This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/SPG, D, INR, DRL, PRM, DARFUR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SU NI DARFUR
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT SIGNED AFTER INTENSIVE 
NEGOTIATIONS 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary: The Government of Sudan and Sudan 
Liberation Movement (SLM) faction leader Minni Minnawi signed 
the Darfur Peace Agreement on May 5 following days of 
intensive negotiations led by the U.S. and U.K.  During a 
final all-night, early morning session led by Nigerian 
President Olusegun Obasanjo, SLM faction leader Minni Minnawi 
overcame dissent among his commanders and personal tragedy, 
to sign the deal.  Faction leader Abdelwahid Nur and Justice 
and Equality Movement leader Dr. Khalil Ibrahim refused to 
sign, citing various powersharing issues.  In the final 
moments, a group of non-Fur Abdelwahid faction members broke 
ranks to sign the document.  In the days following the 
signature, Obasanjo and members of the international 
community tried fruitlessly to convince Abdelwahid to join 
the agreement.  The African Union will leave the document 
open for signature until May 15.  International partners are 
debating the utility of working with Abdelwahid or finding 
another Fur leader to become party to the agreement. 
Implementation of the agreement will be crucial to instill 
confidence in the peace process.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON SECURITY AND POWERSHARING 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Deputy Secretary Zoellick and A/S for African 
Affairs Jendayi Frazer led USDEL in four days of intensive 
discussions with the parties on security and powersharing 
issues.   USDEL tackled the task of closing the remaining 
gaps between the parties on disarmament of the janjaweed and 
integration of the movements forces into the Sudanese armed 
forced.  U.K. Minister of State for International Cooperation 
Hillary Benn worked on strengthening the position of Senior 
Special Assistant and the regional authority in an effort to 
persuade the movements to sign on.  Zoellick and Benn met 
with the African Union mediation and the parties continuously 
from May 2 to 4, listening to their concerns and drafting 
additional language for the AU Mediation Draft Peace 
Agreement. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The targeted discussions built upon US-facilitated 
bilateral meetings between Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) 
faction leader Minni Minnawi and the Government of Sudan over 
the sequencing and conditionality of the disarmament of the 
janjaweed and the assembly of movement forces.  In addition, 
USDEL had facilitated discussions between the two parties on 
the integration of movement forces into the Sudanese Armed 
Forces and police as well as offering education and training 
for others.  On powersharing, the U.S.-U.K. team developed 
provisions to strengthen the position of Senior Special 
Assistant by explicitly spelling out that this person is the 
Chairman of the new regional authority and would have control 
over key nominations and significant leverage in cases of 
disagreement with state governors. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
THRILLA AT THE VILLA 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The final stage of the negotiations featured an 
all-night high drama at times resembling an episode of 
"Survivor" beginning on May 4 and ending at 8:00 p.m. May 5 
at the presidential villa, led by Nigerian President Olusegun 
Obasanjo, African Union President Sassou Nguesso, and AU 
Chairman Alpha Konare.  Each party was brought in separately 
to state their positions.  First up was SLM's Minnawi 
faction.  Minni had told Deputy Secretary Zoellick earlier 
that he could accept the agreement.  However, he changed his 
position at the heads of state meeting, putting forward 
additional demands on powersharing from the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM).  Obasanjo and USDEL asked him to 
reconsider his position and gave him time to consult with his 
politicos and commanders after chastising him for breaking 
his word. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Next up, SLM's Abdelwahid Nur, listened intently 
to a letter to him from President Bush, and then refused to 
sign because the document did not give Darfur a Vice 
Presidency or immediately make it a region.  He, too, was 
sent off to reconsider his decision, but only after Obasanjo 
reminded him that Nigerian peacekeepers died at the hands of 
his troops and the President also accused him of personal 
betrayal.  USDEL reminded Abdelwahid of the consequences of 
impeding the peace process while others asked him if he 
wanted to be compared to Foday Sankoh or Jonas Savimbi.  JEM 
was the third party to face the heads of state.  Dr. Khalil 
Ibrahim restated maximalist demands including some on 
compensation that demonstrated a lack of familiarity with the 
agreement.  In addition, he insulted Obasanjo personally.  In 
a moment of high drama, Obasanjo asked Khalil who he thought 
he was and told Khalil that his disrespect for his elders and 
authority indicated that he was "neither well-born or 
well-bred".  Obasanjo then unceremoniously kicked JEM out of 
the villa.  The session broke up at 5:00 a.m. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Upon resumption four hours later, SLM faction 
leader Minni Minnawi gave Obasanjo the needed breakthrough 
when he accepted the agreement with reservations.  Minni said 
the reservations could be dealt with during the 
implementation of the agreement.  Minnawi also asked for time 
to meet with the head of the Sudanese Government delegation 
Magzoub Kaliffa and again brief his commanders prior to 
signature.  Minnawi had just heard about the death of his 
brother allegedly at the hands of the janjaweed near Khor 
Abeche that morning. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Finally, Obasanjo brought in the Government of 
Sudan delegation and told it that one of the movements had 
agreed to sign.  The Government of Sudan expressed its 
concerns but accepted the document with the US-UK negotiated 
changes.   Pleased with the turn of events, Obasanjo relayed 
a story about how monkeys rub both ends of a banana in the 
dirt to prevent other monkeys from taking it back.  He told 
the parties they could not take back their consent to the 
agreement. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Obasanjo continued to work on Abdelwahid while the 
signing ceremony was being arranged.  Obasanjo held two other 
meetings with him as did international partners, but to no 
avail with Abdelwahid changing his "concerns" from region, 
vice-presidency, compensation, to security issues. 
Abdelwahid also appeared at the signing ceremony but was 
personally asked to leave by Obasanjo after the President 
determined that he did not intend to sign.  A group of 
non-Fur Abdelwahid members, led by Abderahmane Moussa, broke 
ranks and entered the signing ceremony, adding to the day's 
drama.  (Note:  Moussa has now been invited to the E.U. and 
the upcoming African Union Peace and Security Council 
Meeting.  End note.) 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
COMINGS AND GOINGS 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  The Government of Sudan delegation departed Abuja 
on May 8.  The rebel movements will be transported via UN 
aircraft to Sudan on May 10. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  The final Darfur Peace Agreement represents the 
best effort of the African Union mediation and international 
community to meet the demands of the factious rebel 
movements, which consistently demonstrated poor negotiating 
skills and refused to back away from their maximalist 
positions for five months.  The U.S.-U.K. effort strengthened 
the agreement in favor of the movements demands, particularly 
on powersharing.  SLM faction leader Minni Minnawi showed 
genuine leadership as he accepted the DPA in the face of 
concerns from his field commanders.  He has already begun 
talking to the SPLM about political party development. 
Abdelwahid Nur lost a significant opportunity to prove 
himself a leader by allowing bad advice and his own inflated 
sense of self-worth get in the way of an important step 
forward for the people of Darfur.  Most observers want the 
Fur to be party to the agreement, but wonder whether 
Abdelwahid is the right person to pursue at this juncture. 
Justice and Equality Movement proved it was not interested in 
peace and can be expected to continue its spoiler role, most 
likely from Chad.  For its part, the GOS delegation wants 
non-Zaghawa buy-in to the agreement and will make some good 
faith steps toward implementation of the agreement.  The 
international community will need to keep pressure on the GOS 
and Minnawi faction, as well as the non-signatories, to abide 
by the accord in order to ensure the implementation necessary 
to build the confidence that a peaceful Darfur is a genuine 
possibility. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  This cable was not cleared by the Deputy 
Secretary or A/S Frazer prior to departure. 
 
SIPDIS 
CAMPBELL