deficiencies that cause the problems Aoun 
described. 
 
13.  (S)  Aoun disagreed:  Siniora's plan is a disaster, full 
of failed ideas that Lebanon just barely avoided implementing 
after Paris II.  Taking the steps Siniora proposes would 
worsen, not improve, people's lives.  Aoun pledged to use his 
supporters to bloc Siniora's reform plan.  The Ambassador 
urged Aoun to look more carefully at what Siniora was 
suggesting, which strikes us as a good start.  Aoun noted 
that Siniora had sent Minister of Economy and Trade Sami 
Haddad and Minister of Finance Jihad Azour to see him a few 
days earlier to go through the plan.  Haddad and Azour struck 
Aoun as well-intentioned but as extremely naive when it comes 
to politics.  The Lebanese will fight rather than accept new 
taxes, Aoun vowed.  The government should focus first on 
stopping corruption and providing help to those in need. 
Aoun noted his deep opposition to privatization plans in the 
telecom sector, arguing that the GOL needs the revenues.  The 
Ambassador tried to counter that the private sector could 
bring better service to Lebanon at lower prices, but Aoun 
expressed his conviction that privatization was designed so 
that March 14 politicians could profit. 
 
AOUN DOUBTFUL ABOUT RECONCILIATION 
WITH MARCH 14 COALITION 
---------------------------------- 
 
14.  (S)  In closing, the Ambassador noted that the 
principles Aoun espouses -- freedom, democracy, independence, 
etc. -- were the same ones that the March 14 movement 
support.  They coincide with international hopes for Lebanon. 
 The only people who seem to reject those principles are 
Hizballah and the pro-Syrian Lebanese now allied with Aoun. 
The Ambassador asked whether, given the shared principles, 
Aoun could envision any reconciliation with the March 14 
coalition.  Aoun briefly described March 14 leaders, giving a 
somewhat more favorable than usual description of Jumblatt 
but dismissing Hariri ("a Wahabi dictator"), Samir Ja'ja' ("a 
criminal"), and "all the other Christian midgets."  He spent 
considerable time outlining Hariri's alleged sins, accusing 
him of being a stalking horse for those who wish to 
marginalize Lebanon's Christians. 
 
15.  (S)  The basic problem with March 14, Aoun said, is the 
refusal to share power.  March 14 politicians insist on a 
monopoly, and Lebanon cannot be run by a monopoly.  They are 
"dictators" who "refuse to share power."  Aoun cannnot work 
with such dictators, and he will increase his criticism in 
coming weeks.  After all, if they wanted to reconcile with 
 
BEIRUT 00001339  004 OF 004 
 
 
Aoun, they could bring him and his bloc into the cabinet. 
The Ambassador noted that the March 14 bloc has toyed with 
that very idea, but they worry that Aoun would insist on all 
twelve of the Christian cabinet seats, with Amal and 
Hizballah taking the five Shia seats.  This would leave March 
14 with only seven out of 24 cabinet seats -- the Sunnis and 
Druse -- not even enough for a blocking minority.  "What's 
wrong with that?" Aoun asked, noting that his Christian 
support should give him the right to pick the Christian 
cabinet ministers.  What is important for Lebanon to move 
forward, Aoun insisted, is a national unity government.  And 
the only thing standing in the way of that is the March 14 
coalition's insistence on maintaining a monopoly of power. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
16.  (S)  With 20-20 hindsight, it is easy to argue that 
Siniora made a mistake in July 2005 in leaving Aoun and his 
and bloc -- alone among all parliamentary factions -- out of 
his cabinet.  Left outside the government, Aoun has no 
incentive to see Siniora and cabinet succeed.  Yet it is not 
as though inclusion in the cabinet has made the five 
Hizballah and Amal ministers enthusiastic supporters of 
Siniora:  as the December-January Shia walk-out showed, 
inclusion in the cabinet does not mean someone is an ally. 
Whatever a national unity cabinet might have been able to do 
in 2005, bringing Aoun into the cabinet now will be more 
difficult than it would have been last summer.  We are 
certain that Aoun's request for half the cabinet seats is 
simply an opening gambit, but, in any cabinet reshuffle, he 
and his allies will demand more than the one-third portion (8 
portfolios) that Amal, Hizballah, and President Lahoud 
accepted as their collective share in July 2005.  In 
Lebanon's confessional system, the cabinet acts like a 
mini-parliament, and most decisions of national importance 
require a two-thirds majority.  If Amal, Hizballah, Aoun, and 
Lahoud had even nine rather than eight ministers, they could 
prevent a cabinet that is otherwise dominated by March 14 
ministers from taking any significant decisions.  If Aoun 
could be persuaded to vote with the March 14 ministers, then 
the balance changes.  We still hope to persuade Aoun to move 
away from his more unsavory allies and to find an exit for 
Lebanon from its current political gridlock.  But, based on 
this meeting with Aoun, we do not envision easy or quick 
construction of the bridges we hope to build between Aoun and 
the March 14 coalition. 
FELTMAN